Examination of Witnesses (Questions 140-150)
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
ROBERT QUICK
QPM
Q140 Chairman: We will come back
to Olympic security in a bit more detail later.
Mr Quick: You will know that the
Commissioner is currently in South Africa looking at the security
arrangements for the World Cup which will be relevant to our planning.
Q141 Martin Salter: It seems to me
that we clearly have some vulnerable points, any country is going
to have some vulnerable points, and it might be Milford Haven,
it could be the Thames Estuary, the Olympics. Are you constantly
assessing where we are weak in the planning of kind of major terminals,
major transport infrastructure hubs, new airports, new oil refineries
or whatever, and new power stations could be a prime target for
the terrorist network? Do you get involved? The Security Service
and the counter-terrorism services, do they get involved very
early on in the planning and the layout of installations that
could be a future target? Just in the same way as we hopefully
now involve the police in trying to design crime out of estates,
whereas in the 1960s we were very good at designing it in, do
we try to design out terrorism?
Mr Quick: Absolutely, yes. Again,
this has changed enormously in the last couple of decades and
it is still changing. The police, I think, either have just become,
or are about to become, statutory consultees in planning anyway,
so, from the generic crime prevention design advice right the
way through to counter-terrorism advice, we are now at the table
and we are involved at the outset, and where it is a commercial
establishment, whether it be to build a refinery, an office block
or a shopping centre, CTSAs are there at the beginning and the
industry of course engage very enthusiastically with them.
Martin Salter: It is a completely cheeky
question and I have no right to ask it, but cramming even more
activity and even more people into a vulnerable hub like Heathrow
Airport presumably brings with it additional problems in terms
of security and counter-terrorism. Is there a counter-terrorism
argument for not going ahead with the third runway?
Q142 Ms Buck: Nice try!
Mr Quick: I really do not think
I can comment.
Martin Salter: The answer is yes, Mr
Quick!
Q143 Chairman: We have seen at least
a dozen governments involved in Mumbai, maybe more, and I trust
you know more about it than I do by this stage. It is not difficult,
we saw the IRA operating in about 30(?) governments at one stage.
How prepared are we not so much for specific and generic styles
of attack, but for orchestrated, numerous, probably suicidally
inclined individuals, not necessarily carrying bombs, but small
arms and grenades, as we saw in Mumbai? Clearly, the Mumbai attacks,
in my view at least, have ratcheted up the threat. Would you agree?
Mr Quick: I would not agree actually.
I have read the assessments and I think we must be cognisant of
Mumbai. The whole world has witnessed those events and it would
be fair to say that of course we considered an attack of that
nature before Mumbai and we have operating procedures and resources
available to deal with that type of eventuality. Of course, we
have reviewed that and are reviewing, in the aftermath of Mumbai,
what we have learnt, but I would wish to reassure you that we
have got operating procedures and substantial resources in London,
but it was a dreadful incident and dreadfully difficult for the
Indian authorities to respond to.
Q144 Chairman: It is interesting
that you mention London though. So much of what we discuss is
London-centric. Are you as confident about a similar threat that
might develop on the Humber?
Mr Quick: I think big cities have
significant resources and they are all involved in this type of
planning through the counter-terrorism units and through the Protect
strand and the Prepare strand, and this tends to fall more into
the Prepare strand, to make sure that we have got the right plans
and resources to respond to a protracted and perhaps escalating
attack. I think the resources that we have got are generally in
the right place in terms of counter-terrorism resources, and of
course big city forces, like Humberside who have Hull and other
large towns and West Yorkshire, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow,
all have very significant resources to deploy.
Q145 Chairman: Just to press you,
in the event of an incident of this scale happening outside of
London, you are as content, and I appreciate you cannot be fully
content, but you are as content as you can be, given the resources
and the preparations that we have put in place?
Mr Quick: Yes.
Q146 Chairman: Moving on to Olympic
security then, if we may, the Metropolitan Police Service have
had an Olympic Security Directorate for nearly 18 months now.
Do you think it is working well or not, and how has it changed
your approach to the security challenges of 2012?
Mr Quick: I think, if I might
be so bold as to suggest, it may be better to direct the questions
to the OSCT now who of course are responsible for that. I might
just offer the comment from a policing perspective that, in my
role, I am much reassured by recent changes. I think putting the
security planning into the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism
was a wise move because I think there is a substantial resource
base there and a framework within which to conduct security planning
for the Olympics more effectively, so I am reassured by that,
but I am not complacent and I recognise that there is still a
lot of work to be done and still many issues yet to resolve.
Q147 Ms Buck: You may redirect the
question similarly, but just give us an overview of what you would
see as being the main challenges and top priorities in terms of
security preparations for the Olympics from the anti-terrorism
perspective.
Mr Quick: The main challenges
in the first instance are making sure that we have the right level
of resource for what will be an unprecedented endeavour in security
terms in this country and making sure that we get the sequencing
and build of resilience right because clearly we have to start
now building up key elements of resource to make sure that we
have the resilience to run through the 60-plus days of the Olympics
and Paralympics. That is why decisions are now being taken about
where we need to invest money to recruit, train and deploy people
with specialist skills at a level that we ordinarily would not
have to do and these things have a long lead-in time.
Q148 Ms Buck: In terms of the designing
out we spoke about earlier, you are represented adequately in
terms of being able to input into the physical design to look
at vulnerability to make sure all those bases are covered?
Mr Quick: Again, I hope I can
reassure you, I visited the LOCOG offices in probably August of
last year and I had an extensive briefing from my officers who
are deployed to the OSD—the Olympic Security Directorate—who
are expert counter-terrorism security advisors who are directly
at the planning table giving advice about design and, of course,
security during construction which is equally important.
Martin Salter: We have a strange quote
from General Sir David Richards, who is responsible for military
assistance to the civil power. Chairman, which committee was this,
was this the Defence Committee?
Chairman: Yes, the Defence Committee.
Q149 Martin Salter: He told the Defence
Committee he needed: "clarity on what might be required of
the Armed Forces" in relation to 2012, presumably about the
Olympics, which seemed a strange quote from a General. You implied
in your evidence that there was very good liaison between civil
power and military. Do you think there is anything unclear in
that relationship at all or are the military waiting to brief
you as to what you think might be required for 2012?
Mr Quick: That dialogue is going
on. It is difficult for me to answer your specific question because
I think the General's comments were related to what messages he
is receiving from those in charge of the Olympics security planning,
so that is not the police. We play a part in that but do not lead
that at the moment. I think that is a question probably better
directed to the OSCT, if I am honest. However, I would like to
stress that the liaison and relationship between the police and
the military is long-established and very strong. Only this very
week I have had military planners in my office talking about future
development of military capability and how that fits with the
future requirements of police counter-terrorism operations and
there is agreed work underway to review and refresh those protocols
and making sure military capabilities complement police capabilities
and we are not duplicating one another.
Martin Salter: Thank you for that. I
do not think that is germane to our inquiry, frankly.
Q150 Chairman: Mr Quick, we are going
to go into private session now for about ten minutes if you are
content with that. I will call the Committee to order and ask
for the room to be cleared, but with your permission I will keep
Mr Barker and Major General Williams in the room.
Mr Quick: May I ask my staff officer
to remain?
Chairman: Of course.
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