[back to previous text]

Mr. Hoban: That was a brief but helpful speech by my hon. Friend, because it suggests that there is a lack of clarity about where, in practice, the boundary is. Promoting a solution goes beyond what the Thoresen review says about guiding the user to a point
“where they can choose between a small number of options.”
That is very different from a solution. I do not think that a solution is necessarily a package; it may be advice such as, “You should get some life assurance.” This is one of those areas where we will have to see how it develops in practice. People will find different ways of delivering generic advice and have their own view about where the appropriate operational boundary is given the expertise of the people involved. What expertise may be available from one provider may be very different from that from another. The purpose of the amendment was not to prevent advice being given, but to trigger a debate. I suppose that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West would have tabled a much more elaborate amendment around definitions to tease out a debate, and that is certainly an alternative to this. None the less, it has been a helpful debate. There is some uncertainty about what advice is. We know where the hard edge of regulated advice is, but it is difficult to work out how far we can go to get to the point where we are on the right side of that boundary. Having had the debate, I beg to ask leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Further Provision about the Consumer Financial Education Body
Mr. Hoban: I beg to move amendment 47, in schedule 1, page 52, line 31, at end insert—
‘(4) The board must include at least two members who represent the interests of consumers.’.
The amendment seeks to reserve two places on the board of the new consumer financial education body for people who represent the interests of consumers. The board composition set out in the Bill is very permissive. It states that the body must have,
“a chair; a chief executive; and a board (which must include the chair and chief executive)”.
In a body that is aimed at helping consumers and improving financial education, there should be someone who is there to represent the interests of consumers. The FSA board has no predetermined places for consumer representatives. The Consumers Association has campaigned for two places to be set aside for its representatives. The Government have gone part of the way down that route by appointing Brian Pomeroy and Mick McAteer to the FSA board, but there is no statutory requirement for the FSA board to have two consumer representatives. Arguably, the FSA’s consumer panel, which is chaired by Adam Phillips, is a way of ensuring significant consumer input into the work of the FSA. Moreover, the FSA has two practitioner panels—one deals with larger practitioners and the other with smaller practitioners—to provide an input along with the board members who come from the financial services industry. The appointment of consumer representatives would be a significant advantage for the consumer financial education board because it would give it a very clear and distinctive consumer voice on the board. It would also help to demonstrate a degree of independence from the FSA. A demonstrably independent board would ensure the credibility of the authority. Consumer groups want a dedicated body, and Citizens Advice and others have commended that. However, there will be some who ask, “Can the body be truly independent of the FSA, given that the power of appointment of board members rests with it?” I can see the basis of that argument: if someone is appointed by the FSA, would they be beholden to it? However, the experience to date of the Financial Ombudsman Service and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, where the same power of appointment exists, suggests that both bodies are robustly independent of the FSA. There is no reason why the new body should not be similarly independent.
However, if one accepts that the body will be seen to be independent in practice, the next question is, “What other guarantees of its independence are there? What guarantees are there that it will have a wide range of people on its board, reflecting a whole range of different stakeholder interests?” I think there will be interest from people in the industry and asset paymasters of the CFEB, but it is important to have people who are clearly representative to be the voice of consumers. That is the purpose of amendment 47.
Ian Pearson: I assure the hon. Member for Fareham and others that the Government expect the CFEB board to have, without question, wide-ranging representation, including a significant number of board members who bring consumer insight and propose consumers’ perspectives. However, my difficulty with the amendment is that I do not believe that it is appropriate to specify that on the face of the Bill, as it does not allow flexibility in the future. Given that no other elements of the board’s composition, such as its overall size and the representation of other interests, are prescribed in the approach that we have adopted, I do not think that it is appropriate to do so in this case.
As I said, there is every expectation of strong consumer representation on the new body. It is, after all, called the consumer financial education body, and it would be absolutely amazing if it did not have strong consumer representation. However, I do not believe that we need to provide for that on the face of the Bill. If we did, we would have to put many other measures on the face of the Bill as well. Having given the Committee those assurances, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.
Mr. Hoban: I am not sure I am minded to withdraw my amendment on this occasion. One would have expected the FSA’s board to have consumer representatives, yet the appointments of Brian Pomeroy and Mick McAteer were held as a great advance.
The amendment would send a clear signal that there will be consumer representatives on the board rather than simply an expectation of such representatives. As I said, one would have expected the FSA board to have consumer representatives, but the appointment of the two new directors was clearly to make sure that consumers are heard, implying that they were not heard in the past.
The Minister could have been much more positive about the amendment than he proved to be. His view shows that consumer voices can be overlooked. They are not as numerous as industry voices, and do not necessarily have the same clout in lobbying and profile. Given that we have a body that will work on behalf of consumers and represent their interests, their voice should be heard loud and clear, and there should be a statutory requirement for them to be there. I am not minded to withdraw the amendment on this occasion and would press it to a vote.
2 pm
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 5.
Division No. 3]
AYES
Breed, Mr. Colin
Duddridge, James
Hoban, Mr. Mark
Howell, John
NOES
Barlow, Ms Celia
Marris, Rob
Mudie, Mr. George
Pearson, Ian
Roy, Lindsay
Question accordingly negatived.
Mr. Hoban: I beg to move amendment 46, in schedule 1, page 53, line 30, leave out paragraph 6.
The amendment refers to the market confidence and financial stability paragraph. It is a probing amendment, which seeks to understand how the paragraph will interact with the activities of the consumer financial education body, because it says that the body should exercise its function with
“regard to the importance of...maintaining confidence in the UK financial system; and...maintaining the stability of the UK financial system.”
In a way, paragraph 6 acts as a constraint on the activities of the consumer financial education body.
On Tuesday we discussed whether one FSMA objective took precedence over the others. The structure of FSMA is that various objectives are set, and it is then subject to other factors. Paragraph 6 mirrors that approach by saying that the objective of the consumer financial education body, which is set out in the first part of the Bill, is then limited or constrained by the duty to maintain confidence in and the stability of the UK financial system. In part, that goes back to the debate that we touched on this morning and this afternoon about what the consumer financial education body is for. Whose side is it on? Is it a consumer champion, or is it impartial when considering the interests of individuals and those of the industry sector? How will that be reflected in its work?
We have identified situations in which there are, perhaps, products with a particular problem or risk, and one of the objectives of the consumer financial education body is to advise consumers about the risks and benefits of certain financial products. If we go back to the example of payment protection insurance, the FSA’s thematic review indicated that there was a problem with the sale of such products and questioned whether they were being sold appropriately, identifying some significant flaws with the sales process. The consumer financial education body could look at the outcome of the thematic review of the sale of a product and decide that the risks were so great that it wanted to tell consumers, “We don’t want you to”, or even, “You shouldn’t buy these products”, giving clear and explicit advice through its website or face-to-face discussion with clients that the particular product should be avoided. That might be a reasonable step to take, but what happens when we then have the overlay of paragraph 6?
Such products might be fundamental to the profitability of individuals and financial institutions. Sounding some clear warnings about the products might undermine confidence in the UK financial system. A consumer financial education body might, if we consider the recent example of the bank charges, advocate that people should claim compensation for the mis-selling of products. It might see that as being part of its remit. I do not know whether it is. Part of this debate is to help tease that point out. If the financial consequences of a large number of complaints are possible multi-billion pound claims against financial institutions, does that undermine the stability of the UK financial system?
I have presented some pretty extreme cases to make my point. How does clause 6 constrain the role of the consumer financial education body? Is it there as a consumer champion? Is it there to highlight the risks and to encourage consumers to take action, or does it adopt a more neutral position on the more difficult areas around consumer finance? Where the boundary will be set is the point that I am trying to tease out of the debate. We could argue that if we said people should not buy payment protection insurance, that would go beyond the role of generic financial advice. There should not be recommendations to buy, surrender or change a product from a specific provider. That might be going beyond its remit. Or is it within the remit of the consumer financial education body? It might be prevented from doing so where there is seen to be a wider risk of making that sort of information known, and the consumer financial education body would be constrained by paragraph 6.
Consider the run on the Rock. If at a time of financial crisis the consumer financial education body felt that it should advise consumers about the deposit protection limits, and that led to people shuffling around their deposits in bank accounts and triggered a run on a small bank, would that be putting the stability of the UK financial system at risk? I am trying to work out where the boundaries are between what the consumer financial education body can do in terms of fulfilling its core objectives of advising on risks and ensuring people understand the risks associated with particular transactions or services, and how that might then, in the sort of circumstances that we have seen relatively recently, have an impact on financial stability and market confidence. We need to understand how paragraph 6 is meant to work in practice and what it might prevent the consumer financial education body from doing.
Ian Pearson: Let me try to shed some additional light on matters for the benefit of the Committee. The consumer financial education body will have one sole function and objective, which is to increase consumers’ understanding and knowledge of the financial system and help them to manage their financial affairs more effectively. As has been pointed out, the Bill also requires the new body to have regard to the importance of maintaining confidence in the stability of the financial system. Let me emphasise that the CFEB’s consumer financial education remit will always be its primary consideration, and it will be accountable for delivering that function.
In contrast, the have-regards in the legislation are designed to inform that function, so that the CFEB considers wider market issues when performing its functions. The have-regards allow it to consider the issues on its own terms, protecting its operational independence while also ensuring that the body links into the wider financial architecture. The have-regards will give the CFEB a broader and rational frame of reference when making policy, which we think is important. They will allow it to legitimately take into account any broader market consequences of its actions, as of course a stability crisis could ultimately have far profounder consequences for consumers. However, I strongly want to emphasise again that the primary obligation for the new body will be to consider how to help consumers better manage their financial affairs. It is designed to do what it says on the tin; it is about consumer financial education.
The have-regards also give the new body a duty to raise any potential issues that it identifies that could affect market confidence or stability with the FSA and others as appropriate. Hence it could potentially act as an important source of market intelligence for the regulator. That flagging role should complement its consumer awareness function, not compromise it, and is a useful addition. The Government are clear that the requirements to consider financial stability and market confidence are an important counterbalance to the CFEB’s overall objective. We are very clear about the primacy of the overall objective.
The hon. Member for Fareham again raised the issue of whether the new body will be neutral or a voice for consumers. He will be aware that the majority of respondents to the “Reforming financial markets” consultation said that they thought that the new body should focus on consumer education, and not pursue consumer advocacy. There are other bodies, such as Consumer Focus, that already act as consumer advocacy organisations, and they are playing their role effectively at the moment. Obviously, the CFEB will want to work with them where appropriate. It will also liaise and work with other bodies, such as the Office of Fair Trading, and it will want to work in a collaborative way. I think that there is strong role clarity in the body’s remit, which is enshrined in legislation.
I hope that those clarifications are sufficient for the Committee, and that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his probing amendment.
 
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