Electoral Commission: compliance with regulations on funding political parties - Speaker's Committee Contents


Part 2: Securing compliance with regulations on party finance

The principles of good regulation

2.1  Making regulation effective is the subject of Philip Hampton's report, Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and enforcement (March 2005)[15]. The Hampton report is intended to make regulation more effective and less burdensome by getting all regulators to design their systems in accordance with the principles of good regulation in a comprehensive risk based way. Regulatory effort should be focused on areas of greatest risk, cutting down on routine inspection and leading to earned autonomy for well run organisations. The resources freed up could then be put into advice and guidance for those regulated, thereby improving compliance.

2.2  Professor Richard Macrory's report, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective[16], published in November 2006, aimed to ensure that regulatory sanctions were consistent with and appropriate for the risk based approach to regulation as set out in recommendation eight of the Hampton Review. This recommendation proposed that the penalty regime should be based on the risk of re-offending and the impact of the offence, with a sliding scale of penalties that are quick and easier to apply for most breaches, with tougher penalties for rogue organisations that persistently break the rules. The Macrory Report found that most regulators were heavily dependent on criminal sanctions which are cumbersome to apply and might not be proportionate or appropriate to the regulatory breach. (See Annex 2 for more specifics on both the Hampton & Macrory reports.)

The Commission's current enforcement powers

2.3  The Commission's current investigation and enforcement powers under the Act are based on the recommendations of the Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life.[17] The Committee envisaged the Commission as having a number of roles to operate the controls laid down in the Act, including an investigative role and a power to make enquiries concerning all aspects of political parties and third party accounts. The Committee also considered that an enforcement scheme backed by criminal sanctions was necessary in order to encourage compliance and to deter political parties from breaking the rules. As described in Part 1, the sanctions regime includes civil and criminal penalties, with additional options of forfeiture of impermissible donations and deregistration.

The purpose of sanctions within a regulatory system

2.4  Sanctions are an important part of any regulatory system. They provide both a deterrent to non-compliance and an incentive to ensure compliance. Sanctions also make clear that non-compliance will not be tolerated[18]. The sanctions regime described in Part 1, comprising both civil and criminal sanctions, and powers of forfeiture and deregistration, is in place to support the regulatory framework for party financing put in place under the Act.

GOOD PRACTICE IN USING SANCTIONS

2.5  For sanctions to operate effectively, those regulated need to understand clearly what their obligations are. The regulator needs to apply sanctions consistently, fairly, and proportionately according to the offence committed and to be supported by investigative powers so that the regulating authority can determine whether and how rules have been broken. The output from these investigations can then be used as a deterrent to other regulated parties, and also as guidance on risks which could lead to breaches of the Act, and ways to manage those risks. Under the current framework, the Commission does not have discretion on varying the size of a penalty or the circumstances in which they are imposed. The only choice is to seek to recover the penalty or not. The Commission therefore faces difficulty in applying a genuinely risk-based enforcement policy at present.

The Commission's use of its sanctions regime

2.6  We looked at the Commission's use of sanctions to identify how well these are working, in terms of the effect they are having on compliance with the rules by those regulated. We then drew from the use of sanctions conclusions about the approach of the Commission and how it could be improved, in order for the Commission to adopt fully the Hampton approach of comprehensive and transparent regulation.

The impact of enforcement on compliance

Timely submission of annual accounts

2.7  Political parties are required to submit their annual accounts to the Commission by no later than 4 months after the party's year end for parties with both income and expenditure below £250,000, and no later than six months and seven days for parties with both income and expenditure over £250,000. We analysed the available data, which show that a high proportion of annual accounts are submitted within one month of the deadline. There was a marked increase in 2005-06, followed by some slippage in 2006-07 (Figure 2). The measure of 'within one month of the statutory deadline' was the Commission's Key Performance Indicator at the time, and meant one month past the statutory deadline. The Commission now measures compliance against the statutory deadline itself with no grace period and in 2007-08, the proportion of statements of accounts submitted on time was 84%, which shows an improvement in performance.

2.8  In 2007, the Commission began to impose penalties for the late filing of annual accounts. In the first year, the Commission imposed penalties only on parties and constituent parts of parties (accounting units) with income and expenditure over £100,000. In 2008, the Commission imposed penalties on all those bodies which failed to file timely accounts. The fall in compliance in 2006-07 could be related to the fact that a number of parties which had filed a series of nil returns and had thus become exempt from filing quarterly returns mistakenly believed that they were also exempt from filing an annual statement of accounts (see 2.9 below).



Timely submission of quarterly returns of donations

2.9   Section 62 of the Act requires parties to make quarterly returns of donations. The Commission started imposing fines for non-compliance with donation reporting requirements in 2007, and has taken steps to clarify the reporting obligations of the parties. The Commission also sends parties reminders of filing deadlines each quarter, and includes information about late filed returns in its quarterly donation and loan press releases. The recent improvement in the rate with which parties submit their quarterly returns on time (figure 3) could be attributed to these actions. The fact that some parties who do not receive donations are now exempt from filing quarterly returns, as a result of legislation in the Electoral Administration Act 2006, may also be a contributing factor. Under the 2006 Act, a party that submits four consecutive quarterly nil returns is exempt from further quarterly returns until they have a reportable donation or loan.

Figure 3: Percentage of quarterly returns received by the Electoral Commission less than one month late




Source: NAO analysis of Electoral Commission data

Late reporting of donations by political parties

2.10  Although the legislation carries financial penalties for the late submission of quarterly returns, which are required to include details of all reportable donations received during the relevant period, there are no civil penalties if a report omits reportable details. The only remedy in that case is referral for consideration of a criminal offence, which is disproportionate in the case of administrative errors.

2.11  The Commission has referred to the late reporting of individual donations by political parties in its press release for quarterly returns for several years. In 2008, the Commission also wrote to parties who reported late donations seeking an explanation and enquiring about measures the party intended to put into practice to avoid further non-compliance, particularly for the parties' central offices. Figure 4 shows the total value of late-reported donations by all parties.

2.12  The number of donations reported late by the central offices of political parties however has decreased recently, which may be a result of the Commission pressing parties on this issue, though recent figures are also depressed because they do not include recent donations not yet reported. The Electoral Commission told us that all donations reported late in Quarter 3 2008 were from constituent parts of parties (accounting units under the Act) which were often staffed by volunteers.


2.13  The Commission's practice of commenting on late reporting of donations that should have been included in the return for an earlier quarter is the only deterrent, short of pursuing criminal action, available for the submission of incomplete reports of quarterly donations by political parties. These details are published on its website. The deterrent effect is limited. The Commission has commented repeatedly on this problem, and with some improvement in reporting on time.

2.14  The Commission's new approach is to reference the accounts received to donations reported on a quarterly basis and identify discrepancies. The Commission is also starting to develop its risk based approach further by identifying parties and their constituent parts (accounting units) with high levels of income and expenditure, or constituencies where high levels could be expected (e.g. target seats for the parties).

Return to donors of impermissible donations

2.15  The Act lays down that parties must return impermissible donations to donors within 30 days. The register of donations (from 2001 to December 2007) to political parties on the Commission's website includes 17 impermissible donations received by parties and returned to donors (or, in one case, to the Electoral Commission) outside the statutory period of 30 days. It also includes 4 donations from unidentifiable donors: 3 were returned to the agent from whom they were received and one to the Electoral Commission.

2.16  In 2007, the Commission began to seek forfeiture of an amount equal to the value of impermissible donations including those that were returned beyond the 30 day period. Since then, amounts equal to two donations, one for £500 and the other for £1,675, have been voluntarily forfeited despite having been returned to the donor.

Rules on the acceptance or return of donations


Where— (1)


(a) a donation is received by a registered party; and


(b) it is not immediately decided that the party should refuse the donation,


all reasonable steps must be taken by the party to verify or ascertain the identity of the donor, whether he is a permissible donor, and (if that appears to be the case) all such details in respect of him as are required by virtue of paragraph 2 of Schedule 6 to be given in respect of the donor of a recordable donation.


(2) If a registered party receives a donation which it is prohibited from accepting then the donation, or a payment of an equivalent amount, must be sent back to the person who made the donation or any person appearing to be acting on his behalf within the period of 30 days beginning with the date when the donation is received by the party.


Source: PPERA section 56


2.17  The Commission's decision to seek forfeiture of amounts equal to the value of impermissible donations returned to their donor after the 30 day window is in keeping with the Commission's decision to be more robust in its approach to compliance. Our analysis of the donation returns also shows that while some parties report a number of impermissible donations, others do not. The Commission conducts permissibility checks on donations reported in quarterly returns and regularly assesses whether impermissible donations are being reported.

Flexibility of sanctioning options

2.18  The Macrory Report emphasises the need for sanction regimes to be flexible and to take account of circumstances, so as to be proportionate. Reasons vary for political parties' late submission of required information to the Commission. The penalties cannot be flexed to take account of the circumstances of the breach or the size of the party, as the choice is simply to seek to recover the fine or not. This lack of flexibility then leads to outcomes explained below.

2.19  Because there is no provision under the Act to take into account the circumstances and seriousness of the offence in determining the level of the fine imposed on political parties for late reporting, there is no flexibility in the sanctions available. In circumstances where the Commission considers that the only sanctions available for late reporting by parties are disproportionate, it does not seek to recover the civil penalty set out in the Act.[19] It would for example, refrain from doing so where late reporting by a party is a one-off occurrence attributable to operational difficulties or simple error; or where a quarterly report of donations is made on time but is incomplete, and the donations missing from that report are reported in a subsequent quarterly report. Repeated and habitual late reporting by political parties, and where there is evidence that a party is attempting to conceal information deliberately or delay its public release, would attract a different response and the Commission would recover the penalty.

2.20  In 2007, the Commission issued 154 penalty notices for late submission of statutory returns. The value of these notices amounted to £112,150. For the reasons set out in paragraph 1.16, 123 of these penalties were waived because the majority of the parties to whom they were issued (125 parties in all) proved to be inactive, and took the opportunity to de-register, or to file a nil return. Nil returns are checked by the Commission by comparing them against Statements of Account submitted by parties. Of the remaining 31 penalty notices, the Commission received payment on 13 and wrote off 18.

2.21  In the fixed scale of administrative fines available to the Electoral Commission to enforce the Act, the amount of the fine depends only on the degree of lateness of the submission of accounts or quarterly reports of donations or loans. Where the Commission decides to recover a fine, it has no flexibility but to seek the level of a fine imposed by the Act, irrespective of a party's income and assets. In practice the Commission tends not to levy fines on very small parties.

2.22  The Commission has a policy on how it handles complaints and on when it will apply sanctions. The policy on complaints handling and investigations is on the Commission's website. The policy on when it will apply sanctions has been sent to all political parties but is not on the Commission's website. Best practice laid out in the Hampton[20] and Macrory[21] reports says that policies should be shared with all interested parties as an aid to compliance, but especially with those subject to regulation. The Commission's approach to enforcement and sanctions is focussed on larger parties, where it believes the risks lie, but it informs all political parties of changes to its approach on enforcement action.



15   http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/7/F/bud05hamptonv1.pdf Back

16   http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file44593.pdf Back

17   The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom (Cm 4057, October 1998) Back

18   Professor Richard B. Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective, Final Report, November 2006. Back

19   For example in press releases of 24 February 2006 (http://www.electoralcommission.gov.uk/media-centre/newsreleasedonations.cfm/news/513), 22 May 2007 (http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/media-centre/newsreleasedonations.cfm/news/632) and 20 November 2007 (http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/media-centre/newsreleasedonations.cfm/news/685).

 Back

20   http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file44593.pdf Back

21   http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/7/F/bud05hamptonv1.pdf

 Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2009
Prepared 2 April 2009