Memorandum submitted by the Public and
Commercial Services Union
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
1. The Public and Commercial Services Union
(PCS) is the largest civil service trade union representing over
315,000 members working in most government departments, non-departmental
public bodies, agencies and privatised areas.
2. PCS represents over 8,500 members employed
in the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA), 2,500 members in the
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and 4,100 members employed
in both static and mobile detection teams for Revenue and Customs
(HMRC) at the UK's ports and airports. We are therefore in a unique
position to submit evidence as part of this inquiry as our members
are dealing on a day-to-day basis with human trafficking, both
its victims and perpetrators.
3. PCS welcome the committee's inquiry as
an opportunity to further raise our concerns about the introduction
of the UK Borders Agency (UKBA). We would also be happy to supplement
this written submission with oral evidence or further written
evidence.
4. This submission covers our concerns about:
— Social perspective of human trafficking.
— Scale and type of human trafficking
activity.
— Co-ordination between public authorities,
including some specific concerns about "uncanalised"
ports and the Lille loophole.
SOCIAL CONCERNS
5. Our members who deal with the victims
of human trafficking have made these observations about this terrible
practice.
— Victims are often recruited as a
result of coercion through abduction or kidnap:
(i) By deception (empty promises of legitimate
employment).
(ii) Aware that they will work as a prostitute
but unaware of the extent to which they will be indebted to their
trafficker/controller and exploited or controlled.
— Women are often themselves forced
to do the recruitment.
— During exploitation, victims are
often exposed to various forms of violence/abuse which often includes
forced drug consumption and drug related crime.
6. We are also concerned that consideration
should be given to aspects of trafficking other than for sexual
purposes—namely forced and bonded labour. We believe existing
programmes are disproportionately focused on sex work.
7. Since successful detection and prosecution
of the traffickers themselves will rely on intelligence and testimony
from the victims, it follows that protection and support is needed
to reassure those victims. PCS supports the Trades Union Congress
response to the January 2006 Home Office consultation, in summary:
— undocumented workers should have
enforceable employment rights;
— the British government should sign
the European Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human
Beings; and
— trafficked workers are victims and
should be treated as such and should receive appropriate support.
8. PCS welcomes the signing of the Convention
on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings in March 2007, but
is concerned that ratification is still not in sight.
SCALE AND
TYPE OF
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
ACTIVITY
9. We believe for human trafficking to be
effectively countered there has to be effective detection, enforcement
and prosecution of those involved in its organisation. Crucial
to detection and enforcement is provision of adequate resources
for border controls as well as enforcement directed against the
organisers of trafficking, which needs to take place other than
at points of entry. Cost cutting measures as part of the government's
public sector reforms, including the Gershon efficiency programme
are producing:
— persistent pressure to reduce staffing
numbers in the BIA and HMRC;
— restrictions on the amount and timing
of enforcement activity. Restricting, for example, weekend working
whilst the activities of the traffickers and those who have been
trafficked continue on a 24/7 basis.
10. PCS feel that constantly changing political
priorities, such as scandals over foreign prisoners and immigration
status of security guards deflect resources from abiding issues
such as trafficking to whatever is the passing preoccupation of
the day. This means that the actual scale and type of activity
is difficult to quantify, let alone tackle effectively. Care must
therefore be taken over the acceptance of estimates of the scale
of the problem.
11. Contestability in the Home Office means
that key areas of detection and enforcement, for instance enforcement
arrest teams, that are a key the front line resource to tackle
trafficking are due to be privatised. Past experience with privatisation
in the BIA have demonstrated these tasks are more effectively
undertaken in the public sector and we would urge the government
to re-think their future privatisation plans.
CO-ORDINATION
BETWEEN PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES
12. Effective co-ordination between public
authorities at the border is recognised as vital in the fight
against trafficking. For such co-ordination to be most productive,
it has to draw together specific expertise in a complementary
way.
13. PCS strongly believe that government
policy on the creation of a unified border force militates against
effective border security for two main reasons:
— at present, with three sequential
control points there are three opportunities for detection and
intelligence purposes, with passenger and vehicular traffic potentially
subject to three checks by immigration, police and customs officers
at points of entry. Currently these checks are separate and sequential,
allowing each organisation the chance to display their skills
and experience to tackle trafficking. Our experience has shown
that each intervention has yielded intelligence and concrete results
in dealing with human trafficking. The proposed reduction to a
single primary line will reduce the barriers at the border to
one and accordingly reduce the deterrent and interceptive effect
of three separate controls. We expect to receive a report from
management within the next week about how they propose the primary
line will operate; and
— the complementary skills of three
trained and experienced groups of specialists (immigration officers,
customs officers and police) not likely to be matched by one officer
attempting to fulfill a variety of roles.
14. Our view is that effective co-ordination
of separate organisations presents a much tougher barrier to human
trafficking than the reduced presence and deskilling inevitable
as a result of a single border force.
15. We do have concerns about carriers sharing
intelligence to support and direct efforts against trafficking;
we think better co-operation could yield improved results. However
our members in this area are currently constrained by the unwillingness
of carriers to cooperate in the sharing of information.
16. Human trafficking is a world wide problem
that needs a multi-pronged approach. Operation Pentameter (UKP2)
seeks to protect and reassure victims of trafficking and sexual
exploitation. The operation is taking place in conjunction with
a G6 project on human trafficking being led by the UK and Poland,
which includes enforcement work in a number of other EU countries
at the same time as UKP2 is taking place. This approach demonstrates
the level of co-ordination these issues need, to be tackled effectively.
However, adequate resources must be provided to deal not only
with the operations themselves, but the consequences—for
example for the provision of support and housing for child victims
by local authorities.
UNCANALISED POINTS
OF ENTRY
17. Control authorities' coverage of the
UK's myriad of small ports and other non-designated points of
entry is haphazard and sporadic. A clear strategy, with appropriate
resourcing, is absolutely necessary if efforts in other areas
are not to be undermined by weaknesses in this respect.
18. PCS have been raising our concerns since
2006 about Revenue and Customs decision to disband the Maritime,
Aviation and Intelligence Teams (MAIT). These teams focused on
"uncanalised" work at the thousands of marinas, coves,
ports and airstrips around the coastline of the UK, and across
the mainland where members of the public are not channeled through
security or Customs screening.
19. The MAIT team were the only dedicated
intelligence group in any law enforcement agency to undertake
this type of work and were seen as leaders in this field by other
agencies; however they have now been specifically directed away
from uncanalised work.
20. With no equivalent law enforcement unit
in operation elsewhere there is effectively nobody proactively
looking for intelligence or cultivating intelligence sources other
than at the very major canalised ports and airports.
21. HMRC have been keen to make much of
the value of "intelligence-led" mobile teams in terms
of their efficiency and productivity, however PCS are still unclear
why the team focusing on transport intelligence has been disbanded,
particularly since as a transport team its members could be tasked
to provide intelligence on smuggling of not just drugs, guns and
tobacco, but also people.
22. Our figures indicate that intelligence
gathered by the Falmouth MAIT team alone contributed to drug seizures
from vessels worth around £55 million. Much of these seizures
relied on cultivating intelligence sources, so it is disappointing
to note that the two and half thousand maritime and aviation contacts
previously cultivated over a period of two years of customs' officer
visits are now being referred to the Customs confidential "hotline".
23. Experienced Customs officers, now specifically
directed away from uncanalised work, are not optimistic these
contacts will be persuaded to divulge information through a national
hotline.
LILLE LOOPHOLE
24. PCS believes there is a problem with
the juxtaposed controls, which is often referred to as the "Lille
loophole".
25. All passengers boarding Eurostar services
bound for the UK are checked by UK immigration, but the Eurostar
services also have "domestic" stops. EU Schengen treaty
countries allow free unchecked travel between themselves; however
the UK is not a signatory to this agreement. France agreed to
amend its laws to allow UK immigration to check all passengers
and those going to Calais. However, Belgium would not. So non
EU passengers who have residence in France or Belgium or a French
or Belgian visa can dodge our immigration checks by buying a ticket
for Lille and "forgetting" to get off the train there.
Entrants may come illegally into the UK this way as there are
no regular checks or any immigration presence at the arrivals
in St Pancras (previously Waterloo).
26. We know that many non-EU passports and
travel documents have their children on parent's documentation,
but there is no photograph of the child. Therefore we suspect
that children have been brought through using this loop-hole.
We are also aware that some Chinese gangsters also use this route.
We believe this route has been abused since 2004.
27. Prior to that, shortages of staff at
Waterloo meant that on a regular basis the last train and sometimes
last two were not check by UK immigration, this went on for some
time and we calculate up to 200,000 passengers may have entered
the UK unchecked. In 2003-04 we had a meeting with the immigration
minister at the time The Rt Hon Des Browne MP; however we have
heard nothing to address our concerns since.
CONCLUSION
28. Taking effective action to tackle human
trafficking involves having secure borders, which we don't believe
we currently have and have little reason to think this will change
once the unified border force starts to operate, unless extra
resources are provided. The force will effectively reduce the
three checks to only one and reduce the skills and experience
of officers operating that single check. We would strongly urge
the government to rethink their plans, especially at this time
of heightened security risks to our country.
29. We believe it is essential that human
trafficking remain "core business" of organisations
charged with the responsibility of combating such a global crime.
It needs a sustainable, multi-agency approach to policing the
problem and requires a co-ordinated attack involving the UK, G6
and Europe alike. The aim should be to make the UK the most hostile
environment in the world for human traffickers to operate.
30. This requires not only well-trained
and effective border checks, but a system of support and protection
to reassure victims that they will not be penalised for their
exploitation.
8 February 2008
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