Other statutory bodies
129. As indicated earlier, victims of forced labour
in legal employment sectors are even less likely to be identified
than those involved in off-street prostitution or crime. Such
victims sometimes come into contact with public authoritiesfor
example, the social worker who noticed the passports locked in
an office in a factory; or environmental health officers dealing
with complaints about noise or overcrowded dwellings or public
health concerns in relation to catering;[219]
or health and safety inspectors; or those inspecting potentially
unsafe vehicles; or buildings inspectorsbut there appears
to have been little or no effort to alert such officials to the
problem of human trafficking, let alone to inform them of how
to react if their suspicions have been aroused.
130. One exception to this is a sector where a tragedythe
death of Chinese cockle-pickers in Morecambe Baybrought
the problem of trafficking to public attention. As a result of
this, the authority given responsibility for regulating labour
in this sector, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, is alert
to the possibility that some of the workers it deals with may
be victims of trafficking.
131. From May to August 2008, the Gangmasters Licensing
Authority took part in a pilot scheme to identify victims of forced
labour. The objectives of the pilot were:
- To increase understanding of
the scale, scope and nature of human trafficking for forced labour
in the UK;
- To increase awareness and the ability of front
line staff to identify potential victims, and to limit the possibility
of inaccurate identification;
- To improve an identification process, including
a national referral mechanism[220]
to a competent authority;
- To provide access to accommodation and support
for victims; and
- To increase investigations and convictions under
section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants
etc) Act 2004.
The Gangmasters Licensing Authority led the pilot
in the East of England, an area where traditionally large numbers
of gangmasters have supplied labour to the local farmers and food
processors and packers. Other strands of the pilot ran in the
West Midlands (led by the UKBA) and North Yorkshire, and there
was a further strand that involved third sector partners (Kalayaan
and the Poppy Project) in London.[221]
132. There is some anecdotal evidence that the closer
regulation of the supply of labour in the sectors supervised by
the Authority may be diverting traffickers into other sectors.
Moreover, some areas of casual labourthe ethnic restaurant
trade, for examplehave been targets for traffickers for
some years. We were aware that some trade unions were expressing
growing concerns about the incidence of forced labour in the UK,
and we decided to request evidence from one of the most vociferous,
UCATT (the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians).
133. UCATT has conducted research across the UK to
detect the scale of migrant trafficked labour. It provided us
with a number of examples in three areas, the Midlands, North-West
and Northern England, including: assaults and threats of violence;
very low pay (below the National Minimum Wage); excessive deductions
from pay for rent, tools and utility bills; and provision of sub-standard
accommodation. UCATT stated: "The systematic abuse of workers
by contractors, employment agencies and gangmasters in the construction
industry is a constant thread in our research among migrant workers
in the UK."[222]
However, it is impossible for us to determine whether the undoubted
abuses amounted to trafficking in all cases because it is not
clear whether any of the workers willingly accepted the conditions
and were free to leave their jobs if they disliked them. At least
in part, this lack of clarity arises from the fact that the vast
majority of workers on major construction sites are classified
as self-employed. The extent to which those claiming to be self-employed
in the construction industry really are self-employed is a matter
of dispute. We note, in this regard, a recent report from our
sister Committee, the Business and Enterprise Committee, Construction
Matters, which set out the widely varying estimates of the
relevant unions and HMRC, ranging between 200,000 and 1 million
'bogus' self-employed workers in the sector.[223]
UCATT told us that an important factor casting doubt on the 'self-employed'
status of many workers was the increasing incidence of gangmasters
providing labour to major construction sites. UCATT claimed: "gangmasters
and labour providers' use of illegal labour is rife on major [construction]
contracts throughout the UK."[224]
134. UCATT's
evidence on the changing profile of the construction industry
confirms us in our conclusion that the GLA model should be extended
to other sectors.
National Referral Mechanism
135. Anti-Slavery International considered the treatment
of victims of trafficking in the UK had improved over the last
five years or so.[225]
However, a number of our witnesses argued that the training and
information provided currently were not sufficient to ensure that
people were correctly identified as trafficking victims. They
considered that the only way to do this was to have statutory
involvement of relevant NGOs in the process. They argued that
NGOs contributed different experience and expertise from law enforcement
and immigration agencies and could encourage victims who were
frightened of state authorities to come forward. Their ideal was
a form of National Referral Mechanism: a multi-agency body consisting
of experts in law enforcement, the indicators of sexual or labour
exploitation, mental health and medical issues. This, they argued,
would lead to swift identification of victims and provision of
appropriate support to them. It would also have the beneficial
result that the police and the UKBA could concentrate on their
own jobs, without having to try to provide support services too.[226]
136. The NGOs pointed to two examples of where a
National Referral Mechanism had been successful. One was in the
Netherlands, where such an independent body has been in existence
for more than 20 years. This body operates what is called a 'help
desk procedure' under which all cases of trafficking or suspected
trafficking are referred to it, so that its experts can carry
out a thorough process of examination in order to identify any
victims and to assess the victims' individual needs. This system
had, according to Anti-Slavery International, resulted in a "good
number" of prosecutions of perpetrators.[227]
The other example was Operation Pentameter 2 in the UK, where
the majority of the victims were identified as such by NGOs and
not by the police or immigration officials. However, the Poppy
Project conceded that not all the possible victims discovered
during Pentameter 2 were considered under the referral mechanismsome
had opted to go home immediately without any referral. But of
those referred, in only one case was there a dispute about the
woman's status and that was not because there was any doubt as
to whether she was a trafficking victim but because it was argued
that she had been allowed enough reflection time already.[228]
137. With ratification of the Council of Europe Convention,
the UK has adopted a new national referral mechanism. The Government
has named the UKHTC along with the UKBA as the 'competent authority'
under the National Referral Mechanism. According to the Explanatory
Report accompanying the Council of Europe Convention:
129. By "competent authority" is meant
the public authorities which may have contact with trafficking
victims, such as the police, the labour inspectorate, customs,
the immigration authorities and embassies or consulates. It is
essential that these have people capable of identifying victims
and channelling them towards the organisations and services who
can assist them.
130. The Convention does not require that the competent
authorities have specialists in human-trafficking matters but
it does require that they have trained, qualified people so that
victims can be identified. The Convention likewise requires that
the authorities collaborate with one another and with organisations
that have a support-providing role. The support organisations
could be non-governmental organisations (NGOs) tasked with providing
aid and support to victims.
Some of our witnesses have raised concerns whether
the UKHTC and UKBA are qualified to be competent authorities.
In particular, ECPAT UK argued that the UKHTC to date had not
shown that it understood the specific requirements under the UK's
international obligations to respect children's rights, as opposed
to a generic approach to victim care. ECPAT UK said it would "like
to see a multi-agency approach and local decision making as part
of the national referral process. ECPAT UK believes that local
authorities are well placed to make competent authority decisions
about whether a child has been trafficked, yet the proposed Government
model does not include local authorities as a 'competent authority'",
adding: "It is not at all clear why the Government refuses
to accept that Local Authorities be allowed to make competent
authority decisions regarding the identification of trafficked
children".[229]
Kalayaan reported a number of problems with the pilot operation
for identifying trafficking for labour exploitation in May-September
2008,[230] in which
the UKHTC and UKBA had acted as the 'competent authority'. These
included a lack of clear case ownership; delays in identifying
potential victims far beyond the five day period specified; failure
by the UKHTC to speed up the process of obtaining information
on the immigration status of victims whose passports had been
taken away by their traffickers; lack of co-ordination; and excessive
bureaucracy, which, for example, hindered the provision of accommodation
to victims. Kalayaan was clearly of the view that the UKHTC and
UKBA needed to address problems of co-ordination before they would
be able to fulfil their role as competent authorities properly.[231]
Amnesty International UK, Stop the Traffik, the NSPCC, UNICEF,
the Immigration Law Practitioners' Association, Anti-Slavery International
and Glasgow Community and Safety Services (which runs the TARA
project) had similar worries, arguing that the key role to be
played by the UKBA made the 'competent authority' in effect an
immigration screening mechanism rather than one to identify and
help victims, and that NGOs needed to be far more closely involved
in the authority to improve victim identification.[232]
138. We
hope that the UKHTC and UKBA have learned the lessons from 'Operation
Tolerance', as the pilot was known. It is obvious that greater
thought needs to be given to the practicalities of identifying
and assisting victims. As ECPAT UK points out, much of the work
of supplying accommodation and support services needs to be done
with local knowledge and contacts, and we are concerned that the
UKHTC and UKBA may not have such knowledge and contacts. We would
like the Government to provide us with a clear account of how
the competent authorities intend to ensure that they are capable
of fulfilling this role.
123 Ev 154, para 2.2 (Poppy Project) Back
124
Ev 195, para 29 (Home Office); Ev 138, para 20 (Salvation Army);
Ev 151, paras 5-6 (Stop the Traffik); Ev 185, para 11 (Amnesty
International UK); and Ev 250 (UNICEF) Back
125
Q 51 Back
126
ECPAT UK referred to a "culture of disbelief" which
it said existed across the UK in local authorities, police and
immigration services: Ev 261, para 2 Back
127
Ev 97, para 3.18 Back
128
Ev 186, para 17 Back
129
Q 51 Back
130
Ev 154, para 2.12 (Poppy Project) Back
131
Q 21 (Anti-Slavery International) and Ev 105, para 4.7 (ECPAT) Back
132
Ev 272, paras 11-13 According to Amnesty International, the European
Commission is currently reviewing the EU definition of trafficking
to include trafficking for the purpose of criminal activity. See
also Ev 132, paras 27-32 (Immigration Law Practitioners Association);
Ev 190, paras 40-42 (Refugee Council); and Ev 269, para 37 (ILPA) Back
133
Qq 539-540 Back
134
Ev 120, para 15 Back
135
Qq 160 and 172 and Ev 119, para 9 Back
136
Q 171 See also Ev 119, para 14 Back
137
Q 364 Back
138
Q 228 Back
139
Q 447 Back
140
Q 74 Back
141
Qq 220-221 Back
142
Qq 220-221 (UKHTC) Back
143
Ev 95, para 21 and Home Office Press Notice, 'Government ratifies
European Convention against human trafficking', 17 December 2008.
We discussed Pentameter 2 during our oral evidence sessions, but
at that time the Operation had not been evaluated. Back
144
Ev 202, paras 90-91 Back
145
Ev 245, paras 4.1-4.4 (NSPCC), Ev 247 (NSPCC and ECPAT) See also
Ev 250, para 1 (Stop the Traffik) for more general criticism of
Pentameter 2. Back
146
Ev 241 Back
147
Qq 110 (ECPAT) and 364 (CEOP) and Ev 241 Back
148
Ev 250, para 9 Back
149
Q 429 Back
150
Q 434 Back
151
Q 404 and Ev 273, para 20 (Anti-Slavery International) Back
152
Qq 218-219 Back
153
Qq 74-75 (Poppy Project) and 445 (Metropolitan Police) and Ev
273, para 20 (Anti-Slavery International) Back
154
Qq 409-415 Back
155
Qq 512-522 Back
156
Qq 415-416 and 418-419 Back
157
Ev 241, para 2 Back
158
Q 219 (UKHTC) Back
159
Ev 174, para 23 Back
160
See, for example, Q 362 (CEOP) and Ev 114, para F.3 (NSPCC) Back
161
Q 376 Back
162
Q 111 Back
163
Q 183 (ATLeP) and Ev 106, paras 14 and 16 (ECPAT) Back
164
Ev 114, para F.2 Back
165
Q 209 (ATLeP); Ev 105, para 5 (ECPAT); Ev 264, paras 5-12 (ILPA);
Ev 241, para 10 (Stop the Traffik) Back
166
HL Deb, 6 April 2004, col 1645ff and HL Deb, 6 July 2004, col
671ff Back
167
Ev 173, paras 11, 15 and 18 See also Ev 206, para 6.1 (Refugee
Council) Back
168
Ev 174, para 20 and Ev 176, para 31 Back
169
Ev 106, para 19 Back
170
Q 64 and Ev 155, paras 3.3-3.4 ATLeP also criticised the quality
of initial decision making: Ev 176, para 32 Back
171
Qq 194 and 198 (ATLeP) Back
172
In Chapter 42, Identifying Victims of Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation Back
173
Q 198 and Ev 175, para 24 (ATLeP) See also Ev 135, paras 3.3 and
3.6 (CARE); Ev 169, paras 4.18-4.19 (Trafficking Law and Policy
Forum) Back
174
Q 182 Back
175
The Poppy Project also told us that the number of referrals it
received from the UKBA had increased in 2008-09 which, it thought,
indicated greater awareness of trafficking in the Agency: Ev 258,
para 3.2. Back
176
Qq 455-456 Back
177
Q 528 Back
178
Ev 155, para 3.6 Back
179
Ev 154, para 2.4 Back
180
Ev 154, para 2.7 (Poppy Project); Ev 167, paras 4.4-4.15 (Trafficking
Law and Policy Forum); Ev 188, para 24 (Amnesty International);
Ev 206, para 7.1 (Refugee Council) Back
181
Q 190 (ATLeP) and Ev 175, paras 27-29 and footnote 149 (ATLeP)
Also Ev 129, paras 16-22 (ILPA); Ev 188, paras 34 and 36-38 (Amnesty
International); and Ev 272, para 17 (Anti-Slavery International) Back
182
Ev 175, para 28 See also Ev 189, para 30 (Amnesty International)
and Ev 207, para 12.1 (Refugee Council) Back
183
Ev 106, para 13 Back
184
Ev 154, para 2.5 (Poppy Project). See also Q 213 (ATLeP) Back
185
Qq 65-66 and 70 (Poppy Project) and 213 (ATLeP) Back
186
Q 68 and Ev 156, paras 3.9-3.10 (Poppy Project); Ev 106, para
17 (ECPAT) Back
187
Ev 106, para 19 Back
188
Ev 175, para 30 (ATLeP) Back
189
Q 181 (ATLeP) and Ev 189, para 33 (Amnesty International) Back
190
Qq 191-193, Ev 176, paras 32-44 and 49-51 and Ev 182-183 (ATLeP) Back
191
Paragraph 58 Back
192
Qq 159, 161-169 and 173 and Ev 119, para 13 Back
193
Ev 121 Back
194
Q 166 Back
195
Q 155 Back
196
Q 173 Back
197
Ev 153 (Poppy Project) and Ev 174, para 23 (ATLeP) Back
198
Ev 247, para 1 Back
199
Qq 372 and 385. Funding for CTAIL comes jointly from the Home
Office and Comic Relief. Back
200
Ev 208 Back
201
Ev 148-149 Back
202
Ev 193, para 13 and Ev 196, para 35 (Home Office) The guidance
is called Working Together to safeguard Children Who May Have
Been Trafficked. Back
203
Qq 183 and 198 Back
204
Qq 463-466 (London Councils Children and Young People's Forum)
This may be the local authority toolkit mentioned by ECPAT UK
as going "well beyond" anything being used by the UKHTC:
Ev 261, para 9. Back
205
Qq 398-399 Back
206
Q 475 Back
207
The briefing covered national minimum wage and employment agency
legislation, how the enforcement bodies operated, how complaints
were handled, and how to make contact with the agencies when non-compliance
was suspected. Initial feedback reported that the inspectors'
knowledge of these areas of enforcement had increased. Back
208
Vulnerable Workers Enforcement Forum - Final Report and Government
Conclusions, paras 4.15-4.17 Back
209
Q 484 Back
210
Q 465 Back
211
Q 484 Back
212
Qq 469-471 and 486-487 Back
213
Q 484 Back
214
Qq 466 and 468 Back
215
Op cit, para 4.14 Back
216
Qq 379-381 Back
217
Q 382 Back
218
Qq 383-384 Back
219
See Councillor Ritchie's positive response to the idea of training
inspectors in detecting victims: Q 467 Back
220
See paragraphs 135-137 below for this Back
221
Ev 215, paras 6.6-6.7 Most of the 50 victims identified in London
were domestic servants: see Ev 253 (Kalayaan) and Ev 240, para
1.2 (Poppy Project) Other organisations involved were the UKHTC
and Department for Work and Pensions, and the operation took place
in five police force areas: Qq 223-224 (UKHTC) Back
222
Ev 253, paras 3 and 5-7 Back
223
Ninth Report of Session 2007-08, HC 127, paragraphs 164-169 Back
224
Ev 239 Back
225
Q 36; see also Qq 376-377 (CEOP) Back
226
Q 36 (Anti-Slavery International); Q 62 and Ev155, para 2.8 and
Ev 157 paras 6.1-6.3 (Poppy Project) Back
227
Q 36 Back
228
Qq 62 and 63 Back
229
Ev 262, para 9 Back
230
See paragraph 131 above. Back
231
Ev 253 Back
232
Respectively, Ev 185, para 13; Ev 25, para 5; Ev 250, para 5.2;
Ev 250, para 9; Ev 264, paras 13-19; Ev Ev 271, para 25; and Ev
274, paras 4.8 and 4.10 Back