Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2009): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007, Quarterly Reports for 2008, licensing policy and review of export control legislation - International Development Committee Contents


Examination of Witness (Questions 1-19)

IAN PEARSON MP, MR JOHN DODDRELL AND MS JAYNE CARPENTER

21 JANUARY 2009

  

  Q1 Chairman: Good morning and welcome. May I start with a question on where the Government has reached in its consideration of extra-territorial controls. As you know, we very much welcome the Government's decision to extend extra-territorial controls to cover small arms, MANPADS, cluster munitions but our main concern, as we have repeatedly stated, has been to bring within legal control activities which, if they had taken place in the UK without a licence, would be criminal activities; that is that all items on the Military List effectively should be brought within extra-territorial controls. We are aware that there have been discussions between the NGOs and the industry stakeholders. My first question therefore is: what has the progress been in relation to those discussions?

  

  Ian Pearson: The first thing I would like to say is that I think there have been a number of significant successes in general terms over the past year or so. We have introduced significant changes to controls in high risk areas where stakeholders have been calling for change for some time: new controls on sting sticks that were introduced in April, the introduction of a new three-category trade control structure with stronger controls on cluster munitions, small arms and MANPADS, which you have just referred to, which were announced in October 2008, stronger trade controls on light weapons. I think the review that has been undertaken, which undoubtedly we will get into as well, is one of a number of achievements over the last 12 months. With regard to the specific question that you raise on extra-territorial controls, as you know, controls are already in place on a wide range of goods, as I have indicated and as you are very well aware. In April 2009, those will be extended further to cover light weapons—again a not insignificant development. You rightly point out the fact that stakeholders are currently working to produce a joint proposal in relation to any further extension. I have to say that further measures need to be based on evidence of risk; they need to be proportionate and workable; and target activities of real concern in an effective way. We are not at the stage yet where there has been a consensus in terms of taking these matters forward. We still want to continue to work with stakeholders to come up with proposals for any further extensions which we believe are workable.

  

  Q2  Chairman: Some have said that you have sub-contracted this job to the NGOs and the defence industry. We have made the very simple case, and year by year you have given us a bit more, so as the years have gone over you have extended extra-territorial controls. The Government has extra-territorial controls in other areas of public policy. Do you not think that the Government ought to be leading on this rather than leaving it to the NGOs and the industry stakeholders to come up with a solution?

  Ian Pearson: I believe we have a shared responsibility. There is a process underway, as you are aware, that started well before I was appointed Economic and Business Minister. In the time that I have had to look at it, it really fits quite well with my view about how policy is best made. I happen to believe that we ought to be doing more of what you might call co-production of policy, working with outside groups, trying to build a consensus on the best way forward. My understanding is that is exactly the sort of process that we are trying to follow in this case. I think that that co-production method is a good one and we ought to look to see if there is consensus about how we take things forward. Ultimately, of course, if there is not going to be any agreement, then it will be up to Government to make a decision as an arbiter of where the balance of advantage lies.

  

  Q3  Chairman: Finally on this, as you are aware, it took years for this Committee and others to persuade the Government to include small arms and light weapons in the category of equipment that is subject—

  Ian Pearson: Yes, and we have responded.

  

  Q4  Chairman: Minister, you have. I am delighted, as I said at the very beginning, and I always want to praise where praise is due. Do you not think that at the end of the day the logic of this is that all the groups on the Military List should be within your new Category B in the export control order?

  Ian Pearson: I do not necessarily accept that that is the logic because I think you need to look at whether that would impose a disproportionate burden on industry. As I say, we need to look at evidence of risk; we need to look at proportionality; we need to look at what is workable as well. I think the co-production method that I am talking about, getting stakeholders to discuss this, is the best way if consensus can be reached. If consensus cannot be reached, then, as I have said, it will be for the Government to form a view.

  Chairman: Thank you very much. It was worth a try.

  

  Q5  Malcolm Bruce: I am sure all of us will welcome the fact that we have a ceasefire in Gaza and hope to God that that will continue without provocation or response to it from either side. There has been a lot of concern about the conduct and the proportionality of the Israelis forces on what they have and have not done. There are specific points. In the past we have been concerned about the equipment in the cockpits of the F-16s. We had evidence in 2006 from the British Embassy that confirmed that F-16s, to which we had supplied equipment, had been used in incursions to Lebanon and Gaza, which would appear to be in breach of the stated policy. In the conflict that has just finished, the Hermes system which we applied has also been reported to have been used in ways which may or may not contravene international agreements and our own policy. The specific question is: what is being done to assess whether or not the policy has been broken by Israel in terms of our supply, although I would have to say, Minister, I think there is a very strong view of public opinion that the easiest way to resolve this is to stop supplying Israel with anything that could conceivably be used in this way.

  Ian Pearson: Firstly, I share your view, and I think it is a very widespread view as well, about the sense of relief that Israel has withdrawn. We hope that negotiations continue and will bring a long and lasting settlement. The first thing that I want to say in response is that, as I am sure you are aware, Israel has for a long time been a very complex and difficult country to deal with from an export licensing perspective. As a government, we have always acknowledged that Israel has a right to defend itself, but at the same time we have been very mindful of concerns about human rights and in particular also regional stability. Our policy on Israel has not changed. All applications are assessed, as the Committee is aware, in the light of all the available information. We will not issue a licence where we have human rights or other concerns under the consolidated criteria. That has been an established policy for us as a government. The extent to which licence applications are refused or approved, which is determined by the circumstances at the time of the application, will of course change over time. That obviously brings particular difficulties. With regards to the recent action by Israel in Gaza, I am advised that it is not yet completely clear which equipment has been used. Since the introduction of the criteria in 2000, we have issued licences against risks of goods being used aggressively in military operations. Where we have identified a clear risk, we have refused to issue a licence. As you would expect, we will want to take into account the recent conflict when making future licensing decisions and the conduct of the Israeli defence force in our assessment of licensing applications in the future. As part of that process as well we will want to examine exactly what had happened with previous licensing decisions and whether equipment has been used contrary to the consolidated criteria.

  

  Q6  Malcolm Bruce: That was my follow-up point. I will finish with this question. If the British Embassy confirmed that F-16s were used in Gaza in 2006, it seems highly probable in a much more sustained and larger incursion they will be used again. What I am asking is: proactively what are we doing to investigate that? We have also seen a situation where in 2002, 84 licences to Israel were refused; this had fallen to 13 in 2004. The figures show that exports in value have gone up this year. We were told when we protested in the past and others protested by Jack Straw was that the importance of the exports and the UK's trade relationship with the US outweighed concerns against the consolidated criteria. I am putting to you, Minister, that the British public would not find that a very satisfactory justification if we find that these weapons that we have equipped have been deployed in Gaza in this most recent conflict.

  Ian Pearson: Firstly, I do not want to go into detail about the way in which we obtain information about how military equipment may or may not have been used, but there are obvious ways in which we can ascertain that information. With regard to licence applications, as the Committee will be aware, the UK has refused a number of licence applications to Israel over the years. On the figures, in 2002 we refused 84 standard individual licences and since then the annual figures have fluctuated between 9 and 26. Israel regularly features in three destinations with the highest numbers of refusals. I think the figure for last year is that 13 SIELs were refused. We will always look at these things on a case-by-case basis, based on the consolidated criteria. There is a point that I want to make that not all of the licences granted for Israel involve exports which will remain there because Israel does actually systems integrate and incorporates a number of British exported goods into larger equipment for onward export to third countries. You will be aware of Israel's role in that way. We will of course continue to monitor the situation in Israel extremely closely. I agree with him in his views about the British people and how people in Britain see this. This is an area where we need to proceed extremely cautiously. If we have information from any source that UK equipment is being misused, then this has to be factored into future decisions when it comes to making licence assessments, and indeed will I think probably undoubtedly be raised with the Israeli Government as well.

  

  Q7  Chairman: The question about the F-16 issue was raised. With respect, I think we need to have an answer. Everyone knows that F-16s amongst other weapons of conflict were used in Gaza. We know that in 2002 the Government shifted its policy specifically to allow head-up display units to be exported to the United States to be put in F-16s that could then be exported to Israel. The question that Malcolm is raising is: is there not some sort of conflict between our knowing that is what is going on and the state of government policy that arms exports to Israel only take place when there is no significant risk they will be used in the Occupied Territories? Is there not a fundamental conflict between those two policies?

  Ian Pearson: I understand that the decision on head-up display units was taken some time ago. This is a piece of equipment that is put into the F-16 fighter plane. My understanding is that the decisions were taken on that at the time by Ministers looking at the consolidated criteria. I have no doubt that this was a finely-balanced decision at that time.

  

  Q8  Chairman: With respect, the Foreign Secretary at the time said very specifically that the reason was our economic relationship, our defence industry relationship, with the United States. That was the reason given for changing the policy. It does not sound particularly finely-balanced to me. My question was to the Government, and maybe I am not going to get a further answer, and that is no criticism of you, Minister: is there not a fundamental conflict within the stated policy that is supposedly applied in ordinary circumstances, namely that licences are not granted if there is a significant risk that the equipment will be used in the Occupied Territories or aggressively, whereas in the F-16 case we do knowingly export head-up display units for F-16s to be used in Gaza. That is Government policy.

  Ian Pearson: I do not accept that there is a fundamental conflict in policy. I do repeat that Israel is a complex country and a difficult one to deal with. Our policy has always been that Israel has a right to defend itself, but we have also always been very mindful about concerns on human rights and regional stability, and we have been particularly concerned with human rights, given the recent conflict in Gaza. These are difficult decisions, as I am sure the Committee is very well aware.

  

  Q9  John Battle: On a point of fact, because I think the focus is on Israel, we need to keep that focus and that means we need to do more particular work. There are calls on the Order Paper in the Early Day Motions listing all the types of weapons sold to Israel. The particular question is: in the whole of 2007 there were 7.5 million recorded exports to Israel, but in the first three months of 2008 there were 19 million, a massive increase. You may reply to me that the evidence shows that this was for radio communications; that may have been radio communications for use on naval vessels. The whole of that complex system was applied for late in 2007; it was granted early in 2008, so it went through at rapid speed. I would be prepared to put together an argument to say that the military terms in the present conflict would not have been possible without the back-up of that extremely complicated, sensitive equipment that keeps the whole communications systems operational from offshore to cover the whole of a small area. We could put together an argument to say that we created the conditions for conflict by those sales; in other words, unless we are checking much more rigorously and keeping a much closer account of what is going on, we are just making future conflict more possible, not less.

  Ian Pearson: I am not sure that I accept the arguments that you put there, John. I think that dramatises the situation. I repeat the fact that we look at any potential export licences to Israel extremely carefully and extremely thoroughly. A great deal of mention has been made of head-up display units. As I think the Committee is aware, no licence applications have been granted for them since 2002. I think that that needs to be borne in mind by the Committee. We will continue to assess the situation when it comes to future licensing decisions. We will want to factor in how the previous export licences for equipment have actually been used in practice. I can assure the Committee that that will be part and parcel of the rigorous assessment process that we will continue to make on these matters. I think the Committee is aware of the basic process about how decisions are reached on this.

  

  Q10  Chairman: Before I forget it, you are saying that no licence has been granted for the export of head-up display units since 2002?

  Ian Pearson: Yes, that is my understanding.

  

  Q11  Chairman: Have any been applied for and rejected? Perhaps you could drop us a note on that. That is a relevant question. It is an important point.

  Ian Pearson: We would be happy to drop you a note on that.

  

  Q12  Richard Burden: Could I establish on this issue whether or not the trade relationship with the US outweighs the consolidated criteria. You say, Minister, that you do not think there is necessarily a conflict between the UK's trade relationship with the US and the consolidated criteria. It was very specific in 2002. The foreign Secretary then said that the trade relationship outweighed the consolidated criteria. My first question is this. In the light of what has been happening over the last three weeks and arguably for longer than that, which comes first now? Do the consolidated criteria come first or does the trade relationship with the US come first?

  Ian Pearson: I am not going to contradict the Foreign Secretary and what the Foreign Secretary said. Richard, you will be very aware of how supply chains work from the fact that you are an expert in the automotive industry and you understand how there are integrated supply chains in the aircraft industry as well. I think we need to bear in mind some of that in terms of the practicalities. Government will continue to assess applications on a case-by case basis against the consolidated criteria.

  

  Q13  Richard Burden: Will they be the pre-eminent consideration? That is a matter of policy. They are either going to be the pre-eminent consideration or they are not.

  Ian Pearson: Yes, they are. May I read out what the then Foreign Secretary actually said in July 2002? "The Government will continue to assess such applications on a case-by-case basis against the consolidated criteria, while at the same time having regard to, inter alia, the following factors: (a) the export control policies and effectiveness of the export control system of the incorporating country; (b) the importance of the UK's defence and security relationship with the incorporating country;"—and that is the point I think the Committee are making—"(c) the materiality and significance of the UK-origin goods in relation to the goods into which they are to be incorporated, and in relation to any end-use of the finished products which might give rise to concern; (d) the ease with which the UK-origin goods, or significant parts of them, could be removed from the goods into which they are to be incorporated; and (e) the standing of the entity to which the goods are to be exported." The then Foreign Secretary was very clear that the overriding concern would be that the Government would continue to assess such applications on a case-by-case basis. He gave a number of different criteria. I think it is very clear from what he said that the consolidated criteria are important.

  

  Q14  Mr Crausby: I hear what the Minister says about a case-by-case basis and I completely accept, as many do, that Israel has the right to defend itself. I think the real issue is this. Is not killing hundreds of children outside its borders just a bit beyond defending itself? Can we not get back to the issue that when we look at that point of hundreds of dead children in Gaza as a result of Israel's actions, we have to think a little bit beyond a case-by-case basis. It is all right being dragged off into the detail of this. It seems to me that the question really should be: should we not have a new, fresh and overall look in the circumstances that we have just experienced? It seems to me that in a conflict of this extent they are pretty well bound to have used almost everything that we have sent to them.

  Ian Pearson: I think we are all horrified about the loss of lives and in particular of innocent children in Gaza during the recent conflict that has taken place. That sense of outrage has been expressed clearly in the House and you will have heard the statement made by the Foreign Secretary only very recently on these matters. Of course, given these incredibly distressing recent events, we will need to re-assess the situation when it comes to any future licensing applications for the export of goods to Israel. You would expect us to do that; that is exactly what we will do. We will want to factor in all the information we have available about how possibly previous equipment has been used. As I say, we do not yet have a clear picture of that, but we will certainly want to factor that sort of information into any future export licensing decision.

  

  Q15  Sir John Stanley: Minister, you said earlier that in your view there has been no change of government policy towards arms for Israel. I must put it to you that that is factually, over a timescale at least going back to the previous Government, simply incorrect. The policy that was followed, made up by the previous Conservative government, and I have first-hand ministerial experience of implementing it, followed by the previous Labour government before that as well, was that arms exports were not made to areas of conflict or potential conflict. That was the policy and it was very carefully adhered to. I put it to you that that policy has changed profoundly, as has been brought out in the questioning so far. It has been changed to allow arms sales to be made to Israel and, contrary to the impression that you might have left with some members of the Committee and possibly to the wider public that head-up display is some sort of minor piece of kit, the head-up display on an F-16 is the key piece of targeting electronics. The F-16 is the key ground attack aircraft used by the Israeli Air Force. I put it to you, Minister, that it is in my view an absolute certainty, though if you wish to deny it that would be most interesting, that British head-up displays were in place in the F-16s that have recently been bombing Gaza and been responsible for the death of over 1300 innocent civilians. Do you deny that British equipment was used in those F-16s?

  Ian Pearson: We do not have a complete picture about whether British equipment was used. As far as head-up displays is concerned, my information is that no licence applications have been approved since 2002 for that. Israel does have a right to defend itself, but we do have very great concerns when it comes to human rights issues and also the stability of the region. We have a settled policy when it comes to the consolidated criteria and how we judge on a very rigorous case-by-case basis whether to grant or not export licence applications. Israel is one of the countries where we have most cause for concern and where we refuse a significant number of licence applications. Obviously decisions are taken over a number of years and in some cases licence applications are granted. They will be granted because at that time, following a thorough assessment at an official level and, if there is any disagreement, by ministerial agreement, it is appropriate to do so, given the consolidated criteria and all the concerns that are built into the criteria, of which the Committee are fully aware.

  

  Q16  Sir John Stanley: Minister, I put it to you that the issue of the Government not licensing any more F-16 head-up display units since 2002 is irrelevant to the point I am making. The point I am making is that as a result of the change of policy which the Government made, announced by the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, under which head-up displays were licensed, those displays will have been exported to Israel; they will have been installed in the Israeli Air Force's F-16s. I ask you, Minister, when you have completed your assessment, if you will provide confirmation to this Committee that the F-16s that were in use over Gaza over the last three weeks that have been responsible for the deaths of 1300 plus innocent Palestinians did incorporate within them British head-up displays?

  Ian Pearson: I am happy to see what further information I can make available to the Committee about the use of head-up displays. As I repeat, my advice is that at the moment it is not completely clear what equipment has been used. Clearly, there will be further information available in due course as we and other governments look at these matters. I will happily endeavour to make information available to the Committee. Can I just say, Mr Berry, that this is very clearly an incredibly difficult situation. Certainly the UK Government never wanted to see the action that has taken place in Gaza. We have been resolute in condemning that action and calling for an immediate ceasefire. We will continue to work and do what we can to promote peace and stability in that part of the region.

  

  Q17  Sir John Stanley: Finally, Minister, if it does transpire—and in my own view it is a well nigh certainty—that British head-up displays were in use in the F-16s that have been responsible for the civilian deaths in Gaza, if that transpires to be correct and I believe absolutely certainly that will be shown to be correct, is the Government willing to revert to the previous policy in this area in particular in Israel and the Occupied Territories of no British arms sales into this area?

  Ian Pearson: I think the hon. Gentleman with respect is trying to paint a different picture to what happened under previous administrations to that which I understand to be the case. I do not want to go there and make this party political; it is far too serious for that. What I do want to say to the Committee is that we will want to factor in all relevant information when it comes to making future decisions about export licences of equipment that could be used in Israel.

  

  Q18  Mike Gapes: I have two specific questions. Firstly, I received an email from a Dr Wilson in Lichfield, Staffordshire, who says that people in the Lichfield area, concerned about the situation in Gaza, had read in the national press that UAV engines produced in a factory in Shenstone were being used in the drone aircraft deployed over Gaza in the course of bombing missions. Minister, is that correct?

  Ian Pearson: My understanding is that we have spoken to this exporter and they have confirmed what we already know from our own database, namely that whilst they do export UAV engines to Israel, the engines are a particular variant which is not used in Israel but is incorporated into UAVs for onward export so they would not have been involved in the current conflict.

  

  Q19  Mike Gapes: That is what you understand. Do you have any information from Gaza or Israel as to whether that is true?

  Ian Pearson: I would make the point that Israel has a very significant UAV industry and many of the UAV-related exports to Israel are subject to further work or incorporation there and then re-exported to another country. We believe that we made the sort of normal rigorous checks that we would have done before agreeing to the export licence in this case. Jayne Carpenter may want to add to that.

  Ms Carpenter: Our licensing database shows that we have only issued licences for those particular engines for incorporation in Israel and then onward export to a third destination. If the engines had stayed in Israel, then that would be a contravention of the licence condition and that would be an offence. Whilst we cannot categorically confirm that we physically checked that the engines have been incorporated, we have only licensed them for incorporation in Israel and onward export to another destination.

  


 
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