Memorandum from Dorset Fire Authority
Summary (FIRE 08)
1.1 Dorset Fire Authority has significant
concerns about the FiReControl project. In summary, these are:
— The commitment by central government
to a major investment before the Business Case had been fully
developed.
— "FiReControl resilience payments"
which do not meet the Authority's own estimates of projected costs.
— Financial assumptions which have changed
from a projected saving of 30% to a cost to the Authority.
— Significant delays in the delivery of
the project with consequential impact on Fire Control staff.
— Concern that any further delay to the
project could mean that Dorset's cutover date will clash with
the 2012 Olympics events in Dorset.
— Loss of confidence in the ability of
either CLG or EADS to deliver the project or provide the technological
solutions to support the RCC or individual fire and rescue authorities.
2. FIRECONTROL
BUSINESS CASE
2.1 The Fire Authority was disappointed
that the Government chose to implement this project and commit
the taxpayer to substantial investment before the Business Case
had been fully developed. The Authority's own experience in seeking
financial support for a major Government supported PFI project
was that the sponsoring government department required a fully
costed final business case before approving the provision of finance.
This does not appear to have been followed in the case of the
FiReControl project. Members of the Authority felt that because
the Regional Control Centre had been completed and the main system
contract awarded before the Business Case had been finalised,
they would have little choice but to accept what is in effect
a fait accompli.
2.2 The Authority wrote to the Minister
at CLG responsible for the Fire and Rescue Service in October
2008 and reminded him that:
— Final commitment to the project will
not be made until the Full Business Case (FBC) is published and
the legal obligations of best value have been satisfied.
— The Authority reserves the right to withdraw
from the local authority controlled company (LACC) at any time.
— The Authority will not agree to long-term
financial or contractual obligations entered into by the LACC,
eg the lease of the RCC, until it is satisfied that the proposal
to deliver a service through the LACC is justified.
— The Authority will not agree to move
its operations into the Regional Control Centre, either in principle
or in practice, until it is satisfied that both operational and
financial requirements have been met.
— The Fire Authority's primary concern
is that the Regional Control Centre will cost more than the current
Authority's own Fire Control and this is detailed in section 3 below.
3. FIRECONTROL
RESILIENCE PAYMENTS
3.1 The Fire Authority failed to understand
why fire and rescue authorities should bear the cost of national
resilience. If fire and rescue authorities were building or installing
new Fire Controls they would not be installing the level of resilience
that is specified for this project. That is a central government
decision and it was the Authority's view that central government
should bear the cost of that national resilience. The Authority
considered that the best way to do this would be for CLG to calculate
the extra cost of the resilient aspects of the project, eg increased
costs for the building, the FM contract and the infrastructure
services contract, and to make those payments centrally.
3.2 Previous versions of the Business Case
proposed that any shortfall in costs between current Fire Control
centres and the proposed Regional Control Centres would be met
through a payment to regions rather than directly to individual
fire authorities. Although this was changed in the last version
of the Business Case so that the payment would be in the form
of a "FiReControl Resilience payment" direct to fire
authorities, this fire authority is not convinced that the proposed
payment is correct. It believes CLG has overestimated the level
of cashable savings authorities will actually achieve by closing
their control rooms and has underestimated the true costs to the
fire authorities after cutover. Some of these costs relate to
activities which will be required after cutover, including operational
liaison, performance and contract monitoring and data management.
The Business Case makes only limited assumptions about the resources
required to support these functions.
3.3 The Fire Authority's other concern on
costs is the duration of any resilience payment as it had been
suggested this would only be for three years after cutover. The
Government has stated "this should not be interpreted
necessarily as a point of cessation as the principle remains that
no FRA should be in a financially worse position that they were
prior to their move to the RCC." Whilst the Authority
should be reassured by this statement, it will continue to press
for these payments to remain for as long as there is a potential
deficit. The Authority will also want to ensure that the payment
is not absorbed into revenue support grant (RSG). As Dorset is
at the "floor" for revenue grant settlements, any payment
included within RSG will be lost in the revenue grant formula.
3.4 At the 2009 Fire Conference on
13 May 2009, the Fire Minister stated, "We can say with
confidence that no FRA will be out of pocket because of the move
to FiReControl." The Authority remains to be convinced that
this will be the case.
4. FINANCIAL
SAVINGS
4.1 Members of this Fire Authority were
extremely disappointed that the 30% savings anticipated at the
start of the FiReControl project have evaporated. In February
2007, during a visit to the South West, a senior civil servant
stated that based on the likely cost apportionment model, the
region would realise savings of 20%.
4.2 When Part 1 of the Full Business
Case was published in July 2008, it became clear that based on
its estimates of the steady state costs of operating the RCC and
the cashable savings from closing its existing control room, the
Authority would face increased annual costs. Although this been
recognised to some extent by the "FiReControl Resilience
payments" referred to above, the Authority is still disappointed
that the anticipated savings have failed to materialise.
5. DELAYS TO
THE DELIVERY
OF THE
PROJECT
5.1 Staff in the Authority's Fire Control
were informed in 2003 that Dorset's call handling and mobilising
function would transfer to a regional control centre as early
as 2005 and they would consequently face redundancy. Successive
delays to the project have been particularly unsettling for staff
who are expected to maintain their commitment to the Service whilst
being unable to make plans for their future. This group of staff
are extremely loyal and totally committed to the values of the
Service yet they exist in an environment of uncertainty and doubt.
5.2 There is now significant delay in the
delivery of key elements of the project. This has made forward
planning by the Service difficult due to the uncertainty of the
scope and functionality of the solution that will be supplied.
The Authority now has serious doubts that the current cutover
timescale will be achieved. Any further delay will only increase
the anxiety being felt by both current staff in Fire Control and
those seconded to the Service's own project team.
5.3 There is still considerable ambiguity
about certain areas of the project. This includes how the Regional
Control Centre will operate and interact with the Service, the
timescales for delivery of key enablers and the requirements that
the Service is expected to meet during the transition period and
after transfer of its operations. This hinders the Service's ability
to plan for the future and to know how the Service will ultimately
be affected by the project.
6. 2012 OLYMPIC
GAMES
6.1 Dorset will host all the sailing events
for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. It essential for
the Service to have resilient call handling and mobilising facilities
before and during the games in the event of a large multi-agency
incident.
6.2 If the project timescales were to change
yet again, consideration would need to be given of the potential
clash in the transfer to the RCC and the Service's involvement
in the 2012 games. In view of a potential multi-agency exercise
12 months before the games themselves, the Authority has
determined that any cutover date between July 2011 and the
end of the games in September 2012 would be unacceptable
and this could affect Dorset's place in the cutover order and
potentially impact on the other fire and rescue authorities in
the South West.
7. CONFIDENCE
IN THE
PROJECT
7.1 Dorset Fire Authority is becoming increasingly
sceptical that the FiReControl project will actually be delivered,
at least in the form which is currently proposed. It has asked
officers to consider alternatives to the Regional Control Centre,
including retaining the existing facilities, moving to a collaborative
solution with a partner authority (including potentially another
emergency service) or establishing a sub-regional solution.
7.2 The Authority's scepticism has been
prompted by the late delivery of key products and the regular
changes to the cutover schedule. The Authority is losing confidence
in the ability of EADS to deliver the technological solutions
which are an inherent part of the Regional Control Centre's concept
of operations. The Authority has also lost confidence in CLG's
ability to support the project and has doubts of the soundness
of CLG's financial calculations.
8. CONCLUSION
8.1 The Fire Authority has no doubts that
the FiReControl project has the potential to deliver benefits.
The Mobile Data Terminals being provided as part of the Firelink
project will enhance firefighter safety by providing key information
about operational risks. The networking of the nine regional control
centres will allow peaks in demand and large incidents to be managed
more effectively.
8.2 The Authority is not convinced, however,
that these benefits should be delivered through a prescribed national
solution that provides an unnecessary level of resilience at considerable
cost to the taxpayer. Most of the key benefits could have been
met through local or sub-regional solutions combined with the
provision of the national Firelink infrastructure.
January 2010
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