Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-43)
MR JAMES
OPORIA-EKWARO
AND MR
DANIEL LARGE
21 MAY 2008
Q40 John Bercow: What can be done
by the UK Government to encourage China to invest ethically and
to promote good governance and poverty reduction in Burma?
Mr Oporia-Ekwaro: Burma is so
strategic for China that the conversation must be very quiet,
unfortunately. If it goes public then it will have lost, I think,
especially because India is watching, so Burma has the advantage
of playing one off against the other. I think Chinese diplomatic
footsteps are very calibrated to avoid being embarrassed in that
regard in public. I am not impressed by Lord Malloch-Brown's approach
but if it can be quiet diplomacy it could be very helpful indeed,
as a general stance.
Mr Large: I cannot see that, more
than for self-interest, there would be effective leverage mechanisms
on Beijing vis-a"-vis Burma.
Q41 John Bercow: From which I deduce,
I presume correctly, that neither of you gentlemen thinks there
is any realistic prospect in sight of China getting tougher with
the junta.
Mr Large: I would not rule anything
out. I think people initially were surprised by Chinese engagement
in North Korea on the question of nuclear weapons because that
crossed a boundary some people expected Beijing never to cross,
so I would not rule anything out, but in terms of the weight of
historical experience and recent context, it would be surprising
if China were to take that step on Burma. It has been involved
in trying to open the door to the international assistance effort
in the present period but it is doing so very much within its
framework of not interfering in Burma's domestic policy.
Q42 John Bercow: If I may wrap up
my questions, I note what James has just told us about quiet diplomacy,
behind the scenes, footsteps that are rather soft, et cetera,
not least with an eye to the danger of giving an advantage to
India. It has to be said on the other side of the equation that
in the aftermath of the cyclone there was at least a public request
by China to Burma to accept international aid, so that is a positive.
But would I be overly cynical if I were to put it to you that
the chance of the Chinese robustly demanding that the junta recognise
and apply the responsibility to protect is pretty unrealistic?
Mr Large: I would say so, apart
from the possibility that this would be done privately behind
the scenes in Chinese preferred diplomatic style, which is behind-the-scenes
arm-twisting rather than public confrontation or pressure.
John Battle: One of the things
in the debate on Burma that we had was that maybe China's own
experience of opening up to the world to show how it was coping
with its crisis might be a message they could pass on to the Burmese
to say, "Look: we handled our crisis in an organised way.
We got aid workers in as well as resources. Can you do the same?",
and could they pass their example on in the way that they have
handled the earthquake to the Burmese? That was discussed in the
chamber when we had the debate.
Q43 Sir Robert Smith: If there had
not been an earthquake in China would the Chinese now be in Burma
using their resources as part of the rescue?
Mr Large: I think that is likely,
given that the pattern for China's involvement in disaster response
to date has been dominated by China's response to those crises
affecting its regional security or political interests. For example,
China was involved in the Tsunami response, providing assistance
to, amongst other countries, Indonesia, and in that response there
was a big debate about the permissible lengths to which the PLA[9]
could be used in overseas deployment for disaster response. In
the end that was largely confined to domestic roles in terms of
logistical functions of the PLA with the small exception of one
contingent to Indonesia. Based on that pattern would assume that
China would have mounted some sort of disaster response effort
of its own to Burma.
Mr Oporia-Ekwaro: I was asked
the same question by the Chinese, what the earthquake meant, and
I said, "That is when we shall know what is the content of
your modernisation", and they said, "What do you mean?".
I said, "Watch which buildings collapse first", because
we have seen that in Korea. We have seen that in all these rapidly
industrialising countries, this mushrooming of modernisation.
I am very sceptical.
Chairman: Thank you very much indeed.
Obviously, the fact that we are not going immediately has slightly
taken the edge off this session but not the value of it. I think
it has been extremely worthwhile and we appreciate it. The difference
now is that because it will be November probably before we go
we will have to refresh ourselves before we do, but of course
all this is being recorded. Thank you very much indeed.
9 People's Liberation Army Back
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