1 Making important decisions
1. The United Kingdom's ability to maintain continuous
at sea deterrence is dependent on the seamless transition from
the current Vanguard fleet to the future class of submarines.
By 2024, two of the four Vanguard class submarines will have gone
out of service and the first of the future submarines will need
to be in service. The current critical path for the future deterrent
programme is therefore delivery of the submarine platform in time
to meet this deadline, although this plan also assumes the successful
delivery of a five-year life-extension programme for the Vanguard
class submarines.[3] Key
timelines for the principal elements of the future deterrent are
shown in Figure 1.
2. The Department has a long history of delivering
major defence projects late. The Department's unrealistic assessment
of project delivery timetables has often meant that major projects
also frequently exceed their budgets. The current Astute submarine
programme provides a good example of this, since it is already
over three years late against its planned in-service date and
around £1.3 billion over budget. This increase in expenditure
constitutes a 47.3% cost overrun.[4]
3. The Astute submarine procurement programme has
suffered from a range of problems, including slow contract negotiation,
an ill-advised attitude to risk and difficulties with a computer-aided
design tool. Furthermore, the length of time elapsed between the
Vanguard and Astute programmes meant that key skills and submarine-building
expertise disappeared. There has also been unplanned cost growth
such as increases of £164 million and £68 million for
materials and labour respectively.[5]
4. The Department understands that, if it is to avoid
jeopardising continuous at sea deterrence, there is no room for
the future deterrent programme to experience similar delays to
the Astute programme. Although the current Vanguard fleet could
be extended beyond the five years envisaged under the planned
optimisation programme, any further extension of the current submarines
is likely to add extra cost and risk.[6]
5. The Department has yet to make a number of key
decisions, including finalising the principal design parameters
of the submarine, the type of nuclear reactor and the design and
size of the missile compartment.[7]
The Department has until 2014 to decide whether to build three
or four submarines.[8]
At present, the Department believes that four submarines will
enable the United Kingdom to maintain continuous at sea deterrence.
A new design of submarine with increased reliability might allow
the same level of coverage to be maintained with three submarines.[9]
Figure 1: Summary timeline for the replacement of the deterrent capability
6. The Department has yet to choose between using
a variant of the existing 'PWR2' nuclear reactor and developing
a new reactor—'PWR3'—but intends to do so by September
2009, its Initial Gate approval milestone.[10]
Both choices present opportunities as well as costs. The PWR2
model has the benefit of being based on existing technology, but
will require updating because of the risk of obsolescence.[11]
The PWR3 option offers the advantage of increased efficiency,
but presents an added risk to the timeline as it requires a substantial
amount of research and development.
7. The Department faces a difficult judgement in
deciding how much options analysis work to undertake before settling
on the key design features of the submarine. The Department is
attempting to complete the submarine design and build process
in 17 years, against the 18 year timetable which is generally
accepted as necessary (including two years for concept, seven
years for design, seven years for construction and two years for
sea trials). The Department intends to manage this timetable misalignment
by overlapping the design and construction phases. This approach
will mean that construction will commence before the completion
of submarine design.[12]
3 C&AG's Report, para 1.8 Back
4
Qq 18-19 Back
5
C&AG's Report, Box 3 Back
6
Q 4 Back
7
C&AG's Report, para 2.8 Back
8
Q 63 Back
9
Q 46 Back
10
Q 76 Back
11
C&AG's Report, para 1.14 Back
12
Qq 59-60 Back
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