Memorandum from Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire
Fire and Rescue Authority (FIRE 03)
1. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1.1 Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service
firmly believes that the FiReControl Project will deliver enhanced
Fire Control capabilities that will not only be able to deal with
normal levels of response activity but also the increased magnitude,
complexity and frequency of demand associated with terrorism threats
and the effects of climate change.
1.2 The increased resilience of the nine
networked Regional Fire Controls will ensure that the response
from the Fire and Rescue Services will be optimised with the resulting
improvement in protection of the population and responding emergency
service staff.
1.3 The threat from terrorism remains and
many inquiries have identified the need to have command and control
facilities with the ability to provide support across the whole
of the incident rather than by a number of disparate control facilities.
Regional Control Centres will enable a co-ordinated response to
ensure optimum deployment of resources in the right place at the
right time.
1.4 The increasing changes in climate and
extreme weather conditions are becoming more common and require
resources from wide areas to deliver emergency and rescue services
to large numbers of people, utilising a wide range of resources
from many Fire and Rescue Services and other emergency response
organisations.
2. INTRODUCTION
TO AUTHOR
2.1 Peter Dartford is the Chief Fire Officer/Chief
Executive of Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service. He is the
Regional Project Director for the West Midlands and chairs the
Regional FiReControl Project Board. He represents the Region at
National Level on the Local and Regional Delivery Group and is
a member of the Project Assurance Board.
3. STAFFORDSHIRE
FIRE AND
RESCUE SERVICE
POSITION
3.1 There are three fundamental areas that
must remain at the forefront of any Inquiry or Review of FiReControl.
They are three areas that underpin the concept of FiReControl
and they are as valid today as ever before. These three areas
are:
— Improved resilience of control room operations
— Coping with the effects of climate change
— The need to deal with acts of terrorism.
3.2 Improved Resilience
3.2.1. FiReControl will deliver a national
network of nine, resilient, Regional Control Centres, which will
receive calls, and mobilise and co-ordinate resources across the
country, replacing 46 stand-alone centres.
3.2.2. Secondary mobilising systems will
be provided across England to ensure resources can be mobilised
when primary systems fail. This facility will be available to
every Control Room Operator to mobilise a resource from any Fire
Station on the country. Currently this cannot be achieved by any
control room outside the particular Fire and Rescue Service whose
area the fire station lies in.
3.2.3. At times of increased emergency call
rates to control centres, the FiReControl network will automatically
divert a call to another RCC should the local RCC be too busy.
All such calls will remain in the network and be dealt with, monitored
and recorded seamlessly, with no loss of data. Current facilities
to deal with this rely on call re-routing via the BT network to
a pre-determined fallback control, usually a neighbouring FRS.
Should that FRS control room be busy also, the call reverts back
to BT to locate an available control room, a process that can
take several minutes. If the call is taken by the fallback control,
then details of the call are relayed back to the parent FRS via
fax, at which point it receives immediate attention.
3.2.4. Many existing Fire Control rooms
are not purpose built and are unable to meet modern operational
requirements especially when dealing with large scale incidents
or spate conditions.
3.2.5. Technology across the existing Fire
Control rooms is inconsistent and in some cases ageing, pending
the transfer of operations to RCC's. FiReControl will deliver
modern technology and systems that will be consistent across England
and are essential to maintain public safety. This will enable
any Fire Control Operator in any control room to mobilise any
appliance in England, including mobilising appliances across Service
boundaries.
3.3 Coping with the Effects of Climate Change
3.3.1. The effects of climate change are
now becoming all too common with well documented examples of such
events increasing year on year. Examples of extreme rainfall,
devastating communities, causing loss of life and infrastructure
present all emergency and response services with significant response,
logistic and co-ordination problems. Particularly where such events
span FRS borders, response arrangements need to be co-ordinated
between one or more control rooms, operating with different response,
welfare and operational policies. Local control rooms are often
over-run with emergency calls and command and control activities
in order to cope with demands of the incident. There is no facility
to formally transfer demand to another control room other than
the existing fallback arrangements. Regional Control Rooms will
share the same technology and will seamlessly be able to handle
calls from anywhere in the country (see 3.2.3 above).
3.3.2. Two elements of the Fire Resilience
Programme have delivered many of their stated outcomes. The Firelink
Project has already delivered a single digital wide area communications
system that forms an integral part of the FiReControl system and
New Dimension has delivered a wide range of capabilities to deal
with a variety of major incidents. The FiReControl element, to
complete the overall delivery, is required to ensure an enhanced
call handling and mobilisation capability. This includes the provision
of RCC's, fire station mobilising equipment and appliance mobile
data terminals.
3.3.3. A review of the 2007 floods;
"Facing the Challenge"1 by Sir Ken Knight studied
the role of Fire Controls and concluded: "The review findings
underpin the rationale for the FiReControl Project and concludes
that a number of the difficulties experienced in the existing
disparate fire control arrangements will be overcome through the
proposed RCC network. ……… The findings also
seek to add the experience of the significant events of 2007 to
inform the operating protocols that will result from the introduction
of RCC's.
I am satisfied that the introduction of the
RCC's will significantly enhance the service to the public and
the response from the Fire and Rescue Service, particularly during
periods of peak demand"
3.4 Dealing with Acts of Terrorism
3.4.1. Ever since the events of 11th September
2001 in New York, there has been a growing understanding
of the need to manage the co-ordination of large scale incidents
where multiple agencies have a role to perform. This has been
highlighted in the McKenzie2 report into the events of 9/11 which
states the need for a "well-defined, flexible, and complete
command and control structure for major incidents, with clear
and consistent responsibilities and roles. In addition, the FDNY
should improve the support it provides incident commanders so
that crucial functions can be effectively performed, including
command and control, planning, logistics and inter-agency coordination".
The Mott MacDonald3 report expands this
further with: "The scale and complexity of September 11th
meant that vast resources were deployed throughout the city with
little cohesion or co-ordination. Many resources failed to report
to established 'staging areas' from which they would have been
deployed in a systematic manner to appropriate locations. As a
result FDNY control could not accurately track resources or personnel
or deploy the appropriate information and command strategies.
Dispatch operators were overwhelmed with emergency calls limiting
their ability to respond effectively and to concentrate on the
dispatch and control of resources and personnel. Voluntary support
from units not assigned to the incident and from off-duty personnel
complicated control functions. Ineffective and infrequently used
recall procedures further confused the situation and created a
disorganised environment in which the maintenance of effective
control was difficult"
With regard to the incident at the Pentagon
in Washington DC at the same time, Mott MacDonald records: "The
response to the Pentagon incident was similarly disturbed by the
adverse effects of self-dispatching resources. This proved to
'complicate the exercise of command, increase the risks faced
by bona-fide responders and exacerbate the challenge of accountability'.
Although Incident Command procedures were implemented early on,
the ad hoc nature in which resources were mobilised and dispatched
undermined the ability of the Incident Commander to maintain control
of the resources on-site and arriving and to manage a strategic
response accordingly."
3.4.2 Sadly, recent history has proven that
the UK is not immune to acts of terrorism following the London
Bombings in July 2005 and the attack at Glasgow Airport in
June 2007. The FiReControl system will put into place a Control
network that will ensure a fully co-ordinated response to such
events that will greatly improve public protection and responder
safety.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 That the FiReControl Project is endorsed
by the Parliamentary Committee and is given sufficient and appropriate
resources and support to enable it to fully deliver improved capability
and resilience in Fire Control operations across the country as
soon as possible in order to save lives and raise the standards
of public protection and responder safety.
4.2 That the Inquiry gives further support
to the outcomes of the FiReControl Project delivering a national
scale, fully resilient system that is able to deal with the exceptional
demands that occur at times of national level emergency situations
as a result of severe climate conditions and terrorist attack,
the frequency of which are likely to increase in the future.
4.3 That the Inquiry recognises that to
halt or amend the FiReControl Project would delay even further
the provision of facilities required by Fire and Rescue Services
to meet the challenges of today and the future. Also, that it
recognises taking an alternative approach to the provision of
these vital facilities is likely to cost more than progressing
with FiReControl as planned.
5. REFERENCES
1. Facing the Challenge—The Chief Fire
and Rescue Adviser's review of the operational response by the
Fire and Rescue Service to the widespread flooding in England
during 2007: Sir Ken Knight. CLG March 2008
2. FDNY McKenzie Report following the Attack
on the World Trade Centre, New York, 11 September 2001.
3. The Future of Fire and Rescue Service Control
Rooms In England and Wales—Update 2003: Mott MacDonald
January 2010
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