| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
6 Jan 2010 : Column 75WH—continued
"Until a"
"has been completed, it is not possible to give an estimate of the costs relating to land contamination. We currently anticipate that an initial LQA of the site will be undertaken in financial year 2010-11".-[Official Report, 16 December 2009; Vol. 502, c. 1217W.]
In other words, they are talking about moving out of Lyneham and selling it under the Crichel Down rules, which means that it is not worth much anyhow, and they do not have the faintest idea-they have not yet even considered-how much it will cost to decontaminate the site. I can tell the Minister that I have been on the site many times over 13 years and it is absolutely contaminated up to the eyeballs. Local estimates suggest a possible cost of £100 million to decontaminate the RAF Lyneham site.
One RAF officer told me, "I've heard that according to the figures we're putting into the budgets, we'll sell the site for £10 million and it will cost £10 million to do it up-to decontaminate it." I can tell the Minister that he will sell the site for almost nothing at all, if anything, and the contingent liability on the Government to get rid of the contamination and buildings and general mess that will be left on the site will be hundreds of millions of pounds. That is a huge white elephant for the Government and, at a time when defence budgets are under constraint as they are, to waste money in the way that we are describing is wrong.
The Minister should come forward with clear figures about precisely how much it is costing to move all these planes to RAF Brize Norton and how much he intends to save by closing RAF Lyneham, and he should say how much he intends to make, or believes he will make, from selling the RAF Lyneham site. He must come up with a substantial net figure, showing a saving in relation to the large tactical and infrastructure problems that I have described with regard to Brize Norton, to make it work. I do not believe that he can do it. If he thinks that he can do it, I refer him to the late-lamented project to
bring all the Army and Air Force helicopters together in one place from three or four bases around England-Project Belvedere-that we decided not to go ahead with just before Christmas. It was concluded that the cost of bringing them together in one place at Lyneham, despite the fact that the bases would then be sold, was vastly greater than the cost of leaving them where they were. If that was the logic regarding Project Belvedere, how on earth can Project CATARA come to the opposite conclusion-namely, that bringing all these things together at Brize Norton will somehow save money?
I suspect that a decision was taken some years ago by the RAF or by civil servants, who decided to gallop down this track and are now realising that there are problems inherent in bringing all the planes together in one place and that the sums do not add up. The right hon. Member for Barrow and Furness had the guts to say, "Actually, I want to turn this thing round. I want a fundamental look at it." But sadly he did not stay in the job long enough. The fact that the air transport projects that I have described are in a complete and utter muddle cannot be squared.
I shall say only one thing in regard to this debate: I should like the Minister to acknowledge that some of these things are wrong and that he does not necessarily have all the answers to the debate today. We have a strategic defence review coming up and this matter is central to it. If we cannot supply our troops on the ground and cannot get our people out to theatre of war, we cannot conduct a proper war. If the Minister will say to me today, "I want to have a fundamental look at the A400M, at Project CATARA and at the closure of RAF Lyneham and I will do that in my much-promised strategic defence review", I will take the view that this debate has been worth while.
9.56 am
Willie Rennie (Dunfermline and West Fife) (LD): I congratulate the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) on securing the debate and on his impressive dossier, which is one of the most comprehensive that I have seen prepared for any Westminster Hall debate. The hon. Gentleman put forward his case strongly and I should like to hear the Minister's response to it.
The hon. Gentleman has been running this campaign in a determined way since the decision was announced a number of years ago. He has worked on a cross-party basis with a number of people in his constituency, including some with political affiliation and some with none. I commend him for his efforts during that time. Unfortunately, the Minister and the Government seem equally determined to proceed with their case. Today's debate gives us the time to explore that decision and to see whether there is solid justification for their proposals.
The hon. Gentleman was trying to broaden the debate to cover the airlift capacity for the defence of the realm, but he rightly focused on the implications for RAF Lyneham-I do not criticise him for doing so. I support his basic claim that as we are so close to a strategic defence review, this matter should be considered as part of that. We are considering a long-standing decision that goes back a number of years, but because of the facts that the hon. Gentleman advanced in such a detailed way, it would be illogical to rush to a decision on Lyneham so close to a strategic defence review.
Essentially, I agree with the hon. Gentleman that we should take time out and think about the matter more broadly, as part of consideration of the A400M problems, the C-130K life extension and its potential costs, issues to do with Brize Norton, and so forth. Given that those matters are complicated and detailed, they are worth considering as part of a strategic defence review, so I urge the Minister to tell us why we should proceed with this decision so close to a strategic defence review?
In his dossier, the hon. Gentleman advanced a number of detailed concerns about the consequences of Project CATARA. He put them in simple terms-putting all the eggs in one basket, over-cramming, air control, the safety case-and I do not wish to repeat the factors that he mentioned. He described these serious considerations in a compelling way and I hope that the Minister will respond in detail.
The hon. Gentleman will be pleased to hear that I have read his previous debates on this subject in which alternative uses for the site were suggested, should the closure proceed. I would like the Minister to tell us what options have been explored, as some uses seem to have been ruled out. The hon. Gentleman considered the rapid reaction corps and various other alternatives, but we have not had an explanation as to why those suggestions were ruled out by the Ministry of Defence.
If the closure proceeds, will the Minister tell us what is planned in the way of support for the community? The hon. Gentleman rightly referred to the parades in Wootton Bassett and its recognition of the servicemen and women who have lost their lives in conflict. It has been a totemic centre point for the whole of the UK to express its grief. We should be looking after that community, given the service that it has provided to the rest of the country, and I would like to hear what is planned, should the closure go ahead. What regeneration package is in place, and what is proposed for the use of the site?
There are also concerns about the Future Brize project, including the accommodation expansion. Part of that project involves overhauling the IT system, engineering, housing and so on. In response to a parliamentary question, the Ministry of Defence stated:
"some accommodation at Brize Norton is not of the standard that service personnel and their families deserve"
"we are taking steps to address this."-[Official Report, 8 May 2008; Vol. 475, c. 1134W.]
There are reports about cuts in the budget for the changeover from Lyneham to Brize Norton. What impact has that had on the upgrade of the accommodation at Brize Norton?
The hon. Gentleman also referred to the diversion plans. He referred-quite amusingly-to the Bournemouth possibility, but there are also reports that RAF Fairford could be used.
Mr. Gray: I am conscious that I slightly misquoted the Chief of the Air Staff during my speech, and the hon. Gentleman has given me the opportunity of correcting that. The Chief of the Air Staff said that a number of other bases might be used, and in a list of several he mentioned Bournemouth. I perhaps chose the most ridiculous example, thereby slightly misquoting the Chief of the Air Staff, and I am grateful for the opportunity to correct myself.
Willie Rennie: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has done so because it is important that we get the facts straight. RAF Fairford is also a possibility for consideration, but the US air force is pulling out of there in 2010. What are the implications of that for the diversionary plans, if Brize Norton cannot be used under certain circumstances? I would like to hear those details from the Minister.
On the wider issue of airlift for the defence of the country, the procurement of the A400M has been problematic. As a pro-European, my heart is with the A400M and I am keen for it to be successful. However, there have been a number of problems, almost from the beginning-that is probably typical of many projects within the Ministry of Defence that experience problems due to delays, overruns, and specifications. A number of reports have covered issues such as whether the plane is now overweight and will not be able to carry the 32 tonnes originally envisaged but will instead carry only 29 tonnes. There is an issue about whether the plane is big enough, to which the hon. Gentleman referred, and there are concerns about the future rapid effect system vehicle, which we have discussed and are waiting for with great anticipation. Will it fit in the plane, or will the tyres have to be let down to squeeze it in? Will the helicopters need to be dismantled to such a ridiculous level that it is hardly worth while? Are those problems real? It would be helpful if the Minister could be frank about those issues and tell us in some detail how they will be addressed.
Yesterday, there were reports that the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company was getting frustrated with European Governments' inability to make a decision about the future of the A400M. It is demanding a decision by the end of the month. It would be helpful to have an update of the position on that. Will the extra €5 billion be covered, or is the project going to be scrapped? Those are important decisions affecting an important platform that we require for our defence. It is important to have some frankness about the project so that we may have confidence going forward.
We must also have contingency plans in place, and that is the next point that I hope the Minister will address. I have heard reports that the A400M could perhaps be delayed until as far ahead as 2020. That seems ridiculous, but the reports are from well-sourced people. Are contingency plans in place to cover that significant gap? In 2006, the Defence Committee expressed concern about extending the life of the C-130Ks beyond the life extension currently proposed, which would cost about £26 million. Its 2006 report stated:
"The delay to the A400M programme has required the lives of ageing C-130K aircraft to be extended. If there are any further delays in the A400M programme, the scope for further extending the lives of C-130K aircraft may be limited, and expensive, leaving a potential capability gap."
What assessment has been made of that possible need for a further life extension, and what would the costs be? If concerns about a life extension existed in 2006, what are they now?
There have been extensive reports on this subject. At the end of last year, we had a statement from the Ministry of Defence about the problems in the defence budget. Can we afford to plug that affordability gap? If it is not physically possible to have the life extension,
can we afford to buy additional kit to plug the capability gap because of the problems with the MOD budget? These are serious issues. We need confidence and clarity about what is planned, or debates such as this will continue.
The hon. Member for North Wiltshire has done a great service, and I know that he works closely with people in North Wiltshire to try and achieve a successful outcome. Again, I appeal to the Minister by repeating my central point: why, so close to a strategic defence review, would we rush this decision when there are so many complicated factors that need to be taken into consideration? I hope that he will respond to that in his reply.
10.7 am
Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con): It is a pleasure to serve for the first time under your chairmanship, Mr. Howarth. At the outset, let me congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) on successfully securing this debate. He has done us all a huge service, and he has produced a document that the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Willie Rennie) has rightly identified as extremely professional. Although my hon. Friend clearly has a constituency interest, which he has promoted with extraordinary diligence, he has made a compelling generic case for the role of RAF Lyneham and for the future of the air transport fleet. I will return to that in a moment.
I also wish to pay tribute to RAF Lyneham for the particularly gruesome role that has been thrust upon it, as the entry point for the repatriation of those who have fallen in Afghanistan. Having visited Lyneham, I know that it is not easy for the people at Lyneham and the Royal Air Force personnel to have constant public attention due to that extremely sad aspect of the war in Afghanistan, which has been thrust upon them on a weekly basis. I hope that my hon. Friend will take back to all those who operate at Lyneham our enormous appreciation for what they do, on behalf of not only all three services but the nation.
It would be wrong, in paying tribute to Lyneham, not to pay tribute also to the people of Wootton Bassett, who, by common consent, have struck such a chord across this kingdom because of the extraordinary dignity with which they have paid their public but in a sense private tribute to the fallen. I fully endorse my hon. Friend's concerns about the endeavours of that serial ranter, Anjem Choudary, to try to destabilise the position and cause untold offence across the land. I am sure that the Government will take the same view; indeed, the Prime Minister expressed his abhorrence the day before yesterday. What Sir Hugh Orde thinks he is doing, goodness knows, but I certainly share my hon. Friend's view on that matter.
I also pay tribute to the personnel at RAF Lyneham for the contribution that they make, across a range of activities, through the C-130 Hercules fleet. That aircraft has been in existence for about 50 years and has proved itself across a huge range of military and civilian air operations to be an outstanding platform. Versatile and rugged, it is capable of going to the most difficult places. Wherever there is a problem, it is rare not to see a C-130 in the thick of it, doing the business.
Having spent some time on the flight deck of a C-130 flying from Kabul to Camp Bastion before Camp Bastion even had a concrete runway, when it was just bare desert, and having talked to the crew about the trials and tribulations of operating in those extreme circumstances, in which there was no runway lighting save for three markers down each side of the desert strip, visible only through night vision goggles, it would be hard for me not to appreciate the extraordinary skill of the crews-not only the pilots but the loadmasters and other crew members of the C-130-in doing what they do. This is an opportunity for hon. Members to put on record our appreciation for all those Royal Air Force personnel and what they do.
I shall add to the tribute section of my remarks some very personal thanks to the Minister, as well as to the folk at RAF Lyneham. I am a trustee of the Vulcan to the Sky project, which has delivered the only Vulcan to be restored to flying condition. It has been displayed to 2.5 million people this year and has produced something called the Vulcan effect at air shows; it is a huge magnet for attracting the public to air shows. RAF Lyneham has played host to the aircraft over the winter, and we are extremely grateful to RAF Lyneham for providing us with accommodation over the winter, while we are undertaking quite significant modification works to ensure that the aircraft is on the display circuit next year.
I said at the outset that my hon. Friend had produced an extremely professional paper and that he had dealt with much more than simply the situation at Lyneham. Some of the arguments that he advanced are very compelling. One of his key arguments was that there is a severe risk that the Government will put all our eggs in one basket. That reminds me of an expression of Winston Churchill's during the second world war when it was proposed that a number of Cabinet Ministers be transported together in one aircraft. He thought it undesirable that all his baskets should be confined to one egg.
I agree with my hon. Friend that what he has described is a major factor. I fear that officials see airfields just as opportunities to raise money. They see large tracts of land, which generate pound signs instantly in their eyes. There is a failure to recognise some of the practical implications of these decisions, to which my hon. Friend has drawn attention.
I have expressed concern both to the Chief of the Air Staff and to others about the risk that we face in reducing the number of runways available, for all the reasons that my hon. Friend has given. If a runway is out of action, we do not have the ability to use that airfield until it is repaired. What was the Vulcan's endeavour during the Falklands campaign? It was to destroy the runway at Port Stanley, so that the Argentines could not use it to reinforce their troops on the Falkland Islands. In my view, we are taking a risk. It is fine to say that, in an emergency, we would close civilian airports to civilian operations and make them available for military use, but that is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with the issue.
The idea is that Brize Norton will be able to host a huge number of aircraft: myriad fleets, including the C-17, which has now been increased to seven aircraft, the future strategic tanker aircraft-up to 14 of those-C-130 aircraft, of which there are at least 40 at the
moment and there will possibly be more, and the A400M, with another 25 of those. The FSTA will have its own bespoke hangar. The idea that Brize Norton will be able to host all that on an already fairly congested site makes the case admirably.
The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife referred to the decision of the Americans in effect to put RAF Fairford on a care-and-maintenance basis later this year. I join him in saying to the Minister that we need an explanation of the implications of that for the RAF, of whether the Americans will continue to pay the cost of maintaining the airfield and of whether their decision is likely to have an impact on the MOD's budget, in that it will have to find funds to keep that airfield available. For all those reasons, my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire has made a very strong case why we need more than one air transport airfield to provide this essential facility for the RAF.
The wider issue of the air transport fleet is also part of the debate. We have a catalogue of disasters, some of which are this Government's fault; others are not. In the case of those that are not, I shall return to the A400M later. I shall deal first with the TriStars and the VC10 fleet. Those aircraft provide both air-to-air refuelling and air transport. Most notable in the public's mind are the TriStars-those 1970s aircraft that had extended airline service and then were bought by the RAF in the 1980s. Those aircraft are now very ancient indeed and their reliability is not as great as people would desire.
The consequence is that our troops out on operations in Afghanistan find that their return home is delayed, and their leave counts from the moment that they leave their theatre of operation, not the airfield. Many soldiers in my constituency of Aldershot have told me of their frustration at finding that their leave has been consumed to far too great an extent by the business of trying to get home from theatre, because of the inadequacy of the air bridge operated out of Brize Norton.
I do not blame the Royal Air Force. The previous Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Glenn Torpy, took the matter in hand and did a huge amount to try to improve the situation, and there has undoubtedly been an improvement in the operation of the air bridge, but the RAF has to operate clapped-out aircraft, and that is simply not fair on those personnel.
Just over a year ago, I travelled to Afghanistan on a TriStar. As an aviator, I seek to spend as much time as I can on the flight deck, so that I can understand some of the issues, and a number of the dials in that aircraft had little red dots on them. I asked what they were for, and the crew said, "We'd better tell him. Those instruments are all unserviceable." One of those instruments served a reasonably critical purpose. Obviously, the crew were happy to fly the aircraft-a pilot is not going to fly an unserviceable aircraft-but the fact is that the TriStars are old and expensive.
| Next Section | Index | Home Page |