Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE
WEDNESDAY 19 NOVEMBER
2008
Q20 Nigel Griffiths: If that took
this programme to 2027 or beyond, how would you plug the gap?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: I am very reluctant,
if I may say so, to reply to a hypothetical question because we
are not planning to suffer that sort of slippage. As I said at
the beginning, it is conceivable that the Vanguard class could
be further extended beyond 2024 but we are not counting on it.
There is work going on at the moment to assess what the implications
would be were it to prove necessary so to extend it.
Q21 Nigel Griffiths: I cannot imagine
you ever saying that you were counting on it. What sort of problems
has the Ministry had bringing in major projects on time?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: We have had
the problems with Astute that you alluded to earlier.
Q22 Nigel Griffiths: How late was
the type 45 destroyer?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: The type 45
destroyer also is one of these projects that has suffered significant
delay over time.
Q23 Nigel Griffiths: How late is
the Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: Ditto. I accept
that.
Q24 Nigel Griffiths: I think that
was seven years. The question is hardly hypothetical. There would
be concern that if you go beyond 2024, which seems to me to be
a tight deadline, we would no longer be able to operate our defence
strategy with a nuclear submarine in the way that you are planning.
What would we do?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: It is not a
hypothetical question. In relation to Astute, by some way the
most significant factor, as I understand it, was the substantial
loss of skills between the end of Vanguard construction and the
commencement of the Astute programme. A great deal of our problems
are down to that and to an unrealistic view of how much risk we
could transfer to suppliers. The fact that we are now for example
taking over responsibility for the design ourselves, adopting
a more hands on approach—and this is beginning to improve
the Astute position in recent times—adopting a more active
partnership approach with the company gives us some grounds for
optimism that we can do much better this time. Let us not forget
that Vanguard itself was delivered on time and to cost.
Q25 Nigel Griffiths: Let us go on
to Vanguard. If I can expand on one of the answers you gave to
the Chairman, Vanguard came in in 1994 with what should prove
to be a 30 year life span. Is that right?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: Twenty-five
years was the original, projected life span but we are now talking
about a five year extension.
Q26 Nigel Griffiths: If I extend
my logic, that will give you the benefit of the doubt. What you
are saying in terms of the Ohio class going out of service then
is that, around about two thirds of the way through Vanguard's
replacement lifetime, the Americans are going to bring in a new
system.
Sir Bill Jeffrey: That is, broadly
speaking, the position.
Q27 Nigel Griffiths: What happens
if we make a design breakthrough and require a larger or smaller
replacement for the Trident D5? Larger, I presume, it could not
launch. Can it launch a smaller missile?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: There are two
broad answers to that. The first is the one I gave the Chairman
earlier, which is that at the highest political level we have
an undertaking about compatibility prospectively. The second is
that in recent months—and I have been involved to a degree
myself in these—there have been discussions with the Americans
about work together on a common missile compartment which ought
to derisk this issue in the slightly longer term.
Rear Admiral Mathews: One of the
enduring strengths of this programme has been our relationship
with the Americans on the missile system, whether it is Polaris,
Trident or into the future with this system. Both countries recognise
that. As you rightly point out, the significant risk of being
ahead of the Americans is one we have to manage. The Americans
have brought forward their Ohio replacement programme[1]
to align the dates with ours now and we are currently working
on what we call a common missile compartment design. We are going
through the approvals process in the UK at the moment, just as
the Americans are going through the approvals process the other
side of the Atlantic. Our aim is to deliver a common missile compartment
to service both submarines. What we are looking to do is future
proof beyond that 2042 date, if there is a decision to change
from the Trident D5 life extended missile to another generation
missile. Both countries will have identical missile compartment
designs and be able to take that future missile design, whenever
it is. One of the things we are looking at in that design is what
flexibility we need to incorporate into it.
Q28 Nigel Griffiths: What was the exchange
rate when you costed the elements of this programme that the Americans
are involved with or that we are buying from America?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: I do not know
offhand.
Mr Lester: 1.82[2].
Q29 Nigel Griffiths: How much has this
fall now pushed up the costs? Can you update the Committee on
that?
Mr Lester: We do a degree of buying
forward of foreign exchange anyway which mitigates the risk over
the next three years or so. That is a rolling buying forward programme.
If over the course of the programme it just stuck at where it
was today, it would add £300 million-odd to the overall cost
of the programme.
Q30 Mr Curry: You will understand
if we are tempted to say that the motto over the Ministry of Defence
door should be "Everything that can go wrong does go wrong",
looking at the procurement programmes that Mr Griffiths has mentioned.
The motto on this programme seems to be "Nothing can go wrong
because, if anything goes wrong at all, then the whole programme
becomes much more difficult." Is that a fair assessment?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: I do not think
so. I do not think the first part is true either. We have some
well advertised procurements which have gone badly wrong and this
Committee has been involved in them in recent years. I will never
be one to defend the indefensible. On the other hand, if you look
at the programme as a whole, we are delivering at the moment 350
equipment projects, about 300 urgent operational requirements
and, in that much wider population of unremarkable programmes,
our performance is a great deal better. I would just gently contest
the statement that everything that can go wrong does go wrong.
Q31 Mr Curry: This is a very particular
programme, is it not? This is a programme first of all which is
wholly dependent upon American cooperation. Okay, there has been
an exchange of letters but we are dependent on the Americans for
key pieces of kit. We are also dependent on the Americans for
the progress of their own development programme and its synchronisation
or compatibility with ours. There could be dislocation there,
could there not?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: We have an independent
deterrent in the sense that it is independently operable by decision
of our Prime Minister. Having said that, as you observe, we are
very much dependent on the Americans for the development and support
of it. That is a close and, in my experience, very deeply collaborative
and worthwhile relationship from which we get cost benefit as
well as military benefit.
Q32 Mr Curry: The job of this Committee
is not to speculate upon the possibility of the Prime Minister
ever exercising that independence; it is to focus on the costs
of building the kit. You are 60 or about to be 60, I think?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: I am already.
Q33 Mr Curry: Some of us think 60
is quite a young age. I assume that you are not far from retirement.
Is that the case?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: Not very far,
no.
Q34 Mr Curry: As you know, when diplomats
leave their posts, they write a confidential letter to the Minister.
If your Minister said, "Sir Bill, you are going and I would
like you to leave to your successor something which warns him
of all the key things that could go wrong, just in the interests
of making sure that your successor eases into service and is informed",
what would be the key things? What keeps you awake at night?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: Fortunately,
very little keeps me awake at night. I think this Report which
we have in front of us is a very clear account of what could go
wrong. To answer your first question, the Department's position
is not that this is the programme in which nothing can go wrong.
We are acutely conscious of the risks that are involved in this
programme. They are set out comprehensively in this Report. The
principal task of the gentlemen on my right and left and me some
of the time is to ensure that we manage these substantial risks
as effectively as we can.
Q35 Mr Curry: There is one point
here at which my eyes slightly begin to glaze. There is quite
a big section on Astute but we are going to have to build a submarine
to carry these missiles, are we not, a Vanguard replacement?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: Yes.
Q36 Mr Curry: Where is that submarine
in terms of conception? In whose eye is it a spark?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: Principally,
the project we are examining is the successor submarine.
Q37 Mr Curry: But we do not have
one yet, do we?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: We are in the
design phase of it, the concept phase.
Q38 Mr Curry: Whereas the Astute
at least exists, however late it is, meanwhile waiting for the
Astute all the Trafalgar class are being absolutely clapped out
and knackered, both boats and crew. We do not yet have a replacement
for Vanguard. There is nothing to look at yet.
Sir Bill Jeffrey: There certainly
is not. One of the strengths of our position—and I acknowledge
that there are some weaknesses—is that the current intention
is to build what remains of the Astute class, which has a different
purpose, as you know, from the Vanguard, in the period between
now and the commencement of building the Vanguard successor.
Q39 Mr Curry: Is there any read over
from the Astute?
Sir Bill Jeffrey: One of the things
we are trying to do in an effort to derisk this is to maximise
the read over and to learn as much—
1 Note by witness: The US have brought forward
that element of the Ohio programme relating to development of
the common missile compartment, to align with our timescales.
The timing of the wider Ohio programme is a matter for the US
Government. Back
2
Note by witness; The average rate assumed was 1.8 Back
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