Memorandum from The Chief Fire Officers'
Association (CFOA) (FIRE 22)
1. The Chief Fire Officers' Association
(CFOA) is the professional membership association of the strategic
managers of the UK Fire and Rescue Service and as such is an organisation
well-placed from which to present an informed view on the FiReControl
programme. CFOA is both a company limited by guarantee and a registered
charity with the charitable objects of reducing the loss of life,
personal injury and damage to property and the environment by
improving the quality of fire fighting, rescue, fire protection
and fire prevention in the United Kingdom. These aims are pursued
through the provision of advice, information, leadership, research,
informed comment and other services to relevant bodies and to
the Association's own members.
2. The Association has been in existence
since 1941 and is governed by a Board of Directors who are
all trustees of the charity which is led by a Presidential Team
encompassing the roles of President, Vice President and Vice President
Elect. CFOA is funded by a combination of government grant, subscriptions
from UK Fire and Rescue Services and individual membership subscriptions.
3. The Association has had a close relationship
with the FiReControl programme since its inception and provides
a number of advisory personnel on the project. It is our belief
therefore that we have the required professional experience and
authority to provide substantive evidence to this inquiry.
— We are supportive of the principles of
the project which is to deliver a network of nine regional control
centres.
— The project has been beset by poor project
governance and management. The difficult relationship between
CLG and the primary contractor EADS has exacerbated the delays
and momentum of the project.
— The project rapidly evolved from the
conceptual stage to a full Government procurement project in the
absence of proper consultation with the fire and rescue service
this has been the root cause of many of the problems which now
exist.
— Government failed to integrate the FiReControl
and Firelink projects and thus realise efficiencies, both in terms
of staff and consultancy costs and the alignment of requirements.
— Confidence in the project has been eroded
by a lack of appreciation by CLG of the democratic and legal processes
by which FRAs operate.
— Cost and Time overruns have been caused
by the initial urgency to enter the procurement phase of the project
which resulted in an extensive set of high level requirements
that, in almost all areas, lacked adequate detail, leaving the
detail to be elaborated post contract award.
— It remains imperative that if the project
is to succeed that all future costs incurred by fire and rescue
authorities in delivering this project continue to be met by Central
Government.
— It is now necessary to have a "Plan
B" contingency option, with guaranteed Government funding
on which fire and rescue authorities can rely in the event of
project failure for whatever reason be it political, economic
or technical.
INTRODUCTION
4. Whilst many of the issues raised within
this submission are critical of the project approach, management
by CLG and the primary contractor EADS, we do recognise the extent
and complexity of this endeavour and the value of the FiReControl
project both at a local, regional and national level if the stated
project outcomes are achieved. The Association also recognises
that in recent months there has been improvements in the governance
and management of the project. Had the current arrangements been
in place at the start of the project it is most probable that
the project would not have been beset by some of the difficulties
that are referred to in this submission.
THE FIRECONTROL
PROJECT
5. CFOA has and continues to support the
concepts of resilience and efficiency that lie behind the FiReControl
Project As such we have and continue to provide tangible support
to the project through the Senior Professional User and a team
of professional advisors who are embedded within the Government
project.
6. CFOA have always held and stated publically
the view that the Government were and remain unrealistically optimistic
in relation to the timeframe for the delivery of the project,
its costs and the financial benefits that might be realised from
it. This we have formally stated to key officials on numerous
occasions.
7. It is apparent that the project was devised
in haste, based upon, amongst other things two reports by consultants
Mott MacDonald. The project rapidly evolved from the conceptual
stage to a full Government procurement project in the absence
of proper consultation with the fire and rescue service. This
led to a lack of understanding of operational requirements and
ill informed claims of the range of perceived benefits from the
outset. It appears that this project was driven by political ambition
rather than the delivery of an effective operational service.
8. From the outset, there was a clear commitment
from Government that the FiReControl Project would fully support
the Integrated Risk Management Plans (IRMPs) (recently introduced
by the same Government) of all fire and rescue services (FRS)
without any apparent recognition of the additional technical and
procedural complexities that this would bring to the project and
its technical solution. Seeking to service the individual needs
of the 46 English FRS exponentially increased the complexity
of the project.
9. At the time of inception of the FiReControl
Project the Government was already running the Firelink Project
to procure a new wide area radio communications system for the
fire and rescue service in England, Scotland and Wales. Whilst
recognising the synergies between the projects and the key contribution
that the Firelink solution would make to the FiReControl Project,
Government failed to integrate the two projects and realise the
efficiencies, both in terms of staff and consultancy costs. There
was also no alignment of requirements and this resulted in silo
working, duplication and inefficiencies. These examples illustrate
the chaotic, uncoordinated and poorly conceived development of
Government policy in this area to the detriment of the FiReControl
project.
WORKING WITH
STAKEHOLDERS
10. Throughout the project the Government
have failed to recognise and plan in accordance with the democratic
and legal processes within which Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRAs),
operate. This frequently results in inadequate time being allowed
within the project plan for proper consultation and local decision
making. Moreover it reinforces continually the perception within
the service of being "railroaded" by central government
at the same time that CLG publically promotes the idea of partnership
within the project. This has been a significant factor in eroding
the confidence of key stakeholders and FRAs.
11. Notably, in the early stages there was
a gross misunderstanding on the part of Government about the legal
and democratic status of Regional Management Boards and their
ability, or otherwise, to make collective decisions on behalf
of Fire and Rescue Authorities. This resulted in unrealistic expectations
about local decision making processes.
CLARITY AND
TRANSPARENCY WITHIN
THE PROJECT
12. Over the last seven years that the project
has been running there have been a series of decisions, some involving
procurement considerations which appear to have been made on an
arbitrary basis without any formal governance or approvals process.
The absence of any decisions log means that there is no audit
trail or accountability for many of the decisions that have shaped
the development of the project and it is now difficult to understand
how the project has evolved into what it is today and what will
be delivered at the end of the project. CFOA has formally requested
the establishment of a decision recording mechanism on numerous
occasions.
13. CFOA have been concerned that the work
of the Project Board and the agenda for its meetings has not been
based around a project plan and a "critical path". Indeed,
whilst repeated requests have been made, there has been a total
lack of visibility of these crucial documents and it is felt that
this has hampered the ability of the Project Board to play an
effective part in the governance of the project in the way that
would normally be expected.
SPECIFICATION OF
REQUIREMENTS
14. During the requirements capture phase
of the project, prior to procurement, it was clear that the Government
had developed a high level model of what the project would deliver
based on political ambition rather that a clear understanding
of the operational user requirements. This resulted in areas of
the project being over specified whilst in many cases the practical
detail required was missing. In some cases attempts by CFOA to
introduce the reality of what was required resulted in unwarranted
accusations of "gilding the lily".
15. There remains a significant discrepancy
between the approach that the Government has taken to national
resilience in the fire and rescue service in relation to the technological
and security related aspects of the FiReControl Project and that
taken in relation to both Police and Ambulance control rooms.
All these control rooms are categorised as part of the national
infrastructure yet only the fire service Regional Control Centres
are being required to meet the high standards of specification
being rolled out by FiReControl. It appears on this basis that
the FiReControl Project has suffered from a degree of unwarranted
over specification and therefore cost in these areas.
16. The unrealistically ambitious timeframes
allocated to the project by Government led to an inadequate period
being allowed to develop a proper understanding of what the project
should deliver and the requirements that should form the basis
of any procurement. There was a widely held perception that there
was pressure to rush to procurement in order to achieve clearly
unrealistic timescales for project completion
17. The urgency to enter the procurement
phase of the project resulted in an extensive set of high level
requirements for the "Infrastructure Services" which,
in almost all areas, lacked adequate detail, leaving the detail
to be elaborated post contract award. Whilst fully recognising
that in such projects it is frequently not possible to develop
all the detailed requirements until the high level architecture
of the solution is known, CFOA registered its concerns at the
time that, with so many detailed requirements being deferred to
post contract award, it was not possible to derive any assurance
that the contracted solution would eventually meet user requirements.
In addition, with the elaboration of so many detailed requirements
being deferred until post contract award, this would inevitably
lead to both cost and time overruns and there would be a need
for extensive user engagement post contract award to ensure that
the detailed requirements being elaborated would meet the operational
expectations and requirements. Furthermore, there could be no
confidence that the supplier would be able to provide a solution
that would satisfy the detailed requirements.
PROJECT ARRANGEMENTS
AND FUNDING
18. The Government's project team is, by
any standards, extensive; incorporating Civil Servants, consultants
and seconded staff from the fire and rescue service. Any arguments
to justify a team of this size prior to procurement in order to
expedite the procurement process expired some years ago once the
procurements had been tendered. Maintaining a team of this size
is inevitably costly and questionable. In order to manage such
a team the work is sub divided into work streams, It has been
evident that there is a lack of co-ordination between the work
streams and that elements of the project have developed in "silos"
unsighted on related work or decisions made within other work
streams. As a result of the need to elaborate so many detailed
requirements post contract these teams continue to provide the
powerhouse of the project at a time when the bulk of the effort
and the attendant risk should be carried by the contractor.
19. The commitment from Government that
the FiReControl Project will not impose a net new burden on fire
and rescue authorities is welcomed. It is recognised that, to
this point in the project, the costs to the fire and rescue service
in delivering this project have been met through "New Burdens"
funding. It remains imperative that if the project is to succeed
that all future costs incurred by fire and rescue authorities
in delivering this project continue to be met by Central Government.
This must include the costs necessary to integrate legacy back
office systems with the FiReControl solution where necessary.
20. We have real concerns over the ongoing
revenue costs of the FiReControl service in steady state. The
current proposals for Government to make "Resilience payments"
direct to fire authorities incurring additional costs from taking
the FiReControl service are welcomed. However, at present Government
has been unable to commit to these payments in the long term,
undertaking only to review the payments in three years. The concern
here is that these payments may be reduced or withdrawn in future
years leaving fire authorities with a significant and unaffordable
new burden without sufficient or any compensating grant.
CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS
21. The catalogue of delays that have beset
the project and the way in which these have been managed has resulted
in a total lack of confidence in the ability of Government and
its supplier to deliver the project. Most fire and rescue authorities
have fully aligned their plans with the delivery of FiReControl
leaving them in a very vulnerable position in relation to the
discharge of their statutory functions if FiReControl project
should fail. It is now necessary to have a "Plan B"
contingency option, with guaranteed Government funding on which
fire and rescue authorities can rely in the event of project failure
for whatever reason be it political, economic or technical. We
have been urging the Minister and senior officials to commit resources
and attention to developing a viable worked through contingency
arrangement. We have offered our support to work with them on
this.
22. Delays, uncertainty and a lack of substantive
information being made available by CLG and its supplier with
regard to the technology solution has resulted in corresponding
delays in the fire and rescue service preparedness to migrate
to FiReControl. There continues to be a lack of confidence that
the project can be delivered by CLG and their suppliers within
the currently published timeframe. Not withstanding, there are
some signs that the supplier at least, is enhancing their capacity
and capability in order to deliver the project without further
delay. However, it is highly unlikely that the fire and rescue
service has the capacity to correspondingly increase its transition
activities, even if additional funding should be made available.
It should be absolutely clear that any such delays from FRAs will
be as a direct consequence of the lack of information being made
available on which their services can progress transition plans
rather than additional delays originating within the service itself.
23. A national, networked FiReControl solution,
albeit delivered locally through Local Authority Controlled Companies
(LACCs) inevitably requires a degree of central co-ordination
and management (including contract management) in order to ensure
the ongoing resilient and collaborative nature of the solution.
Regrettably, there remains considerable uncertainty about what
is to be managed centrally, how it will be managed and the cost
overhead that will be incurred, development of this aspect of
the project seems to be given a lesser priority than the delivery
of the Regional Control Centres despite the critical nature of
the centralised work. More recently there has been progress in
the creation of a Non Departmental Public Body (NDPB) that is
intended to take on responsibility for the centralised functions.
As all fire and rescue services and LACCs will be dependent upon
the efficient and effective discharge of central functions, the
absence of answers to key questions about the governance and delivery
of these functions is a considerable concern. This work should
be significantly more advanced at this stage of the project.
CONCLUSION
24. CFOA has and still remains supportive
of the principle of the FiReControl project. As such we have been
an active, if independent contributor to the programme. The Association's
support is dependent on the basis that it will bring to all FRSs
a level of service currently enjoyed only by those who operate
the best performing control centres and provided that ongoing
funding for the solution is both adequate and fairly apportioned.
25. We have watched confidence steadily
decline in the project as poor project management, inadequate
communications and deteriorating stakeholder relationships have
eroded patience, goodwill and faith amongst the FRAs. This situation
is not irreconcilable but requires a renewed effort by CLG and
EADS to listen, to work more professionally and pragmatically
in order to deliver a project that many FRAs are relying upon
for their own resilience.
January 2010
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