5 Lack of consultation and collaboration
in the FiReControl project
68. The CLG memorandum maintains that engagement
with primary stakeholders has occurred during the six years that
FiReControl has been in existence:
The FiReControl project has been running since
2004. Since that time, we have engaged very closely with the
Fire and Rescue Service to understand their needs and to establish
their requirements for the Regional Control Centre network.[79]
69. However, contrary to CLG's views, the general
lack of consultation by CLG is a major theme running through both
the written and oral evidence. During most of the FiReControl
project's existence, up until about a year ago, there was a lack
of consultation and collaboration between CLG, EADS, the FRAs
and the LACCs, despite the legal responsibility of FRAs to prevent
or deal with fires and the safety risks connected with this.[80]
Written evidence from the South East Region supports this view:
CLG owns the contract and commercial processes
for FiReControl. FRAs are unsighted on the detailed obligations
and outputs of the main contractor, EADS. The FRAs represent
the main user and only customer for this contract yet have no
contractual relationship with the supplier. Other Government
Departments deliver large and complex projects by having a partnership
between effectively 2 'customers' as the interface with the provider
of operational capability. This has not been the case for FiReControl
(nor FireLink) leading to the perception of disenfranchisement
of the regions and individual FRSs. Too often, FRS involvement
has been too little, too late when early engagement would have
offered better support to EADS and increased project ownership
by the end user community.[81]
70. This point is reinforced by the London Fire and
Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA), whose written submission
highlighted the feeling of disempowerment by FRSs:
The difficult challenges in the project such
as defining all of the use requirements should have been addressed
at an early stage; this may have led to much more clarity during
the delivery phase. Again we would emphasise that early user
engagement would have helped in this area but it is not only the
engagement process but also listening to what the users have to
say that is important. There needs to be a greater emphasis on
partnership working between CLG and the FRS rather than the customer/client
relationship which appears to exist at present.[82]
71. FRAs retain the statutory duty to make arrangements
for dealing with calls for help and for summoning personnel for
the purpose of extinguishing fires and protecting life and property
in the event of fire, under Section 7 of the Fire and Rescue Services
Act 2004. This statutory duty will not change when the new Regional
Control Centres become operational. Despite this fact, the CFOA
highlights the lack of consultation with those involved in the
front-line services of Fire Control:
Throughout the project the Government have failed
to recognise and plan in accordance with the democratic and legal
processes within which Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRAs), operate.
This frequently results in inadequate time being allowed within
the project plan for proper consultation and local decision making.
Moreover it reinforces continually the perception within the service
of being "railroaded" by central government at the same
time that CLG publicly promotes the idea of partnership within
the project. This has been a significant factor in eroding the
confidence of key stakeholders and FRAs.
Notably, in the early stages there was a gross
misunderstanding on the part of Government about the legal and
democratic status of Regional Management Boards and their ability,
or otherwise, to make collective decisions on behalf of Fire and
Rescue Authorities. This resulted in unrealistic expectations
about local decision making processes.[83]
The FBU goes further, stating that CLG actively dissuaded
consultation and collaboration with the main players, up until
the point when technical IT problems occurred in the summer of
2008:
Up to that point CLG [had] imposed itself as
the go-between linking EADS to the FRS. We understand it made
a point of ensuring there was little or no direct contact
between the contractors and other stakeholders [...][84]
End-user requirement
72. The NAO memorandum describes how progress was
delayed in breaking down end-user requirements:
The Department set out approximately 2,000 requirements
for the IT system in its contract with EADS. These needed to
be broken down further into 8,000 more detailed sub-requirements
in consultation with Fire and Rescue Services end users to ensure
that the system's design, development and testing activities are
aligned to end-user requirements [...] Little real progress was
achieved in breaking down the system's requirements until summer
2009 when the Department agreed with EADS and the Fire and Rescue
Services that joint workshops would be held to achieve this.
Until this point there was uncertainty as to the design approach
to be followed.[85]
The FBU goes on to describe complications with technical
specifications of FiReControl:
There were clearly major issues with the technical
specifications the contractors were asked to deliver too. The
Project scope has been changed before, after and since the IT
contract was signed. There also appeared to be no 'real world'
assessment of the true complexity of the project nor of realistic
timescales to deliver what was being demanded.[86]
73. The exclusion of staff from any involvement with
the specification and development of FiReControl led not only
to delays, caused by a failure to appreciate the end-user needs
of the system, but also to the demoralisation of staff and their
sense of alienation from the project. The Fire Protection Association
submitted written evidence that illustrates low staff morale in
the fire community:
The transition to the new arrangements for FRS
mobilising has clearly created anxiety for a number of stakeholders
in the fire community, including it would appear, some of those
who will ultimately be responsible for its governance. That degree
of uncertainty, dissent and project delay has done little to instil
confidence in the wider fire community, particularly those who
fear that the new arrangements will ultimately lead to a 'lowest
common' denominator of service provision.[87]
74. The Minister confirmed that it was the responsibility
of CLG to involve the FRS from the start of the project, to ensure
that detailed end-user requirements was captured and used to develop
the system:
I think it was, absolutely. I take responsibility.
We ought to have done that. We ought to have engaged key stakeholders
in a way that was adequate. It was inadequate.[88]
75. Robin Southwell, CEO of EADS, also accepted responsibility
for failures to involve the fire community from the start:
I have to agree with the Minister that in hindsight
we should have done a little bit more work earlier and we should
have done a little bit more work after we had been selected in
terms of bringing in the various stakeholders, defining their
requirements, understanding the behavioural issues as to how it
actually works on the ground, to allow us to gain the traction
and momentum which we all wanted.[89]
Solution Establishment Workshops
(SEWs)
76. After admitting that EADS and CLG had not taken
account of stakeholders' views, Robin Southwell told us that they
had learnt lessons and went on to describe the Solution Establishment
Workshops (SEWs), which were created in the summer of 2009 and
comprise of representatives from EADS, the FRS and CLG to address
the issue of direct collaboration and stakeholder involvement:
[...] we are having end user workshops, solution
workshops, on a regular basis. In fact, I believe a few of them
are working today, involving the end user on an operational basis
so that we are real time ensuring that we have that dialogue which
was missing at the beginning and which is now taking place.[90]
However, earlier in the same oral evidence session,
the previous witnesses criticised SEWS, with John Bonney describing
them as "not particularly well organised"[91]
and explaining that not all representative bodies are invited
to the meetings.[92]
77. When asked for supplementary evidence on the
issue of satisfying end-user requirements, CFOA sent the following
information about SEWs, describing what it considers to be a fundamental
flaw in their approach:
The Solution Establishment Workshops (SEWs) are
a welcome improvement in user engagement but remain fundamentally
flawed in their approach to system design. Each SEW has been
focussed on developing a single thread of functionality in isolation.
Where demonstrations of functionality have been possible, they
have been on the basis of unrepresentative data and, when requirements
are not apparently met, assurances are given that the functionality
will be provided from "a different module" or by "workarounds".
This gives rise to concerns that the system will be unnecessarily
complex, unworkable and possibly fail to meet requirements when
subjected to tests using real end-to-end scenarios and real fire
service data.[93]
Responsibility for the lack of
consultation
78. The issues of end-user requirement and stakeholder
collaboration highlight the difference of opinion between CLG
and EADS. Although in oral evidence the Minister and Mr Southwell
appeared to share responsibility for the lack of stakeholder involvement,
in its memorandum, EADS maintains that it is responsible for "deploying
and transitioning the System to live operation, including loading
the operational data", while CLG is responsible "for
managing the whole 'business change' journey for stakeholders."[94]
EADS continues to describe the changes that CLG has made in ensuring
closer collaboration with the users of FiReControl:
In order to ensure that the arrangements contracted
with CLG satisfactorily represent the expectations of the FRS
and RCC, these users must be involved at every step of the way.
Close tripartite management is essential to enact this.
We applaud the significant changes that CLG and
FRS have made to the governance of stakeholder engagement and
introduction of collaborative working which is essential to deliver
the overall solution into use.
The new operational processes are still being
evolved by CLG with the FRS and RCC. Developing the processes
alongside the system (as now in the new joint "SEW"
workshops) will give a better result, but it does take significantly
longer. This collaborative development will improve the chances
of success, however, in particular for the FRS and RCC who need
to undertake their implementation.[95]
79. However, as has been discussed earlier, CLG blames
the project's delay—a delay that is largely due to an inability
to address the end-user requirement—on EADS. [96]
79 Ev 96 Back
80
FRAs retain the statutory duty to make arrangements for dealing
with calls for help and for summoning personnel for the purpose
of extinguishing fires and protecting life and property in the
event of fire, under Section 7 of the Fire and Rescue Services
Act 2004.See paragraph 88 for further information on this. Back
81
Ev 46, italics added. Back
82
Ev 65 Back
83
Ev 77 Back
84
Ev 103, italics added. Back
85
Ev 134 Back
86
Ev 105 Back
87
Ev 36 Back
88
Q 86 Back
89
Q 90 Back
90
Q 91 Back
91
Q 26 Back
92
Q 27 Back
93
Ev 80 Back
94
Ev 117 Back
95
Ev 119 Back
96
Ev 97 Back
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