Examination of Witness (Question 140-159)
BILL RAMMELL
MP, MS JO
ADAMSON AND
MR ANDREW
MASSEY
22 APRIL 2009
Q140 Richard Burden: It presumably
also indicates that the UK believes that there is a very, very
serious risk that arms exports or components exports, directly
or indirectly to Israel, will be used in contravention of the
consolidated criteria irrespective of whether guarantees have
been given that they would not.
Bill Rammell: If I reply in the
affirmative to that, then I actually breach our procedures, because
we have to judge each one of them on its merits, on a case-by-case
basis. That is what we do.
Q141 Richard Burden: Jack Straw,
when he was Foreign Secretary, said precisely that; he said that
actually Britain would not in the future rely on guarantees given
by Israel; it would do further checks. Does the UK consider there
is a considerable risk that Israel would use arms exports for
reasons other than included in the consolidated criteria?
Bill Rammell: There are all sorts
of legitimate sales to Israel that do take place, for items that
are used within the Israeli defence manufacturing industry and
for re-export to other countries, for dual-use items, for civilian
items, and we have historically, as is a matter of record, approved
arms sales to Israel but on a case-by-case basis we take account
of the evidence before us prevailing at a particular period of
time, and we reach a conclusion about whether there is a risk
of any of the criteria being breached. It is on that basis that
we reach conclusions.
Q142 Richard Burden: The reason I
am asking this question is that to me it looks as though if there
has been over the last few years, certainly since Lebanon, an
increase in the number of refusals, if it has been known in the
past that armoured personnel carriers have been used in contravention
of the licences for which they are granted, if it is now known
and acknowledged that F16 fighters on two major recent conflicts
have been used in contravention of those criteria, then the main
problem is components that are re-exported to Israel: why do we
not include Israel as a list of prohibited countries for re-export
under the new open general trade control licences?
Bill Rammell: Because we do not
have an embargo of Israel, and quite apart from the specific merits
of the arms export control procedure I do not think politically—and
I know this is something you are very committed to—an embargo
against Israel would help us achieve the kind of outcome more
broadly in the Middle East that we are all looking for.
Q143 Richard Burden: I was not asking
about an embargo and I will ask a final question about an embargo
in a minute, but this is about control and implementation of the
criteria. If there is a risk—and there clearly appears to
be a risk—that components will be used for purposes other
than we think would be acceptable, why do we not give ourselves
more control over whether or not they are going, rather than allow
them to be exported through a third country, where inevitably
we have less control?
Bill Rammell: We can go back to
the statement that the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made
in 2002 in terms of incorporation because there has been a dramatically
changing arms export industry in which there are inter-dependencies.
I do not think, as an absolute matter of policy, that to cut ourselves
off from that would be in the interests of our defence industry
or our armed forces.
Q144 Richard Burden: You have been
very clear that you would not want to go down the road of an arms
embargo against Israel because it would potentially rule out sales
of arms and components that would be legitimate, perhaps for self-defence.
Does the UK Government take the same view on arms exports directly
or indirectly to the Palestinians?
Bill Rammell: We are not dealing
with a nation state in the same way and we actually—
Q145 Richard Burden: That is hardly
their fault, but—
Bill Rammell: No, and we are doing
our level best to get to the situation where we can have a viable
Palestinian state, but I think I am right in saying that at the
moment, because it is not a nation state in the same way, it would
not be eligible for armed exports in the same way as other states.
Mr Massey: That is my understanding.
It is fair to say that we have made exports that have gone to
the Palestinian Authority, armoured vehicles for use by the government,
for example; so there are exports that are going in to the Palestinian
Authority, but I suspect your question is: are we exporting offensive
arms?
Q146 Richard Burden: No, defensive
arms, for civilian purposes and elsewhere.
Mr Massey: In that sense, we are
doing what you are asking.
Q147 Richard Burden: One thing that
would, presumably, be quite often defensive—and I do not
know if Israel has approached Britain for this—is if, say,
Israel applied for a licence for an anti-tank weapon, that might
be granted on the grounds of attack and you need anti-tank weapons
to stop it. In principle that could be a weapon that could be
supplied to the Palestinians.
Bill Rammell: We are really in
the realms of the theoretical here. I am not sure that the civilian
authorities within the Palestinian territories would apply for
a tank—
Q148 Richard Burden: As far as I
know, they have not.
Bill Rammell: For civilian purposes
there are some sales that take place.
Q149 Sir John Stanley: An important
point of clarification of your previous answer, Minister: you
said that you were entirely satisfied that at the time of the
F16 head-up displays and components licences for those were granted,
you were satisfied that the EU consolidated criteria were met.
You will be aware that we received from Ian Pearson's officials
an amendment to the letter which he originally wrote to the Committee
on 19 February, and in that amended letter, which was conveyed
in an e-mail of 12 March from Mr David Johnson at BERR to our
then clerk, the text was amended to read as follows: "At
the evidence session I stated on the basis of advice I had received
that no export licences for F16 head-up display and other equipment
to Israel had been granted since 2002. While this is correct,
I would like to clarify that this refers to licences for the export
of F16 HUD components direct (to Israel) for use in Israel. Since
that date there have been a small number of licences granted for
these goods where, although not going direct to Israel, we were
aware that Israel was the ultimate end-user." The question
I have for you is, first, will you provide the Committee with
the details of the "small number of licences granted"
since 2002 for F16 head-up displays with regard indirectly to
Israel, when the Government knew that Israel was the ultimate
end-user, including the dates when those licences were granted.
Can you confirm for the Committee that at the time of those dates,
when those licences were granted, in each and every case you were
satisfied that EU consolidated criteria had been complied with?
Bill Rammell: We will confirm
it in writing. The answer is "yes" to both. We will
certainly provide you with that detailed information. 3[3]
Secondly, I know from my ongoing practice as a Minister that this
is the case, but obviously in preparing for this Committee I have
gone through this in great detail with officials and I am very
confident that at the time that each of those sales was undertaken,
the judgment was that they were in accordance with the arms export
criteria. I will confirm that in writing.
Q150 John Battle: At our last Committee
meeting in March, I pursued the question of embargoes as opposed
to individual licences with Sri Lanka, and I was a bit disappointed
by the evidence of the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence,
because they made the remark that if Western democracies were
to place embargoes on places like Sri Lanka, then all they would
do, because they had not got their own indigenous production,
is go elsewhere to countries that might not be friendly to us.
I thought that that was a most unsatisfactory answer. I was rather
more encouraged by your answer in the House of Commons in February,
where you assured the House, and the country really, that since
the breaking of the cease-fire in January 2008 that the UK has
not issued any licences for lethal goods or any other military
goods that would prolong or aggravate the internal conflict in
Sri Lanka. Since February, since March, and until today, the situation
has magnified and is much worse. As I pointed out at the last
Committee meeting, there is no proper press reporting of what
is going on, but there are rumours of thousands of people being
slaughtered in the Tamil enclave as we sit here. In the rest of
your reply you said you did not think the situation in Sri Lanka
would be improved by the introduction of an embargo on defence
equipment. In my time as a foreign minister we did—and you
have given a very coherent case for this—case-by-case judgments,
but we also had embargoes on certain countries to send a very
clear political and indeed commercial message to those countries
that we wanted them to act differently. Has the time not come
for you to think about not only imposing our own embargo on Sri
Lanka, but joining with colleagues in the UN and the EU now to
impose an arms embargo on Sri Lanka now?
Bill Rammell: I very much share
your concern about the current situation in Sri Lanka, both in
terms of the internal conflict and the associated human rights
concerns. We have just been talking about Gaza, where there were
genuine humanitarian concerns. If you look at it in number terms,
the situation in Sri Lanka is probably greater and a real cause
for concern. I do not judge. You make judgments based on the situation
at the time; you do not make judgments for ever and a day. I do
not judge at the moment that an embargo would give us greater
leverage with the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE, because
it is a two-sided process, to get the kind of peaceful outcome
and cease-fire that we have been looking for. One of the other
problems, both with trying to get a UN Security Council resolution
or an embargo is that, bluntly, we would fail in doing that. I
know some people argue that you should absolutely state your conviction
regardless of the outcome you will achieve. I think that if we
went to the Security Council at the moment and sought to get,
for example, a Security Council statement, and failed, that would
make the situation of ordinary people on the ground in Sri Lanka
even worse, because the pressure on the authorities and the LTTE
to change their conduct would be less.
Q151 John Battle: I am not sure that
I completely accept that, given the role of the Chinese and the
Indians, and the fact that the Indians could probably be the most
influential, but are in a difficult position because of the election
at the moment. I accept the difficulties at the UN, but could
you also refer to the EU, because someone somewhere has to start
sending pretty heavy signals of pressure? Who can put pressure
on Sri Lanka? Otherwise, our Government is wasting its time, frankly,
sending an envoy, Des Browne, to negotiate at the UN and the Sri
Lankan authorities to try and obtain some leverage on the government
to make some difference. If he is out there as a lone ranger it
is not going to be very helpful. What more can we do internationally?
Bill Rammell: Just because I underlined
the difficulties of getting international co-ordinated action,
do not for a minute imagine we are not trying to achieve that.
I think the statement that the Foreign Secretary agreed with Secretary
Clinton in January or February, calling for a cease-fire, was
a very positive step forward. The fact that we had a statement
through the UN in support has been positive, and statements from
the European Union. We are in discussions with the Indian Government
about the pressure they can bring to bear. I think the situation
in Sri Lanka is extraordinarily concerning. We are exploring every
avenue to try and bring about a cease-fire. I happen to think
the appointment of Des Browne as special envoy by the Prime Minister
was a serious attempt to broker some engagement with the Sri Lankan
Government, and I regret the fact that as yet the Sri Lankan Government
has not responded to that, but we are going to keep at it.
Q152 John Battle: I am still left
in doubt whether there are any circumstances in which we will
bring about embargoes on any country! I want to move away from
what the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence is saying because
we do have embargoes on some countries. Can you envisage that
in the future we will impose no more embargoes?
Bill Rammell: No, there are countries
where we have embargoes. The judgment you have to make when you
go for an embargo is that you have reached the end of the diplomatic
road and you have no other levers at your disposal. Once you go
down that road, let us not delude ourselves that in some senses
you lose the leverage because they say "you are not engaging
with us at all" and the drawbridge comes up. You can use
that card, but I do not want to be in a situation of using an
embargo because it demonstrates you have lost a lot of influence.
Q153 Mike Gapes: I want to raise
a question about why we take such a tough line on the Israelis,
but since 1997 we seem to have taken a very lax line on the Sri
Lankans. There is a very important document we received from Safer
World, which lists components, communications equipment, armoured
vehicles, naval guns, naval equipment, sold to, exported to the
Sri Lankan Government every year from 1997 onwards. It lists the
kinds of things that they have been using, not just in the last
few weeks, but over several years in their conflict with the organisation
LTTE. It is quite clear from reading this that even if we had
an embargo now the horse has bolted! I welcome the fact that in
2008 we said that exports would not be continued, but in 2006,
according to this Safer World document, when the truce broke down
and hostilities began to escalate, we were still exporting air
guns, aircraft military communications equipment, armoured all-wheel
drive vehicles, components for general purpose machine guns, components
for machine guns, components for military air engines, components
for semi-automatic pistols, small arms ammunition, components
for combat aircraft. I could go through the same for other years.
There has been a lack of focus on this conflict, and you yourself
accepted that casualties in Sri Lanka have been greater than anything
that has happened in Gaza, and the international community, partly
because the Sri Lankan Government does not allow journalists in
and also that there are human rights abuses in Sri Lanka, has
not been focusing on this conflict and has not been for years.
In retrospect would you now say that perhaps we should have been
much more strict with Sri Lanka in the last decade so that they
would not have been able to use equipment that was exported from
this country for use in their internal conflict?
Bill Rammell: Again, we make judgments
on a case-by-case basis. On the basis of the information at the
time—those are rigorously looked at, and those sales were
judged to be in accordance with the criteria. I would say it,
would I not, but I do not think it is a fair criticism of the
stance the Government has taken, as a country, in respect of Sri
Lanka, and that is partly because of that historical relationship.
However, it is a fair critique of the international community
that not enough focus has taken place on what has been happening
in Sri Lanka. That is partly because of that historical relationship.
However, it is a fair critique of the international community
that not enough focus has taken place on what has been happening
in Sri Lanka. For the record, not just since 2008 but since the
beginning of 2007 there have been very few licences approved for
Sri Lanka, and for several years we have not supplied the Sri
Lankan armed forces with lethal material. I think that demonstrates
that our procedures and our criteria have been working, but do
we need a resolution to an appalling conflict that is taking place
in Sri Lanka as urgently as possible? Yes. Are we doing everything
we possibly can at the moment to try and bring that about as well?
Q154 Mike Gapes: Would you not at
least accept that whilst we have tightened up the procedures with
regard to Sri Lanka in the last few years, we did not have such
tight procedures with regard to Sri Lanka in the last five, six,
or seven years?
Bill Rammell: I honestly would
not accept that criticism, because you make the judgment based
on the evidence that is available at the time, based on what is
happening on the ground. You are referring to changes that have
taken place since those incidents took place. If you went back
through history, bluntly we would not sell arms to anybody because
of what has happened in the past. You base it on the evidence
available.
Q155 Mike Gapes: Is it not true that
knowing that there was this ongoing conflict, which has been going
on for 20-odd years, and knowing that the cease-fire and the agreement
that was supposedly in place were very, very weak and eroding,
and knowing that we were providing equipment that could be used,
and has been used in recent years, that we should have been more
careful about it in the past?
Bill Rammell: States have a legitimate
right to proportionate self-defence. Taking account of that and
looking at all the available evidence of what is happening on
the ground, you do not judge that a sale will breach any one of
your criteria, then in those circumstances it is legitimate for
a sale to take place. Had we, based upon what has been happening
in Sri Lanka in recent times, similarly made judgments about those
sales and disapproved lethal sales, then yes we have, and that
has been the right thing to do.
Q156 Mr Borrow: Can we move on to
changes in the guidelines for the UK Suppliers' Group, in regard
to the issue of India. As I understand it, the UK Suppliers' Group
had a policy that said you had to sign the non-proliferation treaty
in order to be involved in exporting nuclear materials, and also
that you had to have a comprehensive agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Authority. Those guidelines were changed to allow
exports to India, and that was in the absence of a comprehensive
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Authority, although
there is an agreement of some sort in place. That could have been
halted, as I understand it, if the UK had objected to the change
in the guidelines. Did the UK Government consider objecting to
those changes in guidelines?
Bill Rammell: As soon as this
deal was mooted we made a judgment in the broadest context about
whether we thought it was a beneficial change, and from the beginning
we supported this change. It will make a contribution, both in
energy and climate security terms; and particularly it is a mechanism,
bearing in mind our long-standing belief and policy commitment
that we wanted India to sign up to the non-proliferation treaty
and for all sorts of reasons India has chosen not to do that,
effectively this is a means of drawing India in to the broader
non-proliferation regime. In return for that we have delivered
some significant advantages that the Indian Government has undertaken
voluntarily. For example, India has committed to sign and adhere
to additional protocol with respect to their civil nuclear facilities,
refraining from transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technologies
to states that do not have them, instituting a national export
control system capable of effectively controlling transfers, continuing
particularly its moratorium on nuclear testing and its readiness
to work with others towards a fissile material cut-off treaty.
All of those are things that we wanted to happen for a long period
of time, and by looking at this practically and pragmatically
we have managed to bring them about through this mechanism.
Q157 Mr Borrow: To what extent are
those agreements specific to the current government in India,
and to what extent would they carry forward to a government of
a different complexion in India?
Bill Rammell: Even in respect
of international treaties, future governments' hands are not bound,
and you can renegotiate.
Ms Adamson: I would add on that
that the membership of the Nuclear Supplies Group itself has agreed
to trade under certain conditions, that is the condition under
which the exemption was granted; so it could be for the members
of the Nuclear Supplies Group themselves to say, "You are
not meeting the commitments that you set up before." I think
the NSG itself and the members thereof have the power to say,
"You are not living up to your commitments."
Q158 Mr Borrow: Can you understand
that many people would see the accommodation that was made for
India as a sign very much that India is a powerful player, and
therefore that special consideration was given to India that would
not have been given to a country that was not considered of such
importance internationally? Would that seem to set a precedent
that if you are powerful enough or important enough you can change
the rules, or the rules will be changed to accommodate you?
Bill Rammell: I would look at
it differently. We have wanted, for years, to get India to sign
up to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, and to adhere to
the non-proliferation regimes. That has not happened. You could
continue down that road and if a proposal is on the table that
effectively drags India in, within that broader non-proliferation
regime, I think that is a deal worth doing.
Q159 Mr Borrow: Finally, Minister,
I understand that new criteria are currently being considered
by the Nuclear Supplies Group. To what extent are you confident
that were those new criteria to be agreed, that there would not
be a risk of nuclear exports to countries outside the non-proliferation
treaty countries?
Bill Rammell: I am very confident
of that because the whole of our focus, both through that process
and through the IAEA process is to seek to do everything possible
to stop the spread of nuclear weapon technology.
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