House of Commons - Policing Process of Home Office Leaks Inquiry

Policing Process of Home Office Leaks Inquiry - Home Affairs Committee Contents

3 The Police Investigation

Arrest of Mr Galley

19. Within about three weeks of receiving the request from the Cabinet Office, the Metropolitan Police had decided there was sufficient information to launch an investigation, a senior investigating officer had been appointed and terms of reference for the investigation had been agreed with Cabinet Office officials. Following normal practice, the investigating officers were also consulting special case work lawyers within the Crown Prosecution Service on the inquiry, though the police were ultimately responsible for all operational decisions.[26]

20. By 19 November the police had gathered enough evidence to arrest Mr Christopher Galley for questioning. Assistant Commissioner Quick had played no active role in the investigation since setting up the scoping exercise, though he had briefed the then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Ian Blair, on the potential for a police inquiry and had been kept informed of progress. This changed when a deputy assistant commissioner phoned AC Quick on 20 November to discuss the arrest of Mr Galley and the fact that a senior Member of Parliament was believed to be implicated in the leaks.[27] The two police officers agreed that, because of the political sensitivities, they should proceed with great caution from that moment on: "we would not pursue what would be the ordinary course of police action in those circumstances and in effect we would slow things down and seek advice, in particular legal advice."[28] AC Quick explained that the reasons for proceeding cautiously with the investigation into Mr Green were concerns about Parliamentary privilege and the police's "rights and powers as investigators in relation to the Parliamentary estate", as well as general political sensitivity and the need for consultation within the police force and for legal advice as to how best to proceed.[29]

Investigation into Mr Green

21. AC Quick told us: "I believe on that very day [20 November] an officer was deployed to the Palace of Westminster to start a conversation, initially through the intermediary of the chief superintendent at the palace in charge of policing, with the parliamentary authorities about a potential police investigation/operation."[30] This appears to have been the first contact with anyone outside the police and CPS about Mr Green.[31]

22. We asked about the police's preparations for carrying out a search of Mr Green's offices and home, and in particular why the police applied for warrants for his home and offices outside Westminster but not for his office inside Parliament.[32] AC Quick referred to the provisions of section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended, which provides, in effect, that a Justice of the Peace may not issue a search warrant under section 8 unless:

a) it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises.

b) it is practicable to communicate with a person entitled to grant entry to the premises but it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the evidence.

c) entry to the premises will not be granted unless a warrant is produced.

Assistant Commissioner Quick's letter of 3 December 2008 to the Home Secretary said: "As there was no basis for submitting to a JP that it was believed that consent would be refused, it was considered that it was not open to a constable to make an application."[33]

23. Three police officers went by appointment to the House of Commons at 3 pm on 26 November. They met the Serjeant at Arms and the chief superintendent in charge of the policing of the Palace of Westminster.[34] According to the Speaker's Statement to the House on 3 December, the police did not explain to the Serjeant at Arms that she was not obliged to consent to the search, or that a warrant could have been insisted upon.[35] AC Quick told us that his officers held a "protracted conversation" with the Serjeant explaining the provisions of section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (ie that a warrant was needed only if consent were refused), and that the police had applied for warrants to search three other premises.[36] At this stage the Member concerned had not been named. The police arranged to return on the following morning. They understood that in the meantime the Serjeant intended to seek advice.[37] On the morning of 27 November, the police returned to the Palace, and at this point they told the Serjeant that the Member in question was Mr Green. The Serjeant signed the consent form.[38]

24. The aspects of this affair bearing on Parliamentary privilege are not for us to explore. We note, however, that from the outset of the investigation into Mr Green the police were aware of the political sensitivity of the inquiry and were anxious to adopt a cautious approach, including trying to make preliminary contacts with Parliamentary authorities immediately Mr Green's potential involvement in the case became apparent. It is very regrettable that there should have been any misunderstanding over the issue of consent to search Parliamentary premises, but, in seeking consent before applying for a warrant, the police were following the procedure set down in statute.

25. The Speaker has subsequently issued a Protocol stating: "In future a warrant will always be required for a search of a Member's office or access to a Member's parliamentary papers including his electronic records and any such warrant will be referred to me for my personal decision." The Speaker's Protocol goes on to detail the procedures to be followed when the police indicate any intention of seeking a warrant to search Parliamentary premises, and during the conduct of any search. We hope that this Protocol will help the police to determine the right process to follow in future.

26. The House has referred aspects of this case to the Speaker's Committee on the Search of Offices on the Parliamentary Estate. However, the Committee has still not met, and there are no signs it will do so in the immediate future. The House has not had an opportunity to decide whether the matter should be referred to its Committee on Standards and Privileges. In the special circumstances of this case, we urge the Government to table a motion that would allow the House to decide whether to refer this matter to the Committee on Standards and Privileges.

27. The police's decision to undertake the operation "in the most discreet way"[39] possible manifested itself in a number of other ways. They considered that, because of the political sensitivity, they ought to alert a number of key people to the operation (the Cabinet Office, Sir David Normington, the Chairman of the Metropolitan Police Authority and the Leader of the Opposition). Although they thought they already had enough evidence to arrest Mr Green, they took a deliberate decision that they would tell these people only about the search operation and not about the intended arrest—and, indeed, for the first few hours of the operation they did not reveal the name of the Member of Parliament involved. Moreover, they decided not to undertake an early morning arrest, despite the fact that this is the time when a suspect is most likely to be found easily.[40]

28. Unfortunately, the cautious approach went wrong from the start as Mr Green was not at home when the police arrived to arrest him. After some fruitless inquiries, AC Quick sought the assistance of the Leader of the Opposition, Rt Hon David Cameron MP, to find Mr Green, though without—at that stage—revealing that the intention was to arrest Mr Green.[41] The determination to keep a number of people informed about the operation also complicated it. AC Quick admitted: "I think that our attempts to soften the impact of our operational decisions made the operation more unwieldy than it might otherwise have been."[42]

29. We have attempted to discover all the contacts made between the key players (the police, CPS, Government officials and Ministers, Mr Cameron, the Chairman of the Metropolitan Police Authority) after Mr Galley's arrest and in particular on 27 November 2008. Our findings are set out in the timeline below.

TIMELINE ACCORDING TO ALL EVIDENCE RECEIVED

Thursday 20 November 2008
Time and method of contact	Who initiated contact		Who was contacted		Purpose of contact		Evidence reference
Telephone	DAC McDowell, Metropolitan Police Specialist Operations Unit		AC Quick		Discussion on impact of Mr Galley's arrest. Agreement to proceed with caution in respect of Mr Green		Qq 236-238
'deployed to Palace of Westminster'	DC Walker, Metropolitan Police Specialist Operations Unit		Chief Superintendent of police at Palace of Westminster		DC Walker deployed to start a conversation with the Parliamentary authorities about a potential police operation		Qq 238-239
Wednesday 26 November 2008
Time and method of contact	Who initiated contact		Who was contacted		Purpose of contact		Evidence reference
3.30 pm by appointment at Palace of Westminster	Three Metropolitan Police Specialist Operations Unit officers including senior investigating officer		Serjeant at Arms		Police briefed Serjeant about a possible arrest of an MP and sought consent to search Parliamentary offices. It was agreed that the officers would return the following morning		Qq 240-244, 288, 312 & 318
Thursday 27 November 2008
Time and method of contact	Who initiated contact	Who was contacted		Purpose of contact		Evidence reference
Shortly before 10am in margins of MPA meeting	Sir Paul Stephenson	Mr Boris Johnson (Chairman of MPA)		Mr Johnson was informed a potentially controversial operation was underway; he inquired what it was about and was not told. He was unaware at this time that it involved Mr Damian Green MP. Mr Johnson was told the offices of an MP were to be searched.		Qq 159-163 (Mr Johnson) Qq 266-267 & 323 (AC Quick)
13.05 (telephone)	AC Quick	Mr David Cameron		Mr Cameron not available. AC Quick left message with Chief of Staff asking Mr Cameron to ring him		Qq 252-253 (AC Quick)

Time and method of contact Who initiated contact Who was contacted Purpose of contact Evidence reference

13.07 (telephone) Mr Cameron AC Quick AC Quick said that a search operation was underway and asked for Mr Cameron's help in locating Mr Green Qq 255-257 (AC Quick)

Lunchtime - 1pm approx (telephone)

13.14 (telephone)
Sir Paul Stephenson Mr Johnson's staff Informed that Mr Green was about to be arrested in connection with a leaks inquiry.

Mr Johnson not available: Sir Paul left message with Mayor's PA asking him to phone back
Qq 164-168 & 179 (Mr Johnson)

Q 268 (AC Quick)

1.10pm approx from train platform (telephone)

13.19 (telephone)
Mr Johnson Sir Paul Stephenson To establish the facts about the arrest of Mr Green.

Sir Paul said that the police had asked for Mr Cameron's help to locate Mr Green
Qq 170-172 & 175-177 (Mr Johnson)

Qq 269-271 & 323 (AC Quick)

About 13.30 (telephone) Metropolitan Police Sir David Normington Sir David in a meeting. Police asked him to phone back. Qq 70-71 (Sir David)

13.36 (telephone) Mr Johnson Sir Paul Stephenson Mr Johnson sought further details about the operation Q 323 (AC Quick)

13.36 (telephone) AC Quick Director of Security and Intelligence, Cabinet Office Cabinet Office informed search operation about to take place Q 261 (AC Quick)

13.37 Mr Damian Green arrested in Kent but this news not passed on immediately to AC Quick and others (Q 290)

13.39 (telephone)

About 13.45 (telephone)
Sir David Normington AC Quick Home Office informed search operation about to take place

Sir David Informed that the Met were going to search the offices and homes of a Conservative Front Bench Spokesman. He asked which MP and was told that it was Mr Green.
Q 262 (AC Quick)

Qq 61-63 &71-74 (Sir David)

Time and method of contact Who initiated contact Who was contacted Purpose of contact Evidence reference

(Sir David was told that at about this time AC Quick also informed Messrs Johnson & Cameron, Cabinet Office & the Speaker of the proposed search) Qq 97 & 115-117

13.43 (telephone) AC Quick Sir Ian Blair Sir Ian informed search operation about to take place Q 262 (AC Quick)

13.46 (telephone) AC Quick Serjeant at Arms Serjeant not there, but AC Quick left message to ask whether there were any problems regarding the forth-coming search Q 262 (AC Quick)

13.46 (telephone) AC Quick CPS CPS informed search operation about to take place Q 263 (AC Quick)

13.50 In person Sir David Normington Home Secretary's Private Office Informed Private Secretary that Mr Green's offices were to be searched. Qq 84-87 (Sir David)

13.51(telephone) AC Quick Chief Constable of Kent Kent Police informed of Met operation taking place in their area Q 263 (AC Quick)

"Lunchtime" (telephone) Mr Cameron 'I had a brief conversation with David Cameron at about lunchtime after both of us had been informed by the police of the case.' Mr Johnson's letter to Chairman of 4 February

13.59 (telephone) Mr Johnson Brief conversation Mr Johnson's letters of 10 and 25 February

Exact Time not known (telephone) Serjeant at Arms or her staff Metropolitan Police To report there were 'no concerns' over the proposed search of Mr Green's office in the House Qq 262 and 318 (AC Quick)

About 14.00 Searches of Mr Green's offices and home started

14.19 (telephone) DAC Dick Mr Cameron's office Asked Mr Cameron to contact her Qq 297-298 (AC Quick)

Time and method of contact Who initiated contact Who was contacted Purpose of contact Evidence reference

14.20 (telephone) Mr Cameron DAC Dick Mr Cameron informed of Mr Green's arrest and searches in progress Qq 298-299 (AC Quick)

14.20 (telephone) Home Secretary's Private Office Home Secretary (in Brussels) Informed that the offices of Mr Green were to be searched Qq 88-90 (Sir David)

14.28 (telephone) DAC Dick Sir Paul Stephenson Informed of Mr Green's arrest Q 300(AC Quick)

'About 2.25 pm' (telephone)

14.30 (telephone)
Metropolitan Police

DAC Dick
Sir David Normington

Sir David Normington's office
Informed that Mr Green had been arrested Qq 90-92 (Sir David)

Q 300 (AC Quick)

14.33 (telephone) DAC Dick Cabinet Office and Cabinet Secretary Informed that Mr Green had been arrested Q 300 and Cabinet Secretary's letter to Chairman of 26 March 2009

14.36 (telephone) DAC Dick CPS Informed that Mr Green had been arrested Q 300 (AC Quick)

14.39 (telephone) Mr Chris Wright, Cabinet Office DAC Dick Returned DAC Dick's call to ask for some more detail Q 300 (AC Quick)

About 14.30 (telephone) Cabinet Secretary Sir David Normington To inform Sir David that Cabinet Office had also been told of the arrest. Agreed that the Home Secretary and Prime Minister should be informed as soon as possible. Q 94 (Sir David)

Before 15.00 from City Hall (telephone) Mr Johnson Sir Paul Stephenson To establish the facts of the arrest. Qq 172-177 (Mr Johnson)

About 15.00 (telephone) Home Secretary's Private Office Home Secretary Informed that Mr Green had been arrested Q 95 (Sir David)

About 15.00 (telephone) Cabinet Office Prime Minister Informed that Mr Green had been arrested Q 96 (Sir David)

Just before 15.00, in person, in Southwark Cathedral Mr Johnson Mr Cameron May have had a very brief conversation regarding the arrest, no substance. Qq 201-205 (Mr Johnson)

Just before 15.00, in person, in Southwark C Mr Johnson Sir Paul Stephenson Confirmed that Mr Green had been arrested Q 179 (Mr Johnson)

Time and method of contact Who initiated contact Who was contacted Purpose of contact Evidence reference

About 16.30 Mr Kit Malthouse, Deputy Mayor for Policing Told that Mr Green's offices were being searched and Mr Green had been arrested Mr Malthouse's letter to Chairman of 30 March 2009

Later that day Mr Liam Byrne MP, Minister for the Cabinet Office, became aware of the operation involving Mr Green and Mr Green's arrest from the media coverage Minister's letter to Chairman of 25 Feb 2009

Later that day Cabinet Secretary discussed the police operation with Mr Byrne Cabinet Secretary's letter to Chairman of 26 March 2009

Monday 1 December 2008

Time and method of contact Who initiated contact Who was contacted Purpose of contact Evidence reference

About 6 pm by mobile phone Mr Green Mr Johnson In response to text message from Mayor's office sent on evening of Sunday 30 November. Discussed facts of the arrest. Qq 181-189 (Mr Johnson)

30. We understand the anxiety of the Metropolitan Police to ensure that those likely to be caught up in any political storm were kept informed about the operation so that it did not come as a complete surprise to them. Indeed, the political ramifications of the inquiry are highlighted by the fact that several of them reacted with shock and concern when told that the suspect was Mr Green—expressing the hope that the police had evidence to substantiate the charge or warning the police that this was explosive news.[43] However, in such circumstances all decisions made—who was informed, when, and of precisely what—may be, and have been in this case, subject to question and interpretation as interested parties probe to see whether anyone could have influenced or hindered the police operation. We recommend the adoption by the police of a protocol setting out the exceptional circumstances in which a politician would be informed of any police operation while it was underway.

Scale of the police operation

31. A police operation involving the search of four premises and the sifting of a considerable amount of material seized is bound to involve a number of officers. AC Quick told us that the main investigation team comprised 15 officers and staff, who from time to time were assisted by specialist units. The strategy to be used by this team was considered by a senior command team, and there was a Gold Group, comprising officers at ACPO level as well as the investigation team, and chaired by AC Quick.[44] Although none of the officers and staff was working on this inquiry full time, the involvement of so many officers and, in particular, the heavy involvement of so many high-ranking officers in disseminating information on 27 November caused us some concern. Presumably, the presence of DACs and others was deemed necessary because of the political sensitivity of the operation. This is another reason why it would be sensible not to keep politicians informed during police operations.

32. Because of these concerns and allegations in the press that the police were heavy-handed in the operation,[45]we asked the police whether we could see a copy of the report on the operation made by Mr Ian Johnston, Chief Constable of the British Transport Police, at the instigation of Sir Paul Stephenson. Mr Johnston referred us to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, who declined to give us the report. We believe it would be useful to publish the Johnston report as soon as practicable so that lessons may be drawn from this case more widely.

Role of the Chairman of the Metropolitan Police Authority

33. As can be seen from the timeline, the Chairman of the Metropolitan Police Authority, Mr Boris Johnson, was the first person outside the police, CPS and House authorities to be alerted to the fact that the police were conducting an operation involving a Member of Parliament. Mr Johnson had several conversations with the police and others during the course of 27 November, and shortly after Mr Green's arrest became known he issued a public statement declaring his concern about the police operation. We were aware that his conduct was being investigated by the relevant sub-committee of the Metropolitan Police Authority and Greater London Assembly, but we decided to question him about his role in this affair.

34. We asked whether it was accepted practice that the Chair of a police authority should be informed of any particularly high-profile operations undertaken by their local force. Both AC Quick and Sir David Normington confirmed that it was.[46] AC Quick said that Mr Johnson had also, as a matter of courtesy, been informed of the intention to arrest Mr Galley earlier in November.[47] However, Mr Johnson had no operational involvement in the investigation.[48]

35. We asked Mr Johnson to whom he had spoken about this police operation and the arrest of Mr Green before it became public knowledge. His answers at first were rather vague, but were clarified in subsequent correspondence. As well as speaking to Sir Paul Stephenson, then Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, on four occasions before 3 pm on 27 November, Mr Johnson also had a conversation with Mr Cameron.[49] In his conversations with Sir Paul, he gave robust expression to his concerns about the investigation of Mr Green.[50] He repeated these concerns in a press statement shortly after.[51]

36. We note that the standards committees of the Greater London Authority and Metropolitan Police Authority found that Mr Johnson had not breached their code of conduct,[52] but some of his actions were unwise,[53] and his motives could have been misinterpreted.

Home Secretary's review

37. The Home Secretary told us that she was minded to instigate a wide-ranging review into the conduct of the leak inquiry once any court cases resulting from it had finished.[54] AC Quick and Mr Johnson welcomed this,[55] and so do we. We consider that the review should cover both the approach to the inquiry within Government and the procedures adopted by the police, and should address all the issues dealt with in this Report.