Creating and refining the strategy
21. The Government's counter-terrorism strategy,
known as CONTEST, is divided into four 'strands' or workstreams:
Pursue; Prevent; Protect; and Prepare. The essence of these strands
is defined by the Government as:
- Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks;
- Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or
supporting violent extremism;
- Protect: to strengthen our protection against
terrorist attacks, and
- Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to
mitigate its impact.[7]
22. In March 2008, the Government published the UK's
first National Security Strategy (NSS), subtitled Security
in an interdependent world.[8]
The purpose of the NSS was stated as being "to set out how
we will address and manage this diverse though interconnected
set of security challenges and underlying drivers, both immediately
and in the longer term, to safeguard the nation, its citizens,
our prosperity and our way of life".[9]
23. In the light of the publication of the NSS, the
Government announced its intention to 'refresh' CONTEST to reflect
the changing security situation at home and abroad. Admiral Lord
West of Spithead, appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
and Minister for Security at the Home Office in the summer of
2007, told a homeland security conference in July 2008 that:
Since its inception in 2003, CONTEST has evolved,
in keeping with the changing threat. However, the events of August
2006 [the alleged airline plot] precipitated a recognition by
ministers and professionals alike that we needed to raise our
game, break out of specialist 'silos', avoid being London-centric
and ensure that lessons learned were being incorporated via a
stronger central hub which would manage the development and delivery
of a reinvigorated CONTEST.[10]
24. The new iteration of CONTEST was published in
March 2009.[11] It was
deliberately conceived as a different kind of document from its
predecessor. OSCT stressed to us that it contained as much material
that could be left unclassified as possible; and also included
historical analysis, in order to provide context for readers.[12]
25. One area in which we were keen to see openness
was in recording and publicising the successes of the UK's intelligence
and security agencies. However, Mr Farr explained that the sub
judice convention, by which no public comment is made on cases
awaiting judgement in the courts, was a very serious impediment
to discussing openly the work and successes of OSCT and the intelligence
services. [13] However,
he also conceded that this was an area in which the Government
had underperformed, and expressed a willingness to re-examine
the issue where possible.
26. We were particularly keen to establish how OSCT
measures the success (or otherwise) of CONTEST. The new iteration
of the strategy notes that "for the first time, counter-terrorism
work has a Public Service Agreement (PSA) intended to set targets
and monitor progress […] the PSA is based around nine intended
outcomes across the four main CONTEST workstreams".[14]
We questioned the Director-General of OSCT on this matter, and
he explained the various mechanisms for measuring the success
of CONTEST, highlighting in particular the Prevent strand.
It is difficult to quantify it but I do not think
it is impossible to do it […] I think there are two ways
that you can do it. One is to look at the risk of radicalisation
in certain environments in this country […] secondly, you
can look at attitudes. It is not difficult to look at attitudes
[…] I would be very unhappy, and I know the Treasury would,
if we had a key strand of our counter-terrorism strategy, £100
million or so this year, which we could not measure, and we do
believe we can.[15]
"Prevent"
27. In some ways, the Prevent strand of CONTEST is
the most important, as it aims to strike at the taproot of extremism.
However, Mr Farr was at pains to point out in his evidence to
us that 'prevention'—that is, stopping people from supporting
or embracing violent extremism of whatever kind—is not solely
a function of a counter-terrorism strategy, but in fact must be
regarded as part of a much wider approach to attitudes and attitudinal
change.
This is about promoting the values on which this
society depends, whichever government is in power, and there is
more about that than counter-terrorism […] it can so easily
get lost in the wash.[16]
28. A critical part of the Prevent strand is the
information war. The Research, Information and Communications
Unit (RICU) within OSCT produces strategic communications to analyse
and combat the spread of violent extremism; OSCT also draws on
the resources of the Defence Academy's Advanced Research and Assessment
Group (ARAG).[17] RICU
is a cross-government agency drawing on personnel and resources
from the Home Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the
Ministry of Defence and the Department for Communities and Local
Government, and is responsible for "advising the rest of
government but actually, not just government, officialdom, from
a brigade commander in Helmand province through to a chief constable
in Yorkshire, about how they may wish to characterise the threat
we face".[18] Mr
Farr also acknowledged that radicalisation was the product of
a number of different factors. "We look at radicalisation
under the three headings—political, psychological, behavioural."[19]
29. We welcome the Government's latest iteration
of its counter-terrorism strategy. We believe that, within the
recognised and understandable constraints of security, the maximum
degree of openness is a beneficial factor in the fight against
terrorism. The Government should do all it can to publicise its
successes; while we understand the constraints of sub judice,
we are concerned that the Government is imposing too strict a
self-denying ordinance on itself, and could be more open, albeit
in very general terms, about the extent to which it is winning
the battle against terrorism.
30. We are encouraged by the proactive attitude
of the Government towards the information war, as this is a central
part of countering radicalisation. The work of RICU is of enormous
value and impressed us greatly. The Government should continue
to support the organisation and engage fully in the intellectual
arguments surrounding radicalisation and violent extremism, lest
it be left fighting the symptoms rather than the causes of the
challenges facing the United Kingdom.
31. We note that a decision has been taken to
review the use of powers to stop and search under Section 44 of
the Terrorism Act 2000 for counter-terrorism purposes in the light
of an assessment of their effectiveness and impact on the community.
This demonstrates a welcome flexibility in the Government's approach
to the use of counter-terrorism powers.
3 The US Intelligence Community consists of the following
agencies; the CIA, the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Agency, Army Military Intelligence, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office,
the National Security Agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence,
the Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis, Coast Guard Intelligence, the FBI,
the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, and the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Back
4
Ev 63 Back
5
Q 138 Back
6
www.met.police.uk/so/counter-terrorism Back
7
The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism,
Cm 7547, March 2009, p 11 (hereafter NSS 2009) Back
8
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security
in an interdependent world, Cm 7291, March 2008 Back
9
ibid., p3 Back
10
http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speech-by-lord-west-govnet Back
11
Cm 7547 Back
12
Q 145 Back
13
Q 146 Back
14
NSS 2009, p16 Back
15
Qq 152-53 Back
16
Qq 156-57 Back
17
Q 178 Back
18
Q 128 Back
19
Q 179 Back
