Rebuilding the House - House of Commons Reform Committee Contents


Memorandum submitted by the Hansard Society

  The Hansard Society is the UK's leading independent, non-partisan political research and education charity. We aim to strengthen parliamentary democracy and encourage greater public involvement in politics.

  We welcome the formation of the committee and the areas of inquiry set out. The Committee's deliberations represent a unique opportunity to agree some important parliamentary reforms before the next general election and the recommendations will need to be urgently acted upon if progress is to be made in the short time available.

  Following the 17 September seminar with members of the committee the Hansard Society submits this evidence to follow up in more detail on some of the issues discussed and to comment on some areas which were not raised during the course of the round table debate. We also refer members of the committee to our recent Parliamentary Affairs article entitled "Engagement and participation: What the public want and how our politicians need to respond" (a copy is attached for reference). The section of our submission concerning public initiation of proceedings draws directly on this article.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SCHEDULING BUSINESS IN THE HOUSE

    —   The secretive usual channels process for organising parliamentary business should be replaced by a more transparent system designed to: provide greater certainty to and advance notice of the parliamentary timetable; allow for more involvement by the main political parties in the management of business; facilitate greater discussion between all interested parties in the Commons about the shape and timing of the legislative agenda; and introduce greater flexibility for consideration of topical issues of public interest.

    —   There are advantages and flaws with all the possible business committee permutations. On balance, however, we think the case may be marginally stronger for two committees (one for government and one for non-government business) if some of the concerns about cumbersome administration can be overcome. If not, one single all purpose business committee would still represent a significant improvement on the current secret usual channel arrangements.

APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS AND CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES

    —   An independent selection committee comprised of senior backbenchers from all parties should be elected by secret ballot within the first few days of a new Parliament. The committee could be chaired by the Chairman of Ways and Means. Members interested in serving on a select committee would submit to the selection committee an "expression of interest" paper outlining their relevant interests and experience and committee preferences. The business committee or usual channels would agree the allocation of committee chairmanships and divide the number of seats between the parties and inform the selection committee accordingly. The selection committee would then nominate Members to each committee—informed but not bound by Members' expressions of interest—in accordance with the required party balance. A motion outlining the proposed chair of each committee would be put to the whole House for a vote, thereby allowing members to reject the suggestions if desired. The selection committee should be required to complete its work within six weeks of the start of the new Parliament in order to ensure that the work of committees begins promptly.

PUBLIC INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS

    —   A parliamentary petitions committee should be adopted to assess issues of public concern and, if appropriate, to make referrals for debate or committee inquiry. Additionally a system of e-petitions should be established and incorporated with paper petitions and processed through this new petitions committee.

    —   The procedural process for petitions must be clear if this approach is to be effective. The scope of petitions—what is the responsibility of Parliament and what is not, what is therefore admissible and what is not—must be clearly set out. Responses must be provided in timely fashion and it must be clear from whom, when and how these responses are to be provided. Good tracking mechanisms are required. And clearly defined outcomes through the parliamentary process must be sign-posted (for example, whether, as a result of a petition, an issue may simply appear on the order paper, or a written response be provided, a debate triggered or some other form of procedural escalation).

    —   By placing parliamentary petitions within a clear procedural process a petitions committee and e-petitions approach will help to strengthen the role of representative democracy rather than simply allow the loudest voices and mob mentality to dominate. The introduction of a petitions system would have real symbolic value in better linking Parliament and the public.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

  1.  Contrary to popular perception the House of Commons is not a supine body which acts at the whim of the executive. Recent parliamentary sessions have seen the highest rates of rebellion by MPs in the post war period. The scrutiny opportunities of Members have also been augmented through, for example, the enhancement of the role and resources of select committees, the introduction of Public Bill Committee evidence sessions and the Liaison Committee's opportunities to question the Prime Minister.

  2.  However, the balance of influence over decision-making in the House of Commons—about, for example, what is debated and when, who sits on what committees etc—is widely perceived to have tilted too far in the interests of the executive to the detriment of Members. But a reform approach focused solely on a desire to reduce the power of the executive and thereby empower parliamentarians collectively is based on too narrow an analysis.

  3.  Firstly, the tension within the House of Commons is not one solely between members of the executive and other MPs. At times, the frontbenchers of all parties have a common interest which can frustrate the desires and interests of backbenchers. The drive for reform should be based on a desire to dilute the overweening influence of frontbenchers generally over matters that should be the preserve of the House collectively rather than purely focus on the influence of the executive.

  4.  Secondly, we do not have a political system in which the legislature is a co-equal branch of government alongside the executive but rather a system of "Government in Parliament". Reform should take account of this constitutional position and Members should work with the grain of it—with what the system is rather than what they might wish it to be. A delicate balance must be drawn between the right of the executive to secure its legislative programme in a timely and efficient manner and the obligations that weigh on the shoulders of Members on all sides of the House properly to scrutinise that legislative programme.

  5.  Thirdly, MPs are not a homogenous group of like minded parliamentarians: each defines their role, function and interests differently and the relationship each has with his/her party varies. They do not represent an en bloc vote for an agreed programme of parliamentary reform. There are already a number of ways in which backbench Members could exercise more influence and be more proactive in the arena of legislative scrutiny for example, but many choose not to do so. The independence of Members in asserting their rights and role as parliamentarians is largely a matter of personal will and political vicissitude.

  6.  Fourthly, the vast majority of Members are elected not as individual politicians but as a representative of their party. As such political parties have a legitimate role in the parliamentary process and their influence, as exercised through the whips, cannot and should not be wholly circumscribed but rather restrained from excessive and egregious behaviour.

  7.  Beyond addressing the right of the House of Commons to determine aspects of its own operation free from executive/frontbench influence and control, a further important reason to pursue reform is the need for Parliament to develop into a more open and transparent institution in which its decision-making structures and administrative processes are held up to full public gaze. Greater transparency and accountability is a necessary precondition if improved standards of governance in the House of Commons are to be achieved.

  8.  Any reforms proposed must form a coherent, comprehensive package of change rather than a series of unconnected cherry-picked initiatives selected for their populist appeal. Reforms can often have unintended consequences and lead to developments that are the opposite of what was intended. Imperfect implementation of previous reforms can also significantly undermine their value. For example, timetabling is rightly criticised as having failed and descended into partisanship, but it does not work largely because it has been decoupled from the process of pre-legislative scrutiny. The two changes were recommended not as independent stand-alone reforms but as linked elements of a holistic reform package by the Hansard Society and others. It is imperfect implementation that has seriously compromised their value and effectiveness.

SCHEDULING BUSINESS IN THE HOUSE

  9.  The secretive usual channels process for organising parliamentary business should be replaced by a more transparent system predicated on the establishment of a business (or steering or legislative) committee(s) designed to meet the following principles:

    I.   Provide greater certainty to and advance notice of the parliamentary timetable—the work of the House is of interest to many more people than just Members of the House and the organisation of business should provide, in the public interest, greater advance notice than is currently the case.

    II.   Allow for more involvement by the main political parties in the management of business.

    III.  Facilitate greater discussion between all interested parties in the Commons about the shape and timing of the legislative agenda. A number of key challenges exist with the current arrangement of business: i) there are few avenues by which backbenchers can generate legislative initiatives; and ii) the time split between plenary and committee work needs to be better balanced to reinforce the scrutiny work of committees and ensure that their work is properly debated in the House.

    IV.  Introduce greater flexibility for consideration of topical issues of public interest—the limited topicality of current business arrangements is particularly damaging to public engagement and confidence.

    V.  Ensure greater transparency in the overall process. A shift away from the secrecy of the usual channels in favour of full transparency and accountability in the organisation of business might act as a natural restraint on any egregious effort by party whips to exercise excessive control and influence. Political reality dictates however, that whatever business committee model is adopted, the whips will have the means to influence its deliberations if they wish to do so.

  10.  A single all purpose business committee—amounting, in effect, to the usual channels operating in public rather than private—may be sufficient to address issues of transparency and advance planning and would represent a significant improvement on the current arrangements. However, if the committee is not sufficiently inclusive and is dominated by the main party whips then it is unlikely that the issue of topicality will be addressed or that challenges such as backbench initiation of legislation or the balance between plenary and committee work will be explored.

  11.  The alternatives to an all-purpose Committee are therefore a Committee for non-government business or two separate committees'—one for government and one for non-government business. Both have advantages and disadvantages in equal measure.

  12.  A single non-government business committee would not resolve any issues about the timetabling of government business. A decision would also have to be made about opposition days and whether these would fall under the purview of the committee. If so, opposition whips would want seats on the committee and it would be difficult to do so without also providing equal representation for government whips thereby undermining the committee's rationale vis-á-vis the desired reduction in influence of the whips. If opposition business is not included in the committee's remit then the extent of that remit would actually be quite limited in practice, extending to Private Members' legislation and requests for debates.

  13.  A committee for government business (formalisation of the usual channels, dominated by the whips) and another committee for non-government business (backbenchers, whip free) would combine the pros and cons of the two options set out above. There would be improved transparency as far as the usual channels are concerned and backbenchers would have more control over non-governmental business. But the existence of two committees might prove administratively burdensome.

  14.  There are thus advantages and flaws with all the possible business committee permutations. On balance, we think the case may be marginally stronger for two committees if the administrative and related issues can be overcome. But if not, one single all purpose committee would, we believe, represent a significant improvement on the current secret usual channel arrangements.

  15.  Whichever option Members choose, a number of key questions will need to be addressed:

    I.   If there is to be anything other than a single all purpose business committee then a decision will need to be made about where the balance of time should lie between government and non-government business in any given week if the system is to operate effectively. This may need to be enshrined in Standing Orders. How time will be managed in the event of emergency/fast-track legislation will also need to be considered as this may not readily fit within the usual timetable constraints.

    II.  How are Opposition days to be dealt with—by which committee? When determining this we would urge Members also to consider reform of business arrangements to enable the Opposition to substitute their time for topical debates.

    III.  How far will the remit of the committee(s) extend? For example, should it include decisions about pre-legislative scrutiny or the timing of Public Bill Committees? Will it consider the balance of time between plenary and committee work? In order to provide for greater focus on select committee work and resolve the difficult timetabling issues that often confront MPs we recommend that one half or preferably one full day per week be set aside in the parliamentary timetable for committee work during which time the main chamber would not sit. Alongside this the core tasks of the chamber of the House of Commons should be refined and clarified. The floor of the House remains the main public focus for activity but attendance is low for anything other than big, set piece parliamentary occasions. The extent to which discussion in the chamber dominates political debate has also declined. To improve attendance and influence, the work of the chamber should therefore be refined to reflect its emergence as the plenary session of Parliament and the place where ministers are held to account on the topical issues of the day.

    IV.  What will the relationship be between a business committee(s) and the Liaison Committee? The latter currently acts as the representative body of backbenchers and determines which committee reports are used in which debating slots. Should this remain with the Liaison Committee or pass to the new business committee(s)?

    V.   Finally, how are the chair and members of a business committee(s) to be determined? A single all purpose committee will likely be the usual channels augmented by some backbench representatives. A non-governmental business committee would primarily be composed of backbenchers. The non-whip members of the committee(s) might be (s)elected by an independent selection committee of senior backbenchers set up by the House which would have an obligation to bear in mind party political balance in terms of the committee(s) membership. If the alternative of election of members of the committee is preferred then this should be by secret ballot. The committee(s) might be chaired by the Speaker representing the "interests" of the House and acting as independent arbiter, or perhaps preferably by the Deputy Chair of Ways and Means in order to insulate the Speaker from the partisan debate.

APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS AND CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES

  16.  Committees currently provide an alternative career path for some MPs with a particular interest in specific areas of public policy. But the structure and membership of select committees is a concern due to:

    I.  the frequency of ministerial reshuffles and linked changes in the architecture of departmental administration as a result of which the turnover of select committee membership is unhelpfully high; and

    II.  the increased demands on select committee time and the commitment clashes that Members often experience between committee, other parliamentary and constituency duties, resulting in low attendance levels at some committee meetings.

  17.  We recommend that every member of the House of Commons who is not a member of the Government payroll vote or on the opposition front bench should serve as a member of a select committee. If necessary, the number of Parliamentary Private Secretaries should be reduced to one per department in order to expand the pool of available MPs for select committee work.

  18.  The choice of committee chairs and members should be more clearly placed in the hands of MPs as a collective body. Given the number of posts to be allocated the election of all members of select committees would be administratively cumbersome, unwieldy and time consuming. It would also give rise to difficult political questions about the electoral system to be deployed which might in turn inhibit the chances of the proposed reform being adopted. Nor should it be assumed that election rather than selection of members/chairs would result in better outcomes in terms of securing more independently minded committee members free from the influence of the whips. The whips currently exercise considerable influence but once on a committee many members tend to "go native" quite quickly. They adapt to the independent and collegial approach required by the nature of the committee work and members of the governing party often subject their ministers to considerable and often critical scrutiny.

  19.  We recommend the establishment of an independent, broadly based selection committee comprised of senior backbenchers from all parties elected by secret ballot within the first few days of a new Parliament. The committee could be chaired by the Chairman of Ways and Means and the arrangements for its establishment might be modeled similarly to that of the Chairman's Panel. This approach is similar to that already proposed in 2001 by the Modernisation Committee when it suggested the establishment of a Committee of Nomination.

  20.  Members interested in serving on a select committee would submit to the selection committee an "expression of interest" paper outlining their relevant interests and experience and committee preferences. The business committee (or usual channels if a business committee is not established) would agree the allocation of committee chairmanships and divide the number of seats between the parties and inform the selection committee accordingly. The selection committee would then be responsible for nominating members to each committee—informed but not bound by members' expressions of interest—in accordance with the required party balance. A motion outlining the proposed Chair of each committee would be put to the whole House for a vote, thereby allowing members to reject the suggestions if desired.

  21.  The selection committee should be required to complete its work within six weeks of the start of the new Parliament in order to ensure that the work of committees begins promptly. If not, a gap of six months or more can develop (encompassing the period before and after a general election) during which no committee work takes place. This is an unacceptable delay.

PUBLIC INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS

  22.  Hansard Society research over the last six years—through our annual Audit of Political Engagement—has consistently found that the public view of political engagement and participation is far more complex than many of those advocating for more direct, participatory forms of decision-making are willing to acknowledge.

  23.  In particular, the Audit finds that:

    —   55% simply do not want to be involved in national decision-making;i

    —   a lack of time is the greatest barrier to participation;ii

    —   a clear distinction is drawn between having a say and being involved in decision-making, and influence is favoured but not involvement;iii

    —   people feel they lack influence in decision-making above all because "nobody listens to what I have to say";iv

    —   the more efficacious any form of political action or engagement is perceived to be, the more highly it is valued;v and

    —   although the public recognise what it takes to be a good citizen they largely fail to convert good intentions into positive action.vi

  24.  The barriers to public engagement and participation in the political process are broadly a mixture of a lack of knowledge and interest, low levels of satisfaction, and a shortage of time. If participation in the political process is to be enhanced, knowledge and interest need to be augmented and deep-rooted social and demographic disparities addressed. The objective must be an informed as well as an engaged public. Mechanisms for engagement and decision-making need to be constructed in such a way that they provide for a more satisfying engagement experience, respecting the fact that influence through having a voice in the process rather than direct involvement is preferred by a majority. Such mechanisms must also be mindful of the time that the public is able and indeed willing to give to the political process. Overall the focus should be on the quality of public engagement and participation not just the quantity and scale of direct involvement in the process.

  25.  The public's desire for influence rather than involvement, for giving voice to their views and being heard, points to the fact that the political process may be as important as the policy outcomes from any such process, though positive outcomes do reinforce the value that the public places on the process. But such processes have to be satisfying forms of public engagement if that engagement is to have any chance of being sustained. The most obvious form of enhanced democratic engagement in recent years has been the government's efforts to consult more widely on policy proposals and provide opportunities for the public and interested stakeholders to have a say. However, amidst the blizzard of consultation opportunities a perception has increasingly grown that too often the process is illusory and that the government has already made up its mind, resulting in disengagement amidst increasing cynicism.vii

  26.  The challenge then is how to adopt new mechanisms to enable people to have a say and exercise influence in a meaningful manner, and in a way that ensures that politicians must listen and respond, but which recognises some core constraints: that not everyone's views can be reflected in the final outcome and the degree to which people actually want to sustain their engagement is quite limited.

  27.  In light of this data we believe that a parliamentary petitions committee would provide a possible solution to the public engagement challenge and ought to at least be adopted on a trial basis by the House of Commons. It would not be a panacea for public engagement and participation but it would offer a realistic and deliverable reform. Petitions are an important part of the contemporary democratic process. The Audit shows that the public are more likely to sign a petition than they are to engage in any other form of democratic activity.viii Petitions should therefore be made a much more significant feature of the work of Parliament in order to better engage the public and be more responsive to matters of topical public concern.

  28.  At present, petitions are governed by strict rules about wording and there is little sense that petitions to Parliament result in any concrete action on the part of MPs. In contrast, the Scottish Parliament has a Public Petitions Committee which plays a pivotal role in connecting the public and the legislature. It assesses the merits of each petition, if necessary through the taking of evidence. It filters out petitions where action is already being taken or where the case is weak. But where there is a case to be answered it refers petitions for further consideration. A similar petitions (or public engagement) committee could be established in the House of Commons to assess issues of public concern and, if appropriate, to make referrals for debate or committee inquiry. We further recommend that Parliament adopt a system of e-petitions, incorporated with paper petitions and processed through the new petitions committee.

  29.  An e-petitions system was recommended by the Procedure Committee in a report in April 2008. The Government response "envisaged providing time" to debate the issue later in 2008 but such a debate was not forthcoming. In March 2009 the Procedures Committee issued a further report calling on the Government to introduce the system. It was critical of the Government for stalling on this issue and for requesting that the proposed scheme be changed in order to cut its cost based on comparisons ministers had made with the No 10 e-petitions system. However, what is proposed with a parliamentary petitions committee and incorporation of e-petitions is markedly different to what is offered on the Downing St site. By placing parliamentary petitions within a clear procedural process the objective of a petitions committee and e-petitions approach is to strengthen the role of representative democracy rather than simply allow the loudest voices and mob mentality to dominate. The introduction of a petitions system would have real symbolic value in better linking Parliament and the public.

  30.  However, our support for the petitions system is predicated on the assumption that it will become an integral and core part of the parliamentary process and not a bolt-on accessory. Any petitions system, particularly e-petitions, needs to sit at the heart of a well defined procedural process which is transparent and clear to the public. The scope of petitions—what is the responsibility of Parliament and what is not, what is therefore admissible and what is not—must be clearly set out. Responses must be provided in timely fashion and it must be clear from whom, when and how these responses are to be provided. Good tracking mechanisms are required. And clearly defined outcomes through the parliamentary process must be sign-posted (for example, whether, as a result of a petition, an issue may simply appear on the order paper, or a written response be provided, a debate triggered or some other form of procedural escalation).

October 2009

REFERENCES

iAudit of Political Engagement 6, Hansard Society, 2009, pp. 36-37
iiIbid., p 37
iiiIbid., p 52
ivIbid., p 35
vIbid., p 51
viIbid.
viiSee A. Brazier, S. Kalitowski, and G. Rosenblatt with M. Korris, Law in the Making: Influence and Change in the Legislative Process (Hansard Society, 2008) pp 177-178
viii  Audit 6, op. cit., p 27







 
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