[back to previous text]

Rob Marris: It was I who used the Titanic metaphor. To carry on with that, part of clause 18, without the amendments, is in a sense an attempt to stop or try to dissuade the ship from leaving port in the first place. If a financial institution knows that there could be a collective action, it may be dissuaded from engaging on a course of action that is somewhat risky.
Mr. Hoban: I am sorry for wrongly attributing the metaphors; we have been awash with metaphors this morning, so we should perhaps move away from talking metaphorically about the issue.
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. If this were an unregulated sector, his argument would be powerful, because there would clearly be a deterrent. However, there are already a number of measures in place that should provide protection for consumers—there is an FSA rulebook and rules on the conduct of business—and we should not need the clause to act as a deterrent. I am seeing it very much as a clause that facilitates an outcome when something has gone wrong, but the expectation should be that the FSA is dealing with situations as they arise. Some might argue the problem is that the FSA rules are predominantly about the conduct of business rather than the products. From what we have here, it seems that products have given rise to a problem, given that the FSA is looking at product regulation in particular. It has looked at it most recently in the context of mortgages.
12.45 pm
The regulator should be aware that there is a problem. Such problems do not suddenly emerge out of nowhere. Payment protection insurance was a problem that built up over time, so there should have been a regulatory response as it was building up rather than a resort to law. Concerns have been expressed about the matter and the analogy drawn by several commentators is that it is equivalent to US class actions. The British Bankers Association responded by saying:
“We are very concerned that proposals on class actions risk introducing a US-style litigation culture to the UK. The US system is “opt-out” and has led to incentives for baseless claims, increased costs (ultimately born by consumers) and a situation where the only real winners are lawyers. The BBA urges that any proposals based on an “opt out” approach should be dropped and instead that the focus of the bill is on creating a more effective system of consumer redress via the FSA and subject to court approval.”
We shall talk about that structure later, but its remarks echo the concerns of the Civil Justice Council, which said that
“The Court is the most appropriate body to ensure that any new collective procedure is fairly balanced as between claimants and defendants, the latter of which should be properly protected from unmeritorious, vexatious or spurious claims as well as from so called blackmail claims”.
It is not only partially an industry point; it is reflected by the considerations that underpinned the report of the Civil Justice Council.
As I said, there has been a significant debate about the measures. Consumer groups, such as Which?, Citizens Advice, Consumer Focus and Help the Aged have written a joint opinion on the provisions. They stated:
“We believe that the provisions in the Bill are an entirely proportionate response to tackle the types of mis-selling issues that have arisen in the financial services industry. By giving the court the power to decide whether a collective action would be opt-in or opt-out as required by the circumstances of the case, they strike the balance between ensuring an opt-out process where necessary but providing judicial supervision to prevent vexatious and unmeritorious cases.
Consumer groups recognise the merits of collective action, but also some of the risks of that, which is why I want to move on to the need for safeguards. A great deal of the work of the Civil Justice Council was about some of the safeguards that are needed.
I want to conclude on the second theme. We also need to deal with the problem with the regulatory system. The regulatory system should deal with such issues and, given that the financial services sector is so heavily regulated, we should not have to depend on individuals enforcing their rights to achieve the right outcome for consumers.
Are there necessary safeguards? The safeguards are the measures set out in the Bill, in secondary legislation and under the rules of the court. The explanatory notes to the clause state:
“Regulations or rules of the court may require the court, when considering whether to authorise the bringing of collective proceedings, to consider matters set out in the regulations or rules.”
Our job in Committee is to debate such issues thoroughly. We should all be able to agree that we do not want a situation in which the only real winners are lawyers. We are not aiming for that. We must therefore make sure that there are adequate safeguards in respect of the judicial option on opt-out proceedings.
The point that we have reached in our thinking is that we must make sure that adequate safeguards are in place in the Bill if we are to go ahead. In its submission to the Committee, the Prudential wrote:
“We agree with the Government that collective proceedings should be used rarely and only for the most significant cases. However, we do not believe that the Bill, as drafted, provides sufficient checks and balances to ensure the system is not abused.”
On a similar point, much of the detail will be filled in by secondary legislation, which has yet to be published in draft, and court rulings. We expected to have more of the detail by now, as the European Justice Forum, which does not speak for the financial sector, intimated in its response. It says:
“EJF is particularly concerned that the Bill would introduce opt-out class actions in the financial sector and that—contrary to government policy stated in July 2009, no framework of rules and safeguards has been produced prior to proposing such a remedy.”
The plan to produce a framework document was set out in the Ministry of Justice response to the original paper by the Civil Justice Council. What stage has that document reached?
My comments on amendments to later clauses will be about ensuring that sufficient safeguards are in place. The amendments that I have tabled are an attempt to ensure that the safeguards in the Civil Justice Council paper are reflected in the Bill not only so that we have a framework for collective proceedings but so that rights and safeguards are in place before the process comes into force.
Subsection (5) states:
“A person may be authorised under subsection (1) to bring proceedings even if the person would not otherwise be regarded as having any interest, or any sufficient interest, in the proceedings.”
One can see why Which?, as a consumer group, would have an interest in acting on behalf of consumers, but other groups could equally act as a representative, given the breadth of subsection (5). We are well aware of the activities of claims management companies. Some clearly act in the interests of potential claimants, but one gets the sense from time to time that others are looking for a cause to fight and see a clear commercial benefit to doing so in terms of the fees that they might generate.
So there needs to be some control over who can bring such cases. Subsection (5) is broadly drafted, and amendment 58 would introduce an additional check so that the representative
“is authorised to act as a representative on an ad hoc basis under the civil Procedure rules, or...is authorised to act as a representative and on such terms as specified by order of the Lord Chancellor, in accordance with criteria to be published by the Lord Chancellor for the purposes of this section.”
That would introduce some coherence and structure and make clear who can bring such claims and act as a representative. It would require the Lord Chancellor to consult the Lord Chief Justice or a judicial office holder nominated by the Lord Chief Justice when authorising an individual to act on an ad hoc basis or issuing criteria or guidelines for who might act as a representative.
The safeguard is set out in the Civil Justice Council’s report and is, from recollection, an extract from the draft Bill that the council prepared. The amendment is the first in a series that would introduce the safeguards set out in the report and ensure that a proper framework was in place for such actions to be brought.
The Chairman: The Committee will notice that at the top of the selection list are the words
“Chairmen’s provisional selection and grouping of amendments”.
The Chairman does not always get it right. I think I may say without wishing to be patronising that the hon. Gentleman has taken a pragmatic and sound approach to his coverage of this debate. In so doing, he has covered collective proceeding rules, which are in clause 18, and, to a considerable extent, opt-in and opt-out, which is in clause 19. The substance of clause 20 is fairly light, so I will now group the stand part debates for clauses 18, 19 and 20 with the amendment.
If that leaves the hon. Gentleman in a difficult position, Mr. Benton or I will take cognisance of that. Mr. Benton might wish to make further remarks. We are now debating amendment 58, with which it will be convenient to debate clauses 18, 19 and 20 stand part.
Rob Marris: I am surprised by the amendment, as it appears to take power away from the courts, which are independent, and give it to a politician—the Lord Chancellor—who may or may not be elected, although the current Lord Chancellor is. That would be a retrograde step. Pursuant to the other provisions in this grouping—not only clauses 19 and 20 but clauses 21, 22 and onwards—I think that the amendment is misconceived in focusing power in the hands of a politician rather than leaving it with the courts, as clause 18 would do.
The Chairman: Before we proceed any further, the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West mentioned clauses beyond clause 20. For clarity, may I explain that I drew the line at clause 20 because separate amendments have been tabled to clause 21? It would be unwise to go any further down a tricky road.
Ian Pearson: I am considering where to begin—
The Chairman: Try clause 18.
Ian Pearson —and, more importantly, where to end. I think that I will begin with clause 18, as you suggest, Mr. Gale, and amendment 58. Clause 18 is a new development in the law of the country, and it is entirely right that the hon. Member for Fareham should raise probing questions about the Government’s intentions. I am happy to put a number of matters on the record in the time available this morning and, I suspect, this afternoon.
We believe that there is a clear need for collective proceedings for financial services claims. The hon. Member for Fareham referred to the Civil Justice Council report on improving consumers’ access to justice. It recommended that generic collective proceedings be introduced in the UK. In our response, we said that they should be considered and, where appropriate, introduced in specific sectors where there is a case for doing so. As I have said, we believe that there is a strong case for doing so in relation to financial services.
We do not believe that there is an effective means at the moment for representing consumers as a group in mass financial services cases. There is some provision for collective litigation, but it is so limited that it is rarely used.
The Chairman: Order. I am advised that the Programming Sub-Committee will not now meet and that this Committee will sit between 8 pm and 10 pm this evening. I can take the Chair, so Mr. Benton will be with you this afternoon and I will be with you this evening. I give an undertaking to see when I leave the room whether there is any way to generate a little heat in this igloo.
1 pm
The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88).
Adjourned till this day at Four o’clock.
 
Previous
House of Commons 
home page Parliament home page House of 
Lords home page search page enquiries ordering index

©Parliamentary copyright 2010
Prepared 13 January 2010