Conclusions and recommendations
Involvement of Home Office and Cabinet Office
1. We do not condone the unauthorised disclosure of departmental information; this is an abuse by officials of their positions of trust, and we support the use of disciplinary action in such instances. We also understand the corrosive effect that persistent leaking of information has on the efficient working of departments, not least as it sows mistrust between Ministers and officials. The Home Secretary made plain to us her anger at the leaks.
(Paragraph 13)
2. In this case the Home Office appears to have followed best practice for investigating leaks, as set out in the Cabinet Office's Memorandum to our sister Committee. Nevertheless, we are concerned that growing frustration in both the Home Office and the Cabinet Office may have led officials to give an exaggerated impression of the damage done by the leaks that could reasonably be presumed to have emanated from the Home Office.
(Paragraph 13)
3. There is a clear mismatch between Sir David's description of the sort of material that he suspected had been leaked from the Home Office and the Cabinet Office's letter to the police stating "there has been considerable damage to national security already as a result of some of these leaks". Sir David suggested that this phrase reflected the concerns not about the 20-plus items he had identified but about the other material that had been leaked from somewhere in Government.
However, the Cabinet Office letter did not refer to other departments: only to the Home Office.
(Paragraph 14)
4. We recognise that the Metropolitan Police might still have decided to pursue an investigation on the basis of the damage done to confidence between Ministers and officials and the fear that the leaker(s) might have access to more sensitive information that had not yet been disclosed. We also do not know whether the oral briefing given to the police was less hyperbolic than the letter. However, we think it was unhelpful to give the police the impression that the Home Office leaker(s) had already caused considerable damage to national security.
(Paragraph 15)
5. When Parliament revised the Official Secrets Act in 1989, it narrowed the scope of the section on unauthorised disclosure of government information, focusing on specific types of damaging information—relating to security and intelligence, defence, international relations and crime and special investigation powers.
Unauthorised disclosure of these types of information remained subject to criminal proceedings. This was in line with what the then Home Secretary told the House in December 1988 when introducing second reading of the bill, namely that it would "remove the protection of the criminal law from the great bulk of sensitive and important information", none of which would "any longer have the protection of the criminal law".
(Paragraph 16)
6. The Cabinet Office's guidance to departments says that it is appropriate to involve the police in leak investigations when they involve "a serious and damaging impact on the functioning of a Department and … suspicion of leaking sensitive information". However, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which a leak of sensitive information could lead to a damaging impact on the functioning of a Department without falling within the categories laid down in statute. The Cabinet Office's guidance therefore seems to leave open the possibility of involving the police in an investigation without any suspicion—let alone evidence—that a criminal offence under the Act has taken place. We recommend that the Cabinet Office revise its guidance to preclude this possibility.
(Paragraph 17)
7. We
note that the only person arrested for leaking information from
the Home Office was a junior official providing administrative
support, who had security clearance up to the level of 'secret'.
At this stage of the police investigation, it is impossible to
say exactly what information Mr Galley did disclose. He may not
have been responsible for all the 20-plus leaks identified by
Sir David—and, indeed, Sir David said it was not proven
that all those leaks emanated from the Home Office.
This, together with the
fact that there has been no indication so far that Mr Galley is
linked to the "other" national security-related leaks
that have caused such concern to the Cabinet Office over the last
few years, leaves the possibility (to put it no higher) that there
are other officials within government leaking more sensitive information.
We are unable to judge whether the controversy over the investigation
into Mr Galley and Mr Green makes it less likely that those who
have disclosed information damaging to national security will
ever be discovered. (Paragraph 18)
Parliamentary
aspects
8. The aspects of this affair bearing on Parliamentary privilege are not for us to explore. We note, however, that from the outset of the investigation into Mr Green the police were aware of the political sensitivity of the inquiry and were anxious to adopt a cautious approach, including trying to make preliminary contacts with Parliamentary authorities immediately Mr Green's potential involvement in the case became apparent. It is very regrettable that there should have been any misunderstanding over the issue of consent to search Parliamentary premises, but, in seeking consent before applying for a warrant, the police were following the procedure set down in statute.
(Paragraph 24)
9. The Speaker has subsequently issued a Protocol stating: "In future a warrant will always be required for a search of a Member's office or access to a Member's parliamentary papers including his electronic records and any such warrant will be referred to me for my personal decision." The Speaker's Protocol goes on to detail the procedures to be followed when the police indicate any intention of seeking a warrant to search Parliamentary premises, and during the conduct of any search. We hope that this Protocol will help the police to determine the right process to follow in future.
(Paragraph 25)
10. In the special circumstances of this case, we urge the Government to table a motion that would allow the House to decide whether to refer this matter to the Committee on Standards and Privileges.
(Paragraph 26)
Police
Investigation
11. However, in such circumstances all decisions made—who was informed, when, and of precisely what—may be, and have been in this case, subject to question and interpretation as interested parties probe to see whether anyone could have influenced or hindered the police operation. We recommend the adoption by the police of a protocol setting out the exceptional circumstances in which a politician would be informed of any police operation while it was underway.
(Paragraph 30)
12. the involvement of so many officers and, in particular, the heavy involvement of so many high-ranking officers in disseminating information on 27 November caused us some concern. Presumably, the presence of DACs and others was deemed necessary because of the political sensitivity of the operation. This is another reason why it would be sensible not to keep politicians informed during police operations.
(Paragraph 31)
13. we asked the police whether we could see a copy of the report on the operation made by Mr Ian Johnston, Chief Constable of the British Transport Police, at the instigation of Sir Paul Stephenson. Mr Johnston referred us to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, who declined to give us the report. We believe it would be useful to publish the Johnston report as soon as practicable so that lessons may be drawn from this case more widely.
(Paragraph 32)14. We note that the standards committees of the Greater London Authority and Metropolitan Police Authority found that Mr Johnson had not breached their code of conduct, but some of his actions were unwise, and his motives could have been misinterpreted.
(Paragraph 36)
Proposed
review by Home Secretary
15. The Home Secretary told us that she was minded to instigate a wide-ranging review into the conduct of the leak inquiry once any court cases resulting from it had finished. and so do we. We consider that the review should cover both the approach to the inquiry within Government and the procedures adopted by the police, and should address all the issues dealt with in this Report.
(Paragraph 37)
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