Memorandum from Jamie Hockley (FIRE 01)
SUMMARY
— Proposed Governance arrangements set
the FiReControl Project up for failure. This paper recommends
an alternative direction for FiReControl to take to enable the
project to be completed but in a different way than originally
envisaged.
— CFOA, LGA, FBU, FRS Professionals are
all calling for long term FRS involvement in the governance and
Operations of the RCCs. This is not achieved by removing the very
staff employed in RCC's from the Fire and Rescue Service and replacing
them with third party Company employees reflecting a client/contractor
arrangement.
— I seek to advise the inquiry of the vital
importance and strength of feeling for any proposed solution is
that Control Centres must be staffed and operated by directly
employed and accountable Fire and Rescue Service personnel.
— The recommendation of this document is
for the Inquiry to advise Ministers to abandon the present FiReControl
RCC proposal and to investigate ways of upgrading existing Fire
Control Rooms with FiReControl and FiReLink solutions as recommended
by the Local Government Association report to the Fire Services
Management Committee 23 November 2009.
— Recognise that FiReControl is not about
a regional solution. It is misunderstood. FiReControl is a national
solution for England. The reduction in the staffing of the proposed
centres ensure that at peak times incidents and life risk calls
will be managed in any part of England's network.
— Acknowledge that this arrangement is
a fundamentally flawed method of resilience. True resilience is
ensued by the sheer number of professional staff providing this
service as at the present staffing level which has showed time
and time again to have the capacity to respond to large scale
incidents and flooding. A Computer reliant networked solution
replacing the professional staffing of 46 FRS into nine centres
is totally flawed when it comes to capacity.
What changes, if any need to be made to the Government
plans for proceeding with the project?
1. Ministers, CLG, the Civil Service need to
recognise that the FiReControl model is fundamentally flawed.
In basic terms, it is trying to fit a "square peg into a
round hole".
The present 46 FRS Fire Controls are the
central hub responsible for the total in service management of
all emergency and incident operations for the Fire and Rescue
Authority. They cannot be modelled on other emergency service
or utility control centres. The only commonality of any control
centre be it FRS, or other service, is the call handling and capacity
levels. This is the basis upon which streamlining to an RCC network
has evolved which has reflected the resultant staffing levels.
2. The failure to recognise the complexity of
each FRS's unique overarching and detailed requirements in not
only the deployment of resources but the command, control and
ongoing management aspects of operational incidents has resulted
in the RCC and its IT solutions being years late with no concrete
evidence of a successful solution.
3. In the past a lot has been made about the
removal of local knowledge when handling emergency calls for help.
I agree, that with new systems local knowledge in this specific
area of control operations is no longer a necessity.
However what is dangerous and has been lost
in this debate is the fact that Control Centre Operatives at an
RCC will not be able to continue to have a working knowledge of
local mobilising, command and incident management procedures.
Quite simply because they will be managing and deploying FRS assets
up and down the country. This has made the development of an IT
solution which replaces all of this knowledge and skill almost
impossible. The system must be so robust and comprehensive that
it removes the need for any of this expertise. Locally Integrated
Fire Control staff with detailed knowledge of their FRS policies
and procedures on how to deploy and manage incidents provides
successful resolutions. This cannot be achieved through a network
of RCCs. These outcomes have a direct bearing on the reputation
of the Fire Service which is held in very high regard by the public.
4. Regional Control Centres will only work effectively
and replace the present system if Fire and Rescue Services themselves
are regionalised, or furthermore nationalised something that has
little or no support from the public or fire service stakeholders.
Regional Control Centre Governance Arrangements
5. As a matter of urgency, the Government needs
to review the Governance arrangements for eight of the Local Authority
Controlled Company run RCC's. The Governance arrangement for London
RCC, involves total stakeholder buy in and allows direct management
of the Service to remain within the Fire and Rescue Service, namely
the London Fire Brigade. The LACC arrangement was designed to
apportion equal control of the RCC between constituent FRAs. It
has resulted in the creation of multifaceted & confusing costly
governance arrangements totally diluting ownership and accountability
away from front line staff, Chief Fire Officers and the FRS in
general. Indeed the layers of governance from LACCs to Group/National
Services, National Coordination structures and the latest proposals
on whether to establish a new Non-departmental Public Body (NDPB),
or use an existing quango such as FiReBuy or even the National
Police Improvement Agency dramatically removes the whole ethos
of a local, accountable Fire and Rescue Service.
6. If alternative arrangements are adopted for
the completion of FiReControl such as upgrading existing control
rooms with the technology and equipment, many if not all of these
costly layers of governance can be removed.
Chief Fire Officer's Association (CFOA), Local
Authority Fire and Rescue Services (FRS) the Local Government
Association (LGA) and the representative bodies the Fire Brigades
Union and Unison have all raised concerns about the lack of Fire
and Rescue Service involvement in the management and governance
of the Regional Control Centres (RCCs) both in the short and long
term.
7. Government has failed to place FRS professionals
at the heart of its policy in operating eight out of the nine
RCCs. They have alienated professional fire service employees
by devaluing their commitment to the community and fire and rescue
service.
8. Ministers intend to replace integrated, uniformed
fire service professionals with a client/contractor relationship.
The employees staffing the RCCs will be company staff with no
association or belonging to the fire service. They will be providing
a business service to the FRS. Employees will not be part of the
fire and rescue service team. This is a step too far and is exposes
the public and the FRA's to increased risk that their core business
is being handled by people outside the fire and rescue service.
(Evidence attached—Shahid Malik MP 12 October 2009)
Questions in the House.
Shahid Malik 12 October 2009
Staff employed in the London RCC are eligible
for the Fire Brigade Long Service and Good conduct medal as they
continue to be employed by the LFEPA (London Fire and emergency
Planning Authority)
Staff in other RCCs which are controlled
by an LACC will not be in Fire Brigade Employment and will therefore
NOT be eligible for the medal under the terms of the royal warrant.
Cornerstone and key to the success of operating
any regional fire control centre is the fact that it is crewed
by Fire and Rescue Service Staff.
Governance arrangements are in such a mess that
London will be operated in this way, along with the status quo
in Wales and Scotland.
Joining the Fire and Rescue Service is an aspiration
of many people. Working in a Local Authority Company is certainly
not. The anger felt by Fire Control Personnel at being removed
from the service, their medal withdrawn and the unwillingness
of Ministers to alter this situation has placed these employees
on a war footing with the government.
9. The Government must ensure full stakeholder
buy in immediately. It must alter governance arrangements to ensure
all Fire Control Centres are operated and managed directly by
Fire and Rescue Service employees. These are the people who want
to remain in the Fire Service and professionals who are dedicated.
They are the only group of people that will ensure delivery of
FiReControl. Their professional approach and organising skills
homed as part of the team within the structure of the uniformed
section of the FRS has consistently exceeded expectations in situations
such as the severe flooding at Tewkesbury, the tragic and major
blaze at Buncefield and the London Terror Attacks. The public
have the right to continue to be served at the front line by professional
Fire and Rescue Service control staff.
10. The Inquiry and Ministers must recognise
the anger and the utter strength of feeling on this issue and
advise the Government to take immediate steps to ensure all control
staff employed in any RCC remain as professional uniformed employees
of the UK fire and rescue service with their continued entitlement
to the Fire Brigades Long Service and Good Conduct Medal. This
is cornerstone to valuing and recognising the role of the staff
both now and in the future.
11. If the inquiry decides the project should
continue in its present form the following recommendations should
be adopted:
11.1 The third party contractor arrangement (LACC)
should be abolished immediately.
11.2 Any National and regional governance layers
should involve FRAs CFOA, LGA and the representative bodies.
Success of the FiReControl will only be accomplished
if the Control Centres are under direct management and control
of Chief Fire Officers.
Resilience can only be achieved if Governance arrangements
are repealed and the Fire Service put back in the driving seat
of the RCCs
Recognise that FiReControl is not about a regional
solution. It is misunderstood. FiReControl is a national solution
for England. The reduction in the staffing of the proposed centres
ensure that at peak times incidents and life risk calls will be
managed in any part of Englands network.
Acknowledge that this arrangement is a fundamentally
flawed method of resilience. True resilience is ensued by the
sheer number of professional staff providing this service at the
present staffing level which has showed time and time again to
have the capacity to respond to large scale incidents and flooding.
A Computer reliant networked solution replacing the professional
staffing of 46 FRS into nine centres is totally flawed when
it comes to capacity.
12. Resilience Controls (Original Fire Brigades
Union Proposal)
The idea of the RCC buildings being used as
resilience controls or fire service super centres is one that
needs revisiting.
Key to FiReControl, its viability, staffing
model and costs is that during busy periods any RCC in England
has the facility to take an overflow call from another region
which is busy. If the call is involving immediate life risk, the
remote RCC will mobilise resources (appliance/officers/attributes).
13. I ask the Inquiry to consider this basic
scenario, and the risks involved
Local Fire Controls support mobilisation of
the local FRS Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP).
Fire Authorities up and down the UK are quite
rightly changing the crewing arrangements involving smarter ways
of working.
This can mean that firefighters (wholetime/retained
or volunteers) may be operating a pumping appliance at a location
and because of their skill set are required to be returned to
a specific location to collect a specialist vehicle (example Special
Rescue Unit) to deploy to a life risk incident. Many high rise
appliances and specials are being crewed in this way.
At present due to the professional knowledge,
skills and training in local fire service procedures and policies,
fire control staff ensure these intricate details are considered
and ensure the correct mobilisation takes place when appliances
are deployed elsewhere with crews ordered to return to collect
special appliances for ongoing dynamic deployment to an incident.
I want to use the scenario of a life risk fire
or rescue incident at the House of Commons. London RCC are busy.
The 999 call is answered by the RCC network, for example
in the North East of England
The technical solution must be so accurate,
up to the minute with real time status that it advises the Operator
in the (NE) that the required fire appliances in London to attend
(possibly mobile in their area, or deployed already and need replacing)
need to be returned to another location for the firefighters to
crew specialist vehicles.
There could be a risk that another centre in
the UK may have already mobilised this resource. There can be
no delay in life risk situations, otherwise the nearest fire appliance
may not be mobilised.
I am unconvinced that the system will provide
this detail.
14. I call for the Commons Select Committee to
recommend that FiReControl be halted in the face of mounting opposition
to this project from within the service itself.
15. Acknowledge the technical solution has failed
to deliver
16. That the inquiry recommends the changes proposed
by the Local Government Association (November 2009) as a suitable
way forward.
17. The Inquiry should weight this evidence heavily.
This submission is presented from the view on the ground. Representation
from the very heart of the FRS. The one fact in this inquiry that
is inarguable. Fire Controls and their staff have never let our
communities down. In fact they are the very people and services
that recognise the requirements of our individual communities.
.
In complete contrast, unfortunately the same
cannot be said about the FiReControl project. It has already let
the FRS and its communities down. It has failed to deliver at
all levels. The reputation of this scheme is now so damaged with
both internal and external stakeholders/contractors that its viability
and success is in some considerable doubt.
REFERENCES
Mott MacDonald—The future of Fire and Rescue
Service Control Rooms England and Wales 2000 Updated 2003
Out of Control—Fire Brigades Union 2003
Office of Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) Select Committee
Report into Fire Service—January 2004
Select Committee Report into Fire Service—June
2006
Local Government Association Fire Service Management
Committee—FiReControl Alternative Options—November
2009
November 2009
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