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6 Jan 2010 : Column 81WH—continued
The Government propose to replace the TriStars and the VC10s with the future strategic tanker aircraft. The RAF bought some of the VC10s in the 1960s, so they have been operating for 50 years, although with an extraordinarily good safety record. However, I am on record as opposing that procurement, because it has been absolutely scandalous. Ten years ago, the Government approved a private finance initiative to replace the air-to-air refuelling facility provided by the TriStars and the VC10s. It then took Ministers five years-until 28 February
2005-to announce that the Air Tanker consortium was the preferred bidder. The contracts were not signed until three years later, on 27 March 2008. The first aircraft will not enter service until at least 2011, and the cost will be £13 billion over the 27-year life of the contract. If more than the core fleet of nine Airbus A330 aircraft is required, the costs will presumably go up, although I do not know, because I have had no sight of the commercial contract that the Government have agreed. It is impossible for the Opposition to hold them properly to account, because they will not release the commercial information. We shall have to wait until we come into government to find out exactly what Ministers have signed up to.
The Government's incompetence has delayed the programme and forced the Ministry of Defence to waste £20 million providing new glass cockpits for the TriStars, which will go out of service. The cockpits are required because the International Civil Aviation Organisation demands that aircraft operating in international airspace have up-to-date flight decks, which the TriStars do not. Marshall Aerospace of Cambridge is undertaking the work, which is not expected to be completed until the end of next year. Those aircraft will go out of service by 2016, when the full fleet of A330 tankers is expected to be in service, and they will presumably be scrapped-I cannot see anybody wanting to buy them. What the Government have done is a scandalous waste of money: not only will £20 million go down the drain, but aircraft that are critical for operations in Afghanistan will be taken offline while their flight decks are completely stripped out and refitted.
Last year, the cost of operating the ancient fleet of VC10s was £83 million; this year, the operating cost will be nearly £30,000 an hour. Why did Ministers not take advantage of a commercial offer from Omega Air to lease DC-10s fully equipped to theatre-entry standard at about one third of the cost of operating the VC10s? Omega Air tells me that it can lease the DC-10s for about £10,000 an hour.
Why did the Minister with responsibility for defence procurement claim that there had been no trial of a commercial alternative, when I have before me clear evidence that such trials have been carried out involving air-to-air refuelling with the Omega Air aircraft? The internal MOD document before me is dated 9 May 2009 and headed "Quick AAR"-or air-to-air refuelling-"win from Exercise Torpedo Focus 08-1/2". It states that "COS Ops", which presumably means chief of staff operations, "approved a trial"-I emphasise the word "trial"-"using Omega Air assets". It describes the trial as "a resounding success", adding:
"The RAF now has an 'on the shelf' clearance to utilise Omega Air assets worldwide."
In a parliamentary answer last year, however, I was told that no trials had taken place. I demand an explanation. I fully accept that I have landed this on the Minister without advance warning, so I do not expect him to give me a comprehensive answer now-that would be unreasonable-but I hope that he will understand my anger at the fact that I have been told something that, outside this place, might be described as a straightforward lie. I have an internal MOD document that uses the word "trial", but Ministers say that no trials have taken place, so an explanation is required.
Omega tells me that it has one theatre-entry standard KDC-a DC-10-immediately available. The aircraft can carry more than 350 passengers, and up to six aircraft could be available within a year. If the MOD had seized the opportunity in 2008 to work with the company, which provides continuing service to the US armed forces, they could now be meeting the air bridge and air-to-air refuelling requirement in more modern, efficient and reliable aircraft, thus hugely helping our armed forces in Afghanistan and providing the RAF with the equipment that it needs.
Omega is not the only company to have submitted a proposal to the MOD; Crown Aviation has done so, too. However, despite the desperate need for a more reliable and cheaper aircraft, the MOD has stuck its nose firmly in the sand and ploughed on with clapped out aeroplanes.
A comparison of last year's planned flying hours for the VC10s and TriStars with the actual flying hours perhaps says it all. The TriStar's planned hours were 11,561, but it delivered 8,966-a shortfall of more than 2,500 hours, or 22.5 per cent. I wonder whether that is the result of the aircraft's age and reliability. The VC10's planned hours were 9,254, but it delivered 8,952, so the shortfall was only 300 hours, which was substantially less than that for the TriStars. The TriStar fleet was clearly well short of its planned utilisation, and it would be helpful if the Minister explained why.
I said that I would say a few words about the A400M. The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife has raised a number of issues. Again, there is huge uncertainty about the aircraft. I do not entirely blame the Government. I cannot understand the difficulties experienced by Airbus, which delivered the A380 from design to service in about six years-admittedly, the aircraft had some problems, but it is in service. However, the A400M is a basic transport aircraft, and I do not understand how Airbus can have got itself into such a fix. As I say, I do not blame the Government for that, but we need to know their position and what they are going to do.
What is the contractual status of the aircraft? As my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire has reminded us, Airbus and EADS, the parent company, are so concerned about the implications for the financial health of the company if the contract is persisted with that they are seriously considering possibly scrapping the whole thing themselves. We need to know the Government's position. It is a fixed-price contract, but the latest National Audit Office major projects report for 2009 makes it clear that the original forecast cost of each aircraft was about £110 million, and that has now gone up to £130 million.
Is it proposed that the Government will operate on the basis of 25 aircraft, at a cost of £130 million? Are they holding Airbus's feet to the fire and saying, "This was a fixed price contract; you have to deliver at all costs?" Are they bending to Airbus's concerns and saying, "Okay, we'll take a reduced number of aircraft at the same price as was originally agreed?" We need to know. The House needs to know; the public need to know and, as my hon. Friend said, the Royal Air Force needs to know, because there are great concerns in the RAF about having such a large mix of aircraft in the fleet. That will undoubtedly add to cost and the logistics
of operating the air transport fleet. It is not good enough for the Government to hide behind commercial in-confidence discussions on a matter of such great importance to the nation.
To leave the Minister plenty of time to respond to the debate, I want to conclude by saying that our position is clear. We think that it would be entirely wrong for the Government to pre-empt a strategic defence review that they have said they would undertake if returned to office later in the year and that we, too, have made it clear we would carry out. Indeed, the Government are doing some preparatory work, and so are we. The taking of major decisions that would pre-empt the review will be regarded as at best unreasonable and at worst knavish.
Mr. Gray: I am sorry to press my hon. Friend, but, of course, a few months from now he may well be the Minister making the decision. Am I right in understanding him as saying that the potential closure of RAF Lyneham and the bringing of things together at RAF Brize Norton could form part of a Conservative Government's strategic defence review?
Mr. Howarth: Absolutely. I have made it clear to my hon. Friend's constituents that that is one of the things that we would do. It seems to me essential, if we are to have a defence review that will assess the real and potential threats to the nation, and if, having done so, we are to decide what military capabilities we require to meet those threats, that we must translate those decisions into the aircraft, ships, tanks and armoured vehicles that are needed and the places where they will be based. Making those decisions now-not only is Lyneham affected, of course, as we now hear that Cottesmore is to close-will deprive future Ministers of options that most reasonable people and certainly those who are concerned with defence feel should be available to them; they do not think that the Government should pre-empt those options, as they are doing.
Several RAF stations-I am thinking of places such as South Cerney, Catterick and Dishforth-have been turned over to Army use. Who knows what will happen to the Army in Germany and what decisions might arise out of studies about that? I am not suggesting that any decisions have been made about that, but they could be; and if our forces in Germany were brought back to the United Kingdom, where would they be based? If we close and sell off RAF stations, we limit the options that will be available. I can give my hon. Friend the assurance that he seeks that we would put the future basing of our fleets-not just the air transport fleet, but the fast jet fleet as well-into the mix for a strategic defence review. That seems to me to be the sensible thing to do, and I am sure that that is what my hon. Friend's constituents, both military and civilian, want to hear. I hope that those who are informed about such matters will also be reassured to hear it.
10.35 am
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Bill Rammell):
It is a pleasure to respond to the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) in this debate, and I congratulate him on securing it. I thank him for his words of praise for servicemen and women and civilians who have been doing vital work in support of our operations. I thank
all the people who work at RAF Lyneham, and the community there who have over the years given incredibly strong support to the station and the Royal Air Force. I also want to thank those who have done so much to ensure that people who lose their lives on operations are repatriated with the honour and dignity that their sacrifice deserves.
As the hon. Member for North Wiltshire will be aware, the number and operation of military airfields is under constant review to ensure-and this is rightly the responsibility of Government-that the best use is made of the defence estate for our armed forces. To say that this is not the first time that the hon. Gentleman has raised the issue in the House would be the understatement of the year. I pay tribute to him for the tenacity with which he has made his case on behalf of his constituents, who I recognise are understandably concerned for the future of RAF Lyneham. However, although I recognise that there will be some disappointment about it, the answer that I must give him today is unchanged from the one he has heard from successive Defence Ministers over the past five and a half years.
It was first announced on 4 July 2003 that the future air transport and air-to-air refuelling fleets would, by 2012, be collocated at RAF Brize Norton, which from that point would be the single defence airport of embarkation. The hon. Gentleman knows that the strategic review work that considered the future role of RAF Lyneham, RAF Brize Norton and RAF St. Mawgan took more than a year. Phase 1 of the review was to decide the optimum basing for the A400M, which will, as has been discussed, replace the C-130K fleet currently at RAF Lyneham. The hon. Gentleman will recall that in August 2002 the then Minister of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow (Mr. Ingram), announced that RAF Brize Norton would be the home to the new fleet. Phase 2 of the review was to consider properly the longer-term future of all three stations. It was as a result of that work that the Government announced that the C-130J fleet would move to RAF Brize Norton in 2011, and that if no further defence use was identified for it, RAF Lyneham would close. That remains the position today.
The decision was driven and underpinned by a clear value-for-money case, which estimated the steady-state saving associated with withdrawing from RAF Lyneham at £27.9 million per annum. In addition, it is currently forecast that the efficiencies generated by amalgamating the functions currently carried out at RAF Lyneham with those based at RAF Brize Norton will realise input and output savings totalling some £437 million from the financial year 2011-12 through to 2019-20 alone.
Mr. Gray: Although the Minister may not have time now to answer in detail, if I table a parliamentary question on these lines, will he lay out in clear and precise terms how all the arithmetic works?
Bill Rammell: I was going to come to that, because the hon. Gentleman made that point earlier. He does not need to table a parliamentary question; I will write to him setting out in detail the underpinning logic and the way we have assembled the figures. I understand that it is important to make those clear.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State announced on 7 May 2009 that RAF Lyneham was no longer under consideration
as a possible location for a consolidated support helicopter base under Project Belvedere. Our studies concluded that the proposal did not represent best value for money-specifically, that the efficiencies that could be achieved from a major rationalisation programme would not produce the necessary return, given the significant investment that would be required to implement the change.
It was therefore decided that to continue Project Belvedere did not represent best value for money for the Department, and the programme was closed. That means, and I know that the hon. Gentleman regrets it, that there will be no change at this stage to the current arrangements. At present, Chinook helicopters operated by the joint helicopter command are based at Royal Air Force Odiham; Apache helicopters are based at Wattisham station; Puma and Merlin helicopters are based at Royal Air Force Benson; the Lynx helicopter operates from Dishforth airfield; and the Commando helicopter force, comprising Sea King and Lynx helicopters, operates from the Royal Naval air station at Yeovilton.
On 15 December last year, the Secretary of State for Defence announced a package of enhancements to our future helicopter fleet, including the procurement of an additional 22 Chinooks to enhance the operational Chinook fleet. Those additional aircraft will be based at RAF Benson, as well as their existing base at RAF Odiham. Our future helicopter fleets will be based at existing rotary wing bases, which does not include RAF Lyneham. The position on RAF Lyneham therefore remains as announced on 4 July 2003 by the then Minister for the Armed Forces, my right hon. Friend the Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow; following the move of the C130 fleet to Royal Air Force Brize Norton, and if no further defence use is identified for Royal Air Force Lyneham, the latter will be closed and disposed of.
Mr. Gray: Will the Minister answer a simple question? If Project Belvedere, which will bring all helicopters together in one place, does not work, and if not enough savings are made from that exercise to justify the upgrade to RAF Lyneham, how is it that Project CATARA, which will bring Lyneham and Brize Norton together at one base, will save £400 million or so over the next 10 years? How can the arithmetic of one not work whereas the arithmetic of the other can?
Bill Rammell: It is because they are different propositions. Some rationalisations work from a cost-benefit analysis point of view, and some do not. If one embarks on a course of action or a review and then, through further research, one sees that it will not fly financially, one does not go ahead with that proposition. That is the stage that we have reached. I realise that that is disappointing news for the people at RAF Lyneham and for the local community. Nevertheless, we will do everything that we possibly can to manage the draw-down sensitively, and I shall comment on that in detail later.
The decision to close RAF Lyneham was not taken lightly. The hon. Gentleman can rest assured that the review that was undertaken was comprehensive. He will recall that the review team briefed him and participated in meetings with local and regional authorities in order to ensure that all the issues could be identified and properly considered. The reality is that it is never easy
to close a unit, but we would be failing in our duty if we did not make the best use of taxpayers' money to meet our defence requirements. To put it bluntly, keeping a station that does not meet the defence need would be a waste of public money. I hope that the hon. Gentleman agrees with that proposition.
Recent enhancements to the air transport and support helicopter fleets do not change that position. Infrastructure enhancements at RAF Brize Norton are well under way, and will be sufficient to handle the current and planned air transport and air-to-air refuelling fleets. The hon. Gentleman raised a number of other concerns about the collocation of the air transport and the air-to-air refuelling fleets at RAF Brize Norton. I shall deal with those later. First, however, I shall respond to some of the specific points raised during the debate.
The hon. Member for North Wiltshire started by remarking on Mr. Choudary's proposed march at Wootton Bassett. I share his revulsion at the proposed demonstration. I hope and believe that such a march will not take place. It is disgusting and offensive, and I believe that there is virtually no public support for the town being used and abused in that way. I hope that that message is put across strongly and clearly.
The hon. Member for North Wiltshire, the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Willie Rennie), who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, and the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth), the shadow Minister, all asked why we would not put off this difficult decision and wait for the strategic defence review. We need a strategic defence review, but I do not believe that such a review can or should be used as an excuse for putting off sensible decisions that are well under way. I say to the Opposition, I hope charitably-they are committed to reducing the public deficit faster than the Government, which at the very least will require an additional £26 billion of spending cuts-that they need more credibility in handling such matters given that, at every juncture, they are effectively calling for delays and further public expenditure. Their arguments simply do not wash.
Mr. Gray: The Minister is being most generous in giving way. He admits the main thrust of my remarks, which is that not closing RAF Lyneham will save an awful lot of money-the vast sums not needed to upgrade Brize Norton. Let us call a halt to the project. We could spend the money on the front line in Afghanistan, not waste it on silly projects.
Bill Rammell: I will come later to details of the costings, and I shall set them out in writing for the hon. Gentleman. There is of course a short-term cost, but in the longer term there will be a saving to the Exchequer, which is why we are pursuing this course of action.
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