Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-45)
PROFESSOR CHARLIE
JEFFERY, PROFESSOR
ROBERT HAZELL
AND PROFESSOR
JOHN CURTICE
13 NOVEMBER 2007
Q40 Chairman: Some would say that
is because Canada owes so much to Scotland.
Professor Jeffery: I could have
changed Canada for Germany and said Germany instead, and that
probably would not work in the same way. I suspect that if you
really want to build a sense of commitment to the Union, one needs
to go beyond values. They might be important in a symbolic sense
but I think there should probably be a rather stronger reference
to the shared interests which union can deliver. For example,
social security as a Union-wide policy, delivering benefits irrespective
of location. I think that kind of concrete demonstration of the
benefit of the Union, of sharing risk in as big a pool of people
as possible, is probably an articulation of the benefit of the
Union which has more grip on ordinary people than a loose statement
of values.
Professor Hazell: If I may, I
would like strongly to support that. I think Britishness depends
on much more than values. The United Kingdom and the Union state
rests on far firmer foundations than you might believe simply
from reading the Prime Minister's speeches on values. It depends,
critically, on the shared interests that Professor Jeffery has
just referred to, of, for example, the tax and benefits system,
which are both reserved functions fulfilled by the UK Government,
and which lead to very significant redistribution amongst the
whole population of the UK; shared interests of defence and national
security; and you can go through all the list of reserved functions
and show how they support shared interests of all peoples in the
UK. Lastly, I would also mention common institutions, institutions
like the BBC, like the armed forces, like this Parliament at Westminster,
which are all British institutions and are fundamental to the
governance of the UK, but also, I think, part of people's shared
vision and understanding of what it is to be British. If you just
talk about values, I do think you miss two very important pillars
of Britain and the UK, which are the pillars of interest and of
institutions.
Mrs James: Listening to what you said
earlier and those responses now, it seems to me that it bears
repeating, and repeating often, that we have these shared interests
and that we have these shared pillars, because I feel that in
the interest surrounding devolution we could have lost sight of
those at times, how strong that does make us, in addition to the
benefits of devolution. It is interesting to hear those thoughts.
Thank you.
Chairman: That probably does not need
a response. It was a statement.
Q41 Dr Whitehead: If I could reflect,
Professor Hazell, on your last thought, is there not any sense
in which, as the EU becomes a more secure economic framework within
which to live, what it is to be devolved takes a different form
in the public view, that is, you can actually have a "breakaway
nation" without it making any difference whatsoever in terms
of your overall economic and structural security? As we have seen
recently, Belgium, at the heart of Europe, has existed apparently
reasonably well without any government at all for 150 days, and
it is conceivable it would break up into two constituent parts
with no effect whatsoever on the economy and well-being of Belgium.
Is that a factor, do you think?
Professor Curtice: The decision
of the SNP in the late 1980s to go for independence in Europe
is central to the whole debate. The point is that the kind of
independence that the SNP is promoting is one that would not make
any difference to the freedom of labour, to the freedom of capital;
whether it would make a difference to the currency depends on
whether it decides to stay with sterling or to go to the euro
but, either way, Scotland is not going to have its own currency.
It probably would not mean any change to passport controls because
presumably you would have exactly the same arrangement as the
Irish Republic has with the UK Government. It need not even necessarily
make any difference to citizenship insofar as if the British Government
is still prepared to allow people to have dual citizenship, and
therefore those people in Scotland who wish to retain their British
identity, British citizenship, can do so, but at the same time
people are allowed to take up Scottish citizenship if they want
to as well. Again, lots of people have both Irish and British
citizenship. Yes, precisely in other words, one of the reasons
why it is possible for the Scottish National Party to put up a
case in favour of independence is because independence does not
necessarily mean as much as it once did. That is fundamental to
the whole debate. Indeed, if you listen to a lot of the more serious
debate about the subject, it is essentially a debate about what
is the best way of positioning a relatively small country within
a globalised world; is it better to be playing on the international
stage as part of a big player or is it better to have your own
team, albeit one that in some respects may not be so strong or
have as big a voice? That is essentially what the debate is about.
Q42 Dr Whitehead: Is there then,
putting it round the other way, a sense in whichnot in
Scotland; in Englandthe public's attitude, and we saw earlier
constitutional preferences in England, which with substantial
plurality is "What is the problem? Carry on as we are."
Is that informed by the other side, in your view, of that particular
debate, i.e. people think "Well, actually, what is the problem?
We can continue to go on with devolution in this asymmetric way."
I suspect if you went on the doorsteps and ask people "What
do you think about asymmetric devolution?" you would get
a rather short reply. Is it the case that they think "Well,
we can carry on like this" or is it the case that the issue
simply has not been addressed in most people's minds in England
and, if it were addressed, they might come to different conclusions?
Professor Curtice: I think the
answer is, leaving and awaiting the results of my 2007 research,
so far the evidence suggests that people in England do not see
the need for devolution for themselves. As I said earlier, they
do not seem to feel the need for whatever distinctive identities
they have to be reflected in having a distinctive body of politicians.
Indeed, the argument that is used, and for example was used in
the regional assembly referendum in the North East, is "Why
do we want more politicians?" It is extra politicians we
do not need as opposed to extra politicians that might symbolise
our distinctive sense of identity. There is not that connection
being made. Having said that, obviously, the open question is
whether or not the apparent unfairnesses of the asymmetric situation
so far as England is concerned means that, while it may be true
that originally England did not want some form of constitutional
changelet us leave aside what it might bemaybe that
opinion will change, maybe, for example, as a result of political
parties campaigning on that issue and therefore politicising the
issue, public opinion in England becomes more aware and begins
to divide more strongly on this issue. All that one can say is
that, as it were, those who wish to politicise this issue and
to make it more salient have a task in front of them, which is
that they are having to make an English audience which so far
at the moment seems relatively unaware and relatively unconcerned
about these issues more concerned than they have been so far.
Q43 Dr Whitehead: Professor Hazell
earlier implicitly pointed to the emergence of various regional
bodiesyou did not say this exactlywhich are essentially
accountable to nobody and had been set up, or might be seen to
be set up for the purposes of administrative devolution, perhaps
coming into the public consciousness over a period of time and
perhaps therefore informing that view that maybe something more
needs to be done. Is that in any way in evidence in your polling?
Professor Curtice: I have not,
in truth, asked about it since 2003 but certainly between 2001
and 2003 we were asking people "Have you heard anything about
your regional assembly/chamber/regional development agency?"
and I have to say thatI cannot remember the exact figuresbut
the proportion of people in England who said they had heard anything
very much at all about those bodies in their region was absolutely
minimal. The North East of England was the one that had the highest
level of visibility but even there it was not that dramatic. The
truth is that these are not bodies that have made that much impact
on the public consciousness so far. You are right, of course.
It may well be true that if we establish stronger, more visible
regional institutions by fiat, that might help to encourage a
sense of identification with these institutions, might persuade
the public in England that they might want them. But I would again
simply say to you, in exactly the same way as those who want to
make people concerned about England's unfairness for Scotland
have a task of persuasion to perform. Those who wish to try and
promote a sense of regional identity and a requirement that that
identity be reflected in distinctive political institutions also
have a task of persuasion to perform.
Q44 Dr Whitehead: I ought to add,
for the record, that I was not proposing that the regions should
be brought into place by fiat. In terms of written constitutions
or the moves towards the preparation of constitutions for Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland, would that underline the asymmetric
devolution, in your view, or would that hasten perhaps the development
of regional constitutions for the United Kingdom as a whole? Would
the politics of catch-up perhaps develop?
Professor Curtice: I am not sure
I am getting the force of your question. Scotland and Wales in
effect have constitutions as provided by the Scotland Act and
the Government of Wales Act and their subsequent amendments, so
various aspects of constitutional procedure that are still largely
a question of convention here or indeed of royal prerogative are
laid down by statute in those two bodies. It is already asymmetric
in that respect. I am not quite sure where your question was taking
us.
Q45 Dr Whitehead: My question really
is a thought that we have in the air, shall we say, some discussions
about whether there should be a written constitution for the UK,
which, one might say, could be a sinecure for that view of national
identity, i.e. there is a constitution for the UK, therefore that
binds the UK together, but in practice what has happened, as you
say, is that you have a sort of constitution subject to the UK
Parliament for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Professor Hazell: Very briefly,
I do not know of any country in the world which has codified its
constitution in cold blood. Generally, there are pretty seismic
political circumstances which force a country to write a constitution,
or a new constitution. Those are, classically, following a revolution,
like in France or the United States in the 18th century; following
defeat in war, like the post-war constitutions of Germany or Japan;
following the grant of independence; or following the complete
collapse of the authority of the previous system of government,
as we saw in South Africa post apartheid or in the Soviet Union
post-Communism. There is opinion polling showing that when people
in Britain are asked do they want a written constitution, they
say yes by majorities of around 80%. But for meProfessor
Curtice is the expertit is the classic kind of cost-free
polling question that Dr Palmer was referring to earlier; it is
all upside and no downside. It is asked without any context about
what the consequences of a written constitution might be, namely
greater power for the judiciary, much more difficult to change
the constitution, possibly more frequent referendums. If all the
potential or likely consequences were considered, I think you
might get a much more nuanced response. Shortly, I do not see
any growing demand for a written constitution, either as a consequence
of devolution or indeed in general.
Chairman: Time is calling these proceedings
to a close. I just want to say that there is one other issue which
we have not got time to delve into today but which Professor Hazell
and others have certainly commented on, which is of course the
whole funding basis of devolution, the Barnett formulanot
a subject I am going to open up at two minutes to six but we shall
certainly be returning to it. I am very grateful to the three
of you for your assistance this afternoon. Thank you very much
indeed.
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