Written evidence submitted by Dr Giles
Mohan
1. This submission primarily relates to
"The effectiveness of the UK Government's strategy to engage
with China on international development, especially Africa".
It comes from a team of ESRC-funded researchers examining the
impact of China on Africa's politics and governance. For more
information on the project see http://www.geography.dur.ac.uk/projects/china-africa/.
The project forms part of a wider Asian Driver's Programme located
at the Open University http://asiandrivers.open.ac.uk/.
WHAT DOES
CHINA MEAN
FOR AFRICAN
DEVELOPMENT?
2. China's involvement in Africa undoubtedly
has important implications for international development. However,
it is vital in approaching this issue to disaggregate both "Africa"
and "China", since both are complex and differentiated
(Mohan and Power 2008). Talking in too broad terms takes us down
the unhelpful path of seeing China as having some master plan
and treats 53 African countries as essentially similar. Allied
to this is not over-playing China's role. While an important actor,
many commentators agree that it is still not a major player in
Africa, save for a few countries, and that much of China's commercial
interests are no different from any other commercial interests.
However, in contrast to some countries, the Chinese are thinking
long-term and do not see Africa as a "basket case",
but a region of profitable possibilities.
3. The key contributions of China to Africa's
development are numerous and mostly well known, so we will not
rehearse them in detail. First, they contribute infrastructure,
something which has been ignored by other donors for some time.
Non-Chinese and Chinese commercial interests agree that this is
key for Africa and China's lead has shown how important and popular
infrastructure is. This demonstration effect is seeing a renewed
interest in infrastructure from other donors. Second, China's
model of financing is very much commercially oriented with a relatively
small aid programme, even though the aid is tied into these commercial
ventures. This financing brings revenue into African states, but
given its greater project focus it could be argued that it is
more tangible and easier to monitor than the fungible direct budget
support favoured by other donors. Third, while aid is relatively
limited it is symbolically important. China acts as a symbol and
role model for Africa, even if for most African countries China's
experience is hard to emulate. China also stands for a form "Southern"
development which is somewhat different from the free market consensus
that has dominated since the end of the cold war. Fourth, Chinese
aid and investment permits some limited "triangulation"
between African countries and other countries which enables some
leverage. This is also important politically and symbolically
as it signals the possibility of development alternatives to the
Washington Consensus. That said it is far too early and unwise
to talk of a Beijing Consensus, given the diversity of the Chinese
state and the increasing reliance on competitive tendering, which
loosens any political grip on economic decisions. Finally, a significant,
but overlooked dimension of China's role in Africa is inward migration
of Chinese (Mohan and Kale 2007). The figures are notoriously
unreliable but we know of significant inflows in South Africa,
Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Mauritius and Zambia (Alden 2007). In
these and other countries too the presence of Chinese businesses
is transforming retail and service sectors and, at times and in
some places, creating tensions among Africans.
POTENTIAL AREAS
FOR COOPERATION
BETWEEN DFID, CHINA
AND AFRICA
4. Any policy response must be African-centred
and work with African governments and civil society organisations
all the way. The Chinese have not proven willing to engage with
civil society organisations, so DFID's long experience of this
is an important area where mutual learning for an international
development partnership can occur. And these could have benefits
for opening up political processes in China as officials become
more used to wider scrutiny.
5. The second recommendation is to engage
in joined up thinking. International development is a process
tying economies and societies together in complex ways yet some
of the current thinking treats China and Africa as discrete. Two
key issues stand out here in terms of DFID's engagement with China
on development issues. DFID's Country Assistance Plan and other
policy statements rightly talk about China's rural poverty as
a key issue and resources are being channelled for various education
and health initiatives to tackle this. At the same time the House
of Lords and many other commentators berate China for importing
labour to Africa for construction projects and factory work. Yet
many of these in-migrants are the very same migrants from China
seeking to escape rural poverty. This does not alter the fact
that rural development in China should curb out-migration, but
DFID's policy must recognise the complicity of these processes.
Second, poverty and inequality in China is becoming a political
issue and one wonders how long it is before ordinary Chinese begin
to question a foreign policy which seems to be channelling resources
to the African poor when so much poverty exists domestically.
We feel this is an issue which will need monitoring and managing
carefully.
6. Another key area for cooperation is around
governance, which has a number of facets. The Chinese operate
publicly under the ethos of "non-interference" and respect
for African sovereignty. Yet on the other hand they increasingly
talk about the need for political stability. These two pressures
are proving more irreconcilable and there is evidence that the
Chinese are becoming more involved in internal governance in Africa.
Darfur was clearly the turning point here, but Chinese political
commentary is also talking about the need to re-think the non-interference
policy and look at ways of strengthening governance capacity and
working with pan-African organisations. This is a good sign and
clearly chimes with western policy and stability is not unlike
the security concerns of western countries. So, there seems an
opening to work with the Chinese on questions of stable governance,
but it cannot be framed in the usual way around democratisation.
Issues where synergies might occur are peace-keeping, where the
Chinese have taken a lead, and issues around transparency and
corporate social responsibility. These are tangible activities
where mutual interests seem greatest. The Chinese have signed
up to some global compacts so these need to be encouraged and
embedded in all corporate engagement with Africa. And for this
to stick it needs to apply to corporations of all nationalities.
7. Agriculture is an area where the Chinese
have expertise. Because so much of the debate around China and
Africa focuses on oil and mineral resources, it overlooks one
of the key areas of potential. Many African countries do not have
minerals worth exploiting. We also face a global food crisis and
Africa has the land, climate and labour to enhance agricultural
output. The Chinese have a two-part development process—a
coastal, industrial one and an inland, agricultural one. Much
can be learnt from China's agricultural model and Chinese has
much expertise to bring to Africa as well as commercial muscle.
This, then, seems a primary area for cooperation and DFID has
resources for research which could be used to develop these partnerships.
8. Finally, migration is a key issue for
both China and Africa. As noted earlier Chinese are migrating
to Africa for economic reasons. Many bring entrepreneurial skills
and capital, which is vital for Africa. But where relatively unskilled
workers are brought in they displace African labour. At the same
time skilled Africans have been leaving the continent for 30 years,
bringing their talents to Europe and North America, and supporting
family through remittances (Mohan 2006). There is the need for
a comprehensive policy on migration, which recognises the entwining
of economies and that processes of uneven development in one economy
have implications, via migration, for another. It is incumbent
upon policy-makers in both sending and receiving countries to
rationally analyse when migration works for development and when
it does not, and crucially looking at the entire migration process
since these effects are felt differently in sending and receiving
countries.
CITED REFERENCES
Alden, C (2007) China in Africa, Zed Books,
London.
Mohan, G (2006) "Embedded cosmopolitanism and
the politics of obligation: The Ghanaian diaspora and development",
Environment and Planning A, 38(5), 867-883.
Mohan, G and Kale, D (2007) The invisible hand
of South-South globalisation: Chinese migrants in Africa, unpublished
report for the Rockefeller Foundation, available at http://www.geography.dur.ac.uk/Projects/Portals/115/Rockefeller%20Report%20on%20Chinese%20diasporas%20PDF.pdf
G Mohan and Power, M (2008) New African choices?
The politics of Chinese engagement in Africa and the changing
architecture of international development, Review of African
Political Economy, No 115, 23-42.
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