Memorandum from Yorkshire & Humberside
Regional Management Board (FIRE 12)
In response to the Communities and Local Government
Committee's decision to undertake a brief inquiry into the FiReControl
programme, the Yorkshire and Humberside Regional Management Board
wishes to offer the following comment with respect to the terms
of reference set:
The Committee will consider the progress with
the project so far; the reasons for the cost and time overruns
which the project has experienced; and what, if any, changes need
to be made to the Government's plans for proceeding with the project.
Written submissions to be received by Friday 8 January 2009.
The Yorkshire and Humberside Regional Management
Board is comprised of members from the region's four fire authorities,
West, South and North Yorkshire together with Humberside FRA and
exists to deliver various important national goals that were defined
in the 2004 White Paper "Our Fire and Rescue Service".
FIRECONTROL
PROJECT—BUSINESS
CASE
The final Business Case, published in Spring
2009, brought together both the national and regional cases for
the first time. Elected members up to that point had received
information and made decisions at a local level against the original
strategic case, which presented the rationale for the project
across a range of policy areas. The strategic benefits that the
project aims to achieve have been supported by fire authority
councillors and officers across the region, however, the critical
matter of the project's final cost to individual fire authorities
and therefore the communities they serve had not been presented
until the regional case was published.
The original concept predicted national savings
on current control room costs of up to 30%, whereas it appears
that nationally savings will only be achieved when the network
is operating fully in, say 2015. CLG's calculations suggest that
21 FRA's will achieve savings, while 24 will face increases,
which are to be covered by a new Resilience Grant. CLG,
however, have made it clear that it will not commit the Government
to maintaining the grant beyond three years; it will be reviewed
in each Comprehensive Spending Review.
That statement alone has created nervousness
and confusion at a local level. Firstly, how has CLG been able
to secure the millions required to cover the first three years
of operation of each RCC when that will probably, if not, definitely
fall within a subsequent CSR period. Secondly, it appears that
when it is advantageous to do so CLG can organise longer term
financial support as is the case with the New Dimension assets
it wishes to transfer to local government and will financially
assist the Service in maintaining national resilience for the
duration of the asset's operational life, the contract we believe
is for a duration of 16 years. If indeed national resilience
continues to be paramount and the RCC network forms part of the
critical national infrastructure, surely long term financial assurance
is not an unreasonable expectation or request of individual fire
and rescue authorities?
FIRECONTROL
PROJECT—GENERAL
Each of the four constituent Fire Authorities
that make up the Yorkshire & Humberside region have committed
significant resource and time to both the planning and implementation
phases of the project. Members of the Regional Management Board
have received updates of national, regional and local progress
on a quarterly basis. A range of issues, problems and concerns
have remained fairly constant throughout, namely:
Limited user engagement in the development of
technical requirements; the difficulties associated with separate
procurement processes for the building accommodation and the technical
solution; security arrangements and the specification and size
of the accommodation itself; limited consultation in the development
of the project meant an opportunity was missed to learn from the
service's existing control rooms; lack of clarity with regard
to new burdens settlements for the life of the project; lack of
genuine partnership working between CLG and the FRS; and ongoing
delays with the technical solution.
From the early stages of this project there
has been a lack of effective user engagement and consultation.
This has led to a lack of understanding within the central project
team of the technical requirements needed to procure a system
that would satisfy the operational requirements of individual
fire services. The procurement process was undertaken despite
the majority of user requirements lacking definition. These apparently
were to be resolved post contract award.
At the time, both the Chief Fire Officers Association
(CFOA) and fire service representatives voiced concerns that this
would bring uncertainty and risk to the development of a state
of art technical solution. It remains unclear why CLG were so
confident that the successful bidder would be able to develop
a system that would meet all of the yet undefined requirements.
The ability of the mobilising system to be able to reflect FRS's
individual IRMPs remains a central requirement of the project
and if not delivered it would leave FRS's to further question
CLG's approach.
Fire Authorities have a duty under section 7(1)
Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 to make provision for the
purpose of extinguishing fires in its area and protecting life
and property in the event of fires in its area. Also, under section
7 (2) (c) it must, in particular "make arrangements
for dealing with calls for help and for summoning personnel".
Should confidence in the final system remain low it will be the
local Chief Fire Officer who is responsible for undertaking a
risk based operational judgement whether to migrate from their
current mobilising arrangements to the one offered.
Statutory responsibility will not change once
the network of Regional Control Centres become operational even
with the contractual arrangements and service level agreements
between FRSs and the LACCs in place, it remains with individual
FRAs.
As already mentioned the decision to procure
the accommodation and technical solution separately, rather than
by way of an integrated approach, has been questioned at a local
level. The buildings appear to be over specified and are too large.
The security arrangements incorporated into the premises appear
to be in excess to the threats potentially posed to the buildings,
both of which have increased costs that will result in a long
term revenue burden to fire authorities in Yorkshire & Humberside.
Resilience and security requirements were designed to meet Government
standards but once again consultation was not undertaken with
Fire Authorities at a local or regional level.
FiReControl and Firelink Projects have operated
simultaneously but separate of each other with their own management
structures despite many similarities and a requirement to bring
about integrated solutions. This has not only led to delays to
the overall programme and problems associated with technical aspects
of the two projects but also once again excessive back-office
costs to the programme itself and inevitably to FRA's in the longer
term.
The project is being delivered by a team within
CLG that consists of civil servants, seconded fire service staff
and consultants. The team appears to be very large for a project
of this nature. One would have expected the risks and the resources
required to deliver the project to have sat with the supplier,
however, in this case CLG seem to be bearing much of the responsibility
and resource burden of delivery.
The impact of this on the service in general
is that it has drawn a lot of the technical expertise from fire
services into the centre. From one perspective this is to be welcomed,
as it is only by engaging with users that a viable product will
be produced, but this has led to a significant risk emerging which
is that the fire services themselves will no longer have the in
house capability or capacity to deliver their transition activities
that are required prior to being able to accept FiReControl into
service.
Supposedly there remains a commitment from Government
that the FiReControl Project will not be a net new cost burden
on fire authorities. The main concern for fire authorities is
the ongoing revenue costs of the project post implementation.
The most recent business case has set out the projected annual
payments that are to be made to authorities incurring additional
costs because of the project.
Concern regarding the long term future of resilience
payments has not diminished. CLG have only been able to give an
undertaking to review these payments after three years, which
is confusing as it has been able to direct funding to the New
Dimension programme for long term maintenance and servicing contractual
arrangements. While it is accepted that a review is required once
steady state has been reached to ensure that payments remain accurate
there is a fear that the review could lead to these payments being
reduced or discontinued. This would lead to an increased burden
for local tax payers. In order to ensure that fire authorities
are willing to commit to this project, a clear commitment is required
that the principal of new burdens funding will apply for the full
term of the project and not just the first three years.
The numerous delays in the delivery of this
project have led to a lack of confidence in the ability of CLG
to deliver a complex project of this nature. The problem stems
again from the lack of user engagement at early stages of the
project. From the beginning CLG seem to have failed to grasp the
complex nature of this project. If this project is to deliver
its objectives there needs to be a new culture of working in partnership
with the FRS, more realistic goals and timescales need to be set.
This has not always been the case to date.
The impact of delays to the project on the FRS
is not insignificant. Dedicated project teams have to be kept
in place with a lot of expertise either being seconded to the
national project team or committed to the project internally.
This takes away valuable expertise for delivering other projects
and programmes that are essential to maintaining a first class
service to the public.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The final arbiter of whether the FiReControl
system is acceptable to any individual FRS should remain with
the respective Chief Fire Officer, otherwise CLG may need to consider
the use of directive powers.
There needs to be more effective user engagement
if the project is to be delivered successfully with all user requirements
captured and clearly defined.
The FiReControl and Firelink projects should
be consolidated with significant savings in consultants fees.
Less reliance should be placed on the use of
consultants for specification purposes when there are reliable
sources of advice readily available within other government departments.
More regular external project reviews should
be undertaken and there should be a greater willingness to accept
change within the project as circumstances change.
There may need to be a clearer definition of
responsibilities between the CLG and the supplier as it appears
that there is a large central team having to support the supplier
and so taking on a greater burden of the risks involved.
Ongoing impact on the FRS should be closely
examined by CLG and communicated in a transparent and informed
manner.
The defining of user requirements should be
addressed immediately.
The financial settlement to cover the net new
burden to the FRS needs to be a transparent process that is based
on the real impact to authorities and not on the cash available
to the project.
There needs to be a very clear message from
the government to fire authorities that new burden payments will
continue for the life of the project and not just the first three
years.
If the government should decide to change either
the project in its entirety or any aspects of its delivery strategy
the service itself should be offered the opportunity to manage
the implementation itself, either by refreshing existing systems
or by collaboration with partners. The government should provide
full funding for this to be implemented.
An Options Review should be undertaken and communicated
to all 46 FRAs as part of a formal consultation exercise.
January 2010
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