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Written evidence submitted by Saferworld
October 2009
1. Introduction
(1.1) Saferworld's mandate is to prevent and reduce violent conflict and it is from this perspective that we approach our submission to this inquiry, informed by our programmes in the Horn of Africa, South Asia and Eastern Europe.
(1.2) Saferworld strongly supports the White Paper's emphasis on conflict-affected and fragile states - and particularly the recognition that, to be effective in these contexts, UK development assistance may need to prioritise a different set of interventions than in more stable and secure countries.
(1.3) In conflict-affected and fragile countries, Saferworld believes it is right to prioritise support for inclusive political settlements, addressing the underlying causes of conflict and fragility, and promoting security and justice as basic entitlements. Such interventions are necessary not only for tackling the human cost of violent conflict but also for paving the way for broader development in some of the countries furthest away from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
(1.4) However, this poses questions about which countries fall under the definition of 'conflict-affected and fragile states' and, in any case, countries that may seem to be relatively stable and secure on the surface may harbour underlying tensions that risk being triggered into violence (for instance the 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya, or Bangladesh currently).
(1.5) And so whilst the range of interventions set out in DFID's White Paper for conflict-affected and fragile states is certainly right, Saferworld would argue that an approach incorporating more political engagement, that draws on the full and coordinated resources of all relevant departments of state, and which uses conflict analysis as a starting point for programming designed to maximise the opportunities for supporting peace, security and stability should be a requisite for all the countries in which DFID works (see also 2.4 below).
2. Security and justice
(2.1) Saferworld particularly applauds the White Paper's recognition of security and justice as basic entitlements. Poor people want and deserve to feel safe and secure just like anyone else, but a lack of security also undermines other areas of development - for instance, hampering economic investment and growth, making education more difficult to deliver and providing an enabling environment for the sexual violence that is both an immediate violation and a driver for diseases such as HIV/AIDS.
(2.2) Although many donors work on 'security sector reform' programmes, such work has not typically been part of the development mainstream and it is to DFID's considerable credit that it has moved this issue to the centre of the agenda. But it will be important to ensure that the model of 'security and justice' that DFID (and the rest of Her Majesty's Government (HMG)) promotes is accountable, transparent and responsive to communities. Security and justice should be based on the real needs of those affected by conflict and insecurity as well as those of the state.
(2.3) Neither can the
(2.4) It should be noted that the White Paper refers to security and justice as basic entitlements in the relatively narrow context of development assistance to conflict-affected and fragile states. Whilst this is an essential and natural starting point, HMG should consider security and justice as central aspects of a comprehensive development agenda in other contexts which may not have such acute conflict dynamics. In these contexts poor security provision and access to justice are nevertheless key to a full realisation of the rights of poor and marginalised communities and in turn fundamental to reducing the likelihood of violent conflict and creating the conditions necessary for sustainable development and growth.
3. Challenges for DFID
(3.1) The challenge for DFID (and HMG more widely), is now how to translate the ambition of the White paper into practical programme delivery and support. The remainder of this submission offers suggestions and recommendations to this end, looking particularly at four areas:
· Risk analysis and programme evaluation - Appropriate timeframes and adapting to changing circumstances - Monitoring and evaluation in conflict-affected countries - Evaluating security and justice support
· DFID staffing, capacity and expertise - Guidance and tools for working in conflict-affected and fragile countries - Appraising staff performance - Security and justice career paths - Managing external contractors
· Cross-Whitehall coordination - Joint country strategies and political support for development - The Conflict Prevention Pool
· Building support
4. Risk analysis and programme evaluation
Appropriate timeframes and adapting to changing circumstances
(4.1) Post-conflict societies take a long time to recover from conflict and many conflict-affected or fragile countries are stuck in a cycle of crisis, early recovery, and renewed crisis. Add to this the difficult, protracted and often contested nature of promoting and supporting people-focused security and justice, and it is clear that programming in conflict-affected and fragile states needs to be planned, implemented, evaluated and funded according to the way the world actually is - not to short-term funding objectives and impact assessments.
(4.2) DFID should be prepared for occasional failures and flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances, if necessary by adapting programmes and their timeframes and by recognising that lasting impact can only be achieved and measured over the long-term. This approach may be at odds with increasing political pressure to show immediate and tangible results, but it is the only way such complex and sensitive work will be successful and, ultimately, represent true value for money.
Monitoring and evaluation in conflict-affected countries
(4.3) There is also a need for DFID to ensure that its monitoring and evaluation exercises, like its development assistance itself, are 'conflict-sensitive' and assess the impact they may have on the situation on the ground. There will be issues around staff risk to consider (can evaluators get safe access to the people / places they need to visit) and, in conflicted or politically fragile contexts, the very act of going to speak with particular groups or individuals may have an impact on the conflict dynamic (perhaps inadvertently signalling legitimacy, for instance). These problems do not mean that DFID should down-play its monitoring and evaluation efforts - which are vital for ensuring programmes have a positive effect on conflict dynamics - but do highlight the need for DFID to properly plan and resource this type of work.
Evaluating security and justice support
(4.4) In practice, it appears that most monitoring and evaluation of security and justice sector support is currently project- or programme-focused, since donors wish to know whether their project or programme 'works' and there is a relatively straightforward unit of analysis provided by project documents and logframes. However, given the shift towards 'whole of government' and 'cross-sectoral approaches' needed to effectively support security and justice provision, DFID will increasingly need to look at sector / system level evaluation. Evaluation at this level is likely to be impact- as well as outcome-focussed, concentrating more fully on the functioning of national security and justice systems, the culture and behaviour of institutions and the well-being of beneficiary populations.
(4.5) And DFID will have to make sure that its evaluation does not inadvertently create 'perverse incentives'. For instance, a narrow focus on tangible quantitative indicators could lead to DFID programmes measuring increased numbers of security personnel as a success, rather than more substantive issues around the way those personnel behave, uphold the rule of law and respond effectively to community needs.
5. DFID staffing, capacity and expertise
Guidance and tools for working in conflict-affected and fragile countries
(5.1) DFID has some good programming tools and guidelines but they are not yet sufficiently mainstreamed and the majority of staff are not fluent in their use. DFID's draft 'practice papers' for Working Effectively in Situations of Conflict and Fragility together with the 'emerging policy paper' on Building the State and Securing the Peace, set out a sophisticated conceptual framework with links to practical guidance. DFID should ensure that all staff operating in conflict-affected and fragile contexts have access to - and are trained and supported in the use of - such guidance.
Appraising staff performance
(5.2) Conflict-affected and fragile contexts are challenging environments with no simple solutions or guarantees of success. With particular regard to security and justice sector support, setting performance indicators for staff and success indicators for programmes requires a sensitivity to the context which is arguably more nuanced than for other areas of development programming and must take into account the highly political nature of security and justice sector development and the long-term timeframe necessary for durable results. DFID should ensure that it appraises staff performance in a way that takes into account the long-term timeframes required and incentivises staff to pursue the comprehensive approach to security and justice set out by the White Paper.
Security and justice career paths
(5.3) Related to this, the present lack of an appropriate career development structure in 'security and justice' within the department means that staff turnover is unfortunately high as people are 'promoted out' of post. Instead, staff should be encouraged to develop their expertise and experience in this area - with a clearly defined route of advancement. If DFID is serious about placing security and access to justice 'on a par with health and education', it will need to reflect this in the career opportunities it presents its employees.
Managing external contractors
(5.4) Attempting to deliver an increasingly comprehensive vision of support for security and justice sector development while simultaneously trying to 'do more with less' has led to an increase in the number of DFID-supported security and justice programmes being outsourced to external contractors.
(5.5) While such an approach can potentially fill vital capacity gaps and deliver better value for money, it should not be seen as an 'easy option'. The management and co-ordination of security and justice programmes is inherently difficult, even when all functions are kept in-house. When many activities are outsourced, often to more than one actor, this adds an extra layer of complexity for donors who bear ultimate responsibility for the programme. Negotiating the politically sensitive areas of policy and practice these programmes touch upon - as well as ensuring that they are integrated with wider national development and conflict prevention strategies - will need sustained and proactive management.
(5.6) And so, if DFID is to successfully step up efforts to promote security and access to justice - particularly while placing greater (and necessary) emphasis on 'thinking politically' - it will need enough skilled, experienced and well-supported staff to oversee these programmes, particularly those which are largely outsourced to external contractors.
6. Cross-Whitehall coordination
Joint country strategies and political support for development (6.1) The White Paper's commitment to producing
joint country strategies for HMG in all fragile countries by June 2010 is a
welcome one. However, it is important that these strategies do not simply add
an extra layer of bureaucracy but instead benefit from serious buy-in from all
relevant departments and represent a truly shared vision of what the (6.2) The White Paper's recognition that "close
cooperation between FCO and DFID" is required somewhat papers over the tensions
between these departments. An effective collaboration will require both
institutions to develop positive, constructive, clearly defined working
relationships both in (6.3) DFID is to be commended for its recognition
of the need for long-term political commitment but the White Paper somewhat
underplays the issue. Promoting the provision of responsive and accountable
security and equal access to justice touches on the essence of the way a state
exercises its monopoly on the use of force and on such sensitive issues as
national security and sovereignty. Some governments may be actively opposed to
measures they see as weakening their grip on power. The Conflict Prevention Pool
(6.2) Recent changes to the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) are of potential concern. Much more important than 'simply' a funding stream, the real value of the CPP was in providing a mechanism for promoting and ensuring a high degree of cross-departmental cooperation at the mid- and junior civil servant level. The CPP should not be continued if it is not fit for purpose, but whatever mechanism is developed to replace it should be designed in such a way to encourage staff from across departments to work together towards common goals contained in the joint country strategies.
7. Building support
(7.1) As mentioned above, the White Paper's approach to conflict and fragility is right for both addressing the human cost of conflict and paving the way for broader development in some of the countries furthest away from achieving the MDGs. But it represents a quite different way of working for DFID, the detail and implications of which are not widely understood. Consequently, some within the development community fear that this approach may take resources away from sectors such as education and health and may view the White Paper as potentially the 'securitisation' of aid by stealth.
(7.2) Saferworld does not support the
'securitisation' of aid and believes it crucial that international ODA
definitions and the way the UK defines its aid are not adjusted so that aid
money may be spent on military expenditure. This is particularly true of
promoting security and access to justice, which should require the
(7.3) However, Saferworld does not believe that the commitments made in the White Paper suggest a securitisation of aid but, instead, believes HMG will have to demonstrate what an effective approach to development in conflict-affected and fragile countries does - and does not - entail. It is important that DFID is clear and frank in setting out the full details of its new approach both to allay fears and win support amongst the development community, as well as ensuring that it is widely enough understood to rebut any attempt to introduce a 'harder' security element to UK development assistance in situations of conflict and fragility in the future.
8. Recommendations for specific areas of inquiry for the IDC
From the evidence presented above, Saferworld recommends that the IDC consider looking in more detail at the following specific areas:
· How DFID will approach planning, implementing, evaluating and funding its work in conflict-affected and fragile countries (and to promote security and justice more broadly) based on the timeframes realistically needed to achieve meaningful change.
· What DFID's plans are for meeting the particular challenges associated with monitoring and evaluating the promotion and support of security and justice provision.
· How DFID will adapt internal procedures and tools such as staff performance appraisals, career development paths, and operating guidance to reflect the challenging realities and risk involved in working in conflict-affected and fragile states and on difficult and protracted security and justice interventions.
· How DFID anticipate balancing the benefits of outsourcing programme design and delivery to external contractors with maintaining the level of strategic oversight necessary when working in politically challenging contexts and on politically difficult interventions.
· Whether the Treasury plan on reviewing existing efficiency targets for DFID, with particular regard to ensuring DFID has appropriate staff capacity to deliver on the White Paper's 'new approach' to conflict-affected and fragile states.
· What level of 'buy-in' there is from the FCO and MOD to the White Paper's commitment to creating joint country strategies for conflict-affected and fragile states by June 2010; and how HMG will ensure that staff from DFID, FCO and MOD are properly incentivised to work together in drafting, implementing and evaluating these joint strategies.
· How DFID will communicate the details of its approach to conflict-affected and fragile countries, and promotion of security and justice, so as to raise the level of understanding of these issues amongst the wider development community and win support for them.
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