FiReControl - Communities and Local Government Committee Contents


Memorandum from Oxfordshire Fire Authority (FIRE 13)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    — Oxfordshire Fire and Rescue Authority continues to oppose the project unless all specified functionality and outstanding areas of concern are fully addressed.

    — Despite this, Oxfordshire Fire and Rescue Authority (OFRA) will fully engage in the project to ensure the most beneficial outcome to its local communities.

    — Whilst unsighted as to the reality of the contractual position, OFRA considers that continuation of the project is the most appropriate course of action, subject to enhanced leadership and support from Communities and Local Government, supplemented by active and robust contract management.

    — Whilst continuation is still favoured, OFRA will actively work with colleagues in the South East, and if appropriate nationally, to identify and if necessary implement alternative provision. This will only be feasible with the full financial and commercial support of Communities and Local Government.

    — OFRA fully endorses the South East Regional Management Board submission.

GENERAL

  1.  The OFRA's formal position on the FiReControl Programme is one of opposition unless areas of concern are fully addressed. Whilst this is the official position, practically the Authority has undertaken to engage fully with the wider programme, investing considerable time, finances and managerial effort to ensure that the issues can be identified and resolved as part of the programme management. The Authority has committed fully to active involvement with the Local Authority Controlled company and will do all it can to ensure the successful operation of the South East Regional Control Centre should it become operational. In effect this translates into a position whereby the Authority will support the continuation of the FiReControl programme, subject to the delivery of the full operational capability as identified in the concept of operations and the resolution of all remaining areas of concern.

  2.  As an Authority which responded to exceptional levels of demand caused by the July 2007 flooding OFRA recognises the underpinning resilience issues which predicated the introduction of the project. Current mobilising arrangements, whilst managed effectively, were not designed to meet the increased levels of resilience that are now deemed appropriate within the wider national context. As a direct result of several delays (original cut over in 2007 now intended July 2012) each of which, while increasing the risk, individually did not make the upgrading of the Authority's mobilising system financially or practically viable. Subsequently this Authority now finds itself in a position whereby the risk to its legacy mobilising system is approaching an intolerable level. Therefore, the Authority seeks removal of uncertainty and the decisive action of CLG to either drive through the full implementation of the project on the current timetable or to announce alternatives, including if considered the only viable option, programme abandonment.

  3.  The present situation is not of the Authority's making and the current FiReControl Programme would not have been the chosen option had it had the local autonomy to dictate its future mobilisation arrangements. However, OFRA having reviewed all factors it has awareness of or responsibility for, considers that the most appropriate way forward both for local and national purposes will be to continue with the current project. Whilst this is the case, continuation must be supported by genuine commitment, visible leadership and financial support from Communities and Local Government.

  4.  This Authority has been party to and endorses the South East Regional Management Board submission. Consequently the remaining submission focuses exclusively on what changes need to be made to the Government's plans for proceeding with the project.

CHANGES TO THE PROJECT

  5.  OFRA have actively tracked this project via its appropriate portfolio holder and Scrutiny Committee and have contributed fully to the South East Local Authority Controlled Company. All of these areas have registered increasing levels of concern over programme governance, financial consequences and central support and contract management and assurance. This is evidenced by continued slippage, refusal of business cases, failure to supply deliverables and failures of those products that have been delivered. The following actions are considered essential to ensure the continued ability of the Authority to actively engage with the ongoing and hopefully revitalised project.

  6.  Programme Governance—recent improvements in programme governance must be sustained and improved upon. Active partnership with individual Fire and Rescue Services (FRS) to address concerns must be enhanced. Action should be taken to streamline the governance structure to improve the speed of decision making and make ownership and responsibility clear.

  7.  As the contract was let, and is currently managed by Communities and Local Government, individual FRS's have no ability to ensure active contract management. Whist more active management can be evidenced by the actions relating to the replacement of the Mobilising supplier, this must be sustained and improved upon. The continued failure of the main contractor to meet the deliverables timeline must be addressed and repetition prevented.

  8.  Where deliverables have been received the quality assurance process has repeatedly failed to ensure that these products are fit for purpose. It is essential that a more effective and robust process is put in place to ensure improvement and where failures exist that abortive work from FRS's is recompensed.

  9.  OFRA has ongoing concerns regarding the financial implications of the project both in the short and long term. It is essential that mechanisms are put in place whereby CLG can deliver, in perpetuity, the financial guarantees which underpin the project. The original business case and its subsequent iterations have continually eroded the theoretical savings that would have allowed OFRA to undertake "out of scope" activities within the overall current budget. Any potential removal of future "resilience" payments could have the effect of increasing overall cost the OFRA. This is not acceptable.

  10.  This Authority remains deeply dissatisfied in the contractual arrangements let by CLG relating to the Buildings, Facilities Management and ICT. All these items appear to be either at considerable expense or include a degree of over specification that is inappropriate for FRA's to fund in the longer term where national resilience is the root cause.

  11.  One aspect of continued financial support is the constant refusal by CLG of legitimate business cases submitted by this Authority (both for Firelink and FiReControl items) for support to undertake actions that have been identified as being in scope for financial support. With the difficult financial environment continued proactive actions by this Authority to take early and enabling actions for the project cannot be sustained unless the previously identified financial support is maintained.

  12.  OFRA has limited resources available to undertake the specialist work that is necessary to implement the project. These resources are fully committed in not only implementing FiReControl but also the Firelink project. However, the failure to finalise the technical solution for the project has led to the national team being unable provide sufficient detail to allow the FRS to work on its own actions to put the processes and data systems to support FiReControl in place. This is a major activity requiring considerable FRS specialist resource (a scarce commodity) and requires sufficient lead-time. An inability to progress work poses an increasing risk that when the information finally becomes available FRS's will be unable to resource the necessary work to meet the project timescale. This creates considerable frustration in the FRS and the constant changes to the project delivery dates makes resource planning very difficult. All this has reduced the FRA's confidence in the ability of the project to deliver an acceptable solution within the current timescales. The action required is to resolve the technical issues quickly and authoritatively, communicate these to all stakeholders, including third party software suppliers, and fund actions under the New Burdens principles as originally intended (eg interfacing of supporting systems).

  13.  The OFRA mobilising system is dated and has previously not been replaced due to the impending mandatory movement to FiReControl. However, this coupled with ongoing delay and increasing concern over the current cut over timetable now results in increasing and potentially intolerable levels of risk. This Authority remains proactive and will continue to meet its Business Continuity responsibilities and where prudent either invest in limited interim upgrades or alternative collaborative actions. Financial support from CLG will be essential. However, this is clearly sub optimal and the most appropriate way forward is the delivery of the original project on the current timetable, avoiding any further cost escalation and with all intended functionality.

  14.  Whilst OFRA still consider project continuation the most appropriate option it will actively engage with partners to consider alternatives should the current project become clearly non viable. OFRA is aware that alternatives are being considered by CLG and consider that any alternative strategy must begin by enfranchising and partnering the FRS community. Any future alternative approach should not merely be handed down from CLG as a "fait accompli." Any option for local or regional collaborative ventures must be funded appropriately and national requirements additionally funded. Networked resilience remains the underpinning requirement to meet current and potential future needs.

January 2010





 
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