Memorandum submitted by Transport for
London
1. Transport for London (TfL) is grateful
for the opportunity to contribute to the Committee's inquiry into
Project Contest: the Government's Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
Our comments below are in relation to the committee's inquiry
into the "Protect" strand of Project Contest—focusing
on the preparation of London's transport infrastructure, and London
Underground (LU) in particular, against terrorist attack.
2. The safety and security of passengers
is TfL's highest priority. Across all modes TfL adopts a co-ordinated
approach to managing the risks presented by the threat of terrorism,
keeping policies and strategies under constant review and working
closely with all relevant agencies including the security and
emergency services, central and local Government, and other transport
providers.
3. TfL has invested heavily in improving
the transport infrastructure in London and delivering a safe and
secure transport network and it remains a priority for the organisation
going forward. The public transport system in London is currently
carrying a record number of passengers. In 2007-08 there were
over one billion journeys on the Tube system, over two billion
journeys on the bus network and over 125 million journeys on London
Rail (the Docklands Light Railway (DLR), London Overground (LO)
and Croydon Tramlink).
4. In particular, LU has made great strides
in recent years and is carrying more passengers and delivering
more train kilometres than ever before. Set against this is the
fact that the system is undergoing the biggest transformation
in its history, with a massive rebuilding and change programme
in full swing. Yet customer satisfaction is also at an all time
high.
5. TfL's achievements around customer satisfaction
are largely down to the professionalism and commitment of management
and staff, which in turn stems from their training and experience.
6. It is those factors which were also at
the root of the Tube's, and the wider transport system's ability
to withstand and very rapidly recover from the attacks of 7 July
2005. Also vital was the multi-agency planning that was put in
place by the UK Government, supported by the Mayor of London,
following the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington
DC. LU was fully involved in that process, with a senior manager
seconded to the London Resilience Team (LRT) from its outset,
to ensure that the operational realities of a mass transport metro
system are properly considered in political and investment decision
making.
7. The LRT has led work in subject areas
such as the evacuation of parts of London; chemical, biological
and radiological attacks, and most visibly has arranged tabletop
and live emergency exercises to test and validate the preparedness
for such attacks as well as for more conventional means of attack.
The largest of these was a weekend exercise at Bank London Underground
Station in September 2003, which simulated a chemical attack at
one of the largest, most complex stations on the network. This
was a multi-agency exercise which was also attended by political
and elected representatives, with coverage from world media. This
is in addition to the regular exercises that we hold with our
own and emergency services staff to test our readiness for a wide
variety of operational emergency situations. The learning from
all these exercises played a vital role for Underground senior
managers in revising training and in their own actions on 7 July.
8. TfL has continued its engagement with
LRT and other agencies on planning and exercising for major incidents
and emergencies. Recent exercises in which "transport"
has participated include flooding, contamination at sites away
from London but with implications for London and a major London
hospital evacuation. TfL was engaged as both scenario planners
and players.
9. The training and refreshers that all
staff receive is in our view the most important factor in dealing
with a range of emergency situations. The Underground's ability
on 7 July to evacuate around a quarter of a million people from
the Tube network within an hour, without injury, is testimony
to that, as was the restoration of 85% of services by the following
morning.
10. This was also true of the restoration
later in the day of the bus service in Central London after its
initial shut down on July 7. The restoration of service was essential
in allowing many thousands of stranded commuters return home.
11. In terms of what can be done to secure
open access mass transit systems, we are in a very different position
to some other forms of transport. One has only to buy a ticket
to secure largely unrestrained access to the public areas of the
rail network—500 trains, 270 stations on the LU network,
and 115 vehicle sets and 129 stations/stops on the London Rail
networks—along with millions of fellow passengers.
12. Indeed the Lord West Review presented
by the Home Secretary in a written statement to the House of Commons
on 14 November 2007 concluded that:
"The review has acknowledged the effectiveness
of the security programme that has already been implemented across
the transport sector. This focuses on delivering security measures
that help protect the travelling public and transport staff and
facilities from terrorism threats, without impacting disproportionately
on how the industry operates."
13. There are a number of ways of controlling
risks by applying layers of security measures which create a controlled
environment. No one measure by itself is sufficient and all measures
have to find the right balance, as Lord West concluded:
"To ensure that people and businesses are
free to go about their normal social, economic and democratic
activities as far as possible, as a result there will always be
some vulnerability to terrorist attacks."
14. CCTV is vital to managing security on
the Underground and the wider transport system in London. In July
2005 we already had CCTV coverage of all buses in London and over
6,000 cameras, covering nearly all stations and some of our trains.
We also have extensive coverage on the DLR, LO and Tramlink systems.
The number is ever increasing as part of the transformation of
the system—there are now over 8,500 cameras across the Tube
network and this will reach over 10,000 by 2012. The quality of
the equipment is also being upgraded where necessary.
15. For all new CCTV systems, every camera
will provide images that can be recorded.
16. All of the cameras on the bus system
(up to 12 cameras on all 7,000 buses) already record to a hard
drive on the bus and can be downloaded at the bus garage to provide
evidential quality images, as can those on the trams.
17. The CCTV footage provided by TfL cameras
played a vital role in the investigation and identification of
the individuals involved in both the 7 July and 21 July events.
18. TfL also invests heavily in the visible
policing of the network. In 2009-10 TfL will be investing over
£150 million to provide over 2,600 uniformed officers dedicated
to the network.
19. The Tube network is policed by a dedicated
division of the British Transport Police (BTP) comprising over
700 police officers and PCSOs, the numbers having increased significantly
in recent years thanks to additional funding for the force from
the Mayor of London.
20. In addition, 6,000 front-line station
staff are deployed across the Tube, with every station staffed
throughout the time trains are running and the vast majority staffed
around the clock. All trains have a driver who is in contact by
radio with a line control centre. There are seven such rooms across
the network. This is a high level of staffing compared with other
metro systems world wide. It is widely recognised that high levels
of customer service also provide high levels of perception of
security.
21. On the bus network over 1,900 police
officers, Police Community Safety Officers (PCSOs) and traffic
wardens provide a dedicated visible presence. In 2009-10 TfL will
also provide an additional 155 officers for the London Overground
Network and other parts of the Heavy Rail system in London over
and above the BTP presence paid for by the Train Operating Companies.
Again, numbers have increased substantially due to additional
funding by the Mayor.
22. All our operating staff have to prove
their identity and are subject to criminal conviction checks when
they join. In this as with other areas we strictly adhere to the
guidance of the security services. In fact the Transport Personnel
Review conducted on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport
by Stephen Boys Smith in 2008 identified London Underground as
a model of best practice across the whole of the transport sector
(including aviation) because of our risk based approach to this
issue.
23. LU and DLR have in conjunction with
the Government run trials of equipment at a small number of stations
to scan and search passengers. It remains our view however that
wholesale screening and checking of all those who use the Tube
and bus network on a daily basis is impractical and disproportionate,
and that intelligence led checks sometimes linked to major leisure
events are more appropriate. BTP have made great use of searches[1]
of individuals entering stations in conjunction with behavioural
assessment techniques.
24. We are fully aware of the capabilities
of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive
(CBRNE) detection however there are significant challenges with
fixed detection equipment in a metro environment and we continue
to monitor this type of technology with DfT Transec and through
our extensive international contacts. The BTP currently have the
best available portable detection equipment.
25. We have also examined protective measures
used internationally (including those used by buses in Israel)
and again we have found them not suitable for London's mass transit
infrastructure due to the volume of passenger numbers and frequency
of service.
26. CCTV and policing, together with the
vigilance of our own staff, provide a controlled environment which
is hostile to criminals and those planning possible terrorist
attacks. Our passengers also have a vital role to play, and we
have encouraged them through information campaigns to be on the
look out for, and to report, any suspicious behaviour or unattended
items. The latest multi-modal "vigilance" campaign was
launched at the end of November 2008 [an example poster is attached].
27. Communications between staff, and with
the Police, are vital. We have now rolled out a new communications
network for the Tube, which links control centres, trains, stations
and depots, replacing the existing systems that were not as joined
up and which have been too prone to failures. The new system was
delivered through the Connect PFI, a contract that was behind
schedule when LU was transferred to Transport for London in 2003,
but which we have worked as quickly as possible to bring into
service. The new radio system was only put into operation on each
Underground line once it has passed stringent validation, operational
and safety checks.
28. The Connect system will also improve
communications between drivers on trains and rescuers in an emergency
situation.
29. As part of the project there is now
interoperability with the Metropolitan Police service's "Airwave"
digital radio system. The Airwave radio system can now operate
above and below ground and enables the Police to communicate on
their own encrypted channels between the surface and deep tunnels
(The BTP and London Fire Brigade already had radios that worked
underground).
30. Although the new system will be much
more effective and resilient to damage than the previous Underground
radio system, no system can be guaranteed against the effects
of an explosion.
31. In addition, TfL's operational control
rooms are co-located with the relevant police control rooms. LU's
Network Operations Control room has recently been revamped and
is co-located with the BTP control room for the rail system in
London. The main MPS transport control room (Metrocomm) is also
co-located with the bus network control room (Centrecomm) and
in the summer of 2009 it will be moved to a newly built and equipped
facility and co-located with the London Traffic Control Centre.
32. These co-located control rooms allow
the operational response to incidents to be closely co-ordinated
with the police and engender a close working relationship between
TfL and our policing partners.
33. Since 7 July LU has investigated and
implemented a number of other improvements to our resilience,
including:
— Better first aid provision at stations.
Mass casualty first aid kits have been placed at 170 key locations
and these can be taken to the scene of an incident if necessary.
The importance of providing first aid kits on the scene is also
being incorporated into staff training. In addition we have 30
NHS "pods" (emergency dressing packs) at major stations.
It is not feasible to store these on our trains. These are for
the use of the emergency services personnel.
— Emergency water—All London
Underground stations have access to a supply of bottled water
that can be made available at short notice to passengers who are
feeling unwell or have been involved in a stalled train incident.
It would be impractical to provide emergency water on every train
as the conditions for storage are not ideal and would create health
hazards.
— LU has also provided new, improved
stretchers at all stations (to replace the existing ones), at
all levels so they can be quickly utilised.
— We have over 1,000 qualified first
aiders amongst our employees.
— Members of the public also step forward
in situations such as 7/7.
— New safety notices on trains, all
trains now have standard "In an emergency" signage,
advising passengers of evacuation procedures.[2]
— We have reviewed other emergency
equipment in conjunction with the emergency services and other
relevant experts. This resulted in a number of changes but emergency
equipment on trains will continue to be provided for staff use
only. To publicise its availability to passengers would be likely
to result in theft and misuse.
— In addition to existing torch provision,
new hands free torches have been provided at stations, for use
in emergency.
— Training—lessons learned have
been incorporated into new training programmes.
— The BTP have increased the use of
sniffer dogs on the system and are increasing this further for
the Olympics. In addition they use passive dogs. BTP are better
placed to report on this.
34. At the core of our resilience strategy
is that we constantly work in close co-operation with Central
Government Departments, the security service, the Police, Fire
and Ambulance services, and other agencies and transport operators.
It is that co-operation and co-ordination that enables us to be
aware of and respond to changing circumstances.
35. The need for continued focus on "resilience"
is clear and close working with the agencies described above will
remain a key part of the TfL strategy to provide an open network
in the context of keeping London moving whilst ensuring that those
who use or provide the services are encouraged to maintain vigilance
and can benefit from appropriate investment in systems and equipment.
We know that the threat remains high and that we can never be
complacent, but we must not create an environment of fear as this
will adversely affect public confidence and give the terrorists
what they strive for.
January 2009
1 Under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 Back
2
This was in response to concerns raised by some of the survivors
of 7/7 who were not sure whether it was safer to stay on the trains
or not. Research conducted with international colleagues unanimously
agreed that this is the preferred and safest option in most cases. Back
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