Memorandum submitted by the Hansard Society
The Hansard Society is the UK's leading independent,
non-partisan political research and education charity. We aim
to strengthen parliamentary democracy and encourage greater public
involvement in politics.
We welcome the formation of the committee and
the areas of inquiry set out. The Committee's deliberations represent
a unique opportunity to agree some important parliamentary reforms
before the next general election and the recommendations will
need to be urgently acted upon if progress is to be made in the
short time available.
Following the 17 September seminar with members
of the committee the Hansard Society submits this evidence to
follow up in more detail on some of the issues discussed and to
comment on some areas which were not raised during the course
of the round table debate. We also refer members of the committee
to our recent Parliamentary Affairs article entitled "Engagement
and participation: What the public want and how our politicians
need to respond" (a copy is attached for reference). The
section of our submission concerning public initiation of proceedings
draws directly on this article.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SCHEDULING BUSINESS
IN THE
HOUSE
The secretive usual channels process
for organising parliamentary business should be replaced by a
more transparent system designed to: provide greater certainty
to and advance notice of the parliamentary timetable; allow for
more involvement by the main political parties in the management
of business; facilitate greater discussion between all interested
parties in the Commons about the shape and timing of the legislative
agenda; and introduce greater flexibility for consideration of
topical issues of public interest.
There are advantages and flaws with
all the possible business committee permutations. On balance,
however, we think the case may be marginally stronger for two
committees (one for government and one for non-government business)
if some of the concerns about cumbersome administration can be
overcome. If not, one single all purpose business committee would
still represent a significant improvement on the current secret
usual channel arrangements.
APPOINTMENT OF
MEMBERS AND
CHAIRMAN OF
COMMITTEES
An independent selection committee
comprised of senior backbenchers from all parties should be elected
by secret ballot within the first few days of a new Parliament.
The committee could be chaired by the Chairman of Ways and Means.
Members interested in serving on a select committee would submit
to the selection committee an "expression of interest"
paper outlining their relevant interests and experience and committee
preferences. The business committee or usual channels would agree
the allocation of committee chairmanships and divide the number
of seats between the parties and inform the selection committee
accordingly. The selection committee would then nominate Members
to each committeeinformed but not bound by Members' expressions
of interestin accordance with the required party balance.
A motion outlining the proposed chair of each committee would
be put to the whole House for a vote, thereby allowing members
to reject the suggestions if desired. The selection committee
should be required to complete its work within six weeks of the
start of the new Parliament in order to ensure that the work of
committees begins promptly.
PUBLIC INITIATION
OF PROCEEDINGS
A parliamentary petitions committee
should be adopted to assess issues of public concern and, if appropriate,
to make referrals for debate or committee inquiry. Additionally
a system of e-petitions should be established and incorporated
with paper petitions and processed through this new petitions
committee.
The procedural process for petitions
must be clear if this approach is to be effective. The scope of
petitionswhat is the responsibility of Parliament and what
is not, what is therefore admissible and what is notmust
be clearly set out. Responses must be provided in timely fashion
and it must be clear from whom, when and how these responses are
to be provided. Good tracking mechanisms are required. And clearly
defined outcomes through the parliamentary process must be sign-posted
(for example, whether, as a result of a petition, an issue may
simply appear on the order paper, or a written response be provided,
a debate triggered or some other form of procedural escalation).
By placing parliamentary petitions
within a clear procedural process a petitions committee and e-petitions
approach will help to strengthen the role of representative democracy
rather than simply allow the loudest voices and mob mentality
to dominate. The introduction of a petitions system would have
real symbolic value in better linking Parliament and the public.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
1. Contrary to popular perception the House
of Commons is not a supine body which acts at the whim of the
executive. Recent parliamentary sessions have seen the highest
rates of rebellion by MPs in the post war period. The scrutiny
opportunities of Members have also been augmented through, for
example, the enhancement of the role and resources of select committees,
the introduction of Public Bill Committee evidence sessions and
the Liaison Committee's opportunities to question the Prime Minister.
2. However, the balance of influence over
decision-making in the House of Commonsabout, for example,
what is debated and when, who sits on what committees etcis
widely perceived to have tilted too far in the interests of the
executive to the detriment of Members. But a reform approach focused
solely on a desire to reduce the power of the executive and thereby
empower parliamentarians collectively is based on too narrow an
analysis.
3. Firstly, the tension within the House
of Commons is not one solely between members of the executive
and other MPs. At times, the frontbenchers of all parties have
a common interest which can frustrate the desires and interests
of backbenchers. The drive for reform should be based on a desire
to dilute the overweening influence of frontbenchers generally
over matters that should be the preserve of the House collectively
rather than purely focus on the influence of the executive.
4. Secondly, we do not have a political
system in which the legislature is a co-equal branch of government
alongside the executive but rather a system of "Government
in Parliament". Reform should take account of this constitutional
position and Members should work with the grain of itwith
what the system is rather than what they might wish it to be.
A delicate balance must be drawn between the right of the executive
to secure its legislative programme in a timely and efficient
manner and the obligations that weigh on the shoulders of Members
on all sides of the House properly to scrutinise that legislative
programme.
5. Thirdly, MPs are not a homogenous group
of like minded parliamentarians: each defines their role, function
and interests differently and the relationship each has with his/her
party varies. They do not represent an en bloc vote for
an agreed programme of parliamentary reform. There are already
a number of ways in which backbench Members could exercise more
influence and be more proactive in the arena of legislative scrutiny
for example, but many choose not to do so. The independence of
Members in asserting their rights and role as parliamentarians
is largely a matter of personal will and political vicissitude.
6. Fourthly, the vast majority of Members
are elected not as individual politicians but as a representative
of their party. As such political parties have a legitimate role
in the parliamentary process and their influence, as exercised
through the whips, cannot and should not be wholly circumscribed
but rather restrained from excessive and egregious behaviour.
7. Beyond addressing the right of the House
of Commons to determine aspects of its own operation free from
executive/frontbench influence and control, a further important
reason to pursue reform is the need for Parliament to develop
into a more open and transparent institution in which its decision-making
structures and administrative processes are held up to full public
gaze. Greater transparency and accountability is a necessary precondition
if improved standards of governance in the House of Commons are
to be achieved.
8. Any reforms proposed must form a coherent,
comprehensive package of change rather than a series of unconnected
cherry-picked initiatives selected for their populist appeal.
Reforms can often have unintended consequences and lead to developments
that are the opposite of what was intended. Imperfect implementation
of previous reforms can also significantly undermine their value.
For example, timetabling is rightly criticised as having failed
and descended into partisanship, but it does not work largely
because it has been decoupled from the process of pre-legislative
scrutiny. The two changes were recommended not as independent
stand-alone reforms but as linked elements of a holistic reform
package by the Hansard Society and others. It is imperfect implementation
that has seriously compromised their value and effectiveness.
SCHEDULING BUSINESS
IN THE
HOUSE
9. The secretive usual channels process
for organising parliamentary business should be replaced by a
more transparent system predicated on the establishment of a business
(or steering or legislative) committee(s) designed to meet the
following principles:
I. Provide greater certainty to and advance
notice of the parliamentary timetablethe work of the House
is of interest to many more people than just Members of the House
and the organisation of business should provide, in the public
interest, greater advance notice than is currently the case.
II. Allow for more involvement by the main
political parties in the management of business.
III. Facilitate greater discussion between
all interested parties in the Commons about the shape and timing
of the legislative agenda. A number of key challenges exist with
the current arrangement of business: i) there are few avenues
by which backbenchers can generate legislative initiatives; and
ii) the time split between plenary and committee work needs to
be better balanced to reinforce the scrutiny work of committees
and ensure that their work is properly debated in the House.
IV. Introduce greater flexibility for consideration
of topical issues of public interestthe limited topicality
of current business arrangements is particularly damaging to public
engagement and confidence.
V. Ensure greater transparency in the overall
process. A shift away from the secrecy of the usual channels in
favour of full transparency and accountability in the organisation
of business might act as a natural restraint on any egregious
effort by party whips to exercise excessive control and influence.
Political reality dictates however, that whatever business committee
model is adopted, the whips will have the means to influence its
deliberations if they wish to do so.
10. A single all purpose business committeeamounting,
in effect, to the usual channels operating in public rather than
privatemay be sufficient to address issues of transparency
and advance planning and would represent a significant improvement
on the current arrangements. However, if the committee is not
sufficiently inclusive and is dominated by the main party whips
then it is unlikely that the issue of topicality will be addressed
or that challenges such as backbench initiation of legislation
or the balance between plenary and committee work will be explored.
11. The alternatives to an all-purpose Committee
are therefore a Committee for non-government business or two separate
committees'one for government and one for non-government
business. Both have advantages and disadvantages in equal measure.
12. A single non-government business committee
would not resolve any issues about the timetabling of government
business. A decision would also have to be made about opposition
days and whether these would fall under the purview of the committee.
If so, opposition whips would want seats on the committee and
it would be difficult to do so without also providing equal representation
for government whips thereby undermining the committee's rationale
vis-á-vis the desired reduction in influence of
the whips. If opposition business is not included in the committee's
remit then the extent of that remit would actually be quite limited
in practice, extending to Private Members' legislation and requests
for debates.
13. A committee for government business
(formalisation of the usual channels, dominated by the whips)
and another committee for non-government business (backbenchers,
whip free) would combine the pros and cons of the two options
set out above. There would be improved transparency as far as
the usual channels are concerned and backbenchers would have more
control over non-governmental business. But the existence of two
committees might prove administratively burdensome.
14. There are thus advantages and flaws
with all the possible business committee permutations. On balance,
we think the case may be marginally stronger for two committees
if the administrative and related issues can be overcome. But
if not, one single all purpose committee would, we believe, represent
a significant improvement on the current secret usual channel
arrangements.
15. Whichever option Members choose, a number
of key questions will need to be addressed:
I. If there is to be anything other than
a single all purpose business committee then a decision will need
to be made about where the balance of time should lie between
government and non-government business in any given week if the
system is to operate effectively. This may need to be enshrined
in Standing Orders. How time will be managed in the event of emergency/fast-track
legislation will also need to be considered as this may not readily
fit within the usual timetable constraints.
II. How are Opposition days to be dealt withby
which committee? When determining this we would urge Members also
to consider reform of business arrangements to enable the Opposition
to substitute their time for topical debates.
III. How far will the remit of the committee(s)
extend? For example, should it include decisions about pre-legislative
scrutiny or the timing of Public Bill Committees? Will it consider
the balance of time between plenary and committee work? In order
to provide for greater focus on select committee work and resolve
the difficult timetabling issues that often confront MPs we recommend
that one half or preferably one full day per week be set aside
in the parliamentary timetable for committee work during which
time the main chamber would not sit. Alongside this the core tasks
of the chamber of the House of Commons should be refined and clarified.
The floor of the House remains the main public focus for activity
but attendance is low for anything other than big, set piece parliamentary
occasions. The extent to which discussion in the chamber dominates
political debate has also declined. To improve attendance and
influence, the work of the chamber should therefore be refined
to reflect its emergence as the plenary session of Parliament
and the place where ministers are held to account on the topical
issues of the day.
IV. What will the relationship be between
a business committee(s) and the Liaison Committee? The latter
currently acts as the representative body of backbenchers and
determines which committee reports are used in which debating
slots. Should this remain with the Liaison Committee or pass to
the new business committee(s)?
V. Finally, how are the chair and members
of a business committee(s) to be determined? A single all purpose
committee will likely be the usual channels augmented by some
backbench representatives. A non-governmental business committee
would primarily be composed of backbenchers. The non-whip members
of the committee(s) might be (s)elected by an independent selection
committee of senior backbenchers set up by the House which would
have an obligation to bear in mind party political balance in
terms of the committee(s) membership. If the alternative of election
of members of the committee is preferred then this should be by
secret ballot. The committee(s) might be chaired by the Speaker
representing the "interests" of the House and acting
as independent arbiter, or perhaps preferably by the Deputy Chair
of Ways and Means in order to insulate the Speaker from the partisan
debate.
APPOINTMENT OF
MEMBERS AND
CHAIRMEN OF
COMMITTEES
16. Committees currently provide an alternative
career path for some MPs with a particular interest in specific
areas of public policy. But the structure and membership of select
committees is a concern due to:
I. the frequency of ministerial reshuffles
and linked changes in the architecture of departmental administration
as a result of which the turnover of select committee membership
is unhelpfully high; and
II. the increased demands on select committee
time and the commitment clashes that Members often experience
between committee, other parliamentary and constituency duties,
resulting in low attendance levels at some committee meetings.
17. We recommend that every member of the
House of Commons who is not a member of the Government payroll
vote or on the opposition front bench should serve as a member
of a select committee. If necessary, the number of Parliamentary
Private Secretaries should be reduced to one per department in
order to expand the pool of available MPs for select committee
work.
18. The choice of committee chairs and members
should be more clearly placed in the hands of MPs as a collective
body. Given the number of posts to be allocated the election of
all members of select committees would be administratively cumbersome,
unwieldy and time consuming. It would also give rise to difficult
political questions about the electoral system to be deployed
which might in turn inhibit the chances of the proposed reform
being adopted. Nor should it be assumed that election rather than
selection of members/chairs would result in better outcomes in
terms of securing more independently minded committee members
free from the influence of the whips. The whips currently exercise
considerable influence but once on a committee many members tend
to "go native" quite quickly. They adapt to the independent
and collegial approach required by the nature of the committee
work and members of the governing party often subject their ministers
to considerable and often critical scrutiny.
19. We recommend the establishment of an
independent, broadly based selection committee comprised of senior
backbenchers from all parties elected by secret ballot within
the first few days of a new Parliament. The committee could be
chaired by the Chairman of Ways and Means and the arrangements
for its establishment might be modeled similarly to that of the
Chairman's Panel. This approach is similar to that already proposed
in 2001 by the Modernisation Committee when it suggested the establishment
of a Committee of Nomination.
20. Members interested in serving on a select
committee would submit to the selection committee an "expression
of interest" paper outlining their relevant interests and
experience and committee preferences. The business committee (or
usual channels if a business committee is not established) would
agree the allocation of committee chairmanships and divide the
number of seats between the parties and inform the selection committee
accordingly. The selection committee would then be responsible
for nominating members to each committeeinformed but not
bound by members' expressions of interestin accordance
with the required party balance. A motion outlining the proposed
Chair of each committee would be put to the whole House for a
vote, thereby allowing members to reject the suggestions if desired.
21. The selection committee should be required
to complete its work within six weeks of the start of the new
Parliament in order to ensure that the work of committees begins
promptly. If not, a gap of six months or more can develop (encompassing
the period before and after a general election) during which no
committee work takes place. This is an unacceptable delay.
PUBLIC INITIATION
OF PROCEEDINGS
22. Hansard Society research over the last
six yearsthrough our annual Audit of Political Engagementhas
consistently found that the public view of political engagement
and participation is far more complex than many of those advocating
for more direct, participatory forms of decision-making are willing
to acknowledge.
23. In particular, the Audit finds that:
55% simply do not want to be involved
in national decision-making;i
a lack of time is the greatest barrier
to participation;ii
a clear distinction is drawn between
having a say and being involved in decision-making, and influence
is favoured but not involvement;iii
people feel they lack influence
in decision-making above all because "nobody listens to what
I have to say";iv
the more efficacious any form of
political action or engagement is perceived to be, the more highly
it is valued;v and
although the public recognise what
it takes to be a good citizen they largely fail to convert good
intentions into positive action.vi
24. The barriers to public engagement and
participation in the political process are broadly a mixture of
a lack of knowledge and interest, low levels of satisfaction,
and a shortage of time. If participation in the political process
is to be enhanced, knowledge and interest need to be augmented
and deep-rooted social and demographic disparities addressed.
The objective must be an informed as well as an engaged public.
Mechanisms for engagement and decision-making need to be constructed
in such a way that they provide for a more satisfying engagement
experience, respecting the fact that influence through having
a voice in the process rather than direct involvement is preferred
by a majority. Such mechanisms must also be mindful of the time
that the public is able and indeed willing to give to the political
process. Overall the focus should be on the quality of public
engagement and participation not just the quantity and scale of
direct involvement in the process.
25. The public's desire for influence rather
than involvement, for giving voice to their views and being heard,
points to the fact that the political process may be as important
as the policy outcomes from any such process, though positive
outcomes do reinforce the value that the public places on the
process. But such processes have to be satisfying forms of public
engagement if that engagement is to have any chance of being sustained.
The most obvious form of enhanced democratic engagement in recent
years has been the government's efforts to consult more widely
on policy proposals and provide opportunities for the public and
interested stakeholders to have a say. However, amidst the blizzard
of consultation opportunities a perception has increasingly grown
that too often the process is illusory and that the government
has already made up its mind, resulting in disengagement amidst
increasing cynicism.vii
26. The challenge then is how to adopt new
mechanisms to enable people to have a say and exercise influence
in a meaningful manner, and in a way that ensures that politicians
must listen and respond, but which recognises some core constraints:
that not everyone's views can be reflected in the final outcome
and the degree to which people actually want to sustain their
engagement is quite limited.
27. In light of this data we believe that
a parliamentary petitions committee would provide a possible solution
to the public engagement challenge and ought to at least be adopted
on a trial basis by the House of Commons. It would not be a panacea
for public engagement and participation but it would offer a realistic
and deliverable reform. Petitions are an important part of the
contemporary democratic process. The Audit shows that the public
are more likely to sign a petition than they are to engage in
any other form of democratic activity.viii Petitions should therefore
be made a much more significant feature of the work of Parliament
in order to better engage the public and be more responsive to
matters of topical public concern.
28. At present, petitions are governed by
strict rules about wording and there is little sense that petitions
to Parliament result in any concrete action on the part of MPs.
In contrast, the Scottish Parliament has a Public Petitions Committee
which plays a pivotal role in connecting the public and the legislature.
It assesses the merits of each petition, if necessary through
the taking of evidence. It filters out petitions where action
is already being taken or where the case is weak. But where there
is a case to be answered it refers petitions for further consideration.
A similar petitions (or public engagement) committee could be
established in the House of Commons to assess issues of public
concern and, if appropriate, to make referrals for debate or committee
inquiry. We further recommend that Parliament adopt a system of
e-petitions, incorporated with paper petitions and processed through
the new petitions committee.
29. An e-petitions system was recommended
by the Procedure Committee in a report in April 2008. The Government
response "envisaged providing time" to debate the issue
later in 2008 but such a debate was not forthcoming. In March
2009 the Procedures Committee issued a further report calling
on the Government to introduce the system. It was critical of
the Government for stalling on this issue and for requesting that
the proposed scheme be changed in order to cut its cost based
on comparisons ministers had made with the No 10 e-petitions system.
However, what is proposed with a parliamentary petitions committee
and incorporation of e-petitions is markedly different to what
is offered on the Downing St site. By placing parliamentary petitions
within a clear procedural process the objective of a petitions
committee and e-petitions approach is to strengthen the role of
representative democracy rather than simply allow the loudest
voices and mob mentality to dominate. The introduction of a petitions
system would have real symbolic value in better linking Parliament
and the public.
30. However, our support for the petitions
system is predicated on the assumption that it will become an
integral and core part of the parliamentary process and not a
bolt-on accessory. Any petitions system, particularly e-petitions,
needs to sit at the heart of a well defined procedural process
which is transparent and clear to the public. The scope of petitionswhat
is the responsibility of Parliament and what is not, what is therefore
admissible and what is notmust be clearly set out. Responses
must be provided in timely fashion and it must be clear from whom,
when and how these responses are to be provided. Good tracking
mechanisms are required. And clearly defined outcomes through
the parliamentary process must be sign-posted (for example, whether,
as a result of a petition, an issue may simply appear on the order
paper, or a written response be provided, a debate triggered or
some other form of procedural escalation).
October 2009
REFERENCES
i | Audit of Political Engagement 6, Hansard Society, 2009, pp. 36-37
|
ii | Ibid., p 37 |
iii | Ibid., p 52 |
iv | Ibid., p 35 |
v | Ibid., p 51 |
vi | Ibid. |
vii | See A. Brazier, S. Kalitowski, and G. Rosenblatt with M. Korris, Law in the Making: Influence and Change in the Legislative Process (Hansard Society, 2008) pp 177-178
|
viii | Audit 6, op. cit., p 27
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