[back to previous text]

Mr. Hoban: I could not resist taking part, given the closing paragraphs of the thoughtful speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester. He is right to say that competition should play an increasingly important role in how we deal with the financial services sector. Competition in the banking sector has reduced during the past 18 months or so. My hon. Friend referred to the acquisition of HBOS by Lloyds, but overseas banks have left the banking market that had hitherto operated in the retail or commercial sectors. The number of building societies that operate in the UK has reduced because of a series of mergers or takeovers.
The reality is that there is an increased risk that consumers will have a poorer deal if there are fewer players in the market. We want consumers to have a better outcome. I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the Committee recognise that regulation in itself is not sufficient to deliver the best outcome for consumers. A market can be well regulated, but if only one product is provided, the chances are that consumers will get a poorer deal, as a consequence of only one player being in the market.
We need to address some challenges in considering the role played by competition in financial services. I intervened on my hon. Friend and mentioned the complexity of the products in the financial services sector. That clearly has a bearing on how transparent choice is for consumers and whether they can assess which products offer good value for money.
There are areas where regulation has enhanced the ability for competition to take place. I shall give the Committee two examples. There is huge competition between insurers in the motor insurance market, partly because consumers can chose reasonably well between different products, given that the product specification at the heart of motor insurance is common to all products. When people decide whether to take out a Direct Line or a Privilege policy, they know that either third party, fire and theft or comprehensive cover will lie at the heart of the policy that they buy, and they are therefore better able to exercise choice.
One of the challenges in introducing competition into retail financial services is to ensure that consumers can make an informed choice. Our white paper on financial regulation suggested ways to increase competition in the marketplace—for example, by analysing the data that mortgage companies or banks provide on their charges and enabling those data to be used in a common framework to assess which is the best bank account or which is the best market. So we can take steps to improve competition.
Whether a market is well regulated has an impact on competition, too. The first debate that I took part in as a Front-Bench member of our Treasury team was on equity release products. The market had moved from one that was relatively lightly regulated to a more tightly regulated one. That transition in regulation introduced new competitors to the market, so there was greater innovation in products and more choice for consumers. The cost to the consumer of those products reduced, because more household names participated in that marketplace. Those people only entered the market because they felt that their reputation was not at risk, as the market was better regulated. So we need to consider some important dynamics in looking at the role that competition can play in improving outcomes for consumers.
Mr. Love: I agree with quite a lot of the thrust of the hon. Gentleman’s argument, but parts of the marketplace resist easy solutions. Look at the banking charges for small businesses: in theory, there should be competition, yet report on report shows that they get a pretty raw deal from the banks. We seem unable to deal with that.
Does the hon. Gentleman not think that in many ways, he and I are talking a similar language? I have listened to the contributions made on the new clause, and although the question of the Lloyds takeover of HBOS was raised, no one suggested that, in the circumstances, they would have opposed it. Is it not the case that UK Financial Investments and the Government have been vocal in suggesting that when the Government divest themselves of some of the banks and other organisations taken over during that period, they will ensure that competition is to the fore in the decisions that are made?
Mr. Hoban: The hon. Gentleman raises two important questions. On bank charges and whether small businesses are getting a fair deal, one challenge is to do with people’s ability to switch provider. If it is difficult to switch, the product provider has the opportunity to extract higher charges. I know that the OFT is considering the challenge of how to make it easier for people to switch providers. We may change telephone providers every year, and those who supply our gas, or we might alter our insurance every year to get a better deal, but people are very resistant to changing the people who hold their bank accounts.
If we can improve switching, we will ensure a better deal, and there will be more competition in the marketplace because that would encourage innovation. A new entrant to the banking market who thinks that people are loth to change providers will question the merit or value of entering that market. People tend to enter the market where it is relatively easy to do so, and where the barriers for entry are low, as in the case of the mortgage or credit card market. People are prepared to shop around for those things, but they are not prepared to shop around as much for bank accounts.
On the restructuring of the banking sector, it amused me to hear the hon. Gentleman say that we are all talking the same language. When we suggested last year that the Government should use their stake in RBS, Lloyds and Northern Rock to facilitate a restructuring of the banking market to increase competition, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury criticised our proposals. The only reason why the Government support the measures now is that the European Commission requires them, as a condition of state aid rules, to ensure that Lloyds and RBS divest themselves of part of their activities. Although I welcome the Government’s conversion, it has not necessarily been a willing one. Competition has an important role, and there is interaction to be had with regulation.
My hon. Friend the Member for Chichester also discussed the role that competition plays as regards systemic risk. One challenge when it comes to financial stability is that in order to encourage competition in a market, it is good to have new entrants. He mentioned the barrier erected around a heavily regulated market by the fact that any new entrant must deal with the cost of compliance, but even getting authorisation to enter the market can act as a barrier. We are rightly placing great emphasis on financial stability, and that might create a situation in which the barriers to entry are increased further; we need to think about that carefully.
The hon. Member for Edmonton discussed the credit market, which has one predominant supplier. If the barriers to entry are low, the fact that there is only one supplier does not necessarily mean that consumers will get a bad deal, because if there are additional profits to be creamed off, it is possible to enter the market. However, in the situation with the Provident, quite a lot of infrastructure will need to be recreated, so the barriers to entry in that sector are high. We need to think about them and about the interaction between financial stability and encouraging innovation and competition.
My hon. Friend the Member for Chichester was right that putting the objective in the Bill would create a tension. We have had a debate about where the financial stability objective appeared in the hierarchy. Did it have equal rank with the others, or did it have primacy over the others? We reached a point where each objective balanced against the others. If we were to make competition an objective for the FSA or a successor body, that would increase the emphasis on competition in the balance that determines how the regulator fulfils its duties. That is a factor if we believe that the objectives are important and affect how the regulator conducts its activities.
3.30 pm
Ian Pearson: As is usually the case when he is not playing party politics, the hon. Member for Chichester made a thoughtful contribution on new clause 9 and on the idea that maintaining competition should be a statutory objective for the Financial Services Authority. I think that the arguments are finely balanced, when it comes to whether maintaining competition should be a statutory objective, or whether the FSA should have regard to it.
The Government believe strongly that competition is important for economic efficiency in general and in creating efficient and responsive financial markets. To that extent, I do not think that there is any difference between any of us. We all accept the importance of competition. In my judgment, the balance of the argument would fall slightly in favour of including competition as a statutory objective of the FSA, but that is not the Government’s current view.
I would like to explain why the Government believe that new clause 9 should not be in the Bill. Before I do that, I will comment briefly on the other points that the hon. Gentleman raised. He talked about the fact that a small number of large firms are easier to regulate than a large number of small firms. That might be the case, but it does not prevent the regulator from performing its current role in an effective way. I do not think that regulators set out to increase barriers to entry for new firms, and the hon. Gentleman will be aware of recent developments with new entrants into financial markets. Although we should always be on our guard against regulatory creep, or regulators acting too comfortably, it is the responsibility of other bodies to hold regulators to account and ensure that they perform their jobs effectively.
Mr. Tyrie: Will the Minister give way on a point of fact?
Ian Pearson: I will give way in a moment, but I want to pursue my line of thinking. It is not necessarily the case that a small number of large firms is likely to produce a less competitive market than a large number of small firms. That was hinted at by the hon. Member for Fareham when he suggested that fewer participants are likely to lessen people’s chances of having a good deal. It is important in competition policy to look at the dynamics of markets, and there can be very competitive markets with a small number of entrants, or uncompetitive markets with a large number of small entrants. It is up to competition authorities to address that as part of their regulatory activity. I happily give way to the hon. Gentleman on a point of fact.
Mr. Tyrie: I will wait.
Ian Pearson: Let me move on to explain why the Government are not persuaded that new clause 9 should stand part of the Bill. My personal view is that if the new clause was allowed, I am not sure that it would have a major practical effect, for some of the reasons that the Government have.
We must not forget that competition is intended to benefit the users of financial services. For the FSA, competition should not be an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. Although we must strive to get markets working better, that is because competitive markets deliver economic efficiency, which benefits society by providing consumers with better goods and better services at better prices. That is the important point. In other words, competition policy is usually an excellent complement to consumer protection regulation. However, usually is not the same as always. Consequently, if it was the case that competition might not benefit the consumer for some reason, it would be wrong to prioritise its maintenance. One example of that is when an excessive proliferation of essentially similar products actually reduces the overall efficiency of a market. Who pays for that inefficiency? Normally the consumer.
As the hon. Member for Fareham said last week when we were discussing financial education, choice can be bewildering. If the effect of a plethora of choices is that the consumer gets so confused that they make expensive decisions or abandon the idea of taking up a useful product such as an insurance policy or a savings account, that is not the outcome that we would seek. Again, that raises interesting questions out of which some behavioural economists have made careers. That is something that we need to take account of as part of our practical policy making.
That does not mean that the Government are uninterested in competition in financial services—far from it. The FSA should definitely continue to minimise any adverse effects of its actions on competition, and it should remain mindful of the general desirability of facilitating competition. Those are its duties under section 2(3) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and they should remain in place, in addition to the FSA’s main objectives. The nature of the duty to be imposed on the FSA was considered carefully when the Act was introduced, as the hon. Member for Chichester knows, and placing such duties in the “have regard to” list under section 2(3) was the correct result, in the Government’s opinion.
The Government have a further argument against the new clause, namely that it is not necessary. As members of the Committee are no doubt aware, as mentioned in the text of the new clause, the UK has two separate competition authorities: the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission. The competition regime is world-class and it is independently ranked as one of the top three globally. As for financial services specifically, the OFT already has a duty to keep the FSA’s regulations and practices under review on competition grounds, and may involve the Competition Commission. That can be found under sections 159 and 160 of FSMA.
Furthermore, to ensure that the FSA is fully involved in competition issues, it and the OFT are engaged in continuing dialogue. As the hon. Gentleman noted, last month they announced plans to strengthen co-operation on competition issues through the signing of a memorandum of understanding. It has also been agreed that the FSA’s annual report will in future incorporate a section on competition in the sector, in which it will set out relevant actions that it has taken. For those reasons, the Government believe that there is no need to extend the specific objective to the FSA.
In the Government’s view, the new clause would not be of benefit, given other parts of the existing statutory framework. I am sure that the hon. Member for Chichester agrees that the aim of competition is to gain better outcomes for consumers; it is not about having competition for competition’s sake. A strong competition regime is in place, which is applicable to financial services. I hope that I have outlined in sufficient detail the Government’s view of the work that is already in progress to strengthen further competition in UK financial services, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the motion.
Mr. Tyrie: I am grateful to the Minister for his reply, which, to say the least, was extremely frank and interesting. I am disappointed he thinks that I play party political games. I am not generally noted as one of the worst offenders, but in response to his admonishment, I shall try harder to do better in future.
I wish to refer to three things outlined by the hon. Gentleman, the first of which was fascinating and extremely refreshing in that he distinguished between his view and that of the Government. That is healthy. I was impressed by it. It is rare, and without going into a lengthy digression, that is because the media seize on any distinction of that type immediately to conclude that there are great divisions in the Government, as a result of which we often have the absurd position when, one minute, everyone believes one thing, and the following minute they all seem to believe something quite different—rather like ears twitching on a herd of deer. That is regrettable. It has occurred in the post-war period of British politics. It is relatively new and dates from the ’60s and ’70s. It is perfectly possible to have the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility without the identity of expression of view in between times.
My second point is that I was particularly pleased that the Minister personally favours inclusion of competition as an objective of the FSA. He joins what we could fairly safely call the majority party on that issue over the past decade, and I am glad to have him on the team.
The third major point that the Minister made, which I think was also very fair, was that he did not think that new clause 9 would make a great deal of difference. I do not know whether that is true, but the fact that he has given his personal view tells us that the measure is unlikely to do damage. Indeed, he did not allege that it would, even when he was expressing the Government’s view.
My only regret is that the Minister did not pick up on the point that I made that we will have further change in this area anyway. I do not know if that change will come in a few months or in a few years, but it will definitely come. The Conservatives have worked very hard on this Bill and on the Act over the years. A great deal of work has been done by my party colleagues in the past decade to try to be as consensual as possible in this field. Indeed, that point was made about the original Bill, on which we laboured in this Committee Room or just next door for nearly two years.
I very much hope that as the Minister thinks this matter through, he will perhaps send back a message to say that we need to start doing some work on it internally, even if I cannot persuade him to come back on Report, because sooner or later this change will happen. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Rob Marris: I do not wish to move new clauses 10 to 16, Mr. Gale.
Ordered,
That certain written evidence already reported to the House be appended to the proceedings of the Committee.—(Ian Pearson.)
 
Previous Continue
House of Commons 
home page Parliament home page House of 
Lords home page search page enquiries ordering index

©Parliamentary copyright 2010
Prepared 15 January 2010