Memorandum from Lancashire Combined Fire
Authority (FIRE 06)
1. INTRODUCTION
In response to the call for evidence for the
Select Committee on FiReControl, Lancashire Combined Fire Authority
provide a submission under the following main headings:
The Authority continues to actively engage with
the CLG to discharge its responsibilities under the Fire and Rescue
Services National Framework to deliver the best solution forward
for the Regional Control Centre. However, it believes increasing
costs, together with numerous slippages, threaten the viability
and credibility of the project.
2. PROJECT MANAGEMENT
2.1 Business Case Approval
Ministerial leadership and key CLG staff has
regularly changed throughout the project. This has resulted in
a lack of continuity, particularly with verbal commitments. One
example of this was the Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) committing
at a North West Seminar, that Authorities would be presented with
the full business case to approve or otherwise. This was originally
due in spring 2005 but delayed until October 2006. On her
departure this commitment was remembered by elected members, but
lost to the FiReControl Project.
With the presentation of a full business case
in 2009 and lease and infrastructure service contracts signed,
the CLG has in essence delivered a fait accompli to Authority
Members. This is reinforced by the £320 million committed
to the project to date, over 75% of the expected cost.
2.2 Slippage
The project has been blighted by slippage. It
is understood that in a project of this type unforeseen events
may cause some change in timescales. However, most recent issues
revolve around the infrastructure services contract. Part of this
procurement would have included agreeing specification and delivery
to an agreed project plan, with financial remedies for non-compliance.
It would be helpful for the contractual cause and consequences
of any slippage to be explained to Authorities.
Timing and communication of slippage has also
been disappointing. Little regard has been given to the dedicated,
professional staff working in Control Rooms across the country
whose careers are deeply affected by these changes. Announcements
as Parliament recess with little notice to FRA has become a common
approach.
2.3 Accommodation
Although FRA's have had some input on the accommodation
workstream they were not provided with the proposed design until
after construction contracts had been let. By any measure the
accommodation is too big for solely a Regional Control Centre.
For example in the North West the maximum number of staff handling
calls will be less than 20, yet there are 47 potential office
spaces, 80 parking spaces and a refectory for 30 (albeit
any breaks would be staggered). The opportunity to provide a fit
for purpose, more economic and efficient Regional Control Centre
has simply been missed by the CLG. It will be for FRAs to pick
up these additional costs through the lease and facilities management
contracts.
2.4 Central Project Delivery/Resources
It is evident that the different workstreams
in the project have been delivered at very different rates. Hence
many of the RCC buildings were nearing completion before the infrastructure
service contract was let and available nearly 4 years before
the programmed cutover date. It is also worrying, given the project
has been running since 2004, that the detailed requirements of
the technical solution is still being developed. It is not clear
what the Central Project Team with significant numbers of secondees
have been progressing throughout the project to date. Slippage
has meant that some FiReControl work has not been available to
action. Within FRA, resources can be redirected onto other necessary
work when not required to work on FiReControl issues. However,
this is not the case with the Central Project. It is only recently
that FRS secondees have been released from their role within the
Central team and returned back to FRS to reduce costs when workflow
has been interrupted by blockages in the project
2.5 Sustainability
It is understandable that following terrorist
attacks in London and abroad there will be an increasing emphasis
on resilience. However resilience must be coupled with sustainability.
The building lease for the RCC is for 25 years (possible
two years extension), the infrastructure services contract is
for eight years (possible three years extension); the FM contract
is for seven years (possible two years extension) and the Firelink
Contract for 10 years. However all the emphasis is on initial
delivery not how these contracts will be aligned, renewed or refreshed
in the future. It remains unclear who will fund the next generation
of the system and how replacement will be managed whilst maintaining
resilience and interoperability.
3. COSTS
3.1 Financial Assumptions
A weakness of the FiReControl project is it
is continually working against an uncertain financial backdrop.
The business case is difficult to follow as there is not clear
trail about the project costs and benefits included since the
inception of the project, without cross referencing to at least
three other substantial documents dating back to 2004. Despite
the presence of the Finance Working Group, financial assumptions
are not agreed before publication. This results in a full business
case being issued when assumptions made are still in dispute.
For example, it is assumed in the business case
that the current cost incurred in running existing controls will
automatically be saved on transition to RCCs. This is simply not
the case. With the efficiency agenda most FRS are seeking to downsize
so extra office space is not required. Furthermore a commercial
let of a control room which is normally integrated within a wider
premise is not feasible.
3.2 Cost Apportionment
Lancashire CFA would also contend that the CLG's
apportionment of infrastructure service and central support team
costs is flawed.
The CLG has stated their intention to apportion
should have been:
— Simple, transparent and easy to understand.
— Relatively stable over time.
— Reflects the region's ability to pay.
Their preferred method was apportionment based
upon the relative share of tax base and they went out to consultation
on that basis. This is the method for apportionment that was used
in the Full Business Case. The Authority would argue, given that
all RCCs will have identical IT specifications and requirements,
that shared costs should have been split equally between regions.
This would also have avoided the situation where local tax payers
in one region subsidise tax payers in another. This approach fulfils
the first two CLG criteria in the bullet points above. Also given
the CLG has already agreed the concept that resilience payments
will be made to regions incurring net additional costs, the regions
ability to pay will be taken into account by this provision.
3.3 Critical National Infrastructure Requirements
The requirement for RCC to be part of the Critical
National Infrastructure is obviously a CLG requirement based on
enhancing national resilience. It is well in excess of current
standards. The business case does not highlight clearly what elements
of the costs are attributable to national resilience and Critical
National Infrastructure requirements. Lancashire Combined Fire
Authority believes that in line with the New Burdens doctrine
such costs should be clearly identified and centrally funded.
One example of these costs is the 24/7 security required
at the RCC. FRA will be liable for these costs through the facilities
management contracts. Clarity regarding how these costs have been
allocated is required.
4. HR ISSUES
4.1 Over prescription of Structure and Staffing
It is recognised that HR solutions rests with
the employer in this case the respective RCCs. It has taken time
to resolve the governance issue to enable the employer to become
a legal entity and all parties must accept some responsibility
for any delays.
However the FiReControl Project has generally
adopted a utopian approach to HR issues.
The papers provided are largely theoretical
best practice, detached from the reality of existing terms and
conditions and TUPE tensions. Much of the work that has driven
efficiencies has been commissioned on a regional basis. It is
unfortunate that the Project could not have been more proactive
in this respect.
The supervisory structure was devised when staff
numbers were estimated to be 100-130 and has never been adjusted
despite operator numbers being reduced. This provides a level
of supervision particularly at a senior level unparalleled anywhere
else in efficient Fire and Rescue Authorities. This is just another
example of lost opportunity to optimise the RCC.
4.2 Communications
Over the duration of the project Communications
has generally been poor. There have been some good examples such
as the locations release but the FiReControl Communications leads
have been many and short-lived. The problem is less to do with
individuals and more to do with the priority Communications commands
in the FiReControl Project.
Most recently there have been some encouraging
signs, with the appointment of a new Communications Lead with
the recognition of who is responsible for which messages to which
stakeholders.
Part of the frustration is the consistency and
credibility of the messages we give our staff. Fire and Rescue
Authorities relate to their dedicated and professional staff whose
careers will change dramatically as a result of these proposals.
Within an ever changing environment they remain surprisingly patient
with remarkable levels of morale considering the challenges they
are facing. Only certainty with the project will provide the firm
basis upon which local release of information can be planned.
January 2010
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