Aid Under Pressure: Support for Development Assistance in a Global Economic Downturn - International Development Committee Contents


Written evidence submitted by Dr van Heerde and Dr Hudson

A.  SUMMARY POINTS

  1.  Findings from recent surveys of public opinion and development aid show an overwhelming level of support for the principle of aid to poor countries and official development aid. These findings have buoyed policymakers who argued that high-levels of support are necessary for increasing aid levels, notably to the 0.7% (ODA/GNI ratio) goal for all OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. However, to date, there is no empirical evidence showing positive covariation between public opinion and development aid.

  2.  Our research has shown that using a more restrictive (and hence valid) measure of support for development assistance, there is a weak, negative correlation between public opinion and ODA. Using a more generous measure of support for aid/concern for poverty/helping the poor, we find a positive, but very weak correlation. Neither of these results achieve traditional levels of statistical significance which may be a function of low sample size, but the conclusion we draw is that based on the nearly flat slope lines (see figure 1/2 for evidence) there is no relationship between support and ODA.

  3.  There dangers to DFID's mission of poverty alleviation in rendering future policy decisions on development aid contingent upon results from existing surveys of public support for development aid programmes. Whilst democratic responsiveness is key to effective democratic governance, current measures of public support are subject to extreme measurement error and are of poor validity.

  4.  Existing surveys of public attitudes suffer from poor validity, in other words, they fail to measure the underlying attitudes they claim to. Moreover, respondents may understand development aid as essentially humanitarian aid thus further biasing results. Surveys also fail to report absolute v. relative support for aid.

  5.  Measures of support for development aid do not control for respondent knowledge-levels and perceptions of aid effectiveness, which results in an upward biasing of levels of true support.

  6.  There is little understanding of the factors that motivate individual-level support for development aid or concern for poverty which is important in linking domestic issue publics with development publics, and for developing strategic communication and the citizenship curriculum.

  7.  We do not dismiss a (potential) relationship between public opinion and policy, we suggest here that the public for development aid is substantially smaller than survey results would suggest. Future survey instruments need to take into account existing weaknesses so that we are better able to identify and understand support for development aid.

B.  INTRODUCTION

  1.  Dr Jennifer van Heerde is Lecturer in Research Methods in the Department of Political Science/School of Public Policy, University College London. She received a BA from the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) and a Masters and PhD from the University of California Riverside. Her research interests include public opinion, political knowledge and communication and party/campaign finance. Her work has appeared in the British Journal of Political Science and Journal of Elections Public Opinion & Parties. A recent paper, co-authored with David Hudson, on understanding the determinants of individual-level concern for poverty is forthcoming in Political Studies.

  2.  Dr David Hudson is Lecturer in International Relations and Political Economy in the Department of Political Science/School of Public Policy, University College London. He received a B.Soc.Sci, MA, and PhD from the University of Birmingham, UK. His research interests include financing for development, global financial governance and support for poverty alleviation. His work has appeared in Review of International Studies, and Millennium. A book on Global Finance and Development is forthcoming with Routledge Press. A recent paper, co-authored with Jennifer van Heerde, on understanding the determinants of individual-level concern for poverty is forthcoming in Political Studies.

C.  FACTUAL INFORMATION

  1.  A key assumption underlying national and international organisations' commitment to monitoring public opinion is that public support for development assistance is fundamental to maintaining, and importantly, increasing current levels of aid. By way of example, the International Development Committee in their inquiry call states: "Public support is essential to an effective development policy and this could also be threatened if the financial crises continues to affect the real economy. As part of this inquiry, the committee will assess whether there have been changes in public support for aid expenditure as a result of the economic downturn, and in particular whether the public's view on the UK Government's development work have changed". In policy terms then, high levels of public support for development aid, can be used as both an indicator to, and leverage against, politicians who vote to allocate foreign aid against a number of competing budget issues (Council of Europe, 2001; Burnell, 1998).

  2.  The assumed linkage between opinion and policy is not without merit; a substantial literature has demonstrated both the theoretical and empirical link between public opinion and public policy (Monroe 1998; Hill & Hinton-Andersson 1995; Stimson et al. 1995; Page and Shapiro 1983). Much of the evidence, however, for a link between public opinion and policy focuses predominantly public opinion and domestic policy issues; the linkage between public opinion and foreign policy has been harder to detect and unstable (Holsti 1992; 2004). This is due, in part, to issue salience (ie the extent to which an issue resonates with individuals) which has been shown to play a key role in opinion formation and responsiveness (Burnstein 2003) and citizens' ability to process complex information and reveal consistent opinions (Zaller 1992).

  3.  The assumed opinion-policy linkage has not been subjected to robust empirical testing. In fact, evidence produced by McDonnell (2001) shows a small, negative relationship between opinion and aid. In other words, as support for aid increases, aid allocations decrease.

  4.  Our analysis (see figure 1 and 2) shows no evidence of a positive relationship between public opinion and ODA (as a percentage of GNI) for OECD countries from 1990-2007. We create two measures for public support. The first measure (figure 1) includes only those survey questions that ask explicitly about support for development aid (PIPA) or the principle of development aid (Eurobarometer). These questions are considered to be of greater face validity—they measure what the researcher is intending to measure, eg support for a particular policy of development assistance—and therefore are the best indicators of public support. Using this measure we find that public support averages 73.6% (standard deviation 12.6), however, there is a negative correlation between support and ODA (r= -.04, p < .699, n=95). This result is not statistically significant at the traditional .05 level, which may be due to the small sample size (a result of available data).

  5.  The second measure (figure 2) is more inclusive, keeping the questions from our first measure as well as those survey questions that tap concern for poverty in developing countries more broadly. For example, the standard attitudinal measure for support for development programs in the Eurobarometer surveys ask, "In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important, or not at all important to help poor people in countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop", and DFID's primary dependent variable asks respondents' level of concern for poverty in developing countries (5-pt). Using this measure, which we argue is a less valid measure of support for development assistance (but more inclusive of general attitudes towards poverty alleviation), we find pubic support averages 77.2% (standard deviation= 13.1) and a small but statistically insignificant relationship between support and ODA (r = .021, p < .81, n= 128). (See figure 1). In sum, both measures show essentially no relationship between the two variables. The shift from a very weak negative relationship to a weaker positive relationship is not surprising given the change from a more restrictive measure 1, to a broader measure 2. In both cases, the slopes are essentially flat indicating no relationship between the two variables.

  6.  Existing surveys on public opinion and development assistance suffer from a number of problems that render their findings suspect. We have examined the following representative sample of surveys from which we offer the following critique: (1) World Opinion on Addressing Hunger and Poverty (PIPA 2008); (2) Public Attitudes towards Development (UK Department for International Development 2008, 2005); (3) Europeans and Development Aid (European Commission Eurobarometer 2007, 2005, 1999); and (4) Americans on Foreign Aid and World Hunger (PIPA 2001). Our critique covers four categories of interest: (1) the validity of measures of public support for development assistance; (2) knowledge and awareness of development; (3) perceptions of effectiveness and corruption, and (4) motivations of support for development aid and concern for poverty.

  7.  Validity 1. Existing surveys are of poor validity, in other words they fail to measure the underlying attitudes they aim to. To illustrate, the most commonly asked question is whether respondents support the "principle of providing aid to developing countries" (OECD, Eurobarometer). From this and similar questions (eg respondents' level of concern for poverty in developing countries) researchers conclude there are high-levels of support for development assistance. However, as Czaplinska (2007: 7) notes, questions that ask about helping poor people and support for development aid are not equivalent. Following on from this, interpreting high-levels of support from such findings may be the result of measurement error, as respondents may feel compelled to reply in the affirmative to the principle of aid as a socially desirable response.

  8.  Validity 2. Survey instruments need to do a better job of measuring absolute vs relative support for development aid. Policymakers have assumed that consistently high levels of support (>70%) readily translates into political support, however there is no evidence that development assistance as a policy issue is salient for respondents when compared to competing policy issues. In measuring relative support, respondents are asked to make reasoned trade-offs between competing policy issues thus revealing relative policy preferences. For example, when a PIPA (2001) survey asked respondents to register their priorities, foreign aid is seen as less important that domestic concerns. An overwhelming 84% agreed with the assertion that "taking care of problems at home is more important than giving aid to foreign countries" (PIPA 2001: 9).

  9.  Validity 3. Finally, research has also shown that development aid/assistance can be interpreted by respondents as at least three quite different things, namely "1) attitudes toward humanitarian aid, 2) attitudes toward ODA in relation to other government expenditures, and 3) views to the effectiveness of different ODA activities" (Boas 2002: 2). McDonnell (2003) claims "public opinion does not even see 'helping poor people' as 'development' because they conceive aid as short term charity for humanitarian relief" (in McDonnell 2006, 5). She tests and finds support for the hypothesis that public opinion has an impact on decisions on aid, only if "aid" is specified and restricted to mean emergency aid. Evidence from the UK has found that the public tends to associate the UK Government's involvement in development as being disaster relief (42%) (DFID 2008: Q6).

  10.  Knowledge. Surveys of public opinion and development are characterized by pervasive and persistent low-levels of knowledge. Whilst this may be undesirable in light of considerations of democratic competence and government responsiveness, our criticism of low-levels of knowledge are targeted not towards citizens of donor countries, but to researchers who fail to report findings controlling for knowledge and indeed interest levels. A second, but related criticism here is that Gilens (2001) has shown that ignorance of policy specific information leads citizens to hold views different then they might otherwise. In short, policy specific information may yield different preferences than general political knowledge, thus, it is not enough to be interested or informed about politics generally, one must be able to engage with policy specific knowledge in order to express genuine attitudes and preferences.

  11.  Effectiveness. Evidence suggests that support for development assistance is highly contingent on perceptions of effectiveness, most especially corruption. In the UK, for instance, 47% of respondents thought that aid was wasted with 73% attributing this to corruption and 50% agreeing that it was due to poor management and/or delivery (DFID 2008: 44). Similarly, 53.8% of US respondents thought that aid money that goes to poor countries ends up in the pockets of corrupt government officials there (PIPA 2001: Q51). Though problems of corruption appear to be reasonably well surveyed they are not analysed systematically nor controlled for when reporting absolute levels of support.

  12.  Determinants of support 1. Whilst there is a substantial literature on the determinants of state motivations in giving aid, the determinants of individual-level motivations is significantly under-researched. Two recent studies, Paxton and Knack (2008) and van Heerde and Hudson (forthcoming 2009) have begun to examine what motivates individual-level support for aid programmes or concern for poverty, but much more needs to be done to understand the determinants of support particularly as strategic communication(s) on development issues and the citizenship education curriculum would be better targeted. This research agenda needs to move beyond the traditional self-interest vs moral imperative framework and better demarcate self-interest as direct benefits (eg view of the world as a zero sum game or enlightened self-interest (eg indirect benefits, positive sum game) in addition to other explanations such as altruism (satisfaction gained by others' utility (ie their utility is included in your preference set), justice, cosmopolitanism (transnational identity or as global citizens), religious beliefs, humanitarian or moral sympathies, emotional responses, etc.

  13.  Determinants of support 2. Finally, reporting public attitudes towards development aid should not exist in isolation from measures of general attitudinal structures. Or in other words, "polls rarely deliver information on underlying attitudes and values and on preferable directions of aid. In addition, polls usually neglect people's approach to policy issues going beyond aid, for instance trade, debt and immigration policy" (Czaplinska 2007: 14). Here, support for development aid may co-vary with attitudes on domestic welfare redistribution (Noel & Therein 2002), position on a left-right ideological scale, perceptions of government efficiency, or trust in political institutions. On the latter, a recent DFID survey (2008) poses a general question on respondents' trust in government to act in the country's best interest. Knowing something about respondents' wider attitudinal structures may provide a more robust interpretation of support for development aid, and importantly, link existing "publics" of support on domestic policy issues with "publics" of support for development aid.

D.  RECOMMENDATIONS

  1.  There dangers to DFID's mission of poverty alleviation in rendering future policy decisions on development aid contingent upon results from existing surveys of public support for development aid programmes. Whilst democratic responsiveness is key to effective democratic governance, current measures of public support are subject to extreme measurement error and are of poor validity. Consequently, whilst we might expect a decline in support as a result of the economic downturn, any such decline should be interpreted with serious caution as existing (high) levels of support may also be dubious or the function of measurement error.

  2.  During an economic downturn, public opinion tends to favour spending on domestic policy issues/problems relative to foreign aid expenditures. However, this opinion is no different than under normal economic conditions. Individuals have consistent preferences for spending at home than abroad. The Government should not view hard economic times as being different vis-à-vis policy preferences on development assistance than normal economic conditions.

  3.  It is crucial that knowledge questions are integrated into both survey instrument design and into the analysis of responses; respondent knowledge questions are fundamental to evaluating the robustness of public support. Moreover, issue salience should be controlled for when determining levels of support. The policy implication of this is the UK government needs to be able to identify those constituencies whose support is robust (either positive or negative) and those whose support variable or non-existent.

  4.  Let the status quo persevere: the UK government should not pull back from its 2013 commitment to meeting the 0.7% target. Public opinion may be a vital ingredient in determining aid levels and programmatic activity, but it is currently not measured in such a way that can be considered valid and reliable.

  5.  We recommend significant modifications to DIFD's (and others) monitoring of public attitudes in order to reveal robust support for development assistance. Understanding what drives individual-level motivations, especially in young-people, it vital for tailoring curriculum design and strategic communications to strengthen support for development assistance.

REFERENCES

  Boas, M. (2002). Public attitudes to aid in Japan and Norway. Working Paper 2002/02, Centre for Development and Environment, University of Oslo.

  Czaplinska, A. (2007). Building support for development cooperation. ICEI: Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales: PP 02/07. http://www.ucm.es/info/icei/pdf/PP%2002-07.pdf [Accessed 08 February 2009.].

  Council of Europe (2001). "0.7%: When and How?" http://www.coe.int/t/e/northsouth_centre/resources_centre/1_the_interdependent/Terraviva_GB101.pdf. The North-South Centre. Strasbourg.

  Department for International Development (DFID). (2005). Public attitudes on development; beliefs and attitudes concerning poverty in developing countries. London.

  van Heerde, J., & Hudson, D. (forthcoming). The righteous considereth the cause of the poor? Public attitudes towards poverty in developing countries. Political Studies.

  Holsti, O. (1994). Public opinion and American foreign policy. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

  Holsti, (1992). "Public Opinion and Foreign policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippman Consensus", International Studies Quarterly, 36 (4), 439-466.

  Mc Donnell, I. (2001). The state of public support for development co-operation. Terra Viva Dossier. North-South Centre/Inter Press Service. www.nscentre.org/tvmonthly/. [Accessed December 2008].

  McDonnell, I., H. Lecomte, & L. Wegimont, eds. (2003). Public Opinion and the Fight Against Poverty. OECD/North-South Centre. Paris: France.

  Monroe, A.D. (1998). Public opinion and public policy. Public Opinion Quarterly 62(6), 6-28.

  OECD Development Centre. (2008). Public opinion polls about development.

  http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en_2649_34101_39295366_1_1_1_1,00.html. [Accessed 9 December 2008].

  Page, B., & Shapiro, R. (1983). Effects of public opinion on policy. American Political Science Review 77(1), 175-190.

  Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA). (2001). Americans on foreign aid and world hunger: A study of US public attitudes. Available at: http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/ForeignAid/

  ForeignAid_Feb01/ForeignAid_Feb01_rpt.pdf [Accessed 27 August 2008].

  Smillie, I. (1996). Mixed messages: Public opinion and development assistance in the 1990s. In C. Foy and H. Helmich, eds., Public support for international development. Development Centre OECD: Paris, 27-54.

  Stern, M. (1998). Development aid: What the public thinks? United Nations Development Programme, Office of Development Studies. New York: New York.

  WorldPublicOpinion.org (2008). World Opinion on Addressing Hunger and Poverty, Publics in Developed Countries Ready to Contribute Funds Necessary to Cut Hunger in Half By 2015. PIPA: University of Maryland. Available at: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/btdevelopmentaidra/554.php?nid=&id=&pnt=554&lb=btda. [Accessed 12 November 2008].

  Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Figure 1. Correlation of Public Support for the (principle of) Development Aid and ODA, 1990-2007 OECD Countries


Figure 2. Correlation between Public Support for Development Aid/Concern for Poverty and ODA, 1990-2007 OECD Countries





 
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