Memorandum from Surrey Fire and Rescue
Authority (FIRE 17)
1. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
— A sufficient level of resilience for
the FiReControl project is yet to be demonstrated to the Surrey
Fire and Rescue Authority (the Authority).
— The Authority needs reassurance that
the technology will have sufficient currency and provide at least
the same comprehensive level of functionality that is currently
in use within Surrey.
— There is a lack of clarity and detail
associated with the project, which is impeding local delivery
of the transitional arrangements.
— It does not appear that the FiReControl
project will deliver the financial savings originally identified
and it could impede the development of other efficiency savings
for Surrey. The project should not create any additional financial
pressure on the Authority.
— It is essential that central government
retains a significant stakeholder interest in the long term governance
of the FiReControl project.
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 The Authority has been making preparations
to transfer its mobilising control arrangements to the Regional
Control Centre (RCC) as required by the Fire and Rescue Service
National Framework 2008-11.
2.2 This position is only tenable on the
basis that the benefits of the FiReControl project are delivered
and no additional financial burden is placed on the Authority.
2.3 It should be noted that Surrey Fire
and Rescue Service (the Service) had sufficient concerns regarding
the potential for delay in the project to warrant investment in
a new mobilising system. The previous system was installed in
1994. This has been operational since 2 December 2008 and
combined with advanced mobile data technology this means the Service
already has access to all of the projected benefits of the FiReControl
project and is working with another FRS on the same system to
develop a reciprocal fallback solution.
3. AREAS OF
CONCERN
3.1 The Authority requires total confidence
that the FiReControl solution has end to end resilience prior
to transfer of undertakings. This is currently difficult to assess
as there is insufficient detail associated with the project implementation
plan. For example, there is no clarity on the fallback arrangements
(the third way) or the proposals to adopt the 46 disparate
networks currently in use by the participating Fire and Rescue
Services (FRS).
4. TECHNOLOGICAL
4.1 The delays to the project could result
in the delivery of out of date technology against the initial
specification. As previously mentioned, the Service believes that
it already uses technology in advance of the specification being
provided by the FiReControl project and the Authority would be
reticent to relinquish these facilities. For example, demountable
mobile data terminals are used for incident command support, data
capture, community safety education and language translation within
Surrey.
5. PROJECT DETAIL
5.1 It is noted that the FiReControl project
has already been subject to delays but it is has not been apparent
what has caused them. In order to be reassured, the Authority
requests transparency as to the reasons for these delays and other
variations to the project plan.
5.2 There is also a lack of detail relating
to the requirements being placed on FRSs. These include requirements
for data provision schemas, ways of working action plans, minimum
attribute levels, etc.
5.3 The lack of and delays to published
guidance on proposed Service—RCC technical interfaces is
delaying local development on the project.
5.4 Without a greater level of project detail,
it is difficult for the Service to undertake the work required
to support the transition plan.
6. TRANSITIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS
6.1 Although the Service has taken steps
to ensure the resilience of existing mobilising control arrangements,
delays in the project are increasing the risk associated with
staff retention until cutover. Further slippage in delivery of
the FiReControl project would exacerbate this risk and clarity
regarding the central provision of funds to cover these costs
is required.
6.2 The implementation of FireLink phase
C ahead of the FiReControl project could lead to a loss of functionality
to the Service of access to risk critical information and a dynamic
mobilising capability, which is outlined in the Surrey Integrated
Risk Management Plan. A contingency for this will need to be developed
and is likely to create additional cost which, under the circumstances,
the Service is naturally unwilling to bear.
7. FINANCIAL
7.1 The cost of the solution is also a key
concern, initial indications from the Chief Executive of South
East Fire Regional Control Centre Ltd (SEFRCC) are that the staffing
numbers proposed centrally may not be adequate and a proposed
enhanced staffing level has been circulated for consultation.
It is difficult to accurately ascertain appropriate staffing arrangements
until the end to end solution is seen to operate and the detailed
ways of working and contingency arrangements are finalised.
7.2 This is coupled with a concern that
the cost of residual activities that will stay within individual
Services has been under estimated.
7.3 The updated FiReControl business case
published on 6th May 2009 indicated a forecast saving of
£70,000 for the Authority, taking into account the above
factors it is a real concern that the actual costs will wipe out
this saving and potentially create an increased financial burden.
7.4 The project is currently a barrier to
exploring other options that could derive greater savings from
collaboration with another Fire and Rescue Authority (FRA).
7.5 The long term funding for this national
resilience capability should be adequate and transparent and should
not increase the financial burden on the Authority.
8. GOVERNANCE
8.1 The contractual arrangements regarding
premises and infrastructure are currently between the Communities
and Local Government department and the providers, with FRAs as
end users having limited visibility and understanding of the potential
risks. The potential change to the contract management to be via
a non-departmental public body increases concern as to where these
risks may be borne.
8.2 The continuation of central government
funding and involvement in the long term governance arrangements
for RCCs is considered essential to maintain national resilience
arrangements.
9. THE WAY
FORWARD
9.1 With the information currently available
to the Authority it is not possible to judge whether the current
project is the best way forward as the financial implications
of adoption or abandonment cannot be judged. Reassurance regarding
the resilience of the technical solution is impossible to gain
as the end to end solution is yet to be provided.
9.2 The Authority is in the fortunate position
of having identified the potential for delay and have refreshed
the mobilising control technology. This leaves the Authority far
less reliant on the delivery of this project than is the case
elsewhere.
January 2010
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