Electoral Commission: compliance with regulations on funding political parties - Speaker's Committee Contents


Annex 2 - Hampton and Macrory Reports

Hampton Review (March 2005)

The aim of Hampton's report is to identify ways to:

  • Reduce the regulatory burden; and
  • Maintain or improve regulatory outcomes.

The findings break down the improvements into 5 key areas of the regulation process. A good regulator should be successful in doing the following:

1.  Risk Assessment - concentrate resources on areas that need them most (particularly inspections / investigations etc). This should mean that regulation places the greatest burden on the non-compliant;

2.  Advice and guidance - increase the probability of compliance through authoritative and accessible advice;

3.  Form Filling - simplify / minimise the form filling process and streamline the volume of data that the regulated must supply;

4.  Penalty Regimes - create deterrence through proportionate and meaningful sanctions; and

5.  Regulatory Structures - simplify the structure of regulation (e.g. reduce overlapping regulatory jurisdiction).

It is also recommended that regulators should have a performance management framework and systems in place to monitor the impact of changes on those they regulate.

Macrory Report (November 2006)

This was designed to identify a set of flexible and proportionate sanctioning tools that can be used by regulators to achieve more effective regulation. This follows on from Hampton's findings that many penalty regimes are cumbersome and ineffective.

Macrory found that many regulators are heavily reliant on one tool - criminal prosecution. This is problematic as:

  • The sanctions imposed are often insufficient;
  • Criminal prosecution may be a disproportionate response (e.g. where non-compliance was unintentional); and
  • Criminal sanctions are costly and time consuming for all parties. The regulators may be deterred from using their powers which creates a compliance deficit.

Macrory's solution

1.  The government should initiate a review of the drafting and formulation of criminal offences relating to regulatory non-compliance (to clearly distinguish between matters of regulation and criminal offending).

2.  In the design of appropriate sanctioning regimes there should be regard for the following 'Penalty Principles' and 'Characteristics'.

Six Penalties Principles

A sanction should:

1.  Aim to change the behaviour of the offender;

2.  Aim to eliminate any financial gain or benefit from non-compliance;

3.  Be responsive and consider what is appropriate for the particular offender and regulatory issue, which can include punishment and the public stigma that should be associated with a criminal conviction;

4.  Be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm caused;

5.  Aim to restore the harm caused by regulatory non-compliance, where appropriate; and

6.  Aim to deter future non-compliance.

Seven characteristics of a successful sanctioning regime

Regulators should:

1.  Publish an enforcement policy;

2.  Measure outcomes not just outputs;

3.  Justify their choice of enforcement actions year on year to stakeholders, Ministers and Parliament;

4.  Follow-up enforcement actions where appropriate;

5.  Enforce in a transparent manner;

6.  Be transparent in the way in which they apply and determine administrative penalties; and

7.  Avoid perverse incentives that might influence the choice of sanctioning response.

3.  The effectiveness of the criminal courts for regulatory offences should be increased via:

  • Sentencing Guidelines Council should prepare guidelines for cases of regulatory non-compliance;
  • Prosecutors should make clear to the court any financial benefits resulting from the non-compliance;
  • Prosecutions in particular regulatory fields could be held in designated Magistrates' Courts (i.e. to build up court level understanding of the regulations); and
  • Regulators should provide specialist training to prosecutors.

4.  Fixed and Variable Monetary Administrative penalties should be available to regulators who are compliant with the Hampton and Macrory principles and characteristics (particularly risk assessment) and there should be an appeals mechanism in respect of these.

5.  Statutory notices should be considered as part of an expanded sanctioning toolkit.

  • They should be systematically followed up using a risk based approach; and
  • Administrative penalties or criminal proceedings should be available where the notices are not complied with.

6.  The government should consider the use of Enforceable Undertakings as an alternative to criminal prosecution.

7.  Pilot schemes should be considered for Restorative Justice.

8.  Alternative sentencing should be available to criminal courts - Profit Orders, Corporate Rehabilitation Orders, Publicity Orders.

9.  Transparency and Accountability should be improved via

  • A Better Regulation Executive working group of regulators / departments to share best practice; and
  • Each regulator should publish a regular list of its completed enforcement actions.



 
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