DFID and China - International Development Committee Contents


3  Working internationally with China

72.  China's growth is having impacts far beyond its own boundaries. This has a number of implications for both high and low income countries around the world and contributes to China's increasing importance to donors such as DFID. In this chapter, we will explore: China's role within international efforts to address climate change; its engagement with development in third countries, particularly in African states; its participation within multilateral development institutions and frameworks; and the capacity of the international community to learn from China's own experience of poverty reduction and development.

Climate change

73.  As discussed in the previous chapter, China is paying increasing attention to the environmental impacts of its economic growth. Probably the major challenge facing the country in this respect is the response to climate change. China's ability both to mitigate and adapt to the effects of a changing climate are crucial to international efforts, because of China's size, its contribution to climate change and its role as leader of the G77 countries.[100] Negotiations on a new international climate change framework are being intensified in the run-up to the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen at the end of 2009.[101]

MITIGATION

74.  China has recently eclipsed the USA as the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases. In 2006, it emitted 6,018 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, compared to the USA's 5,903 million tonnes and Europe's 4,721 million tonnes.[102] However, its per capita annual emission rates are still substantially lower (5 tonnes) than the USA (20 tonnes) or the EU (10 tonnes). The 2006 Stern Report said that the global target should be 2 tonnes by 2050.[103] As the new UK Strategy for China states:

The decisions [China] makes on energy production in the next five years could lock in emissions trends for the next thirty [...] Chinese policies to reduce emissions, as part of an ambitious Copenhagen agreement, are crucial to maintaining global temperature rises from reaching dangerous levels.[104]

75.  China is also the world's second largest energy consumer, with 70% of its energy coming from carbon-heavy coal. China remains under international pressure to reduce its carbon emissions, pursue cleaner energy alternatives and participate in international frameworks. DFID told us that the Chinese Government has taken this on board: "At the top level, there is now an understanding that China can, and must, contribute to the global climate change effort. China's position at the Bali meeting [3-14 December 2007] reflected that shift in thinking."[105] However, the Government of China regularly points out that its historical emissions are low compared to western countries.

76.  The UK Government works with China on all aspects of climate change. The stated aims of the UK Strategy for China include: "China signs up to ambitious action to combat climate change at Copenhagen at end-2009" and "China ratifies an ambitious and comprehensive post-2012 framework beyond that."[106] The UK's central message is that implementing a swift transition to lower emissions is not only essential for China's own security and prosperity, but it is also feasible without undermining economic growth. There are six strands to the UK's approach: agreeing an international post-2012 framework; a shift to low carbon; carbon capture and storage; economics of climate change; EU/China work on low carbon zones; and impacts and adaptation.[107]

77.  At a UK-China Prime Ministerial Summit in January 2008, a Joint Declaration on Climate Change was signed, including at least £50 million for low carbon development allocated from the Environmental Transformation Fund together with increased grant aid for climate change.[108] Partnership over climate change was reaffirmed at the UK-China Summit of January 2009, with a commitment to intensify joint dialogue (including through a joint visit by ministers from the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR) in April 2009) and a UK Government announcement of £3 million to support adaptation in China.[109]

78.  DFID is now working to develop investment areas for the Environmental Transformation Fund allocation. It is also helping China to access and make use of additional financing for clean energy and energy efficiency, for instance by collaborating with the World Bank and other multilaterals on making the Clean Energy Investment Framework and the Strategic Climate Fund operational in China.[110] DFID supports a taskforce on energy and low carbon development within the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, a high-level advisory body to the Chinese Government. DFID believes such mechanisms will help to create the right enabling environment for low carbon development, especially at provincial level.[111]

ADAPTATION

79.  Adapting to the effects of climate change—effects that are already evident in many regions of China—is a major priority for the country. The huge snowstorms of January 2008 affected 100 million people across China and provided evidence that weather patterns are changing. The melting of the Himalayan icepack—a process that could affect one-third of the world's population, many of them in China and India—is likely to cause erratic river flows, resulting in increased flooding and drought downstream. Experts predict that climate change will make most of China warmer and wetter, but that western areas will become warmer and drier. Agricultural production is likely to be affected across the country.

80.  DFID is the lead UK Government department on promoting adaptation in China. DFID told us that, of all donors, the UK "has the most comprehensive and advanced programme of engagement" with China on climate change adaptation.[112] DFID is working with China's National Development and Reform Commission (the lead Chinese Government Department for climate change) on the development of a programme to implement an effective national and local adaptation strategy. In this work, DFID draws on two of its projects:

  • co-funding, between 2001 and 2008, with DEFRA and subsequently DECC, a study on the impacts of climate change on Chinese agriculture, both nationally and in Ningxia province; and
  • sharing lessons from research into how domestic infrastructure investments and projects may be affected by climate change.[113]

DFID'S SUPPORT TO ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE IN CHINA

81.  DFID told us that it is seen by the Chinese Government as a "trusted partner" on climate change.[114] The current initiatives described above build on collaboration with China over the last decade, for instance through the Sustainable Development Dialogue (see Chapter 2 for further details). It is clear that work on development aspects of climate change, including the impact on agriculture and infrastructure, will need to continue after the projected date for DFID's withdrawal of its bilateral aid programme in 2011. The Institute for Development Studies (IDS) highlighted that, whilst other UK Government departments, including DECC, DEFRA, FCO and BERR, will need to play a co-ordinated role in the UK-China climate change strategy, "there remains an ongoing need for in-country engagement that bears on development aspects of climate change". The IDS believed that the right agency to undertake this work was DFID. It said "an ongoing DFID presence in China as part of a co-ordinated HMG [UK Government] approach will therefore be crucial."[115] DEFRA's submission was in agreement, particularly given that DFID leads the Sustainable Development Dialogue in China (whilst DEFRA leads in the UK).[116]

82.  The DFID Minister told us that, when considering which aspects of DFID's development relationship with China should continue post-2011, climate change was his "number 1 area of choice". He saw potential for current collaboration to "roll forward", saying "it is not only where we can add value with the Chinese Government, it is where they have a real vested interest as they need to tackle this issue both in adaptation as well as mitigation."[117] During our visit, DFID told us that continuing its work on climate change in China would not require substantial funding, and that money could come from a range of sources, including DFID's research budget and from China's own resources, which the UK could help leverage. Officials said that the Chinese Government had money available for investment in adaptation but access to funding for research and policy analysis was more difficult. The IDS thought that the UK had a crucial role in supporting research and "collaborative expertise", particularly given China's limited engagement with the development studies field.[118]

83.  We believe that DFID will need to continue to play a primary role in supporting China's responses to climate change after 2011. DFID is the only donor with a comprehensive approach to climate change in China. It has spent a number of years building trusted relationships with the Chinese Government in this crucial area—it would be a risky and inefficient use of resources to give up this influence at this important stage of international climate change negotiations.

84.  We reiterate our recommendation that DFID continue to lead the UK-China Sustainable Development Dialogue within China between 2012-2015. We further recommend that DFID continue its current valuable support to development aspects of both mitigation of and adaptation to climate change after 2011. This should include monitoring the £50 million allocated from the Environmental Transformation Fund and supporting China to use potential resources from the Clean Energy Investment Framework and the Strategic Climate Fund. We recommend that particular attention is paid to a 'weak link' in China's current approach: research and policy analysis on climate change. DFID's continued support to work on climate change in China should take place within a co-ordinated UK Government approach across all relevant departments.

Development in third countries

85.  Over the last five years, China has been increasingly willing to assume an active leadership role within international development fora. DFID said that examples of this include: China's support of the G22 at the Cancun trade negotiations in 2003; its endorsement of Prime Minister Gordon Brown's MDG Call to Action in 2008; and, after years of shielding the Government of Sudan in the UN Security Council, its recent positive support for UN Security Council Resolutions on Darfur.[119] DFID states that China has been a strong supporter of the MDGs.[120] The Beijing Action Plan, adopted in November 2006, made multi-billion dollar commitments to aid and investment in Africa, including the cancellation of $1.3 billion of debt. China has consistently emphasised developed countries' aid commitments and the importance of MDG 8, which seeks a "global partnership for development".

86.   China itself has also become a donor. It does not generally give details about its aid and it is not a member of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC). However, Premier Wen recently announced that support to developing countries had amounted to $30 billion by June 2008. Although the nature of this assistance was not disclosed, almost half of it was categorised by the Premier as "free aid".[121] In 2007, China became a donor for the first time to the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA). DFID told us: "[China's] $30 million contribution was modest (the UK provided £2.1 billion), but it showed China's acceptance of its global role in dealing with international poverty reduction".[122] China also contributed $120 million to the replenishment of the African Development Fund and will participate in the replenishment of the Asian Development Bank. It is in discussions about membership with the Inter-American Development Bank.[123]

87.  China's approach to supporting development in third countries, whether in Africa or in neighbouring poor states such as Cambodia, clearly differs from the 'western' model of development pursued by OECD DAC donors such as the UK, who seek to address the basic human needs of the poor—such as health, education, sanitation, water and livelihoods—while also encouraging trade liberalisation, financial and market reforms and making aid conditional on human rights, good governance and economic reform. But Professor Stephen Chan of the School of Oriental and African Studies told us that China's alternative approach comes with many advantages:

[The UK has] no choice but to put in [...] all kinds of regulatory mechanisms which safeguard the taxpayer's investment [...] The Chinese are not constrained in that manner and are able to see things in a much more holistic view [...] If the Chinese follow the remainder of the methodology in terms of actually building these things themselves [...] it is welcome by African leaders for more than one reason: sometimes you actually get a result.[124]

88.  In 2006, DFID launched a formal dialogue with China on international development issues. The Dialogue is underpinned by dedicated staff resources in Beijing and £1 million funding for research on relations between China and African countries.[125] DFID told us that this funding supports strategic studies, capacity building and seminars on development-related themes. It said:

Support is being provided to African universities and think-tanks for better information, research and analysis. There is a general paucity of good research and studies, and the support is therefore filling an important gap.[126]

Examples of this work include: supporting the publication of a report about Chinese aid for African policymakers; English language training for China's UN peacekeepers; and the DFID-WWF UK project with Chinese and African stakeholders on forestry in East Africa (see Paragraph 69).[127]

89.   DFID told us that high-level six-monthly formal dialogue sessions have been held at Director-General and DFID/FCO Africa Director level to discuss policy and potential collaboration. Partnership over global poverty reduction and the MDGs was reaffirmed at the UK-China Summit in January 2009.[128] DFID believes that the Dialogue still has a lot to achieve:

China's approach to engagement with some African regimes differs substantially from ours. It will require further sustained engagement in Beijing and in African capitals to make the case that Chinese and African interests will be better protected by encouraging conflict resolution, and that commercial and political factors are not divorced from development outcomes.[129]

90.  DFID says that it is now keen for this dialogue to move into practical measures. It is particularly keen to collaborate in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in Sudan, but is also interested in co-operating in a range of countries on a variety of issues.[130] Some collaborative work has begun in the DRC, where DFID has been assisting with environmental assessments for a big Chinese road-building project.[131] YozuMannion Ltd, a consultancy, agreed that moving into practical collaboration is important so that the UK and China can "develop greater understanding of each other's approach, and help to minimise situations in which respective approaches contradict or undermine each other."[132] The Vice Minister for Commerce told us in Beijing that China would potentially be interested in collaborating with the UK in third countries but no practical co-operation had yet been launched.

91.  We support DFID's dialogue with China on international development issues, and the decision to underpin the process with funding and staff resources in Beijing. DFID-supported research about the relationships between China and African countries is a useful step towards greater understanding about international development. It is essential that the UK continues to strengthen this dialogue and begins to move it beyond discussion into practical collaboration in third countries. We believe that on the ground co-operation in developing countries, particularly those in Africa, could help ensure that the benefits of UK and Chinese approaches are mutually reinforcing.

92.  The dialogue on international development is embedded within the UK's wider strategy for China. This strategy has had the same three elements since its launch in 2005: getting the best for the UK from China's rise; fostering China's emergence as a responsible global player; and promoting sustainable development, modernisation and internal reform in China.[133] The current four-year phase of the strategy was launched by the Foreign Secretary on 22 January 2009.[134] We were not informed of the timetable for launching the Paper, despite it evidently having been in preparation since June 2008, and so we were not able to contribute to its content.[135] We were surprised to see that DFID is not mentioned at all in the document, despite the high profile of development issues within it. When we questioned the DFID Minister and a Foreign Office (FCO) official about this, we were told that this was because the Strategy is led by the FCO and that one of its key aims was to raise awareness within the UK of the importance of China. We were told that many Departments—including DFID—had contributed to the Strategy and "will be very closely involved in its delivery".[136]

93.  We were surprised that the new UK Government framework document on engagement with China, launched in January 2009, did not mention DFID despite the fact that international development issues are an integral part of the Strategy. We fail to see how these development issues can be effectively implemented, or how a coherent UK Government strategy can be operated, without a clear delineation of departmental roles. We are concerned that this may lead to confusion and poor co-ordination. We urge the UK Government to ensure that all Departments working in China have a clear understanding of the interaction between their different areas of work and the importance of co-ordinating their activities.

China's engagement in Africa

94.  The increasingly close links between China and African countries divide opinion. On one hand, the huge inflows of money and resources to poor African nations are much-needed. In 2006 China's EXIM Bank committed $13 billion to Africa, over twice as much new lending as the World Bank.[137] WWF-UK told us that other benefits to China's increasing investment profile in the continent include: higher commodity prices (for instance, oil, copper, nickel and timber); the importation of cheap products that benefit local consumers; and increased investment in infrastructure (an area that has been underfunded by other donors in previous years).[138] China has been quick to reassure African governments that it has no plans to cut investment and further aid commitments were made to Tanzania and Senegal during President Hu Jintao's visit to Africa in February 2009.[139] However, it remains to be seen whether current investment levels will be sustained throughout and following the global economic downturn.[140] Recent reports suggest China's biggest investment deal in Africa, a £6 billion mining project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) under which China will gain natural resources in exchange for building infrastructure, is already at risk due to reduced commodity prices and western donors' concerns about DRC taking on new commercial debt.[141]

95.  Critics of China's engagement in Africa assert that few Chinese investments are truly pro-poor. Their concerns fall into three main categories. The first of these relates to the transparency and sustainability of Chinese investments. As stated earlier, China does not publish details of its aid and investment programmes. Loan agreements are not disclosed. Some argue that the availability of such loans releases countries with poor human rights and development records from working through multilateral concessional lending frameworks such as those offered by the IMF, who demand progress in transparency and economic management in return for funds.[142]

96.  Secondly, it is clear that the trading relationship is not always on equal terms. Chinese investments are often subsidised by cheap capital from the Chinese government and bring in Chinese labour rather than using local workers.[143] Thirdly, Chinese companies have been criticised for weak adherence to national safety, labour and environmental legislation. As we have said, violations of such codes are in part due to poor governance structures in many African countries. This includes the ability of governments to enforce tax collection, a pre-requisite for poverty reduction. Christian Aid told us that, in response, DFID should "channel support to those African governments who want more capacity to enforce labour, environmental [...] and tax legislation."[144]

China's participation in multilateral processes

97.  Christian Aid believed that addressing concerns about governance would require greater Chinese participation within multilateral approaches to private sector development and corporate responsibility, such as the UN Global Compact and the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA).[145] In our report on DFID and the African Development Bank (AfDB), published in May 2008, we recommended that securing Chinese membership of the ICA, which the AfDB hosts, would help increase Chinese engagement with the AfDB, one of the most important multilateral institutions in Africa.[146]

98.  Given that up to 80% of Chinese investment in Africa is concentrated in resource-rich countries, securing Chinese participation in initiatives specific to the natural resources sector, such as the UK-led Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), is a priority.[147] Thus far, China has not signed up to the EITI, despite its huge stake in the international natural resources sector. DFID said that China tends to view "looser" coalitions such as the EITI and the ICA "as rich-country/OECD clubs that it says are not suitable for China given that it is still a developing country".[148] Daniel Large of the School of Oriental and African Studies said that China's reservations about joining the EITI are likely to relate to a wish not to "revise its principles or renegotiate its terms of engagement" (for instance, publicly disclosing terms of contracts) and concerns about impairing the competitiveness of Chinese companies.[149]

99.  Dr Martyn Davies, Director of the Centre for Chinese Studies at South Africa's Stellenbosch University, believed that the "goodwill" already established between DFID and China put the Department in a "unique position" to encourage Chinese participation in multilateral processes.[150]

100.  Chinese engagement with multilateral processes is also sought in connection with the impact of China's investments on governance and human rights in African countries. China's Africa Policy, published in 2006, explicitly states that Chinese economic aid comes with no "political strings".[151] China has attracted criticism for its policy of non-interference in countries with poor human rights records. Recent controversy has focused on: China's trade and military links with the Sudanese government (around 70% of Sudanese exports, mainly oil, go to China); close links with Mugabe's government in Zimbabwe, including weapons shipments; China's veto of economic sanctions against Zimbabwe following what the EU termed the 'sham' presidential run-off election of 2008; and its £5 billion mining deal in the Democratic Republic of Congo, giving a large slice of DRC's copper and cobalt resources to China. Chinese influence on the African Continent will be extended following the creation of five "special economic zones" in Africa. This initiative emanated from the Beijing Action Plan announced in 2006. The preferential trade and industrial zones aim to facilitate Chinese business entry in Africa. The first zone has already been established in Zambia, a second in Mauritius, and others are reportedly being negotiated in Egypt, Nigeria, and possibly Tanzania.[152]

101.  We are aware that China is developing its own channels for dialogue with African countries, for instance through the China-Africa Forum and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.[153] Of course, it is African and Chinese policymakers who should "drive the process" of dialogue, rather than the UK seeking to somehow govern their relationship.[154] However, a more multilateral approach by China would help ensure that the achievement of common development objectives such as the MDGs are given a high priority.

102.  Whilst there are many positive aspects to China's increasing investments in African countries, there are also concerns regarding: transparency; sustainability; the capacity for equal partnership; weak adherence to safety, labour and environmental legislation; and governance and human rights. Finding the most appropriate way to address these concerns is a matter for the Chinese Government and the governments of African states. However, we believe that, within its wider work on governance issues, DFID should continue to help to build the capacity of African governments to regulate foreign investors and enforce labour and environmental legislation. We believe that DFID should also promote greater Chinese involvement in multilateral initiatives, including those relevant to private sector development such as the UN Global Compact and the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, and those focused on the natural resource sector, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Learning from China

103.  China's recent record of rapid poverty reduction holds important lessons for other developing countries. A 2008 World Bank paper found that China had reduced poverty at a much higher rate than the rest of the developing world and said that Africa's situation today is "for the most part comparable to China's starting point after the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward [in the 1950-60s]."[155]

104.  The Chinese Government has highlighted 'south-south learning' as an objective within its international role as part of its MDG 8 commitment.[156] DFID says that it aims to draw out activities for south-south learning from most of its projects in China, and seeks to strengthen the dissemination of such lessons by:

  • providing funding to the International Poverty Reduction Centre in China (where, amongst other support, DFID has collaborated on comparing poverty reduction in China and Africa);
  • the production of a set of papers with the International Food Policy Research Institute on key reform experiences that have contributed to China's development success, and how these may be relevant for international experience; and
  • supporting Zhejiang University in strengthening its training for African officials on rural development.[157]

As the IDS pointed out, the learning process is a mutual one and there are many opportunities for DFID to develop ideas from both China's development and from the Department's own work in China, which it can subsequently use in its programmes elsewhere:

The exchange of ideas, technology and expertise remain valuable both to China as it continues to address development challenges; as well as to western donors in creating an opportunity to understand, learn from and work with China in other low income countries. It also provides a basis for fostering more direct south-south learning and engagement, something to which DFID's Beijing office has demonstrated commitment.[158]

105.  China has also raised its profile in the global knowledge economy, particularly in the fields of science and innovation. DFID told us that it is exploring collaboration with Chinese researchers in the production of global public goods, particularly in research and innovation, that can benefit countries in Africa:

We are exploring whether existing UK-China research collaboration has the potential for pursuing international development goals, working closely with colleagues at the Embassy, British Council, and the UK Research Councils, which recently opened an office in Beijing. We are also actively participating in a UK/China Ministerial dialogue on health.[159]

DFID organised a series of consultations to explore the potential for collaboration whilst developing its Research Strategy for 2008-2013.[160]

106.  The range of topics on which China could share its learning with other developing countries is very broad. However, we were struck by one particular area in which Chinese expertise is much-needed: agriculture and food security. A recent World Bank paper points out that China is in a good position to help African countries to strengthen their agricultural sectors, given that agriculture has contributed significantly to growth and poverty reduction in China.[161] Many international actors are calling for a second 'green revolution' to try to repeat the successes of Asian agriculture in Africa.[162] Dr Giles Mohan of the Open University told us, "Much can be learnt from China's agricultural model and China has much expertise to bring Africa as well as commercial muscle. This, then, seems to be a primary area for co-operation and DFID has resources for research which could be used to develop these partnerships."[163] DFID launched a new package of support to agricultural research in 2008 which will see funding double to £400 million over five years.[164]

107.  China already offers some support to agriculture in Africa. The China Development Bank has granted loans worth several hundred million dollars to agricultural processing firms, mostly in East Africa. It has also agreed to help raise grain production in some African countries by using Chinese rice seeds and technology, and to set up demonstration farms.[165]

108.  The DFID Minister agreed that agriculture should be a priority area for establishing transferable lessons.[166] At the UK-China Summit in January 2009, an agreement was reached to "co-operate on food security, including agricultural research on food security, improving food safety and co-operation in agriculture in Africa." The UK and China agreed to host "an important meeting on agriculture co-operation that includes officials and experts from African countries."[167] As noted in Chapter 2, DFID supports work on agriculture in China through initiatives such as the UK-China Sustainable Agriculture Innovation Network (SAIN).

109.  China offers many lessons about economic growth and poverty reduction for other developing countries. The learning process between donors such as DFID, China and third countries is a mutual one: there are many opportunities for DFID to develop ideas from both China's development and from the Department's own work in China, which it can subsequently use in its programmes elsewhere. Significantly, specific innovative development pilots to eradicate poverty could also be trialled in the UK.

110.  We consider agriculture a priority area for lesson-sharing between China and other developing countries, especially those in Africa. We were pleased to hear that an agreement was reached at the UK-China Summit in January 2009 to strengthen co-operation between the UK and China on food security, including agricultural research, and that the two countries will host an international meeting on agriculture co-operation that includes officials and experts from African countries. We urge DFID to press ahead with implementing this new agreement as quickly as possible, and request that we are kept up-to-date with progress on organising the international meeting.



100   The Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organisation of developing countries in the United Nations system.  Back

101   Negotiations over a new climate change pact will be held at the Copenhagen conference. Back

102   "Climate change: The carbon atlas", The Guardian, Tuesday 9 December 2008 Back

103   Information provided during the Committee's visit to China. Back

104   FCO, The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement, January 2009, pp 9 and 7.  Back

105   Ev 62  Back

106   FCO, The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement, January 2009, p 16 Back

107   Information provided during the Committee's visit to China. Back

108   The Environmental Transformation Fund (ETF) is a £800m joint DFID/DECC fund, announced in Budget 2007. The aim is to reduce poverty through environmental protection and helping developing countries respond to climate change. Back

109   UK-China Summit: Key Outcomes 2009, online at www.Number10.gov.uk Back

110   The Clean Energy Investment Framework is an initiative involving regional development banks and the World Bank to accelerate the adoption of technologies that enable cleaner, more efficient energy production and use in developing countries. The Strategic Climate Fund is a multi-donor mechanism that will channel funds into clean technology and other climate-related investments including forestry. Back

111   Ev 62 Back

112   Ev 62 Back

113   Ev 62 Back

114   Q 170 Back

115   Ev 92 Back

116   Ev 81-82 Back

117   Q 172  Back

118   Ev 91 Back

119   Ev 64 Back

120   Ev 64 Back

121   According to Premier Wen Jiabao's speech at the UN High Level event on the MDGs, 25 September 2008, this sum represented "various forms of assistance", of which 90.8 billion renminbi was "free aid". Back

122   Ev 64 Back

123   Ev 64 Back

124   Q 120 [Professor Stephen Chan] Back

125   Ev 61 Back

126   Ev 61 Back

127   DFID Factsheet, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Africa: Working with China, December 2008 Back

128   UK-China Summit: Key Outcomes 2009, online at www.Number10.gov.uk Back

129   Ev 61 Back

130   Ev 61 Back

131   Q 179 [Adrian Davis] Back

132   Ev 112 Back

133   Ev 60 Back

134   FCO, The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement, January 2009 Back

135   Q 148 Back

136   Qq 144-147 Back

137   Ev 61 Back

138   Ev 109 Back

139   "China's Hu grants aid to Tanzania", BBC News Online, 17 February 2009 Back

140   "Chinese keep low profile to cash in on the slump", The Times, 24 January 2009 Back

141   "Congo pressed over China deal", Financial Times, 10 February 2009 Back

142   Ev 109 Back

143   Ev 85 Back

144   Ev 87 Back

145   Ev 86 Back

146   International Development Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2007-08, DFID and the African Development Bank, HC 441, para 51 Back

147   The EITI is a partnership of oil, gas and mining companies, NGOs and producer/consumer countries which was launched by Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2002. By increasing public knowledge of revenue levels, the Initiative aims to empower citizens and institutions to hold governments and companies to account. Back

148   Ev 64 Back

149   Qq 21-22 Back

150   Ev 80 Back

151   China's Africa Policy, January 2006. Available online at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm  Back

152   Ev 85 and Dr Martyn Davies, How China delivers development assistance to Africa, Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch (February 2008), p 3 Back

153   Ev 64 Back

154   Q 16 [Daniel Large] Back

155   M. Ravallion, Are there lessons for Africa from China's success against poverty?, World Bank Research, 2008  Back

156   'South-south learning' refers to the sharing of experiences between countries from the Global South, usually relating to poverty reduction and development. Ev 63 Back

157   Ev 63-64 Back

158   Ev 90 Back

159   Ev 64 Back

160   Ev 64 Back

161   M. Ravallion, Are there lessons for Africa from China's success against poverty?, World Bank Research, 2008 Back

162   Asia's 'green revolution' over the last 30-40 years has resulted in sustained agricultural development and improvements in productivity-although there is debate over whether this increased output is now slowing. Back

163   Ev 97 Back

164   DFID Press Release, UK announces aid package to tackle rising food prices, 22 April 2008 Back

165   "Investing in Africa: Land and agriculture", Reuters (8 October 2008). Online at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L6139470.htm Back

166   Q 183 Back

167   UK-China Summit: Key Outcomes 2009, online at www.Number10.gov.uk

 Back


 
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