Procedural implications
11. We have also considered the procedural implications
of allowing the tabling of amendments by select committees. The
Chairman of Ways and Means set these out very clearly in his two
responses to our inquiry. In offering general support for the
proposal, he pointed out that "any inherent advantage is
gained only if a select committee amendment is accorded priority".[11]
He identified two aspects to this: selection, and procedure under
programming:
The fact that an amendment is endorsed by a select
committee does not give it any advantage from the point of view
of selection, for selection can be done only on merit. If selected
according to the usual criteria, the amendment will fall to be
considered as and when the relevant part of the legislation is
discussed, making it no more certain to be reached than any other
amendment.
Thus your suggestion impacts not so much on selection
but on programming. Should a select committee backed amendment
be guaranteed time for debate; or should it be guaranteed a vote
when the knife falls?[12]
12. The Chairman expanded on this point in his second
response:
Unless discretion is expressly ruled out by the
terms of the programme motion the Chair will be inclined to grant
a vote on an amendment which has featured as a key point in the
debate. Government amendments not reached when the knife falls
will more often than not be moved formally and put as one question.
In your scenario [where a select committee amendment has similar
status to a government amendment] a select committee amendment
in a group not reached would pre-empt the decision of the Chair
and a vote would be required. This might not go down well with
colleagues backing a significant but non-debated amendment. This
could further eat into time available for the next selected group
of amendments or, at the end of Report, Third Reading.[13]
13. We are grateful to the Chairman of Ways and Means
for identifying this important issue. It would be quite possible
for select committee amendments to be tabled as such for identification
purposes alone, but the logical corollary is whether there is
or should be an expectation that these amendments should be given
a higher priority in terms of selection for debate or decision.
Debate and decision need to be examined separately. On the former,
it is clear that giving special status to select committee amendments
would have an impact on the time available under programming for
debate on other amendments and might cut across amendments tabled
by other groups of backbenchers. On the latter, the time taken
out of programmed business for a decision on select committee
business would not be substantial (a maximum of 15 minutes) should
the convention be adopted that the Chair should look favourably
upon granting a vote to such an amendment. An automatic right
to a vote in all cases, enshrined in Standing Orders, would be
inadvisable since there may be occasions upon which select committees
table amendments to several different parts of a bill or upon
which a committee amendment breaches the established rules of
the House (for example, on decisions already taken that Session).
11 Ev 1 Back
12
Ev 1-2 Back
13
Ev 4 Back
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