3 Democratic and judicial voices
19. The role that Parliament plays in monitoring
sentencing guidelines has to take into account the different roles
of Parliament and the judiciary. While sentencing as a whole requires
democratic legitimacy, justice in individual cases requires that
the independence of judicial decision-making is beyond question.
This chapter explores these areas to inform the future of parliamentary
monitoring of sentencing guidelines.
THE MANY INFLUENCES ON A SENTENCE
20. The decision as to what sentence to impose is
a balance between the influence of the individual sentencer and
the framework set by Parliament. Professor Neil Hutton, University
of Strathclyde, comments:
"There is a common misconception that judges
have sole authority over sentencing decisions; this is never the
case even in those jurisdictions where judges exercise very wide
discretion. Sentencing always takes place within a legally authorised
structure."[23]
21. The overarching division between the role of
Parliament and the role of the sentencer is that one (Parliament)
defines the framework for sentencing where the other (the sentencer)
makes the decision on the individual case within that framework.
The former Lord Chief Justice, Rt Hon Lord Phillips
of Worth Matravers, described the balance of interests:
"The primary way that Parliament influences
the sentence is by making statutory provisions that restrict the
discretion of the judge as to what sentence to impose. The most
obvious example is that when a new offence is introduced by statute
the statute will normally specify the maximum sentence that the
judge can impose. In this way Parliament indicates its view of
the relative gravity of the offence and the judges have regard
to this when imposing individual sentences."[24]
22. Parliament defines the overall sentencing framework
by setting maximum penalties for offences and determining the
structures of sentencing, for example defining in legislation
that a court must take a guilty plea into account when determining
sentence or by legislating for specialised types of sentence or
sentencing, such as Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) sentences
for those offenders considered to be dangerous.[25]
Our Towards Effective Sentencing inquiry considered in
detail Government failures to provide adequate resources for the
implementation of IPP sentences and concerns about how these sentences
were originally designed in the Criminal Justice Act 2003.[26]
23. There are also a great many other factors that
affect what sentences are imposed and what they mean in practice.
Local policing priorities or public willingness to report crime
will affect whether a person ever enters the criminal justice
system in the first place; the Crown Prosecution Service decision
as to what offence a person should be charged with determines
which of the maximum sentences set by Parliament the sentencer
is working with. Once a sentence is imposed, the operation of
that sentence will depend significantly on decisions made by the
services responsible for implementation. For example, for prisoners
on IPP sentences, the type of sentence and the minimum sentence
will have been determined by the sentencer but it is the Parole
Board who will decide how long that individual spends in prison
beyond the minimum term. Nicola Padfield, University of Cambridge,
referred to factors like this as "back-door" sentencing,
saying: "It is too easy to lay the blame on magistrates and
judges."[27]
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
24. Rt Hon Lord Judge, Lord Chief Justice, emphasised
the principle of judicial discretion to the Justice Select Committee:
"The point about the judicial discretion is that a judge
is trying to do justice in the individual case".[28]
However, the judge's ability to respond to the individual case
takes place only within the range of influence that his or her
decision can have and according to the framework set by Parliament.
Where proposals come forward that might move decisions about sentencing
into the hands of Parliament, the Magistrates' Association raise
misgivings about "upsetting the balance between the legislature
and the judiciary."[29]
The Council for HM Circuit Judges fear the consequences of such
action: "executive or legislative encroachment would put
the separation of powers at risk undermining the Constitution."[30]
The Criminal Bar Association commented on how judicial discretion
is integral to the criminal justice system:
"Judges must be allowed to retain a discretion
to decide upon a sentence that is appropriate for the particular
facts of an individual case. The exercise of this discretion,
based upon a full consideration of the individual case, is exactly
the judgment that a judge is expected to bring to the criminal
justice system."[31]
25. Sentencing guidelines fall inbetween the exercise
of discretion by individual sentencers and the overall framework
drawn up by Parliament, by providing further guidance to sentencers
on levels of seriousness within an offence type and how that translates
into sentence types and lengths. The Sentencing Guidelines Council,
responsible for the final decision as to what instructions go
into these guidelines to sentencers, is chaired by the Lord Chief
Justice and has a majority of judicial members; guidelines are
drawn up with reference to current patterns of sentencing and
guideline judgments from the Court of Appeal. The Sentencing Guidelines
Council is thus an independent body with significant judicial
input. We look in more detail at what the Sentencing Guidelines
Council focuses on when drawing up guidelines later in this report.
26. Professor Mike Hough, King's College London,
suggested that there is a general consensus of support for current
sentencing guidelines produced by the Sentencing Guidelines Council.
He said: "We have talked to judges and magistrates about
their sentencing practice, including their views of the guidelines,
and I do not get a sense that they find them appalling."[32]
The reason that there is support for sentencing guidelines seems
to be, according to practitioners and academics, that they provide
an appropriate balance between discretion for the individual case
and a consistent structure for decision making. The Magistrates'
Association, for example, commented:
"It [the Consultation Sentencing Guideline
for Offences Against the Person] is certainly designed—all
guidelines are—to improve consistency of approach. As far
as outcome is concerned, it is inevitable that there will be a
range depending on the individual circumstances."[33]
Professor Andrew Ashworth QC, Oxford University,
said:
"[The current approach to sentencing guidelines]
allows judges room for manoeuvre, it allows them to go outside
the range if there is something unusual, but it should require
them to start from a certain point in all similar cases."[34]
A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT?
27. The role of Parliament in sentencing policy is
the "democratic expression of the 'public voice'".[35]
Whereas some witnesses said the guidelines allow judicial discretion,
there are concerns that mechanisms for drawing them up leave a
'democratic deficit'.
28. Warren Young and Claire Browning of the New Zealand
Law Commission argue that, without parliamentary participation
in drawing up sentencing guidelines:
"there is no effective mechanism whereby
Parliament can participate in the setting of sentencing levels
and thereby perform its social policy function. If it wishes to
try, it has recourse only to the blunt tool of amending maximum
penalties, in the hope that this will have some unspecified trickle-down
effect upon sentencing in the ordinary run of case."[36]
The New Zealand Law Commission therefore proposed
that a new sentencing body in New Zealand should draw up sentencing
guidelines and then place them before Parliament in their entirety
subject to a negative resolution procedure.[37]
They felt that, if the:
"goal of changing the nature of the law
and order debate is to be achieved, there must be some political
ownership of the [sentencing] guidelines […]. The alternative
is that it is too easy to use sentencing as a rhetorical political
device." [38]
29. The Sentencing Commission Working Group considered
whether, in creating a new sentencing body, changes should be
made to how Parliament considers sentencing guidelines; the Working
Group was unable to agree. A minority of the Sentencing Commission
Working Group recommended, as had been the proposal for New Zealand,
that Sentencing Guidelines should be placed before Parliament
to be accepted or rejected as a whole. It commented that "enhancing
Parliamentary scrutiny and participation in the guidelines process
would give the guidelines greater democratic legitimacy".[39]
It also commented on the impact of a formal process of parliamentary
approval on the quality of public debate over sentencing:
"such a system may lead to stability over
time. It would reduce the risk that sentences would increase in
response to political criticism of individual decisions and would
help to control the impact of media firestorms. Parliament might
be encouraged to take responsibility for the guidelines in the
knowledge of the price tag attached to them."[40]
30. Sentencers in England and Wales are sceptical
about Parliament as a venue for rational debate on law and order.
The Judiciary of England and Wales commented on New Zealand proposals
for laying sentencing guidelines before Parliament:
"The principal advantage claimed is this
allows elected members of Parliament to participate in the setting
of sentencing levels, which may be thought to be a matter of legitimate
social concern: it would be a way of giving some form of Parliamentary
'ownership' to the advisory guidelines of the Council. […]
The risk must be that it will allow sentencing levels to be driven
up yet further by tabloid pressure and political rhetoric."[41]
The Council of HM Circuit Judges quoted the former
Lord Chief Justice, Rt Hon Lord Woolf, as saying:
"We should at all costs avoid the House
of Commons becoming involved in a bidding war about sentencing
levels in which someone argues for a standard sentence of one
year for a first time burglar and someone else suggests two and
someone else suggest three".[42]
31. Our two academic witnesses had similar concerns
about whether Parliament could consider sentencing without "politicians
[being] locked in a counterproductive battle to 'out-tough' each
other."[43] Professor
Ashworth expressed concern that Parliament as a whole might look
at sentencing guidelines, saying:
"I have a certain reluctance simply borne
of the possibility that perhaps some Members of Parliament might,
for their own reasons or for reasons of things that have happened
in their constituency, feel that they have to argue in favour
of severity all the time, and it would also, I think, put the
Government on the spot because they would have to decide where
their position was on any particular guideline or set of guidelines".[44]
Professor Hough had similar concerns, but nevertheless
concluded that sentencing guidelines should be placed before Parliament.
He stated:
"it is very important to have some sort
of buffer institution to stand between sentencing and the law
and order rhetoric that one inevitably gets between Parliament
and the press; but on the other hand to have no parliamentary
oversight at all is unthinkable."[45]
Professor Hough and Jessica Jacobsen recommended,
in their report Creating a Sentencing Commission for England
and Wales: an opportunity to address the prison crisis, that
sentencing guidelines be presented to Parliament on a negative
resolution procedure. They propose this as an addition to the
Justice Select Committee reviewing guidelines.[46]
32. The recommendation made by the majority of the
Sentencing Commission Working Party was that sentencing guidelines
should not be laid before Parliament for approval, regarding this
as "a significant and unwarranted change in the relationship
between Government and Parliament on the one hand and the judiciary
on the other. They [those members of the working group making
this recommendation] believe that seeking Parliamentary approval
would inevitably result in the politicisation of the guidelines."[47]
A comment was nevertheless made that "consideration might
be given to enhancing Parliament's existing role in scrutinising
draft guidelines."[48]
The role of the Justice Select
Committee
33. The current role of the Justice Select Committee
is seen as an appropriate balance between judicial independence
and democratic scrutiny, in the sense that the Justice Select
Committee comments on draft guidelines, but our views are not
binding on the Sentencing Guidelines Council. The Council of HM
Circuit Judges said:
"We agree that the present procedure which
provides that Parliament and Ministers should be consulted […]
is appropriate […]. We believe that the Sentencing Guidelines
Council, as an independent body, should make the final decision".[49]
Professor Ashworth similarly was satisfied with the
role of the Justice Select Committee, concluding, "so for
myself I am very happy with the job that this Committee does."[50]
34. Whilst maintaining this balance, our experience
of monitoring sentencing guidelines in our first two years as
the Justice Select Committee has suggested ways in which this
role might be enhanced. These include ensuring cross-fertilisation
between review of individual guidelines and scrutiny of the broader
criminal justice context, and using consideration of sentencing
guidelines to enhance post-legislative scrutiny.
SETTING A SENTENCING GUIDELINE IN
CONTEXT
35. Professor Ashworth raised a concern about how
looking at individual areas in terms of sentencing guidelines
can skew effective oversight:
"the fact that the guidelines at the moment
come out in penny numbers […] does not really lend itself
to a proper rounded consideration of the whole map and that is
really what now above all we need to do. […] the fact that
we proceed at the moment by penny numbers not only inhibits proper
parliamentary scrutiny but also gives that press regular field
days because they can have a little pick at each guideline […]
whereas it would be far better if they looked at the whole picture."[51]
36. Our consideration of an individual sentencing
guideline often raises issues of the inter-relationships between
sentencing for different offences. For example, RoadPeace questioned
the relationship between offences of causing death by driving
and those offences which involve the same standard of driving
but, by fortune, no fatality. They stated: "the maximum sentence
is 14 years if the victim happens to be killed, but just two years
for an act of equally bad driving if the victim happens to survive
(even if s/he is maimed for life)."[52]
37. We have also seen how key conundrums for sentencing
as a whole may be highlighted through an individual sentencing
guideline. The sentencing guideline for theft and burglary not
in a dwelling raised issues of dealing with persistent low level
offenders, including those stealing to fund an addiction. Paul
Cavadino, Chief Executive of Nacro, suggested that there was a
double-standard in sentencing such individuals:
"we tend to say, 'we have tried fines and
we have tried community penalties. They did not work. Therefore,
we must use custody'. We less often say, 'We have used custody.
The offender re-offended. That did not work, so we ought to try
something else'."[53]
He went on to argue that, as with individuals who
have to try to give up smoking several times before they succeed,
a drug addict may require more than one chance. He spoke of people
in his experience: "They have gone on a drug rehabilitation
programme, they have relapsed, they have re-offended, but they
have subsequently had another chance. They have gone on another
programme and eventually have succeeded."[54]
He concluded that "we should be ready, in appropriate cases,
to use community penalties of an appropriate kind repeatedly,
if that seems to be the best option, the option most likely to
prevent re-offending."[55]
38. An important aspect of our work with sentencing
guidelines has therefore been to pinpoint concerns about the broader
aspects of the criminal justice system during consideration of
individual guidelines. In considering sentencing for offences
against the person, we asked questions about the use of custodial
sentences for less serious violence. In relation to sentencing
for theft, we looked at cases where individuals commit crimes
to fund an addiction, and how a sentencing regime can respond
effectively to an individual who may find it difficult to move
past that addiction and out of crime. Sentencing for offences
of causing death by driving raised a number of issues around how
bereaved families are kept informed about criminal justice processes.
Where relevant, we have commented on these both to the Sentencing
Guidelines Council and the Ministry of Justice. We have further
found that the focus on an individual area of sentencing provided
important considerations for our scrutiny in other areas. For
example, we were able to take ideas from Victim Support on what
victims want from the criminal justice system, discussed in the
context of the sentencing guideline on theft and burglary (non-dwelling),
and pursue these with witnesses in our Justice Reinvestment
inquiry.[56]
39. Consideration of sentencing guidelines is an
unusual parliamentary process without applicable formal parliamentary
procedures. It also presents certain practical difficulties. It
has not been possible, for example, within the usual guidelines
timetable to conduct conventional select committee evidence gathering
leading to a report to the House. Whereas normally a select committee
determines its own priorities as to where scrutiny is important,
the process of monitoring sentencing guidelines is subject to
the timetables and processes of an external body, the Sentencing
Guidelines Council, which itself may be affected by timetables
for implementing new criminal offences. These timetable pressures
particularly affect the range of evidence available to us, as
the most relevant organisations may also be seeking to respond
on specific issues relating to the guideline directly to the Sentencing
Guidelines Council.[57]
CONTRIBUTING TO POST-LEGISLATIVE
SCRUTINY
40. The Lords Constitution Committee commented in
their report Relations between the executive, the judiciary
and Parliament on the desirability of post-legislative scrutiny,
which could look at how courts are interpreting and applying legislation.[58]
Our experience with sentencing guidelines has suggested that consideration
of sentencing guidelines, which are after all a concrete example
of a system explicitly designed to provide more practical information
on the application of legislation, provides indications of where
post-legislative scrutiny may be important.
41. One overarching issue that has arisen during
our scrutiny of sentencing guidelines is the complexity of the
criminal law. Nicola Padfield, University of Cambridge, described
for the Committee one of the challenges facing sentencers:
"the law rightly says and completely properly
says, you get sentenced on the law which applied when you did
your crime. This means we cannot just learn the law today, we
have to know yesterday's, and the day before, and people are being
released under systems for crimes they committed and were sentenced
for a few years ago."[59]
She concluded:
"We live in a nightmare world of criminal
justice. I had not thought I was going to say this but maybe it
is an opportunity to say yet again, yes, we do need a criminal
code and we do need a sentencing code and a code of criminal procedure."[60]
The Magistrates' Association were also interested
in simplification of criminal legislation, although sceptical
that it could be achieved effectively: "Please, no more Acts,
no more legislation. Although in principle codification would
be wonderful, I do not think it would be done in the way that
everybody would wish."[61]
42. Scrutiny of guidelines might also suggest the
need for post-legislative scrutiny of a particular area of legislation.
CTC, the national cyclists' organisation, commented on the draft
guideline for offences of causing death by driving: "The
draft SGC [Sentencing Guidelines Council] guideline proposals
are generally sensible given the legal anomalies within which
they must operate."[62]
One potential issue with the legal framework was brought to light
by public opinion research commissioned by the Sentencing Advisory
Panel on sentencing for these offences. The sentencing guideline
for Causing Death by Driving covers four offences:
- Causing death by dangerous
driving (maximum 14 year custodial sentence);
- Causing death by careless driving whilst under
the influence of alcohol or drugs (maximum 14 year custodial sentence);
- Causing death by careless driving (maximum five
year custodial sentence);
- Causing death by driving: unlicensed, uninsured,
disqualified (maximum two year custodial sentence).
The maximum sentences set in legislation may suggest
a hierarchy of seriousness for the offences, with the longest
maximum sentence the most serious. In research focus groups people
distinguished between a deliberate choice to drive whilst disqualified
where somebody died, even if the standard of driving was not in
question, and careless driving where someone died, which was conceptualised
as a tragic error.[63]
There is therefore a potential mismatch between public and legislative
assessment of seriousness in these offences.
43. A further element to sentencing guidelines and
post-legislative scrutiny is the extent to which a sentencing
guideline accords with legislative intention. The Sentencing Guidelines
Council is required to consider when drawing up guidelines:
a) the need to promote consistency in sentencing,
b) the sentences imposed by courts in England
and Wales for offences to which the guidelines relate,
c) the cost of different sentences and their
relative effectiveness in preventing re-offending,
d) the need to promote public confidence in the
criminal justice system, and
e) the views communicated to the Council […]
by the [Sentencing Advisory] Panel. [64]
We have found consistently when reviewing different
sentencing guidelines that the cost and relative effectiveness
in preventing re-offending of different sentences and the need
to promote public confidence in the criminal justice system present
difficulties. We consider further in chapter four issues relating
to these. We hope that over time our scrutiny of sentencing guidelines
will contribute to the broader debate of how to reach effective
sentencing solutions, thereby meeting the expectations of Parliament,
victims and the public.
44. Parliament sets the framework for sentencing
in legislation. Sentencing guidelines are a key element to how
this legislation works in practice. It is vital that Parliament,
representing the public voice, contributes to sentencing guidelines
as they are produced and in doing so identifies the crucial issues
of public confidence and the effectiveness of sentencing. We are
convinced this is compatible with safeguarding the crucial discretion
of sentencers to impose a sentence tailored to the individual
case.
45. We are concerned that, all too often, political
debates about sentencing descend into a counter-productive competition
as to who can appear toughest on crime, measured by sentence length.
A select committee works on the basis of consensus and we are
less likely to fall foul of the temptation to 'out-tough' each
other in our consideration of sentencing guidelines or to confuse
length of sentence with effectiveness.
46. On the basis of our experience with sentencing
guidelines, we have found that a spotlight on an individual sentencing
guideline can illuminate broader concerns and issues in relation
to the criminal justice system. We will continue to review sentencing
guidelines in the wider context, seeking thereby to enhance the
quality of scrutiny of criminal justice policy and legislation.
This is an entirely different process from judgments on individual
cases.
23 Hutton, N. 'Institutional Mechanisms for incorporating
the public',in Frieburg A., and Gelb K. (eds), Penal Populism,
Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy, Willan Publishing,
Devon, 2008, p208 Back
24
Rt Hon Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, "Who decides the
sentence?", Prisoners' Education Trust Annual Lecture, 14
October 2008
Rt Hon Lord Woolf was Lord Chief Justice
6 June 2000-30 September 2005; Rt Hon Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers
was Lord Chief Justice 30 September 2005-1 October 2008, during
which time he gave evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee
as part of the Towards Effective Sentencing inquiry; Rt
Hon Lord Judge has been Lord Chief Justice since 1 October 2008,
when he was also elevated to the peerage, but gave evidence to
the Justice Committee prior to this as President of the Queen's
Bench Division and Head of Criminal Justice. Back
25
Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 144 Back
26
Justice Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007-08, Towards
Effective Sentencing, HC 184-i Back
27
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on Sentencing
Guidelines, 22 January 2008, HC (2007-08) 279-i, Q 4 Back
28
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on Sentencing
Guidelines, 22 January 2008, HC (2007-08) 279-i, Q 19 Back
29
The Magistrates' Association Response to the Sentencing Commission
Working Group Consultation, 30 May 2008 Back
30
Council of HM Circuit Judges Response to the Sentencing Commission
Working Group Consultation, 30 May 2008 Back
31
Criminal Bar Association Response to the Consultation Paper of
the Sentencing Commission Working Group, 5 June 2008 Back
32
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on the Sentencing
Commission, 14 October 2008, HC (2007-08) 1095-i, Q 23 Back
33
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on Draft Sentencing
Guidelines: Assaults, 23 October 2007, HC (2006-07) 1098-i, Q
2 Back
34
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on the Sentencing
Commission, 14 October 2008, HC (2007-08) 1095-i, Q 21 Back
35
Hutton, N. 'Institutional Mechanisms for incorporating the public',
in Frieburg A., and Gelb K. (eds), Penal Populism, sentencing
Councils and Sentencing Policy, Willan Publishing, Devon,
2008, p210 Back
36
Young, W. and Browning, C., 'New Zealand's Sentencing Council',
Criminal Law Review, No. 4 (2008) Back
37
Since the 2008 election in New Zealand proposals for a new Sentencing
Council have not been progressed. Back
38
Young, W. and Browning, C., 'New Zealand's Sentencing Council',
Criminal Law Review, No. 4 (2008) Back
39
Sentencing Commission Working Group, Sentencing Guidelines
in England and Wales: An Evolutionary Approach, July 2008,
paragraph 8.21 Back
40
Sentencing Commission Working Group, Sentencing Guidelines
in England and Wales: An Evolutionary Approach, July 2008,
paragraph 8.22 Back
41
Response prepared at the request of the Senior Presiding Judge,
Response to the Sentencing Commission Working Group Consultation
Paper, 30 May 2008 Back
42
Council of HM Circuit Judges, Response to the Sentencing Commission
Working Group Consultation, 30 May 2008 Back
43
Hough, M., Jacobsen, J. and Prison Reform Trust, Creating a
Sentencing Commission for England and Wales: an opportunity to
address the prison crisis, 2008 Back
44
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on the Sentencing
Commission, 14 October 2008, HC (2007-08) 1095-i, Q 37 Back
45
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on the Sentencing
Commission, 14 October 2008, HC (2007-08) 1095-i, Q 38 Back
46
Hough, M., Jacobsen, J. and Prison Reform Trust, Creating a
Sentencing Commission for England and Wales: an opportunity to
address the prison crisis, 2008 Back
47
Sentencing Commission Working Group, Sentencing Guidelines
in England and Wales: An Evolutionary Approach, July 2008,
para 8.23 Back
48
Sentencing Commission Working Group, Sentencing Guidelines
in England and Wales: An Evolutionary Approach, July 2008,
paragraph 8.26 Back
49
Council of HM Circuit Judges, Response to the Sentencing Commission
Working Group Consultation, 30 May 2008 Back
50
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on the Sentencing
Commission, 14 October 2008, HC (2007-08) 1095-i, Q 37 Back
51
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on the Sentencing
Commission, 14 October 2008, HC (2007-08) 1095-i, Q 37 Back
52
Justice Committee, Consultation Sentencing Guideline: Causing
Death by Driving, Oral and Written evidence, 4 March 2008, HC
(2007-08) 407-i, Ev 17 Back
53
Oral evidence taken before the Justice Committee on Consultation
Sentencing Guideline: Theft and Burglary (non-dwelling), 3 June
2008, HC (2007-08) 649-i, Q 11 Back
54
Oral evidence taken before the Justice Committee on Consultation
Sentencing Guideline: Theft and Burglary (non-dwelling), 3 June
2008, HC (2007-08) 649-i, Q 11 Back
55
Oral evidence taken before the Justice Committee on Consultation
Sentencing Guideline: Theft and Burglary (non-dwelling), 3 June
2008, HC (2007-08) 649-i, Q 11 Back
56
See for example, uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken
before the Justice Committee on Justice Reinvestment, 24 June
2008, HC (2007-08) 425-iv, Q171 Back
57
On 20 May 2009 the House agreed changes to its Standing Orders
to enable parliamentary scrutiny of National Planning Statements.
This procedure has some similarities with the consideration of
draft sentencing guidelines such as external timetabling pressures. Back
58
House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee on the Constitution,
Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament,
Session 2007-08, HL Paper 177 Back
59
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on Sentencing
Guidelines, 22 January 2008, HC (2007-08) 279-i, Q 14 Back
60
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on Sentencing
Guidelines, 22 January 2008, HC (2007-08) 279-i, Q 14 Back
61
Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on Draft Sentencing
Guidelines: Assault, 23 October 2007, HC (2006-07) 1098-i, Q 27 Back
62
Justice Committee, Consultation Sentencing Guideline: Causing
Death by Driving, Oral and Written evidence, 4 March 2008, HC
(2007-08) 407-i, Ev 21 Back
63
Justice Committee, Consultation Sentencing Guideline: Causing
Death by Driving, Oral and Written evidence, 4 March 2008, HC
(2007-08) 407-i, Q 27 Back
64
Criminal Justice Act 2003, Section 170 Back
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