Written evidence submitted by the World
Development Movement (WDM)
1. INTRODUCTION
1. The World Development Movement (WDM)
campaigns to tackle the root causes of poverty. With our partners
around the world, we win positive change for the world's poorest
people. We believe that charity is not enough. We lobby governments
and companies to change policies that keep people poor. WDM is
a democratic membership organisation of 15,000 individuals and
70 local groups.
2. We welcome the International Development Committee's
(IDC) decision to hold an inquiry into sustainable development
in a changing climate. The terms of reference for the inquiry
raise many issues of importance. Given the constraints of time
and space, we focus our consultation response on the following
four points:
The proposed Phulbari open-cast coal
mine project in Bangladesh and the lack of UK government policy
coherence.
The centrality of the creation of a low
carbon economy in the UK to enable sustainable development in
the global south.
The unsustainable use of carbon trading
both for tackling climate change and promoting development in
the global south.
The need to halt the growth in aviation
emissions from the UK, and the impact this would have on sustainable
development in the global south.
3. THE PHULBARI
OPEN-CAST
COAL MINE
IN BANGLADESH
4. The terms of reference for the IDC inquiry
states it is looking for evidence on: "The effectiveness
and coherence of the UK Government's approach to sustainable development
in developing countries." The following example of the Phulbari
open-cast coal mine in Bangladesh shows a lack of coherence in
the UK Government's approach to sustainable development.
5. UK company Global Coal Management Resources
(GCM) is seeking to develop an open-cast coal mine in Phulbari,
north-west Bangladesh. If built the mine would take away the land
of more than 40,000 people.[64]
GCM's resettlement plan says cash compensation would be given
to the legal holders of land and houses, and other agricultural
land users and sharecroppers would receive livelihood restoration
grants for just two years.[65]
It is not clear how resettling affected families on land of equivalent
size and quality can be achieved without adversely impacting on
other agricultural communities. GCM's resettlement plan states;
"the project will not directly acquire replacement cultivation
land for displaced households, because this will simply transfer
the impacts associated with the loss of land to households in
host communities".[66]
6. Bangladesh is already one of the most
densely populated countries in the world,[67]
with huge pressures on land. Rising sea-levels and increased flooding
from climate change are and will make good quality land even scarcer.
Atiq Rahman from the Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies, a
lead author from the IPCC, has said that 35 million people could
be displaced from Bangladesh coastal areas by 2050.[68]
In the face of climate change, it would be disastrous for local
people to be displaced from the good quality land in Phulbari.
7. The Phulbari mine will be dewatered to
its base. The Expert Committee report on the proposed mine, commissioned
by the Bangladesh Government, estimates that the dewatering and
relocation means the mine would affect a total of 220,000 people.[69]
The Expert Committee report also raises the likelihood that the
mine would lead to acid mine drainage affecting water supplies
and agriculture for large surrounding areas, and there are fears
that the mine could lead to arsenic and other toxins being released
into water supplies.
8. In August 2006, tens of thousands of
people protested in the area against the mine and Asia Energy.
Three people were killed after Bangladesh government troops opened-fire
on the protest. The Expert Committee says there is a "high
risk of social unrest and conflict" if the relocation of
thousands of people is attempted, and: "The majority of the
local community with whom the Committee exchanged views was against
the Phulbari coal project."[70]
Forty-two community leaders from the Phulbari area have said:
"we believe that this project will increase the poverty of
the local population as well as cause environmental disaster."[71]
9. The Phulbari example is a case where
the exploitation of fossil fuels does not assist development,
regardless of concerns about climate change. Since the start of
2008, the Asian Development Bank, Barclays and RBS have all withdrawn
from investing in the project. However, in a parliamentary answer
in April 2008, Gareth Thomas, UK Minister for International Development
and Minister for Business stated:
10. "We have provided support to Global
Coal Management Resources PLC, through the British high commission
in Dhaka. They have lobbied to ensure that the Government of Bangladesh
take the company's interests into consideration and do not prohibit
opencast mining. The British high commission will continue to
remain in touch with the company and will represent their interests
as appropriate. The Bangladeshi Caretaker Government's new draft
coal policy leaves the way open for opencast mining in Bangladesh
in the future."[72]
11. In a further parliamentary answer Gareth
Thomas stated: "BERR officials have held regular discussions
with officials from the Department for International Development
on this subject, both in the UK and the British high commission
in Dhaka."[73]
12. However, in an email to WDM, Bo Sundstrom,
Head of Corporate Business for DfID in Bangladesh said: "DfID
has not looked into the proposed Phulbari coal mine issues in
detail, since other development partners such as the ADB and the
World Bank lead on energy issues in supporting the Government
of Bangladesh."[74]
It is worth noting that the Asian Development Bank cancelled its
proposed project to fund GCM and the Phulbari mine in April 2008;
the World Bank does not appear to have shown interest in funding
the project.
13. Furthermore, in response to a freedom
of information request from the World Development Movement, DfID
said that it: "does not hold any information about the discussions"[75]
between BERR and DfID officials about the Phulbari mine, whether
in the UK or Bangladesh. BERR have also told us that "No
formal meetings have taken place between DfiD and BERR on this
subject."[76]
14. Since September 2008, WDM supporters
have been emailing Gareth Thomas about the mine. Originally the
emails were sent to the Minister's Private Office in BERR. The
BERR private office emailed WDM on 2 October saying it was an
issue for Gareth Thomas at DfID, not BERR. Having switched the
emails to being sent to DfID, Gareth Thomas's private office at
DfID emailed WDM on 22 October saying this was an issue for BERR
not DfID.
15. The Phulbari case raises various issues:
BERR did not adequately consult DfID
before lobbying on behalf of a British company for a controversial
project.
Gareth Thomas's role as Minister
for Business and International Development appears confused and
incoherent.
The UK government is more concerned
about the profits of British companies than sustainable development
in countries such as Bangladesh.
16. The one argument for the Phulbari mine
is that it would enhance Bangladesh's energy resources. However,
under current plans 80% of the coal extracted would be exported
out of Bangladesh.[77]
17. Beyond the negative impacts on the local
population of an open-cast coal mine, there is no in principle
reason why Bangladesh should not be able to use coal. Bangladesh
currently emits around 0.3 tonnes of CO2 per person, compared
to 10 tonnes per person in the UK. Bangladesh effectively makes
no contribution to climate change, although the people of Bangladesh
will suffer some of the worst impacts of climate change, the more
others such as the UK cause it to get worse.
18. Given the UK's past and current contributions
to climate change, we have a responsibility to drastically reduce
our emissions, and pay for compensation to countries like Bangladesh
to help them adapt to the impacts of climate change which are
already being experienced. But given the necessity of cutting
global emissions, we also have a responsibility to help developing
countries move towards a low carbon future. Rather than lobbying
for a destructive open-cast coal mine, the UK government should
be offering support and finance, in addition to aid, to assist
Bangladesh in developing low-carbon energy options.
19. Further information on Phulbari is in
the attached document: The impacts of an open-cast coal mine
at Phulbari in Bangladesh.
3. A LOW CARBON
ECONOMY IN
THE UK
20. As the IDC is aware, climate change
threatens to have a disastrous impact on the lives and livelihoods
of hundreds of millions of people around the world. And climate
change is principally an issue of injustice; it has and is being
caused primarily by the richest people and countries in the world.
21. The UK is responsible for more than 6% of
CO2 emissions from 1850-2003, despite having less than 1% of the
world's current population. Rich countries, with less than 20%
of the world's population, currently account for around 50% of
CO2 emissions. In contrast, developing countries, with more than
80% of the world's population, are responsible for the other 50%.
Rich countries currently emit on average 13.2 tonnes of CO2 per
person, compared to 2.5 tonnes per person in developing countries.[78]
22. The UK government and EU have committed
to keeping the increase in global temperature on pre-industrial
levels to 2°C. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) reported in 2007 that to keep the increase in global temperatures
to between 2°C and 2.4°C requires global emissions to
peak between now and 2015, at the latest, and then fall by between
50 and 85%, on 2000 levels, by 2050.[79]
For the UK to play its part in reducing global emissions by 50-85%
by 2050 requires UK emissions to fall by 80-95% by 2050 (see Table
1 below).
Table 1
GLOBAL AND UK REQUIRED EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS
BY 2050[80]
|
| Global | UK
|
|
2000 total emissions | 23.8 billion tonnes
| 555 million tonnes |
2000 per person emissions | 3.9 tonnes
| 9.3 tonnes |
2050 total emissions | 3.6-11.9 billion tonnes
| 36-108 million tonnes |
2050 per person emissions | 0.6-1.8 tonnes
| 0.6-1.8 tonnes |
|
| |
|
23. For global emissions to peak by 2015 at the latest
requires sizeable reductions in emissions in rich countries like
the UK to begin straight-away. To reduce emissions by more than
80% by 2050 requires cuts of around 4% every year, beginning in
2009. This means UK emissions need to fall by 40% by 2020, on
1990 levels.
24. The UK is actually reducing emissions very slowly,
if at all. In 2006, the UK's total contribution to climate change
was 8% lower than in 1990 (see Graph 1 below). A step-change is
needed in the UK's approach to tackling climate change. The passing
of a climate bill with a target to reduce emissions by 80% by
2050 is a welcome first step. Policies are now needed to ensure
that this happens, with large cuts in emissions beginning straight
away.
Graph 1
UK CO2EQUIVALENT EMISSIONS 1990-2006 (INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION AND SHIPPING, AND NON-CO2 IMPACTS OF AVIATION)[81]

25. If we cause global temperatures to increase by significantly
more than 2°C, then many of the impacts of climate change
will become impossible to adapt to. The UK's Committee on Climate
Change has said: "adverse human welfare consequences are
likely to increase significantly if global temperature rises more
than 2°C relative to pre-industrial temperatures, and that
if a 4°C rise were reached, extreme consequences potentially
beyond our ability to adapt would arise."[82]
26. The Intergovernmental panel on climate change report
in 2007 said: "Although many early impacts of climate change
can be effectively addressed through adaptation, the options for
successful adaptation diminish and the associated costs increase
with increasing climate change. | Adaptation alone is not expected
to cope with all the projected effects of climate change, and
especially not over the long term as most impacts increase in
magnitude | Unmitigated climate change would, in the long term,
be likely to exceed the capacity of natural, managed and human
systems to adapt."[83]
27. The creation of a low carbon economy in the UK is
vital to protecting the lives and livelihoods for hundreds of
millions of people across the world. Urgent and large cuts in
UK emissions are needed to contribute to global reductions in
emissions.
28. A low carbon economy in the UK is also needed to
develop the technologies and ideas which can be used throughout
the world to cut emissions. For developing country governments
to take action on climate change, they need to see that rich countries,
with far higher emissions per person and far more resources, are
able to cut emissions whilst still meeting their energy needs.
29. One of the key decisions currently facing the UK
government is whether to allow a new generation of coal power
stations to be built, starting with Eon's application for an unabated
coal power plant at Kingsnorth in Kent.[84]
In 2006 public electricity and heat production accounted for 24%
of the UK's contribution to climate change,[85]
with coal used in electricity production accounting for around
17%. Whilst coal and electricity make up a large proportion of
the UK's contribution to climate change, the electricity sector
is often identified as one of the cheapest in which to cut emissions.
30. The UK's committee on climate change has said that
there needs to be: "Decarbonisation of the power sector,
starting now and continuing through the 2020s" to meet the
UK's emission reduction targets.[86]
This is clearly incompatible with allowing new unabated coal power
stations, with a lifetime of more than 30 years, to be built.
Allowing new unabated coal power stations to be built would also
reduce the need to develop alternative technologies which could
be used throughout the world to provide energy in a sustainable
way.
31. DfID's third White Paper in 2006 listed one of its
five key priorities to: "Make sure that our wider policies,
as well as aid, support development; and work with the European
Union, G8 and others, including large developing countries such
as China, India and South Africa, to create an international environment
that promotes development."[87]
One of DfID's roles within government should be to champion policies
on behalf of the world's poor. Creating a low carbon economy in
the UK, and specifically preventing new unabated coal power stations,
should be one such policy. Unfortunately, despite devoting one
whole chapter to tackling climate change, the 2006 White Paper
made no reference to cutting emissions in the UK, never mind DfID's
role within government to ensure that this happens.[88]
32. Similarly, in scrutinising DfID and championing policies
on behalf of the world's poor, the IDC has a role in commenting
on the need to create a low carbon economy in the UK, and policies
to achieve this such as preventing new unabated coal power stations
from being built. If we do not quickly move towards creating a
low carbon economy in the UK, there is no chance that a cleaner
development path will be possible for developing countries.
4. CARBON TRADING
AND THE
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM
33. The IDC lists one of the topics for this inquiry
as: "Opportunities for developing countries presented by
sustainable approaches, such as carbon trading, direct fiscal
transfers and addressing the needs of increasingly environmentally
sensitive consumers." We will focus on the issue of carbon
trading.
34. Carbon trading currently works primarily through the EU's
Emissions Trading Scheme. A cap is set for the total amount of
CO2 which can be emitted from large industries in Europe, such
as power stations and factories. Permits equal to this cap are
then distributed to companies. The cap, and thereby the number
of permits, are reduced over time. Companies can buy-and-sell
the permits between themselves, meaning companies can choose whether
to cut their emissions or pay someone else to do so.
35. However, companies can also buy permits from companies
operating in developing countries, through the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), rather than purchasing permits to reduce emissions
in Europe. The EU energy and climate package is currently being
negotiated which will set the terms under which the ETS will operate
from 2013 on. It looks likely that between 33 and 65% of emissions
reductions under the ETS will be able to be achieved through buying
Clean Development Mechanism credits, rather than reducing emissions
in the EU. The UK government has been lobbying for 50% of the
EU's targeted emissions reductions by 2020 to be achieved through
buying CDM credits rather than cutting emissions within the EU.[89]
36. Carbon trading as it currently operates is carbon
offsetting. Buying carbon credits allows the EU and UK not to
cut emissions domestically, but to pay for offsetting in developing
countries instead. This prevents the creation of a low carbon
economy in the EU and UK.
37. The UK government has argued that new coal power
stations are consistent with its climate change targets because
the electricity sector is in the ETS. New coal power stations
will have to pay for carbon offsets. The House of Commons Environment
Audit Committee responded to this saying:
38. "the Government is wrong to rely on the EU ETS
cap to excuse the increase in emissions that would derive from
the new unabated coal-fired power stations | The EU ETS is a mechanism
designed to reduce emissions; using it as a cover for choosing
high emissions technology goes against the purpose of the scheme
| The Government should prioritise emission reductions within
the UK as soon as possible."[90]
39. Carbon trading and use of the Clean Development Mechanism
is not a sustainable approach to tackling climate change. As was
highlighted in section 2, to prevent the worst impacts of climate
change rich countries like the UK have to cut their own emissions,
and in addition assist developing countries in curbing the growth
in, and ultimately reducing emissions. Support to developing countries
to cut emissions needs to be additional to action in the UK and
EU, not instead of action in the UK and EU.
40. However, there are also further problems with how
the Clean Development Mechanism works, which we address below:
4.1 The Clean Development Mechanism does not necessarily
reduce emissions in developing countries
41. Under the CDM the largest number of carbon credits
has been generated by projects claiming to reduce the potent greenhouse
gas HFC-23,[91] rather
than CO2. One study has found that the value of credits given
to HFC-23 projects at current carbon prices is 4.7 billion.
However, an estimate of the cost of technology needed to capture
and destroy the same amount of HFC-23 is 100 million.[92]
Around 4.6 billion has been generated in profit by HFC-23
generating plants, which could then further expand their operations
with the reinvestment of this profit.[93]
42. For example, one Indian chemical company, SRF, made 87
million from the sale of carbon credits in 2006-07. Ashish Bharat
Ram, managing director of SRF, claimed: "Strong income from
carbon trading strengthened us financially, and now we are expanding
into areas related to our core strength of chemical and technical
textiles business."[94]
43. The Joint Committee of Parliament on the draft climate
change bill reported that: "the economic incentives offered
by the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism] appear actually to be
encouraging the building of refrigerant plants in the developing
world, simply in order that the HFC by-products from the plant
can be incinerated, and the credits generated from this sold at
a large profit."[95]
44. There are further questions over whether CDM projects
produce actions that would not have happened anyway. For example,
because of a perceived over-reliance on coal as an energy source,
China has implemented a new policy of promoting hydro, wind and
gas power stations. But even though it is Chinese government policy
to promote hydro, wind and gas power, virtually all new hydro,
wind and hydro power stations in China are applying for CDM credits.[96]
Around 60% of Chinese CDM accredited projects in 2007 were wind,
hydro or gas.[97] David
Victor from the Californian University concludes from his research
that: "It looks like between one and two thirds of all the
total CDM offsets do not represent actual emission cuts."[98]
4.2 Where CDM funds go
45. The funds generated by CDM projects go to companies
in those countries which are industrialising quickly and so therefore
have large numbers of projects which are eligible. In 2007, projects
in China and India were responsible for 75% of CDM projects.[99]
Of course, as a mechanism to try and reduce emissions, CDM funds
should be going to projects in countries where emissions are growing.
But CDM funds should not be confused with being funds for development.
46. Within countries, CDM funds go primarily to large companies.
Furthermore, much of CDM funding is profit rather than productive
activity. As outlined above, many CDM projects would have gone
ahead anyway; the investment already existed. In such cases, funds
gained from CDM are pure profit for local elites. In other cases,
the cost of investment, such as technology to tackle HFC-23, is
far cheaper than the funds gained from CDM. Again, in such cases
the finance is mostly profit for local elites.
4.3 The negative impacts of CDM funding
47. Carbon credits are produced on the basis of having
a positive climate change impact, so it is natural to assume that
projects are also socially responsible. Yet carbon credits are
sold by private companies which are normally unaccountable to
the communities in which they seek to implement their projects.
Unfortunately, there are already examples of carbon credit projects
exacerbating social harm.
48. A project has been developed in Durban to extract methane
from the Bisasar Road landfill site to use for electricity generation.
This could reduce emissions of methane, a more potent greenhouse
gas than the CO2 released when methane is burnt. The generating
of electricity from the methane gas rather than coal could also
reduce emissions. The project has qualified to create carbon credits
under the CDM.
49. However, local campaigners have been calling for
the landfill site to be shut down as it exposes local people to
cancer-causing pollution. Concentrations of cadmium, lead, hydrogen
chloride, formaldehyde, benzene and trichloroethylene are all
high in the area. Before getting CDM funding, there was a good
chance the landfill site would be closed down. However, the project
has provided finance to enable the landfill site to keep operating.[100]
50. The Indian state of Gujarat is one of the most industrialised
states in India. Between 2006 and February 2008, 19 projects in
Gujarat qualified to receive carbon credits under the Clean Development
Mechanism. Of these, 13 (68%) are to reduce HFC-23 emissions from
factories (see above on HFC-23 projects). In total, the 19 projects
are claimed to have reduced emissions by 12.5 million tonnes of
CO2eq.[101]
51. The Gujarati NGO Paryavaran Mitra says that some
of the industries funded by CDM produce toxic or hazardous local
pollution. The reinvested profit from CDM allows these industries
to expand their operations, producing more local pollution, without
any regulation of the impacts. Mahesh Pandya from Paryavaran Mitra
says: "It is unjust that the rich are allowed to emit whilst
paying for more pollution for the poor."[102]
4.4 Alternatives
52. The current way carbon trading works does not match
the level of action needed to cut emissions. An alternative would
be for rich countries to take on much larger targets for cutting
emissions, with a certain proportion of these targets having to
be met through domestic cuts in emissions. For instance, under
the Greenhouse Development Rights framework for allocating responsibility
for cutting emissions, the EU is responsible for cutting emissions
by 80% by 2020 and 140% by 2030.[103]
Clearly this is impossible just domestically, but could be achieved
by the EU adopting such targets and then meeting some of the target
by buying carbon credits from developing countries. However, this
would not address the other problems with the CDM.
53. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) says: "The extent to which developing country Parties
will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention
will depend on the effective implementation by developed country
Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial
resources and transfer of technology.[104]
In other words, developing countries will implement actions to
cut emissions if they receive funds and technology from rich countries
to do so. These views have been reiterated in recent submissions
by the G77 and China to the UNFCCC ahead of the international
negotiations meeting in Poznan in December 2008.[105]
54. Creating a fund to finance mitigation in developing
countries could shift support for cutting emissions from project
funding under the CDM, to funding for country-led programmes.
One of the sources of revenue for such a fund could be the revenue
from rich country policies such as the auctioning of permits under
a true cap-and-trade scheme, or carbon taxes. In return, developing
countries could take on emission curbing/reducing targets, and
implement coherent policies for sustainable development.
55. For a successful outcome to the international negotiations,
it seems apparent that rich countries like the UK need to move
beyond offsetting to recognising the need for additional funds
over and above domestic cuts in emissions.
56. The G77 and China have also stated that funds from
mitigation and adaptation in developing countries should not go
through the World Bank, as this is an institution dominated by
rich countries. Instead the funds should be operated within the
UNFCCC.[106]
5. AVIATION AND
THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN
THE GLOBAL
SOUTH
57. UK aviation, including its non-CO2 impacts, currently
accounts for 13% of the UK's contribution to climate change.[107]
The Department for Transport predicts that under current policies
CO2eq emissions from UK aviation will rise from 94.8 million tonnes
in 2006 to 99 million tonnes in 2010, 146.5 million tonnes in
2020 and 159.5 million tonnes in 2050.[108]
These estimates are conservative when compared with more independent
estimates for the growth in aviation emissions (see Table 2 below).
Table 2
DIFFERENT PREDICTIONS FOR EMISSIONS FROM UK AVIATION (MILLION
TONNES OF CO2EQ)
| | |
|
Year | Tyndall Centre
| Owen and Lee[109]
| Department for Transport |
| | |
|
2010 | 111 | 79.8
| 99 |
2020 | 158.5 | 122
| 136.5 |
2030 | 195.3 | 168.8-204.5
| 162.3 |
2050 | 296 | 269.5-407
| 159.5 |
| | |
|
| | |
|
58. As set out above, for the UK to reduce emissions
as needed to prevent disastrous impacts from climate change requires
reduction in emissions of 40% by 2020, 60% by 2030 and more than
80% by 2050 (see Table 3 below).
Table 3
MAXIMUM UK EMISSIONS ALLOWED TO PREVENT GLOBAL TEMPERATURE
INCREASING BY MORE THAN 2°C
| | |
|
Year | Emissions reduction needed on 1990 levels
| UK CO2eq emissions | Department for Transport prediction for aviation emissions
|
| | |
|
1990 | 0 | 818.8
| 42.4 |
2020 | 40% | 491.3
| 136.5 |
2030 | 60% | 327.5
| 162.3 |
2050 | 80% | 163.8
| 159.5 |
| | |
|
| | |
|
59. Using the Department for Transport's somewhat conservative
estimates for aviation emissions growthand assuming the
UK reduces emissions as needed to tackle climate changeby
2020 aviation will be responsible for 23% of UK emissions, 50%
by 2030 and 100% by 2050 (see Table 3 above and Graph 2 below).
The UK cannot make its fair share of cuts in emissions whilst
allowing aviation emissions to grow as predicted by the Department
for Transport.
Graph 2
THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF AVIATION GROWTH AND UK REDUCING
EMISSIONS AS NEEDED TO PREVENT DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE

60. To reduce emissions by 40% by 2020 is a challenge
which will need action across every sector of the UK economy.
It is unrealistic to expect other sectors to reduce by even more
to allow aviation to expand. Even halting the growth in aviation
emissions requires other sectors to reduce by more to compensate
for aviation not making any cuts in emissions.
61. To reduce UK emissions by 80% by 2050 whilst allowing
aviation to expand, every other sector would have to reduce emissions
by 100% by 2050; ie. not use any fossil fuels. It is clearly unviable
for aviation to be the only sector that can use any fossil fuels.
The UK cannot tackle climate change and allow and enable aviation
to expand; for instance through allowing more flights and runways
at Heathrow and Stansted airports.
62. Aviation is a particular issue for the UK. The UK
is the third largest producer of aviation emissions in the world,
after the US and Japan; both of which have much larger population's
and economies than the UK. Aviation makes up a greater share of
the UK's contribution to climate change than of any other major
economy (see Table 4).
Table 4
AVIATION EMISSIONS BY COUNTRY[110],[111]
| | |
|
Country | Aviation CO2 emissions in 2004 (million tonnes)
| Aviation's share of country's CO2 emissions (per cent)
| Aviation's share of country's contribution to climate change (per cent)
|
| | |
|
UK | 35.5 | 6.1
| 12 |
France | 24.1 | 5.9
| 11 |
Netherlands | 12.5 | 4.7
| 9 |
US | 261.8 | 4.4
| 8 |
Spain | 15.5 | 4.3
| 8 |
Australia | 15.1 | 3.9
| 7 |
Canada | 20.7 | 3.5
| 7 |
Japan | 36.3 | 2.9
| 5 |
Germany | 24.5 | 2.8
| 5 |
Italy | 12.1 | 2.5
| 5 |
| | |
|
| | |
|
5.1 Aviation and tourism
63. The World Development Movement commissioned the New
Economics Foundation to research what the impacts on tourism to
developing countries would be of halting the growth in emissions
from UK aviation. The results of this research are in the attached
report; Plane Truths.
64. In summary the report finds:[112]
65. 1) The vast majority of aviation tourists from the
UK go to Europe, and then to richer parts of the world such as
North America and Japan. Only around 10% go to developing countries.
Initially halting the growth in aviation can be done through tackling
short haul flights, which needs the carrot of better rail services
and the stick of higher taxes on short-haul aviation and an end
to airport expansion. This would not impact developing countries.
66. 2) However, if the growth in UK tourism to developing
countries is halted, this would have a small impact on the growth
in the economies of countries which receive a proportionally large
number of UK tourists. By 2020, the economies of Kenya, Thailand
and the Dominican Republic would have had 0.1-0.4% less GDP growth
than would happen if UK aviation grows as currently planned. There
are some small countries who would suffer more (the Maldives is
a loss of 3% growth by 2020) so measures will be needed to compensate
such countries when the growth in long-haul flights are tackled.
67. 3) Of tourism that does go to developing countries,
a large proportion of the revenue does not help the local economy
but comes back to northern countries. Therefore, to increase the
benefits of tourism, the most useful thing is to stop such leakages
happening, rather than increasing the numbers of tourists which
do not create much benefit to the local economy. The UK and EU
are currently pushing measures in free trade agreements which
prevent countries implementing such policies.[113]
68. 4) It is very dangerous for a country to become too
dependent on tourism. Tourism is vary variable and influenced
by external shocks such as changes in the economic situation,
tourists tastes, conflict, terrorism, public health scares, geological
disasters and extreme weather events (which climate change will
make worse) and fuel prices. Furthermore, the threat of peak oil
means that fuel prices may continue to fluctuate widely and increase
in the future. This will mean cuts in the numbers of tourists.
Countries will be more vulnerable to future declines in tourists
the more their dependence on tourism increases now. Expansion
of tourism now is not a route to sustainable development.
69. Many of these arguments are potentially relevant
to debates about air-freight as well. However, for most countries
tourism is likely to be a far bigger issue than air freight. Air
freighted goods from developing countries to rich countries such
as the UK is primarily dependent on passenger flights. For instance,
the vast majority of fresh fruit and vegetable products which
are flown from sub-Saharan Africa to the UK are in the bellyhold
of passenger planes, rather than dedicated freight services. For
the UK as a whole, over 90% of aviation emissions are from passenger
aircraft rather than air freight.[114]
Only 1.5% of UK imports of fresh fruit and vegetables from sub-Saharan
Africa arrive by air.[115]
70. If the focus of tackling emissions from aviation
is put on consumer choices, rather than government action, then
there is a danger that particular groups could be hit by sudden
falls in income, although overall consumer action will have a
limited impact on emissions from aviation. This makes it imperative
that the UK government leads a smooth transition on aviation policies,
as opposed to promoting knee-jerk reactions from UK consumers.
Arguments around the benefits of aviation for tourism and air
freight trade with developing countries do not provide any reason
to allow UK aviation to expand, such as through more flights and
new runways at Stansted and Heathrow airports.
71. Globally, tackling aviation emissions offers possibilities
for raising significant revenues needed for limiting the impacts
of climate change. As has already been mentioned, significant
funds are needed for developing countries to curb the growth in,
and ultimately reduce, emissions. And the IDC will be aware of
the significant funds needed by developing countries to adapt
to the climate changes which are now inevitable.
72. Aviation is a heavily subsidised sector as it pays
no tax on fuel and no VAT. An international tax on fuel would
raise revenue whilst helping to mitigate emissions from aviation.
Globally, rich countries are responsible for over 70% of flights,
whilst holding around 20% of the world's population (see Table
5 below). If all funding from an international tax on fuel went
to developing countries, this would more than offset any cost
born by developing countries for such a tax.
Table 5
DISPARITY BETWEEN REGIONAL ACCESS TO AVIATION AND POPULATION
|
| Percentage of
world aviation[116]
| Percentage of world
population[117]
|
|
Africa | 2.0 | 13.2
|
Asia-Pacific | 22.4 | 55.3
|
Europe | 30.9 | 14.3
|
Latin America | 3.6 | 8.6
|
Middle East | 2.7 | 3.5
|
North America | 38.4 | 5.1
|
|
| |
|
73. Three broad areas for distributing funds from an
international tax on aviation fuel could be:
A fund to assist countries particularly dependent
on tourism to diversify into other activities.
Funds for climate change mitigation in developing
countries.
Funds for climate change adaptation in developing
countries.
64
Asia Energy. (2006). Bangladesh: Phulbari Coal Project. Summary
Environmental Impact Assessment prepared for the Asian Development
Bank. August 2006. Back
65
International NGOs. (2008). Letter to the ADB Board of Directors
concerning the Phulbari project. 11/01/08. Back
66
Asia Energy draft resettlement plan (2006). The draft resettlement
plan was previously available on GCM's website. In late-2007 it
was removed and the website notes that the revised resettlement
plan would be disclosed in "early 2008". However, no
updated resettlement plan has been made publicly available. The
2006 draft has been made publicly available on the website of
the Bank Information Centre http://www.bicusa.org/en/Project.Resources.59.aspx Back
67
The average population density is 1,042 people per square km,
compared to 246 people per square km in the UK. Around Phulbari,
an agricultural area, the population density is still 711 people
per square km. Back
68
Rahman, A. (2007). Promoting equity and adaptation for developing
countries. 23/11/07. Back
69
Expert Committee. (2006). Summary of the Report of the Expert
Committee to Evaluate Feasibility Study Report and Scheme of Development
of the Phulbari Coal Project. Back
70
Expert Committee. (2006). Summary of the Report of the Expert
Committee to Evaluate Feasibility Study Report and Scheme of Development
of the Phulbari Coal Project. Back
71
Phulbari Community Leaders. (2007). Letter to Asian Development
Bank. 15/12/07. Back
72
Thomas, G. (2008). Parliamentary answer to question from Lynne
Jones MP. 28/04/08. Back
73
Thomas, G. (2008). Parliamentary answer to question from Lynne
Jones MP. 15/07/08. Back
74
Sundstrom, B. (2008). Email to WDM. DfID. Dhaka. 29/07/08. Back
75
Simpson, E. (2008). Letter to WDM in response to Freedom of Information
request F2008-182. DfID. East Kilbride. 15/08/08. Back
76
Modha, U. (2008). Letter to WDM in response to Freedom of Information
request 08/0561. UK Trade and Investment. London. 23/09/08. Back
77
Asia Energy. (2006). Bangladesh: Phulbari Coal Project. Summary
Environmental Impact Assessment prepared for the Asian Development
Bank. August 2006. Back
78
Calculated from US EIA. (2008). Back
79
IPCC. (2007). Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Summary
for Policymakers. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
04/05/07. Back
80
US EIA. (2007). World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption
and Flaring of Fossil Fuels, 1980-2005. US Energy Information
Administration. June 2007. Back
81
Defra. (2008). UK greenhouse gas emissions 1990-2006: Headline
results. Defra. London. http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2008/images/080130a/annex-a.pdf
And Defra. (2008). Estimated emissions of CO2 by IPCC source category:
1970-2006. http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/globatmos/download/xls/gatb04.xls Back
82
Turner, A. (2008). Letter to Ed Miliband: Interim advice by the
Committee on climate change. Committee on climate change. 07/10/08. Back
83
IPCC. (2007). Climate Change 2007: Climate change impacts,
adaptation and vulnerability. Summary for Policymakers. Contribution
of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. 06/04/07. Back
84
Eon's application for a new coal power station at Kingsnorth in
Kent makes no reference to any of the power station being carbon
capture and storage. Back
85
The UK emitted 183.7 million tonnes of CO2 from electricity generation
in 2006: Defra. (2008). Estimated emissions of CO2 by IPCC source
category: 1970-2006. Back
86
Turner, A. (2008). Letter to Ed Miliband: Interim advice by the
Committee on climate change. Committee on climate change. 07/10/08. Back
87
DfID. (2006). Eliminating world poverty: Making governance work
for the poor. DfID. London. July 2006. Back
88
DfID. (2006). Eliminating world poverty: Making governance work
for the poor. DfID. London. July 2006. Back
89
UK Government. (2008). Access to project credits in the EU Climate
and Energy package: Non paper. Available at http://www.wwf.org.uk/filelibrary/pdf/leaked_document.pdf Back
90
EAC. (2008). Carbon capture and storage: Ninth report of session
2007-08. EAC. House of Commons. 22/07/08. Back
91
Hydroflurocarbons (HFCs) are potent greenhouse gases. HFC-23 is
a kind of HFC, one tonne of which is equivalent to 11,700 tonnes
of CO2 emissions in terms of their contribution to climate change.
Overall, HFC emissions are low, so make up a small percentage
of the world's contribution to climate change. Back
92
Harvey, F Bryant, C and Aglionby, J. (2007). Producers, traders
reap credits windfall. Financial Times. London. 26/04/07. Back
93
Smith, K. (2007). Pollute and profit: So when will Brussels
admit that its emissions trading scheme is not only not working,
but has proved a disaster? Back
94
Smith, K. (2007). Pollute and profit: So when will Brussels
admit that its emissions trading scheme is not only not working,
but has proved a disaster? Back
95
Joint Committee of Parliament on the draft climate change bill.
(2007). Final report: Volume I. August 2007. Back
96
Wara, M. and Victor, D. (2008). A realistic policy on international
carbon offsets. Stanford University Program on Sustainable Energy,
Working Paper Number 74. April 2008. Back
97
Calculated from http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html Back
98
Vidal, J. (2008). Billions wasted on UN climate programme. The
Guardian. London. 26/05/08. Back
99
Calculated from http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html Back
100
Lohmann, L. (2006). Carbon trading: A critical conversation
on climate change, privatisation and power. Development Dialogue
No. 38. Dag Hammarskjold Centre. September 2006. Back
101
Calculated from UNFCCC. (2008). https://cdm.unfccc.int Viewed
on 29/02/08. Back
102
Jones, T. (2007). Climate march blog. 17/07/07. http://climatechangemarch.blogspot.com/2007/07/corrupt-emissions.html Back
103
Kartha, A., Athanasiou, T., Baer, P. and Kemp-Benedict, E. (2008).
A call for leadership. A Greenhouse Development Rights analysis
of the EU's proposed 2020 targets. EcoEquity. SEI. Back
104
UNFCCC. (1992). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. United Nations. Back
105
Stilwell, M. (2008). G77-China Propose "Enhanced Financial
Mechanism" For UNFCCC. 29/08/08. Back
106
Khor, M. (2008). World Bank climate funds under fire from G77
and China. TWN. Bangkok. 03/04/08. And Stilwell, M. (2008). G77-China
Propose "Enhanced Financial Mechanism" For UNFCCC. 29/08/08. Back
107
See Merron, G. (2007). Answer to parliamentary question from Peter
Ainsworth MP. 26/04/07. And Jones, T. (2008). Mind the gap: Why
the UK government's climate change bill will not reduce UK greenhouse
gas emissions. World Development Movement. London. March 2008. Back
108
Cairns, S. and Newson, C. (2006). Predict and decide: Aviation,
climate change and UK policy. Environmental Change Institute.
University of Oxford. Back
109
Is for scheduled traffic only. Back
110
Figures are only available for UNFCCC Annex-1 countries. China
and India are also in the 10 largest economies in the world, but
it is fair to say that China and India's aviation emissions as
a share of their contribution to climate change are well below
that of most rich countries. Back
111
Calculated by WDM based on UNFCCC. (2005). Compilation of data
on emissions from international aviation. Paper prepared for
the 22nd session of the subsidiary body for scientific and technological
advice of the UNFCCC. Bonn. 19-27 May 2005. Back
112
Johnson, V. and Cottingham, M. (2008). Plane truths: Do the economic
arguments for aviation growth really fly? New Economics Foundation
and World Development Movement. London. September 2008. Back
113
See Jones, T. (2008). Raw deal: The EU's unfair trade agreements
with Mexico and South Africa. World Development Movement.
London. April 2008. Back
114
MacGregor, J. and Vorley, B. (2006). Fair Miles? The concept of
"food miles" through a sustainable development lens.
Sustainable Development Opinion. International Institute for Environment
and Development. Back
115
MacGregor, J. and Vorley, B. (2006). Fair Miles? The concept of
"food miles" through a sustainable development lens.
Sustainable Development Opinion. International Institute for Environment
and Development. Back
116
Calculated by WDM from Air Transport Action Group. (2005). The
economic and social benefits of air transport. Air Transport Action
Group, Geneva. September 2005. Back
117
UNDP. (2006). Human Development Report 2006. United Nations Development
Programme, New York. Back
|