The July 2005 terrorist attacks
36. This vulnerability was shown most starkly in
July 2005, when 56 people (including the four suicide bombers)
died in a coordinated series of bomb attacks on the transport
network (three on the Underground and one on a bus); later that
month there was another concerted attempt on the network with
three bombs placed on Tube trains and a fourth on a bus, none
of which exploded as intended. There were no serious casualties
as a result of this second series of attacks.
37. The bomb attacks on the London transport network
in July 2005 were the deadliest attack on the capital since March
1945, when a German V2 rocket landed in Stepney and killed 131.
TfL's memorandum maintained that its investment and management
of risk allowed it to "withstand and very rapidly recover
from the attacks of 7 July 2005". It pointed to the multi-agency
planning put in place by the Government after the terrorist attacks
on New York and Washington, DC, in September 2001, and to the
training and refreshers received by all TfL staff. "The Underground's
ability on 7 July to evacuate around a quarter of a million people
from the Tube network within an hour, without injury, is testimony
to that, as was the restoration of 85% of services by the following
morning."[22]
38. In 2007, the Prime Minister announced that the
Security Minister, Admiral Lord West of Spithead, would conduct
a review of how the UK protected crowded places, transport infrastructure
and critical national infrastructure from terrorist attack. The
review was not published but the then Home Secretary, the Rt Hon
Jacqui Smith MP, summarised its findings in a written statement
to the House of Commons, to which TfL's memorandum drew attention.
On the subject of transport infrastructure, the Home Secretary
recounted that Lord West had concluded:
The review has acknowledged the effectiveness of
the security programme that has already been implemented across
the transport sector. This focuses on delivering security measures
that help protect the travelling public and transport staff and
facilities from terrorism threats, without impacting disproportionately
on how the industry operates.[23]
39. The London Assembly also conducted an investigation
into the events of 7 July 2005. Its 7 July Review Committee, chaired
by Richard Barnes AM, reported nearly a year later, in June 2006,
and came to some conclusions which were critical of the performance
of TfL. For example, it concluded:
The plans, systems and processes that are intended
to provide a framework for the response to major incidents in
London must be revised and improved. Communications within and
between the emergency services did not stand up on 7 July. As
a result, individual emergency service personnel at the affected
Tube stations and at Tavistock Square could not communicate effectively,
in some cases with each other, and in other cases with their control
rooms.[24]
40. The lack of adequate communications equipment
was considered all the more damning since the need had been identified
after the investigation into the fire at King's Cross Station
in 1988. It was the view of the Committee that "It is unacceptable
that the emergency services, with the exception of the British
Transport Police, are still not able to communicate by radio when
they are underground, 18 years after the official inquiry into
the King's Cross fire recommended action to address this problem."[25]
41. We took evidence from Mr Tim O'Toole, the Managing
Director of London Underground. He accepted that the Underground
network would always be a prime target for terrorism "because
it is such an iconic institution. It is so much a part of this
country's identity that I think in that respect it will never
drop off the radar."[26]
However, he argued that the intensity of the threat was not necessarily
inevitable.
Speaking only for myself, I believe this madness
will burn itself out. It has always done so in the past and we
will confront other things in the future. The only thing that
is different about this madness is the lethality, but I do not
believe suicide is a sustainable business practice.[27]
42. Mr O'Toole also maintained that TfL had responded
well to the attacks of July 2005. He pointed to the evacuation
of 250,000 passengers within an hour on 7 July, and suggested
that this level of efficiency was due to fundamental "competence":
"only by people being trained to follow certain patterns
of behaviour can you rely on the appropriate response".[28]
Mr Nick Agnew, TfL's Safety and Contingency Planning Manager,
reinforced the point. "London did not come to a stop and
the process of recovery brought us back into a position where
we were maintaining the network."[29]
43. However, despite the heroism of many members
of its staff, and the efficiency and orderliness of some parts
of its operation, it is clear that there had been some failings
in TfL's response to the terrorist attacks. A central issue was
the inadequacy of communications. This took two forms. Firstly,
there was a technological issue: in July 2005 there was no comprehensive
and reliable system of underground communication for London Underground
staff and the emergency services. Mr O'Toole concurred that the
British Transport Police
were just using the old, somewhat unreliable system
we [London Underground] have on our stations […] it was replaced
because actually it was a radio system that was in parts all over
the network, it was very unreliable, very spotty and we wanted
to go to a modern system that was expandable.[30]
44. In addition, he acknowledged that there had been
failures to disseminate information properly and consistently
on 7 July 2005. In part due to an inadequate technological solution,
members of staff were not as well informed as they should have
been of what was happening during those fateful minutes and hours;
some were deriving their information only from the news media
and this led to an unacceptable level of confusion. "When
you have drivers in depots who are sitting there waiting to take
their turn and there is a television on reporting something and
they are not getting information directly […] you create
problems for yourself."[31]
45. Another criticism levelled at the Underground
system was inadequate provision of emergency equipment. TfL had
considered extending the provision of such equipment but had concluded
that "emergency equipment on trains will continue to be provided
for staff use only. To publicise its availability to passengers
would be likely to result in theft and misuse."[32]
However, Mr O'Toole argued that the lack of space on most Tube
trains made widespread provision impossible; moreover, he pointed
out, the removal of wooden components from many trains meant that
fires were extremely unlikely on much of the system.[33]
Preparation for the future
46. Given the continuing vulnerability of the Underground
to terrorist attack, we were keen to know what preparations and
planning were being undertaken by TfL, both routinely and in the
light of the attacks, both successful and foiled, of July 2005.
Clearly, one major step forward has been the introduction of the
Airwave underground communication system. Designed to provide
secure digital encrypted network for voice and data transmission,
it is able to operate even in the deepest parts of the Underground
system, some 35 metres below sea level. Airwave 'piggy-backs'
on London Underground's Connect digital radio network and removes
the need for police officers to carry two radios, one for the
surface and one for below-ground. Connect also allows better communications
between control centres, trains, stations and depots. The management
and dissemination of information has also been addressed in the
light of the July 2005 attacks. We heard of a "cascading
of information" to front-line TfL staff in the event of a
future emergency to avoid any response being "slowed by the
indecision of, 'Have I been told everything?'".[34]
47. TfL is also continually engaged in a programme
of exercises, both virtual and 'real time'. These range from drills
involving only London Underground or TfL staff to major exercises
staged with the involvement of a number of agencies. Mr O'Toole
stressed that, perhaps counter-intuitively, live exercises can
be of limited value. He pointed in particular to Exercise Osiris
II, a major multi-agency exercise organised by the London Resilience
Team and staged at Bank Underground Station and University College
Hospital in September 2003.
It is an awful lot of expense for an amount of learning,
from our perspective, that we think we get more effectively through
the table top because we can posit so many different variations
and, thereby, increase people's thinking. It, for us, was largely
not as effective.[35]
48. In addition to these efforts, TfL also maintains
strong relationships with mass transit systems in other parts
of the world. Best practice is widely shared, and there is a committee
of representatives of European mass transit systems which fosters
cooperation and dialogue.[36]
Mr Agnew was particularly complimentary about the measures implemented
by Singapore's Mass Rapid Transit, though he cautioned that it
benefited from much newer infrastructure than London Underground.[37]
49. It is clear to us that the men and women who
work for Transport for London responded admirably and, in many
cases, heroically to the challenges of July 2005. While the loss
of life on 7 July was tragic, we are in no doubt that the actions
of TfL staff prevented the death toll from being significantly
higher, and we pay tribute to their dedication and professionalism.
Without question, the attacks exposed some weaknesses in the procedures
and preparations of TfL. However, we are satisfied that these
have been identified and accepted, and are in the process of being
addressed.
50. No mass transit system in a large city can
ever be without vulnerabilities. The London Underground network
will always be a high-profile and iconic target for would-be terrorists,
as is the case with similar networks in other countries vulnerable
to terrorism. The demands of a mass transit system on the scale
of the London Underground will always be incompatible with airport-style
security. We would, nevertheless, seek to reassure the House and
the public that a great deal of work has been done, both overtly
and behind the scenes, to protect the millions of passengers who
use the Transport for London network every day. However, there
is no room for complacency, and this work must remain a high priority.
20 Ev 36 Back
21
Ev 37 Back
22
Ev 37 Back
23
HC Deb, 14 November 2007, col 46WS Back
24
Report of the 7 July Review Committee, London Assembly, June 2006,
p. 120 Back
25
ibid. Back
26
Q 2 Back
27
Q 3 Back
28
Q 10 Back
29
Q 12 Back
30
Qq 18-19 Back
31
Q 11 Back
32
Ev 39 Back
33
Qq 33-34 Back
34
Q 11 Back
35
Q 56 Back
36
Q 61 Back
37
Q 63 Back
