Memorandum from Wiltshire and Swindon
Fire Authority (FIRE 21)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
— The programme has extensively overrun
its original timescale.
— It is now some five years late.
— This overrun is directly affecting the
existing control room staff morale and impacts on management of
this FRS.
— There is a loss of confidence amongst
elected members, management and firefighters and a belief that
it will not be successful.
— The concept was part of a much bigger
plan at a different political timescale and agenda.
— It was over ambitious in its concept.
— There has been a lack of understanding
of the technical hurdles needed to be overcome to ensure success.
— This FRA has tried to help at all levels
of the programme.
— There is a reluctance by CLG to accept
the impact of the Out of Scope work
— The successful Wiltshire and Gloucestershire
Tri-Service Control room models should be revisited.
— There is a possible way forward in using
the SW RCC for Devon and Somerset FRS with dated equipment and
control rooms
— This SW RCC could also provide resilient
fall back to other FRSs in the SW region.
— The improvements in the FireLink programme
are welcomed.
— Data handling technology such as Mobile
data terminals and risk information transmission already exists.
PROGRESS WITH
THE PROJECT
SO FAR
1. The project was initiated by Central
Government and, whilst this Fire Authority recognises the legitimate
right of the (then) Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the
Department for Communities and Local Government to reorganise
control rooms, we judge it is not acceptable for individual fire
authorities to share the burden of continuing extensive delays
with considerable impact on staff morale, additional workloads
and expense which all falls outside any "New Burdens"
agreement.
2. The financial outlook for Fire Authorities
in 2010-11 and 2011-12 cannot bear ongoing costs of
this project which will, if carried through to completion, be
handed over to FRAs at some future point in time to fund.
3. This FRA has not changed its position
since the last Select Committee in that it has yet formally to
agree to voluntarily move its mobilising operation into the now
completed South West RCC building at Taunton.
4. The ongoing delays from an original completion
date of 2007 have meant continuing uncertainty and a considerable
loss of confidence, which has had a serious impact on:
(a) staff confidence and morale, leading to staff
leaving the FRS's employment;
(b) an impossibility to forward plan in terms
of staff likely to apply to work at the new SW RCC; and,
(c) a continuing loss of confidence by fire authority
Elected Members, management and firefighters in the programme—the
complete opposite effect of what was publicly intended and stated
at the programme's onset.
THE REASON
FOR THE
COST AND
TIME OVERRUNS
WHICH THE
PROJECT HAS
EXPERIENCED
5. The FireControl programme was intended
to provide benefits in public safety, firefighter safety, national
resilience, efficiency, interoperability and mobilisation of national
fire assets (New Dimensions' appliances and equipment). This Fire
Authority accepted all these original promises as a means to further
improve the safety of the community and its firefighters in Wiltshire
and Swindon.
6. The project was conceived at a time when
regional government, regional management boards, regional fire
authorities and fire & rescue services were part of the current
Government's programme. The 2004-05 National Framework document
stated in paragraph 2.3 that the Government was "committed
to a regional approach where that is the most appropriate level".
Following the North East referendum decision in November 2004,
the political direction has changed and the 2008-11 National
Framework document stated at paragraph 4.3 "whilst closer
joint working at a regional level has a role to play in improving
efficiency; Government has no plans to introduce a regional fire
service". CLG has continued to try to deliver this unique
project through a different political, governance and financial
model—itself creating many of the reasons for the cost and
time overruns.
7. The original stated expectation was a
significant financial saving in the order of 30%—a figure
which is now recognised as unattainable.
8. It was also originally stated that the
FireControl programme would deliver a mobilising solution that
was as good as or better than the equivalent FRAs' control rooms—a
point to which I shall return.
9. Finally, the FireControl programme was
stated as delivering a high level of resilience—again a
point which will be referred to later.
10. This project was embarked upon, for
the best of reasons, placing complete reliance on new (albeit
unproven) information technology. Regrettably, there is a long
history of such projects both in Government, for example in Defence
and the NHS, and in the private sector, for example in the aerospace
sector with the current example being EADS' A400M military aircraft
project. Knowing that the required technology does not exist,
it is so tempting for the politician leading to believe, with
the time available due to other routine work, often likely to
take a year or two, and that a solution will have been achieved,
to overcome systems design and execution that are known to exist
at the start of the project. Mr Micawber's approach, "hoping
that something would turn up", was laughable in a novel but
is devastating in modern industry but, because of it, the RCC
project has failed to meet its deadlines and is now nearly half
a decade behind schedule. The system still has not been fully
designed, delivered and tested from end to end.
11. Criticism has been levelled at the project
management and numerous changes of personnel involved—all
of which have led to a continuing loss of confidence that this
project will deliver any of the stated benefits to FRAs.
12. This criticism is not made lightly—of
all English FRAs, Wiltshire and Swindon has contributed at SW
regional and national levels to try and assist the project through
professional advice from officers on many aspects, including the
treasury functions of the SW project and political leadership
at LGA level.
13. It has also become clear that the RCCs
will not undertake all of the functions already carried out by
existing FRS mobilising controls—leading to the "Out
of Scope" project to assess what work would still be undertaken
by individual FRSs under the new RCC arrangements.
14. It is quite clear that some means of
data collection and monitoring of functions beyond 999 call
handling will fall to individual FRSs and this will mean that
staff will continue to be employed in some sort of "non-emergency"
control room function, with the additional expense borne by individual
FRAs.
What, if any, changes need to be made to the Government's
plans for proceeding with the project?
15. This Fire Authority would submit that
the experience of Wiltshire FRA in operating the Tri-Service Control
room since 24 March 2004 following considerable financial
investment by this Government under its Invest to Save budget
of £7.5 millions, now warrants revisiting as a possible
model for future adoption. It is noted that, since the inception
of the Wiltshire model and a very similar Tri-Service Control
room in Gloucestershire, one Welsh fire and rescue authority has
decided to copy some of these functions with a dual police/fire
facility.
16. The Wiltshire Tri-Service facility has
been independently audited by the Audit Commission and judged
to be successful by its three constituent "blue light"
services with resilience embedded until at least 2015 without
further investment being required. This has always been seen as
a long-term investment (circa 30 years' contract) and illustrates
the forward thinking and innovation of previous Chief Officers
and Elected Members at NHS Health; Police and Fire & Rescue
Authority levels.
17. In particular, the expected advantages
of placing all three "blue light" services under one
roof have been realised, namely:
— The ability to share information technology.
— The close professional working relationship
between all three services.
— The "bespoke" construction
of the building making it totally "fit for purpose".
— The very high level of resilience against
business disruption incorporated in its construction.
— Dedicated "Gold Command" and
"Silver Command" multi-agency rooms within the same
building, able to undertake the strategic management of emergencies,
whilst being physically close enough to liaise with operational
commanders through the mobilising control room on site.
18. It is noted that the "resilience
aspect" of the FireControl project remains an argument for
its continuation. It is fully accepted that any mobilising control
must have sufficient resilience incorporated into its design.
19. The Wiltshire Tri-Service control room
has proved, over its operation in almost six years, that satisfactory
resilience has been incorporated, with fall-back arrangements
in the event of "spate conditions" and overload of 999 calls
to firstly Avon FRS and now Gloucestershire FRS control rooms,
with reciprocal arrangements whereby Wiltshire FRS can take any
overload of 999 calls from those FRSs. Similar arrangements
exist for the other emergency services and, in respect of Wiltshire
FRS, a fall-back facility to Service Headquarters exists should
the Tri-Service Control room have to be evacuated—this is
frequently exercised and rehearsed as part of our Business Continuity
arrangements.
20. In the continuing uncertainty of global
terrorism atrocities, the need for even greater levels of resilience
may be required.
21. Given the completion of the nine Regional
Control buildings and using the South West as an example, these
could be utilised to provide an even greater degree of resilience
and fall-back than currently exists.
22. It is already accepted that some FRS
have dated equipment and control rooms requiring extensive upgrades
at considerable expense. Again, using the Taunton RCC building
as an example, this could be utilised to provide dedicated command
and control mobilising for Devon and Somerset FRS, whose own two
control rooms are overdue for replacement, whilst also accommodating
a "super resilient" fall-back arrangements for modern
Tri-Service control rooms such as Wiltshire FRS and it is suggested
that this model be explored as a similar arrangement for Gloucestershire
and other FRS.
23. This situation, whilst improving still
further the resilience arrangements, continues with the considerable
advantages of a locally based mobilising control room, totally
under the control of the FRA with its legal responsibility for
receiving 999 calls under the Fire and Rescue Services Act
2004 to make arrangements for dealing with calls for help,
for summoning personnel and to develop mutual aid schemes with
other FRAs. This approach would also maximise the advantage of
locally based control room operators utilising their local knowledge
for call handling.
24. Significant benefit is claimed for the
improved data handling to be provided to fire appliances and officers
through the FireControl and FireLink programmes. It is important
not to blur the distinction in that the improved radio scheme
has been required urgently for many years and is most welcome.
However, other FRSs already provide mobile data terminals (MDTs)
as a stand-alone system and, therefore, it is apparent that existing
information technology, delivered through the existing control
rooms, would still deliver an improved system of information to
the incident ground, without reliance on totally unproven technology.
25. In summary, technology already exists
to provide much of the claimed data improvements such as automatic
vehicle location systems, MDTs. etc. Indeed, if the project continues
to be delayed, individual FRAs will have to consider purchasing
such equipment to ensure it fulfils its legal obligations in terms
of firefighter safety—a subject attaining even more importance
nationally with recent increases in firefighter fatalities and
other events leading to inspections of FRAs by the Health and
Safety Executive.
26. In conclusion, what is urgently required
now is a proper, open and transparent review of the complete programme.
This needs to include a frank reappraisal of the political, financial
and governance arrangements now in place in which this regional
programme was intended to operate.
27. Notwithstanding the ongoing escalation
of terrorist activity and the need to maintain resilience in operating
an emergency response, it can be argued that in almost six years
of operation, the Wiltshire Tri-Service Control has not failed
at any time, its resilience arrangements have worked and this
legacy needs to be properly considered as a viable alternative
which provides local control to protect its citizens and firefighters.
January 2010
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