Written evidence submitted by IIED (International Institute for Environment and Development)

 

28 November 2008

 

Summary

 

1. HMG attention to climate change in developing countries is greatly to be welcomed. IIED hopes, however, that this will reinvigorate wider HMG efforts towards the sustainable development of poor countries - rather than substitute for them. Of particular concern is DFID's concentration on the economic and social aspects of climate change, neglecting the environmental component of the phenomenon. Climate change has several root causes - economic (unfettered growth), social (consumption patterns) and environmental (ecosystem degradation through e.g. misuse of land). Climate change also has several consequences - economic (production system collapses), social (poverty and vulnerability) and environmental (further ecosystem degradation through e.g. loss of biodiversity and changed flows of water). Attention to the combined economic, social and environmental aspects of climate change would be more robust and much more consistent with the sustainable development objectives of the International Development Act, the UK Sustainable Development Strategy and the UNFCCC.

 

2. This submission recommends that:

 

a) HMG should promote SD principles as the fundamental framework for building the multilateral and national institutions needed for tomorrow's world.

b) HMG's international development programme should address the combined SD priorities of social justice, low-carbon economy and biosphere protection.

c) In particular, DFID should give greater attention to SD, given the social and environmental implications of its focus on growth. This will require:

· complements to DFID's 'upstream' poverty reduction strategy/budget support work - supporting diverse drivers of change towards SD

· promoting climate screening, climate proofing, climate capacity, and their synergies with DFID's poverty reduction work

· a focus on ecosystem management as a key aspect of building resilience

· promoting 'socially just and sustainable management of natural resources' rather than 'pro-poor exploitation of natural resources'

· supporting scale-up of pro-poor tourism through public policy development - given the rapid growth of tourism in poor countries today, and building on DFID leadership in the late 90s and early 2000s

· supporting real agents of change towards SD in developing countries and not merely central ministries - civil society, business, local authorities, etc

· a serious rethink of DFID's SD Plan, so that it becomes an effective operational guide, rather than window-dressing

d) The mooted 'Rio+20' review and 'Post-MDGs Initiative' should be supported, as they (respectively) present opportunities to learn about what works for SD in developing countries and to put these centre-stage in development policy.

e) The Sustainable Development Commission needs to raise the profile of its international work above the status of a barely visible 'cross-cut' activity.

f) Meeting UK environmental priorities through market-based approaches needs to be balanced with supporting the development priorities of low-income countries. Carbon trading emphasises mitigation, not adaptation; and campaigns for local food to reduce food miles damage the prospects for exports. Ensuring the participation of small-scale producers in market-based sustainability approaches is a challenge for both carbon trading and certification of sustainability claims. IIED promotes an 'AdMit' approach that combines mitigation, adaptation and engagement with small-scale producers.

 

3. We attach a copy of IIED's submission to the Environmental Audit Sub-Committee's inquiry into the role of DFID in Trade, Development and Environment. Although this is almost three years old, we note that the observations contained in this submission almost all apply today.

 

4. IIED is an international policy research institute, working for sustainable and equitable global development. Set up in 1971, just before the first UN Earth Summit in Stockholm, IIED was a major contributor to the Brundtland Commission of 1987, the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, and WSSD in 2002 in Johannesburg. Based in London, IIED works through a wide range of long-standing relationships with partners in the developing world - and notably with local research groups - thereby ensuring that our policy advice and advocacy at national and international levels are well informed by local realities. IIED's work broadly falls into five areas: climate change, natural resources, urban, markets, and governance - all of which emphasise low-income countries' work towards sustainable development.

 

 

Q1. The effectiveness and coherence of the UK Government's approach to sustainable development in developing countries

 

HMG's sustainable development goals and definition:

 

5. DFID's attention to climate change impacts on development is greatly to be welcomed, but seems to have substituted for any wider 'sustainable development' (SD) pursuit. DFID has concentrated on the economic and social aspects of climate change, neglecting the environmental component of the phenomenon. Climate change has several root causes - economic (unfettered growth), social (consumption patterns) and environmental (ecosystem degradation through e.g. misuse of land). Climate change also has several consequences - economic (production system collapses), social (poverty and vulnerability) and environmental (further ecosystem degradation through e.g. loss of biodiversity and changed environmental flows of water). A balanced attention to the combined economic, social and environmental aspects of climate change would be more robust and much more consistent with the UK's sustainable development objectives and the UNFCCC.

 

6. There are inconsistencies between DFID's definition of sustainable development and those accepted elsewhere: Although SD appears as a goal in the International Development Act (IDA), its definition is inconsistent with that of the Brundtland Commission, the UK Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS), and most developing countries' SD policies. The IDA accords the International Development Minister too much 'wriggle-room' in defining SD. In practice, DFID interprets SD in terms of sustained economic growth - rather than the integration of economic, social and environmental objectives where possible, and informed trade-offs where integration is not possible (the interpretation we commonly observe in developing countries).

 

7. HMG should ensure that DFID's work abroad is consistent with UK and developing countries' understanding and pursuit of SD. For example, DFID should encourage the same kind of bottom-up approaches to SD innovation and planning that Defra and others are encouraging within the UK. It would attempt to identify and support the wide range of existing SD activity in developing countries - activities that are often driven by civil society, enlightened businesses, local authorities and line ministries, rather than the finance and planning authorities with which DFID's engagements have become increasingly confined.

 

HMG's institutional coherence regarding SD in developing countries:

 

8. The international dimension of the UK Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) needs to be strengthened. It is to be welcomed that the revised UK SDS has an international dimension, an advance on the first version. For the SDS to support developing countries, however, DFID would need to take a lead role. Yet DFID's engagement in the UK SDS has been noticeably lightweight. DFID's own SD Plan appears to be a mere administrative rearticulation of what it was going to do anyway; we cannot identify any major areas where DFID has included major changes as a response to the SDS. We understand that the process of preparing and reporting on the DFID SD Plan barely involves senior DFID officials or their major policy-making fora. Yet the pursuit of SD surely involves fundamental assessment, reflection and new decisions?

 

9. The current framework for dividing departmental responsibilities for international SD commitments is outdated. This results from a bureaucratic sifting following the 2002 WSSD, and is based on 'obvious' division of responsibility, with little in the way of creative partnerships or mutual monitoring. Probably less than 1% of DFID staff knows of this set of responsibilities and understands its implication for their own work. The framework seems to be used for one-off reporting purposes, rather than preparing strategies for supporting developing countries.

 

10. The Sustainable Development Commission (SDC) is a global leader in SD, but is inadequately linked to developing country realities. The SDC is an acknowledged global leader in analysis and policy formulation, and is well-linked with counterparts in the OECD. However, it is less well linked to developing country counterparts (e.g. the many national councils for SD, or multi-stakeholder groups attached to poverty reduction strategies). Although international SD issues are apparently 'mainstreamed' in the SDC's work programme, they do not appear as a separate programme area. This lack of overt and consistent attention to international issues, and to DFID's role in developing countries in particular, results in an incomplete view of the UK's international footprint (both positive and negative aspects of that footprint). The SDC should be strengthened in its ability to engage with DFID and others who aim to pursue SD with developing country partners; this should result in a more positive view of DFID, and in DFID, regarding its international SD role.

 

11. HMG has been a significant supporter of international assessments of progress in SD, but has not yet made these systemic: Defra and DFID have supported the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) and the International Assessment of Agricultural Sciences and Technology for Development (IIASTD), as well as research on the impacts of UK biodiversity and non-biodiversity policies and investments on developing country environments (by JNCC and Scott-Wilson). However, there have neither been adequate HMG responses to the findings of these one-off assessments - even in relatively high-profile cases such as the MA, nor efforts to install analogous approaches into mainstream development planning and monitoring.

 

DFID's SD performance:

 

12. DFID's work has often pursued some of the principles of SD, even if that has not been its overt aim. It is important to encourage positive discussion of SD in DFID, to enable the department to be cognisant of its many SD contributions (as well as its weaknesses). A number of recent Inquiries have resulted in DFID's reputation in matters environmental or sustainable being 'blackened', damaging morale of concerned officers in the system and perhaps marginalising these important issues within forward-looking plans. Below, we cover intragenerational equity, intergenerational equity, development within environmental limits, institutional change to support sustainability, and monitoring progress towards sustainable development.

 

13. Intragenerational equity - DFID has an acute focus on governance but relative blindness to poor people's environmental needs: Here, DFID's strong focus on poverty reduction and improving governance to tackle inequality and corruption is invaluable. Unless we achieve an equitable approach to resource use in an increasingly resource-constrained world, we will lock into enduring conflicts between groups for water, good land, energy, etc. DFID's governance work is well-placed to tackle the rights problems of, e.g., people who might be displaced from national parks or forest reserves. In this sense, DFID's governance work is potentially more valuable than any 'biodiversity support' that some environmental groups might expect DFID to give.

 

14. However, the particular environmental rights and needs of poor groups are given inadequate attention by DFID. If issues such as water poverty, sanitation poverty, and lack of access to land are picked up by local-level participatory poverty assessments as part of the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) process, they are dropped again when it comes to shaping the PRS in discussions with developing country finance authorities.

 

15. Intergenerational equity - DFID takes a rather short-term view and lack of consistency in support over time: DFID has a weak long-term view, in spite of its attempts to install a horizon-scanning facility. It exhibits inconsistency in its theory of change, and consequent rapid policy flux with major changes every few years (the latest development fashion invariably being accompanied by invidious 'fatwas' against previous development fashion...). Promising approaches for SD are regularly and inexplicably dropped e.g. the sustainable livelihoods framework and support for national SD strategies (required by Agenda 21 and apparently important enough for the UK itself to have an SDS) were heavily promoted in the 1990s and then dropped in favour of PRS procedures, in spite of their value beginning to be realised in developing countries. This would be understandable if it was the result of DFID learning from past approaches that these approaches were not helpful, but lesson-learning with aid recipients does not take place concerning sustainability.

 

16. Development within environmental limits - a good DFID knowledge base (internal and in key partners) is, however, underused: DFID maintains a policy and research group which is examining some significant climate change issues and, to a lesser extent, local and global environmental issues (albeit not within a coherent SD framework). The climate and energy teams have offered international leadership in engaging with developing countries, and in producing advice on balancing mitigation, adaptation and energy portfolio needs in developing countries (Q2). There has been some highly significant support to the provision of clean water and (to a lesser extent) sanitation. However, the environment team is given very little priority except for a watching brief and reporting, and has been allowed to diminish in size, scope and influence. The lack of high-level DFID leadership for integrating environmental issues as a foundation for development, in both internal planning and external dialogue, exacerbates the lack of incentives for regional and country offices to act.

 

17. 'Environment safeguards' are still treated as a one-off hurdle in DFID programme development, rather than as a constructive set of guidelines on how to make the most of environment for poor people and how to ensure their protection from environmental damage. There is no clear framework for identifying, understanding and acting on ecological factors, either on the positive side (basing sustainable livelihoods and economies on environmental assets) or on the negative side (environmental risk schedules and management regimes). In neither case are the costs and benefits of investment in environmental management assessed. Almost no support is offered to developing countries to build their own institutions to do this. Consequently UK aid may, in some cases, be actively harming poor people's prospects for SD in the pursuit of 'pro-poor exploitation of natural resources' (Q7).

 

18. Institutional change to support sustainability - in PRSs and budget support, DFID has excellent entry points into the 'mainstream', but does not use them for SD: DFID's focus on governance change may, at times, address some of the political, market and institutional constraints that are the underlying causes of poverty, environmental problems, and economic unsustainability, as discussed above. However, more could be done if environmental governance were more routinely included in governance support, and if environmental information and stakeholders were routinely engaged in PRSs.

 

19. DFID takes PRSs or their equivalent national development planning processes very seriously, which offers the potential to weave together a comprehensive plan and budget that builds on sustainability goals. However, DFID makes very little effort to encourage engagement of environmental authorities or environmental interest groups in those processes. And, because these processes are increasingly linked directly to developing country budgets, this is shutting off opportunities to restructure expenditure for SD.

 

20. We are equivocal about budget support and SD. On the one hand, there are indications that budget support has improved the predictability, flexibility and reliability of aid delivery, in theory increasing the chance for developing countries to develop longer-term SD policies and plans. On the other hand, DFID's emphasis on budget support is politically risk-averse when it comes to institutional change - its focus on central planning and finance authorities tending to cut out opportunities to support the many diverse national and local actors who in practice are the real 'drivers of change' towards SD - NGOs, civil society organisations, watchdogs, local authorities, academics, local businesses, etc. Many of these actors are also key deliverers of outcomes' i.e. those who work 'at the end of the MDG delivery chain', and who might be in a position to change prevailing practice towards SD. Many of these constraints are perhaps inevitable if the PRS/Budget Support model is pursued; a further constraint being that the PRS tends to be both marginal to private sector investment and immune to sustainability issues - its effective 'added value' being to help a country to play 'short-term donor games'.

 

21. Monitoring progress towards sustainable development - this has been limited in DFID: At national level, development monitoring tends to exclude the non-financial realities facing poor people, and notably their environmental deprivations. DFID's focus on financial targets, whether 1-2$/day or % budget support, exacerbates this. At global level, the heavy emphasis on the MDGs - a construct created by the UN Secretariat with only indirect input from developing countries - means that DFID's work on sustainability is skewed by the MDGs' inadequate incorporation of sustainability factors (an odd set of indicators shoe-horned into MDG7). Potentially stronger sustainability goals that might also be monitor - from Rio, Joburg and the MEAs - are not used (they are collected for DAC aid statistics, but are not reviewed within DFID).

 

Learning the lessons of SD in developing countries - and adjusting policy: the potential value of a 'Rio+20' review and the 'Post-MDGs' Initiative

 

22. With other donors, DFID is currently supporting IIED in helping stakeholders in developing countries to reflect on progress towards SD, and on the mechanisms and tools that have supported this. Preliminary findings indicate the value of:

 

· Public environmental expenditure reviews in developing countries, assessing what each sector is gaining and investing in environmental asset and risk management

· A shirt from planning for 'priority sectors' to planning for 'priority outcomes', enabling environment and sustainability interests to show what they can contribute to all such outcomes (instead of being absent as a 'non-priority' sector)

· Working on sustainability with 'mainstream' institutions such as finance and planning ministries rather than environment authorities (an entry point open to DFID) especially by making the economic case for environmental investment

· Supporting civil society in watchdog roles, in improving calls for environmental justice, and in generating new approaches to SD in the kind of flexible 'policy space' that aid programmes can offer

· Taking seriously the OECD-DAC Paris Declaration, which has called for strengthening countries' own sustainability systems, rather than requiring countries to follow multiple donors' own 'safeguard' measures

 

23. This (and much more) research from IIED, ODI, IDA and LDC institutions needs to be reviewed at high levels in DFID - not to tinker with development policy at its margins, but to reshape approaches towards sustainability. With IUCN and WWF, IIED has been reviewing such lessons and exploring what the shape of a future SD agenda might be: it is likely to fall into three areas: social justice, decarbonising economies, and biosphere protection.

 

24. With the exception of UNFCCC, DFID is only very weakly engaged with the international institutions and fora that enable developing countries to define SD and to negotiate positions e.g. CSD, UNEP, IUCN, etc. Even if DFID is (rightly) not too impressed by some of these initiatives, it ought to be identifying and supporting the wide range of bottom-up institutions, ideas and traditional knowledge that can support SD within LDCs, so that they are in a position to truly inform the prospective 2012 Rio+20 exercise, and to shape the 'Post-MDGs' Initiative. For several years now, IIED's research and advocacy partners in developing countries have been calling for SD principles to be reflected in the design of all multilateral and national structures that are needed for tomorrow's world. They are concerned that powerful countries are not also promoting SD seriously as an international framework or lingua franca.

 

 

Q2: The extent to which climate change adaptation is integrated into DFID's development policies

 

25. DFID's 2007 White Paper has clearly made climate change, including adaptation, an important (if not yet fully integral) part of DFID's overall strategy. Since then, DFID has made significant efforts to develop activities at international and national policy levels, country programme level and research level to support adaptation to climate change. These include the Climate Change Adaptation in Africa (CCAA) research programme, capacity building of climate change negotiators from the least developed countries through the European Capacity Building Initiative (ECBI) through the Policy Dept, and support to the Climate Change Trust Fund (MTDF) in Bangladesh through its country programme strategy for Bangladesh. These have a valuable 'bottom-up' character, involving local scientists and stakeholders - indeed, they are more participatory than many other DFID activities.

 

26. DFID should prioritise climate screening, climate proofing, climate capacity, and their synergies with DFID's poverty reduction work. While the above (and further DFID initiatives) are important elements of ensuring that adaptation to climate change is integrated into DFID's development policies, they could be considerably enhanced and speeded up by:

 

· Climate screening: assessing of all major DFID spending programmes at Policy, Programme and Research levels for vulnerability to adverse impacts of climate change.

 

· Climate proofing: where indicated by the above, including climate risk management, adaptation and mitigation measures in work at country level, especially for the least developed countries where DFID has significant Country Strategies. For example, DFID needs to do a bit more to make sure all its development work in sectors such as agriculture, health and water management considers climate change. There is no point digging a bunch of new wells if the whole area is going to dry out entirely.

 

· Climate capacity: In addition to climate screening and climate proofing its own portfolio at policy and programme level DFID also needs to support government and civil society groups within programme countries (with a focus on the least developed countries) to be capable of climate screening" and climate proofing their own investment portfolios.

 

· Climate change impact information: As climate change impacts are difficult to predict with great accuracy and as the science improves over time, a prerequisite for making adaptation decisions will be the provision and availability of up-to-date and accurate climate change impact information. Thus, supporting capacities to generate and update climate change (especially impact assessments) for particularly vulnerable regions and countries should be supported as matter of priority (by both the country programme as well as research departments of DFID).

 

· Synergies between poverty reduction and climate change adaptation: There is a great deal of overlap between the poorest people living in the poorest countries, and the communities and countries that are most vulnerable to climate change. Thus it is advisable to link the poverty eradication agenda with adaptation to climate change. This means investing in ways to "mainstream" adaptation to climate change into regular development (or "sustainable development") planning, policies, projects and programmes at country, region and global levels.

 

· Resilience conferred by ecosystems: The extent to which the links between climate change and environment more generally are addressed seem to be confined to Kyoto-related mechanisms, notably REDD schemes. A more fundamental understanding of how biodiversity protection can increase resilience against climate shocks needs to be factored into climate change work - in other words, inform that work by the economic, social and environmental 'pillars' of sustainable development.

 

Q5. The role of transport, including aviation, in economic development in developing countries, particularly freight and exports, and the impact of such transport on the environment

 

27. The aviation industry is a small - although fast-growing - contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. Per kilometre travelled, its impact outstrips that of any other form of transport. As today's technology seems unlikely to reduce that impact significantly over the next 25 years, aviation has become a key issue in climate change policy. Nowhere are the concerns about aviation expressed more vocally than in relation to tourism and air freight.

 

28. Aviation presents a development dilemma: Tourism and air freight are very important for poverty reduction and growth in many developing countries. Tourism generates up to 40% of GDP in many developing economies (see Q6). Many jobs are supported in part by the fresh produce trade with the UK (over one million livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa). The sustainability of tourism, fresh produce trade and other industries reliant on aviation cannot be "fixed" simply by attention to air travel without reference to the other environmental, social and economic factors that contribute to sustainability.

 

29. Whilst air travel is iconically climate-unfriendly, there is no a priori reason why a lower carbon budget needs to cut out long-haul travel. HMG should be concerned both with the quantity of air travel and with raising its quality - or its sustainable development utility, considered from a holistic viewpoint. HMG will wish to ensure that environmental concerns do not inevitably trump development needs. Limiting the options for people and materials to travel to and from developing countries limits opportunities to upgrade industries and skills in those countries. It limits export opportunities for fresh produce. It constrains imports of vaccines and drugs for human and animal health. And it greatly reduces wider business opportunities. The history of economic failure of many colonial territories that became cut off from major shipping routes reminds us that connectedness and mobility are key to development.

 

30. Simplistic solutions are not always helpful: Many air travellers and people working in the travel industry see carbon offsetting as a viable green solution to the aviation problem. But offsetting schemes based on tree planting or forest conservation may simply shift sustainability problems from air travel to land use in developing countries - and consequently to the poor groups who are dependent on that land. Forest-based offsetting schemes may result in communities losing access to land that has become designated as protected carbon stores; schemes are also subject to considerable uncertainty, in terms of permanence and displacing land use.

 

31. Solutions need to be informed by economic, social and environmental considerations - a holistic, SD perspective: 'Quality' could be raised by highlighting and rewarding destinations with good environmental records (carbon plus all other aspects of good environmental management), where there are genuine benefits for the poor living in these countries. Differentiated air travel levies based around per-capita carbon emissions from individual countries - i.e. higher for developed than developing countries - could provide one such nudge to the industry, and reward carbon prudence. Preliminary calculations by IIED suggest that a small levy per trip could raise US$8-10 billion a year towards adaptation (see Q8).

32. Fair miles not food miles: UK concerns about the carbon footprint of food imports can work against the interests of developing countries to increase exports, for example concerns about the emissions from air-freighted flowers and vegetables from Africa. Food miles need to be seen in perspective. Fresh fruit and vegetables from Africa account for just 0.1% of all UK emissions, and per capita emissions from Sub-Saharan Africa are miniscule compared to those in industrialised countries. The development benefits of the exported fresh fruit and vegetable sector in Sub-Saharan Africa are substantial, supporting 1 million plus livelihoods. (see Q8)

 

 

Q6: The role of tourism in economic development, and the potential for sustainable tourism

 

Tourism's contribution to national economic development

 

33. Tourism is a major international industry that is growing fast, particularly in developing countries: The World Travel and Tourism Council estimates that in 2008 the industry contributed 9.9% (US$5,890 bn) to global GDP in 2008 and accounted for 1 in every 12 jobs. In 2007, international tourist arrivals were over 900 million - up from 800 million in 2005 and double what they were in 1990. Although the Middle East led the growth in visitor numbers, developing countries have shown significant increases. Asia and the Pacific account for 184 million of the 900 million arrivals (up 10% on 2006) and Africa 44 million (up 7%). Average annual growth in tourism receipts since 2000 is 4.1% at a global scale, but 7.8% in Asia; 8.6% in Central America; and 6.9% in Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the UN World Tourism Organisation predicts continuing growth along a similar trajectory to 2020

 

34. The vast majority of countries where tourism is a significant contributor to the country's GDP are small island states - particularly in the Caribbean. The total amount of tourism revenue earned by any country is closely related to arrival figures (as the stats above show), and thus countries with high arrivals numbers receive high levels of receipts. However, countries where tourism makes the most significant contribution to the national economy (in terms of proportion of GDP earnings) are not necessarily those with the highest levels of receipts - such as small islands.

 

35. The direct and indirect contributions of tourism cannot be underestimated. WTO estimates that tourism's contribution to GDP is up to 40% in small island states and developing economies, compared to advanced economies at between 2 and 12%. Indirect contributions include, but are not limited to:

 

· Enabling other businesses through establishment and upkeep of necessary business infrastructure - e.g. hotels, restaurants of a high standard, internet and other communications.

· Air freight opportunities for local producers and for imported goods.

· Visiting friends and family opportunities are enhanced, and in developing countries often a significant proportion of journeys on new routes.

 

 

 

Distributional impacts of tourism - can tourism benefit the poor?

 

36. Tourism clearly makes a significant and growing contribution to the national economy of many developing countries - including the least developed countries. However, its size and significance reveals little about its distributional impact.

 

37. Because of its significance and rapid growth in developing countries, tourism affects the livelihoods of many of the world's 'poor' both positively and negatively:

 

· Many of the characteristics of the industry lend themselves to pro-poor growth: it is labour-intensive (on average, more labour-intensive than manufacturing) and employs a high percentage of women and unskilled workers; it can build on the natural and cultural assets of the poor; 'eco-tourism' is suited to certain remote areas with few other livelihood and development options; it has high potential for multiplier impacts which stretch to SME and informal sector development

· However, tourism development can disadvantage the poor - displacement of people from national parks and 'pristine' coastal areas, increasing local livelihood costs, losing access to resources, and other social and cultural disruption.

 

38. Pro-poor impacts are not guaranteed without intervention. Traditionally much revenue from tourism is captured by foreign companies (hoteliers, tour operators etc) or is retained in metropolitan centres. Maximising the pro-poor impacts of tourism requires intervention by both government (in form of supportive policy and legislative framework) and the private sector (in terms of local employment, sourcing and support policies). "Responsible tourism" is being increasingly embraced by the private sector as part of a broader "corporate social responsibility" agenda and improved attention to thorny issues such as local employment conditions and local/sustainable procurement are becoming increasingly mainstreamed. Analogous public policy development is less evident, or lags behind rather than leading - reducing the potentials for poor groups to reap wider benefits from tourism, and for removing systemic anti-poor biases in tourism development

 

39. DFID helped to lead the field in pro-poor tourism in the late 90s and early 2000s, but is no longer active - in spite of the rapid growth of tourism in poor countries today. Work for DFID by IIED, ODI and the International Centre for Responsible Tourism brought the aspiration for 'pro-poor tourism' closer to the mainstream of the tourism industry (if not the development business). It offered the original thinking on pro-poor tourism strategies now adopted by the UN World Tourism Organisation and others. The DFID Tourism Challenge Fund pioneered a private sector approach to the issue. DFID could build on this track record, now encouraging attention to the public policy environment in its partner countries and within other development agencies.

 

Can tourism be sustainable?

 

40. Whether or not tourism can be sustainable depends very much on our definition of sustainable tourism. Some understand this as tourism that can be sustained or grow over the long term (a view of SD consistent with the International Development Act), others as a particular form of tourism that does not undermine environmental and social parameters (a view more consistent with the UK SDS).

 

41. Developing countries' reliance on an industry that is so investment-intensive, notoriously volatile and reliant on air transport brings its own set of challenges:

 

· Tourism is an industry that requires considerable investment in set-up, infrastructure, training and importantly run-on costs of marketing. This is often not available in small island states or developing countries, creating challenges of ownership, wealth distribution and impact on other productive sectors.

· Tourism growth is also unreliable - like other exports, tourism demand depends strongly on economic conditions in the tourist generating countries; it is also subject to additional influences such as threat of terrorism or civil unrest; and environmental perspectives of consumers. Climate change also affects tourism - as climate-conscious consumers cut down on air travel and as changing climatic conditions affect the natural resource base on which much tourism depends (eg affecting the viability of small island destinations because of sea level rise or storm frequency; affecting the attractiveness of natural resources such as coral reefs; exacerbating the problem of high levels of water demand associated with tourism). Equally, advice dispensed on reducing carbon footprints from tourism include taking longer breaks in one place - which could ensure higher economic impacts in destinations that are successful in attracting tourists. As Tony Blair famously said he did not want to limit UK public's choice of holiday destinations on the back of climate change arguments.

· Aviation is an integral part of international travel, especially to developing countries which are usually far from OECD markets and, given its impacts on GHG emissions, the aviation component of tourism is unsustainable (see Q5).

 

42. If aviation is taken out of the equation, 'responsible tourism', 'pro-poor tourism', 'fair trade tourism' and other movements are already making a contribution to the development of a tourism industry that meets 'triple bottom line' criteria of economic, social and environmental sustainability. Sustainability standards and criteria abound, and there are many examples of good practice to counter the often cited examples of unsightly tourism sprawl along coastlines, cultural disruption, economic displacement and so on.

 

43. HMG has made significant contributions, as far as the UK outbound tourism industry is concerned, in particular through its support to the UK Sustainable Tourism Initiative - now the Travel Foundation. Greater attention is however required to consumer awareness and public policy within destinations. Sustainable tourism cannot be achieved without this combination of public, private and civil society levers. The issue is thus not to identify what needs to be done to make tourism sustainable, but how to scale up the current movement beyond the most responsible operators to the mainstream; beyond niche destinations to the mass tourism resorts; and complementing global standards with compatible local standards that make sense for in-country SD goals. It is clear that the success of niche movements such as fair trade tourism will help build the business case for the whole industry to begin adhering to sustainability standards.

 

 

Q7. Pro-poor exploitation of natural resources, including minerals and forests, and the regulatory framework for exploitation

 

Rethinking 'pro-poor exploitation of natural resources'

 

44. 'Pro-poor exploitation of natural resources' is potentially a one-way street to environmental and - ultimately - social ruin, if it raids nature to fix a part of today's perceived development problem. Instead, what is needed is 'socially just and sustainable management of natural resources'. To get there, we need to put decision-making in the hands of those with the rights and capabilities to bring such management about. Thus our focus should be on securing the rights and strengthening the capabilities of those who are often currently marginalised. For this we need:

· Governments to adopt and follow through recent positive policy reforms

· Civil society organisations and the private sector to support small-scale natural-resource enterprises much more vigorously

· Donors to increase their support to the above

 

Governments and governance of natural resources

 

45. The governance of natural resources in developing countries is inherently difficult:

· Laws are often contradictory and incoherent across natural resource-dependent sectors such as agriculture, mining, forestry, trade, land allocation, road building and infrastructure.

· Rights to own and access natural resources are unclear or easily overridden, and procedures for communities to secure rights are onerous.

· Natural resource access and use rules are stacked in favour of large-scale institutions, which treat small-scale enterprises and communities with disdain. Illegal activity often underpins political systems and patronage

 

46. As a minimum, a governance system that works for natural resource development needs: strong and fair rules and institutions; macro-economic and sectoral policies to in tune; strong civil society engagement and local control of natural resource management; and independent monitoring. To get there, useful starting points are:

· Actively seeking practical, cross-sectoral approaches - integrating actions in agriculture, forestry, infrastructure, products industry, employment creation

· Focusing on areas where institutional capability and local property rights can be combined with good natural resource management practice

· Adopting 'learning group' approaches involving: mixed disciplines outside formal institutional constraints doing honest diagnostics of what really works and does not; building partnerships and tactical work to developing counterweights to governance frameworks that are regressive in practice; transparency initiatives and research/information use; catalytic court cases; policy reform opportunism; and champions for key issues

 

Small natural resource-based enterprise

 

47. Small natural resource-based enterprises are the predominant form of enterprise in most developing countries, and are increasing in number. Some are good news, and some are bad news for sustainable local development. They work best for local development when rights and policy are favourable. This often requires turning much of the natural resource governance system 'on its head' - to stop rigging the rules in favour of large-scale actors only. Once this is done, effective approaches for 'socially just and sustainable management of natural resources' can then focus on financial instruments, information, connections between enterprises and support agencies, and capacity.

 

48. To make progress in supporting sustainable small-scale natural resource-based enterprises, useful starting points are:

 

· Removing barriers e.g. to accessing land and resources, business registration, credit, policy forums

· Making good information available e.g. databases of small enterprises, business service providers, market trends

· Linking, promoting, and building capacity e.g. strengthening associations, marketing councils, business support networks

· Making finance available e.g. credit lines, guarantees, subsidies, microfinance

· Consumer mechanisms e.g. procurement policies preferring small enterprises, certification, and initiatives to distinguish community natural resource products in the market

· Watchdog activities e.g. independent forest monitoring, and other approaches to level the playing field for big and small scales

 

HMG has been a leader in this field - but needs to pick up the ball again, given increasing pressure on natural resources for poor people as both producers and consumers

 

49. HMG has had a strong track record to date - but seems to have 'dropped the ball' recently: Several strong DFID country programmes emphasise parts of the above agenda. A few years ago, DFID led the donor field in innovative analytical approaches such as 'sustainable livelihoods' and 'drivers of change' analysis that would help to identify and develop pro-poor, sustainable resource management regimes. But these approaches have lost prominence in DFID's work (in spite of becoming common practice in developing country planning institutions themselves). DFID has also been a leader backing influential programmes such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade programmes. These are two areas where we applaud DFID's continuing strong leadership.

 

50. However, much more could be done by HMG/DFID to learn the lessons of what works and what does not, and to deepen support for approaches that engage directly with existing political systems that stifle local natural-resource based development; as well as integrating disjointed efforts into practical packages at effective scale. Without this, there are risks that attempts at 'pro-poor exploitation of natural resources' may result in poverty traps at local level (e.g. people being led to work small plots of unviable land) or 'resource curses' at national level (e.g. imbalanced attention to forest or mineral exploitation resulting in uncompetitive other sectors). Thus HMG/DFID may wish to consider:

 

· Collaborative approaches. Collaboration is essential for natural resources work - often requiring multidisciplinary teams that can appreciate differential powers within communities, and multi-sectoral approaches that can co-create programmes with government, NGOs and the private sector, to provide a wider vision and engagement with local/ regional actors

· Crossing scales. Effects at higher and lower scales should be considered, with cross-scale analysis and planning routinely conducted and such analysis examined against simulations of long-term processes at other scales - use modelling to provoke (not divert) thinking.

· Timeframes long enough for adaptive work to deliver. There is a need for support over longer timeframes to enable natural resource management efforts to be adaptive and responsive. Quality and depth should be the aim - with effective impact tracking - to generate useful, reliable solutions for a subset of problems rather than poor ones for many.

· Innovation funds. Relatively small proportions of funding programmes (say 20%) should be set aside for innovative ideas and one-off initiatives that meet programme aims should be considered.

· Between-project funding. Ways in which funding can be made available between programmes, to maintain networks in priority areas and avoid 'feast and famine' programmes amongst key institutions, should also be a priority

 

Q8. Opportunities for developing countries presented by sustainable approaches, such as carbon trading, direct fiscal transfers and addressing the needs of increasingly environmentally-sensitive consumers.

 

51. Meeting the environmental priorities of high-income countries through market-based approaches may not always be compatible with the development priorities of low- and middle-income countries. Carbon trading emphasises mitigation, not adaptation; and campaigns for local food to reduce food miles damage the prospects for exports. Ensuring the participation of small-scale producers in market-based sustainability approaches is a challenge for both carbon trading and certification of sustainability claims.

 

Carbon trading

 

52. There are very few CDM projects in LDCs: Opportunities for many of the poorer developing countries from carbon trading have been limited. Clean Development Mechanism projects have been concentrated in middle-income countries, and there are very few projects in Africa (less than 2% of the CDM pipeline in March 2008). Yet FDI to Africa has been increasing in recent years, notably in sectors such as infrastructure which could be eligible for carbon finance. This suggests that it is not the overall investment climate in Africa that is the main reason for the lack of investor interest in CDM projects. Requiring investors in new capital projects to identify the CDM potential of their projects before government approval is given may be one way of boosting the share of CDM finance going to Africa.

53. And there are limited livelihood impacts from CDM projects: CDM projects have not had major positive impacts on livelihoods of local communities because they have tended to focus on large scale HFC destruction projects, N2O abatement or landfill gas recovery, none of which involve significant employment generation. This situation is starting to change as some smaller clean energy projects are coming on-stream. Land-based projects, which might be expected to benefit rural communities, remain restricted by the rules of the CDM.

 

54. There are a few examples of CDM projects which demonstrate its development potential. One example is the Kuyasa project in South Africa which improves thermal performance of low-income housing units and solar water heating in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. This project has been certified under the CDM Gold Standard (an independent set of standards addressing social, economic and environmental issues). But it has suffered from financing constraints and has not been able to expand beyond the initial pilot households. Some of the CDM projects supported by the World Bank Community Development Carbon Fund have also provided benefits for local communities as part of a planned community benefits package. There are also new funds with explicit social or development objectives such as UNDP's MDG Carbon Facility and the Brazil Social Carbon Fund. But considerable support will be needed from donors and NGOs to help small scale projects in poorer countries access these funds.

 

55. The voluntary carbon market gives more attention to small-scale projects with development attributes, but is also often dependent on donor funds: Voluntary carbon markets have targeted small producers and land-based activities but have required a heavy input of donor funds. Meeting the demands of the carbon market while continuing to provide social benefits and ensure wide participation has proved challenging. If there is a more sustainable role for donor funds, this might be in ensuring that developing country capacity is installed.

56. Adaptation should be incorporated in carbon projects: CDM and voluntary carbon projects are focused on emission reductions, which may not be a high priority for developing countries. In most poor communities in developing countries, where emissions are very low compared to those in the North, adaptation to the impacts of climate change is the greater priority. If HMG is to support sustainable development in poor countries, it is necessary to ensure that these countries' priorities are reflected in carbon projects, in particular to look at ways that adaptation to climate change can be incorporated in carbon projects. IIED's 'Admit' Initiative addresses both mitigation and adaptation: it is based on increasing awareness that consumers who wish to reduce the damage caused by greenhouse gas emissions might also be willing to invest in adaptation, provided that rigorous standards can be met. Admit is developing a set of standards for community-based adaptation projects which will provide quality assurance to purchasers (see Q2).

 

57. Other mechanisms to raise funds for adaptation need to be explored, such as a levy on air travel: An internationally collected levy on international air passengers could contribute significantly to existing adaptation funds without burdening national budgets. Preliminary calculations by IIED suggest that a small per trip levy could raise US$8-10 billion a year towards adaptation (see Q5).

 

Addressing the needs of increasingly environmentally-sensitive consumers

 

58. There is limited participation of small producers in environmental certification: Certification of sustainability claims has expanded and for some products such as coffee is beginning to move beyond a mere 'niche' status. However, with the exception of Fairtrade, certification is not reaching smaller producers because of the high transaction costs involved in application to the schemes, some management requirements, and verification. Empirical evidence on the impact of Fairtrade is generally positive in social, environmental and economic terms, (at least for coffee) but is more mixed for other types of certification.

ANNEX: The Environmental Audit Sub-Committee

Trade, Development and Environment:

Inquiry into the role of DFID

Brief Memorandum by IIED, March 27^th 2006

 

 

DFID has, over the last decade, offered international leadership in intellectual and policy terms for integrating environment and development. Particularly well appreciated DFID contributions include:

 

· Promoting the sustainable livelihoods framework, which has improved understanding of the many assets (including environmental assets) on which poverty reduction depends

· Key documents and seminars on the links between poverty and the environment offered at the 2002 WSSD, which have subsequently influenced most other donors

· Supporting, and twice chairing, the OECD ENVIRONET as a way to improve environmental harmonisation among donors on e.g. strategic environmental assessment

· Catalysing the more informal Poverty Environment Partnership as a means to share learning between donors and identify best practice on e.g. environmental fiscal reform

· Designing and implementing a comprehensive 'environmental screening' procedure for DFID activities, which addresses environmental potentials as well as negative impacts - and which other donors have copied (e.g. Irish and Belgian aid)

· Promoting a post-Kyoto regime that ensures a fair deal for developing countries, addresses both mitigation and adaptation to climate change; offering clear information; and supporting engagement by their stakeholders in international negotiations

· Announcing research strategies in climate change, environment/natural resources and sustainable agriculture that will include significant involvement of Southern groups; and a science and innovation strategy that will also help to build capacity.

 

However, DFID's leadership has been less evident in responding to the environmental aspects of poverty in specific low-income countries (LICs). There are a few effective DFID environmental projects, e.g. in Kenya, India and China. But these are in a minority amongst other kinds of activity. Moreover, there has been no comprehensive review of DFID environmental activity - either as part of its recent environment policy review or as a recommendation from it. Without such facts, IIED can only observe that:

 

· There has been no coherent, deliberate approach to ensuring good environmental information, analysis, prioritisation and planning in country-driven approaches.

· If environment does not 'come up' in discussions on country plans, it is not pursued further - even if it might have been identified as a priority by local people in the Participatory Poverty Assessments usually performed for country-based planning. (This point is well documented by DFID studies)

· Existence of environmental activities tend to correlate with DFID environmental adviser presence in-country or interest of the country office head.

 

The recent publication of 'DFID's approach to the environment' (2006) is extremely welcome in view of the imbalance between DFID's intellectual/policy leadership and practical support to LICs. This policy paper commits to greater attention to three key needs. IIED supports these three levels as a useful framework, but emphasises that more needs to be done to make them operational and to engage the geographical and multilateral divisions of DFID. Observations of gaps and recommendations follow for each of these three areas:

 

1. Addressing the underlying institutional reasons for environmental problems in LICs. IIED welcomes this emphasis because it offers potential synergies with the cross-DFID priority of improving LIC governance. However, DFID staff need more guidance to understand how the underlying (institutional) causes of both poverty and environmental degradation are similar, and how to design DFID governance programmes to address both. Much more is needed if the institutional base for managing the environment in every LIC is to be adequate:

· supporting civil society to articulate environmental concerns, to claim rights and to actively manage the environment

· building basic environment information capabilities that reach to the heart of LICs' own poverty monitoring and development planning processes; and

· strengthening the capacity of environmental authorities to make their case to treasuries, and then to deliver effective environmental management

 

2. A commitment to supporting environmental management where this can be shown to contribute directly to poverty reduction. IIED welcomes this commitment because it is reveals an understanding that environmental management is a foundation for lasting development. It is neither appropriate nor efficient for DFID to address all the environmental issues facing LICs. Rather, DFID should concentrate on the major environmental deprivations and hazards suffered by the poor, and/or the best environmental potentials for improving livelihoods and economic growth.

 

Whilst DFID has contributed usefully to a number of international processes that identify the generic case to invest in the environment for poverty reduction (e.g. the multi-donor Poverty Environment Partnership), the challenge now is making full and specific investment cases at the country level. However, neither the PRS planning process, nor DFID's own country assistance strategies include adequate diagnostics or consultations which would enable specific environmental priorities to be identified. This will also require particular attention to investigating drivers for and against the 'resource curse' at macro level, and 'poverty traps' at micro level.

 

Finally, to give confidence to DFID country heads to invest more in the environment, it would be helpful to draw together the lessons from DFID's varied environmental projects - which have worked; which have not; what the costs and benefits have been; and what has contributed to success or failure?

 

3. Managing environmental risks associated with development assistance. IIED welcomes acknowledgement of the environmental risks associated with development assistance. However, DFID's Approach to the environment gives no details of how risk management is to be achieved. The current 'environmental screening note' procedure is fine on paper, but is separate from other procedures, is very often applied too late in the day with inadequate technical consideration of both environmental threats and (especially) opportunities. It has tended to be applied to projects rather than to broader programmes or policies. Thus it has become little more than one bureaucratic step, and one which has been 'pushed' by DFID environment advisers with little other 'power base' - serving to reinforce 'negative' impressions of the environment, i.e. as a block to development plans, rather than an asset for development. A more integrated approach to the environment is needed throughout the activity cycle.

 

More should be done to consult with local environmental expertise and stakeholders. Further environmental risks arise when DFID neither listens to, nor responds to local groups that both suffer from and understand environmental problems - thereby risking the reversibility of poverty reduction programmes. Although in-country procedures often exist to integrate local people's perspectives into 'country-driven' planning - such as Participatory Poverty Assessments - DFID's promotion of, support to and use of these procedures should be strengthened.

 

In addition, DFID's management board does not, as far as we can ascertain, maintain an environmental risk profile or horizon-scanning exercise to inform long-term development (although recent inclusion of environmental scenarios in horizon-scanning processes for the White Paper is a very welcome innovation).

Several constraints limit the potential of DFID's Environment Approach - many of them deriving from the current 'development model' pursued by DFID:

 

DFID's Environment Approach is unlikely to be achieve more than any 'bolt-on' exercise unless key DFID policy and structural issues are addressed:

· A larger DFID budget and limited range of aid delivery instruments. The fact that DFID's budget is growing rapidly tends to favour big, simple, 'efficient' development processes and relationships with central authorities in LICs. Budget support is the epitome of this trend. Environmental assets, environmental deprivations, environmental governance and environmental management play no central part in such processes or the development models they aim to support. Indeed, at national level the specificity, complexity, uncertainty and diffuse responsibilities for environment are very difficult to reconcile with such models. Local stakeholders (key for integrating environment into development) and research groups (key for handling environmental uncertainties) tend to have been marginalized by budget support approaches. DFID's extra funds need to be accompanied by extra responsibility to tackle the wider impacts of bigger expenditure. As a minimum, more needs to be done to lay out the 'theory of change' that underlies budget support, to assess its sensitivity to environmental issues, and thus to incorporate environment in budget support planning and monitoring.

 

· A static or reduced overall DFID staff complement, and disproportionate reduction in environmental and natural resources skills. The reduced staff exacerbates the problems inherent in 'big, simple models' and creates internal incentives for 'efficiency' that are greater than those for equity or diversity. IIED is pleased that the HQ complement of environment advisers has been maintained (although some policy teams e.g. the Urban Rural Change Team have been disbanded before their conclusions have been fully internalised). In contrast, there have been significant and apparently ill-planned reductions in environmental advice in geographical offices. This may be due to a lack of oversight of the cumulative effects of all country office heads facing few incentives to employ anybody but economists, governance advisers and administrators. This would be less of a problem if DFID environmental advice were being replaced by e.g. agreements with other donors in-country to take responsibility for (cross-donor) environmental advice, or if DFID country offices were better linked with in-country sources of environmental expertise such as local universities and NGOs. There are signs that DFID is now below critical mass in environmental advice - its advisers are amongst the best, and efforts should be made to retain them and place them in strategic positions. This should be complemented (but not substituted for) by reinstatement of the in-house environment training modules for non-environment staff.

 

Other major DFID-wide directions could be more promising for the environment - if there were more active promotion and implementation of its Environment approach:

 

· Donor harmonisation: On the one hand, efforts to implement the OECD Paris agenda on aid effectiveness are promising if they result in a more coherent and prominent cross-donor approach to (a) taking responsibility for environmental integration; (b) coordinating environmental activities in-country; and (c) the environmental reporting requirements of country authorities. For example, the donor group on environment in Tanzania, coordinated by Denmark, is working fairly well. On the other hand, efforts at donor harmonisation can take up so much time and political capital that attention shifts even further away from the environmental stakeholders who are already marginalized so much in country-driven approaches.

 

· More development assistance delivered through multilateral institutions: It can be effective to deliver more aid through multilaterals such as the World Bank and the EC if, at the same time, DFID strengthens its commitment as a shareholder to assure the highest quality in multilaterals' environmental policy and procedures, and scrutinises their implementation. Yet the BTC oil pipeline experience, amongst others, suggests that DFID is happy merely to defer to the development banks, rather than to adopt a continuous improvement approach. Neither does DFID's new SD Action Plan attempt to address the new European Consensus on sustainable development. With the closing of 11 years and 10 programmes of DFID's Renewable Natural Resources Research Strategy, there is now considerable UK expertise that could be deployed by DFID to improve environmental integration in the activities of the multilaterals...

 

· Programme Partnership Agreements: PPAs are analogous to budget support, offering DFID a way to provide long-term, predictable supplies of flexible assistance to trusted agencies. From July 2006, IIED will join WWF so that there will be two organisations concerned with environment that have Programme Partnership Agreements with DFID. For these 'environment' PPAs to work well, 'carrots and sticks' need to be established: for DFID country/regional office heads to engage with these PPAs; for the PPAs to work coherently together (and with the 'development' PPAs); for WWF's PPA to encourage local civil society to articulate environmental issues; and for IIED's PPA to offer better information and analysis on poverty-environment links at national level.

 

· Joint working with Defra and the UK Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS): There has been recent progress in balancing DFID's (fairly clear) international development agenda with Defra's international environmental agenda (which has not always been very clear in relation to local and national environmental issues). The UK SDS appears to have offered a good framework for a mutual exploration and harmonisation of roles between DFID, Defra and the FCO. However, following the flurry of activity in preparing the SDS, this has not really been pursued very actively beyond DFID's production of an SD Action Plan; it is not clear how the latter commits DFID to anything that it would otherwise not have done.

 

· Focus on climate change: DFID's climate change initiatives are well appreciated (see p1). In addition, DFID has been bold in highlighting the direct links between consumption patterns in the North and climate-induced vulnerability in the South. There is a danger that DFID's focus on climate change becomes a substitute for balanced attention to the range of environmental deprivations and hazards facing poor people - 'ticking the environment box' in one step. Instead, The links need to be clarified between climate variability/change and soil, water, biodiversity and environmental health, etc - so that climate change becomes a useful 'entry point' for environmental action. DFID's upcoming climate change research programme offers potential here.

 

· Focus on agriculture: Two recent DFID documents, Strategy for Research on Sustainable Agriculture 2006 - 2016 and Policy Strategy "Productivity growth for poverty reduction: our approach to agriculture", have usefully raised the profile of agriculture and rural development. But there are inconsistencies. The research strategy promotes a wider definition of 'agriculture', including wildlife management, forestry, and fisheries. This is welcome, as it recognises farmers' diverse livelihoods and accommodates the possibility of a future where such activities function better with each other and with environmental processes. Yet the agricultural policy adopts a narrow definition around farming - and a commercial focus aimed principally at national economic growth. Whilst the policy reveals valuable appreciation of the roles of value chains and market access, rather than merely supply-side activities, poverty is treated as purely income-based and the 'safety net' functions of agriculture are not well addressed. The problems faced by poor people in accessing environmental assets are not addressed as a priority; neither are the impacts of agribusiness gaining preferential access to such assets.

 

In both the policy and research strategy, a narrow emphasis on farming technology is inadequate and inconsistent with the importance of demand-side constraints and with the other natural resource activities on which farmers depend. There is little emphasis on technology for soil and water management, on other means to sustain the environmental asset base of agriculture, and on approaches to minimise the energy intensity of farming technology. Finally, there is inadequate commitment to more inclusive science and technology, including building on traditional knowledge which has proven so effective at working with natural processes - rather than against them. Here, DFID's support to the current International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for Development is to be welcomed, as it will attempt to bring together 'scientific' and traditional knowledge from almost a hundred countries.

 

In conclusion, DFID needs to improve efforts towards MDG7, because this is one of the most 'off-track' MDGs. IIED welcomes this inquiry by the Environmental Audit Sub-Committee and hopes that it will offer timely information and compelling ideas that will influence the current International Development White Paper process. Ultimately, development is not merely a function of improved supply of finance to central governments. Development is achieved through the accumulation and management of a portfolio of assets - including environmental assets - in ways which improve both their productivity and the equitable sharing of associated costs and benefits. The evidence from national MDG reporting is that MDG7 ('Achieve environmental sustainability') is highly off-track, and that progress towards many other MDGs is hindered by under-investment in environmental assets. DFID needs to benchmark - and then regularly review and report on - its investment in MDG7 according to the three categories in its Environment approach.