Preventing Violent Extremism - Communities and Local Government Committee Contents

4  Central and local control of Prevent


111. The lack of a conclusive 'risk profile' which may indicate an individual's vulnerability to violent extremism means that the targeting of the Prevent programme poses a challenge in many ways. As our inquiry progressed, it became clear that a lack of agreement amongst partners as to what was to be achieved through Prevent was a barrier to progress.

112. A major area of concern is the apparent lack of agreement between central government departments charged with the delivery of Prevent. The UK Youth Parliament, for example, told us that

The work we have been delivering has involved DCLG, DCSF, the Home Office and ACPO. However, rather than that working as a strength, it's been our experience that the inter-departmental arrangements are actually a major weakness. […] the muddled way of working between departments is perhaps one of the major barriers to operational success. It was simply never clear who was in control, who could make decisions, and what the key drivers were.[161]

The West Midlands Police Authority adds weight to this view, saying that "Prevent policy and funding is shared between two Government departments, DCLG and the Home Office—and there is a real risk that these Departments do not communicate as effectively as they might".[162]

113. Links between CLG and other Government departments are key to the successful delivery of Prevent. As with many of the issues into which we have inquired, CLG's leadership capability is crucial in ensuring that robust relationships are in place with its fellow departments.


114. The Government has been actively promoting the need for greater local control in the design and delivery of Prevent. The majority of our witnesses support a local approach, of the kind which the New Local Government Network describes:

[…] it is right that we have a national and international approach to counter-terrorism, security and preventing violent extremism. Terrorism does not operate within local, regional, or indeed national boundaries, so it is important that our response is multi-layered and flexible, with the right partners involved, and the right information shared at the most appropriate spatial level. However, it is at the local level that radicalisation can take root and it is in the social fabric of our local communities and neighbourhoods that the strength and resilience to reject and condemn violent extremist ideologies can be found.[163]

115. However, a great number of witnesses question whether local authorities are best placed to take on such important and sensitive work. The Board of Deputies of British Jews states for example that

Local authorities seldom have sufficient expertise to determine who is extremist and who is not. […] there is evidence that while they may know what is going on in their local areas, they may not have the expertise to determine the religio-political ideology of applicants for funding, and thereby assess whether they are capable of helping combat violent extremism, or assist in building community cohesion.[164]

Charles Farr of OSCT seemed to share this concern, that local authorities had neither the skills nor the confidence to accurately identify individuals who may be a cause for concern.[165]

116. Moreover, front line workers such as teachers and youth workers, on whom Prevent depends for their cooperation, feel unable or reluctant to carry out some of the aims of the programme. Dr Paul Thomas described how his research in 2008

found that practitioners and managers feel unskilled and unprepared to engage with young people around such controversial and emotive subjects [as local or international political issues, or of religious interpretation] as well as feeling that they have not been authorised to engage with young people and communities on such subjects.[166]

Speaking about the challenges facing youth workers when deciding whether or not to refer a young person for Prevent interventions, the Secretary of State told us

What I would hope […]—and this is a challenge for us—is that [a] youth worker first and foremost would have received some proper training in the dangers that are there […] and how to respond appropriately.[167]

Evidence from the UK Youth Parliament suggests that this has not been the case:

Spurred on by the sessions we delivered with youth workers in every Government Office region, we pushed for many months for an extension of youth worker guidance, built on the firm foundation of the evidence we had gathered and the specific appeals from youth workers for more information. We tried to push this idea forward with DCSF officials for many months, but in the end were told that there was no resource in place to make this happen. We have written separately to John Denham highlighting our keenness to engage on this issue. However, it is another example of a lack of clarity on issues shared across departments.[168]

117. During our visit to Birmingham we met Jahan Mahmood, a visiting lecturer at the University of Birmingham with a special interest in Muslim soldiery in Britain during the two World Wars. Besides academic interests, Mr Mahmood is actively involved in community-related work and has dedicated much time to mentoring young disengaged Muslim men in and around the inner city regions of Birmingham. Mr Mahmood arranged for us to meet a young man who had been strongly influenced by al-Qaeda inspired narratives, particularly those found on the internet. We were interested to learn how Mr Mahmood's inspirational accounts of Muslim soldiers' contribution to British military successes had helped to give some young Muslims a greater sense of pride and identity, whilst simultaneously highlighting flaws in the radicalisers' message. His ability to contextualise Muslim history and politics in British society is a method which seems to strike a chord with disaffected young people.

118. Jahan Mahmood has a particular knowledge and skill set which cannot easily be replicated across all individuals working at the front line with young people. Faith Associates suggests that

what may be achievable is training and supporting those who are responsible for the care of those in their community, from parents to faith leaders, teachers to youth workers, in identifying those who may be or are becoming vulnerable to violent extremism. Key is addressing early signs of vulnerability by supporting the development of the skills and confidence of those working with young people and the wider community and ensuring they have access to professional and culturally sensitive advice and support.[169]

119. The lack of such knowledge in some areas has led to widespread accusations in the evidence of local authorities funding inappropriate or irrelevant projects, or even funding 'extremist' organisations which seek to undermine the Prevent message. It is maybe for this reason that Government has, so far, been reluctant fully to loosen the reins and allow local authorities to deliver Prevent autonomously. The evidence certainly demonstrates a high level of frustration amongst local authorities and community groups at the lack of real 'letting go' from the centre:

It is right that local authorities are at the heart of building safe, secure and cohesive communities. They have responsibilities as community representatives and as local leaders to help ensure public safety, to help people feel confident and get along well together, to protect the vulnerable and to limit harmful behaviours. Yet at the moment their ability to perform these roles are being hampered by an approach under the Prevent banner that is proscriptive from the centre, does not always support broader community cohesion objectives and which lacks sufficient integration with police and security services at local and national levels.[170]

120. CLG appears to have acknowledged the need to support greater subsidiarity and emphasises the work it has undertaken to strengthen the role of local authorities in delivering Prevent:

Tackling violent extremism is a national priority but the nature of the challenge can vary greatly from place to place. That is why working with local authorities and partners is critical. We have strengthened the dialogue between national and local Government through the creation of a Local Delivery Advisory Group (LDAG). This group meets regularly to advise the Communities and Home Secretaries on the development of the Prevent agenda at a local level. We are working closely with local authorities and with groups like the Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) and the Local Government Association (LGA).[171]

121. The LGA Group is supportive of CLG's work through Government Offices which, it says, have made "considerable and noticeable improvements in their key role as a conduit for information exchange between national and local government".[172] The training and development consultancy Faith Associates also commends the recently updated guidance from CLG which assists local partners in delivering Prevent effectively.[173]

122. However, despite welcome new guidance, many witnesses raise the need for advice which recognises differing local circumstances and, more importantly, is focused on risk:

Over the last 18 months this provision has developed, but it is still limited, and is not always relevant to local circumstances, since most advice is forthcoming from areas which have experienced significant PVE challenges. The development of a proportionate, risk-based approach therefore remains a challenge.[174]


123. Prevent's focus on Muslim communities has met with resentment and suspicion. Ed Husain of Quilliam provided a pragmatic explanation for the current 'unfocused' approach: a lack of understanding of actual risk.

[Prevent] should target those communities in which there is a serious terrorism problem. My hunch is at times it is not targeting those communities in particular and hence this broad brush approach. That comes about as a result of not understanding where the problem lies.[175]

124. Government guidance for local partners states that Prevent "needs to be delivered through a wide ranging local partnership and should be informed by an understanding of the local context".[176] The understanding of local context and risk is critical to the successful delivery of any Prevent programme, as our local authority witnesses acknowledged. Heather Wills of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham explained:

it is very important for us to each understand the local context and develop our own action plans, albeit informed and supported by the learning that our colleagues elsewhere in the country are doing.[177]

125. In addressing this point, 'local narratives' which "tell the story of the place, describing the risks and priorities to be addressed through local Prevent strategies", are seen by several witnesses to be "the first step to success"[178] in any local Prevent programme. Leicester City Council, whose approach to the issue of tackling extremism has been widely acknowledged as one of the most effective, told us

the main elements of our approach have been firstly to understand our communities better. That is because the nature of the way Prevent funding has come to us has made assumptions, I think, that the Muslim community is a homogenous group and our own experience has been that that is not the case, and therefore we have had an element which has been about social research, working with our local universities to understand our communities better and to understand our Muslim communities better.[179]

126. However, as Anna Turley of the New Local Government Network described, the tools and information required to undertake robust assessments of risk are not always being made available to local authorities and their partners:

I know it is early days in all of our understanding of these issues but certainly local authorities I think are struggling. They are responsible for targets about reducing vulnerability of a local area to extremism, but they actually do not themselves necessarily have the toolkit and the understanding of what these risk factors are and how to handle them. Often there is a failure to share evidence, information and intelligence with police and counterterrorism organisations to really enable them to make the decisions they need and to allow them to follow a risk based approach. I think local authorities feel they do not necessarily have the toolkits they need to understand some of these pathways towards extremism.[180]

This was a point raised in the 2008 Learning and Development Exercise on Prevent from HMIC and the Audit Commission which found that "There are significant opportunities to improve information sharing locally, regionally and nationally", and concluded that "Chief Executives, basic command unit (BCU) commanders and other partners are not being briefed effectively. They do not receive the information necessary to support effective decision making. This inhibits understanding of local vulnerability, making it difficult to determine the effectiveness of Prevent strategies and delivery of the local approach".[181]

127. Information sharing in the context of a counter-terrorism initiative clearly poses some dilemmas. If police and the security services share an honest risk assessment with local authorities, it may have negative impacts for the locality. Conversely, if a candid assessment is not provided, then local authorities may fail to see the need for Prevent interventions to be put in place. Charles Farr told us that these were the reasons

why we introduced the Counter-Terrorism Local Profile system and why every chief executive in areas receiving significant Prevent funding has already got one. The CTLP will not yet be in its final form but the intelligence product—it is not just intelligence, some of it is just overt information—will improve over the next year. I absolutely agree, and so do ministers clearly, that chief executives and elected councillors, wherever possible, need to have that information otherwise when we show up saying, "We would like you to do the following Prevent type work", they will turn round to us and say, "Why?"[182]

Mr Farr mentioned that "feedback I have from local authority colleagues in many areas—Luton is the one that springs to mind—is that they have already transformed the way they are doing Prevent".[183] Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles[184] are still in early stages of development. However, we see them as being vital to effective local delivery of Prevent programme.

128.Local authorities and their partners appear to lack clarity as to what Prevent aims to achieve. Witnesses suggested that CLG and the Home Office were not providing consistent advice to local authorities and this is a barrier to effective local implementation. The Government should ensure that its departments are delivering joined-up and consistent messages on this delicate agenda.

129.The Government is encouraging greater local control of the Prevent agenda. Local authorities support this in principle as they are best-placed to understand the local context within which they operate. However, there is criticism that the Government has not 'let go' sufficiently and that Prevent is still heavily controlled from the centre. This may be due to a lack of confidence in the ability of all local authorities to tackle this agenda effectively. The importance of prioritising the development of a risk-based approach to Prevent is therefore ever more critical. We recommend that the Government prioritise work on facilitating the development of 'local narratives' and improving information sharing between local partners—including a more rapid roll-out of Counter Terrorism Local Profiles—to provide local authorities with the vital information they need to undertake their roles effectively. Alongside this, much greater training and support for front-line workers such as council staff, police, teachers and youth workers should be provided.


130. In no other way is a risk-based approach to the design and delivery of Prevent more needed than in the distribution of the programme's funds. As the Secretary of State himself admitted:

an ideal situation […] would be something that was more clearly risk-based and something that was able to take a coherent view at a local level on the relative needs of cohesion funding and Prevent funding, which, as you know, currently go out separately. That would be the ideal. There are two real obstacles to that at the moment, but I do not think they are absolute and forever. One is that risk-based funding clearly has a problem in that you are indicating somebody's assessment of risk and that has both a presentational and practical problem.[185]

131. The current system allocates funds to localities with a Muslim population exceeding 2,000. This approach has been criticised across the board, as the Institute of Race Relations describes:

rather than targeting Prevent funding on areas according to identifiable risks, it has simply been imposed in direct proportion to the numbers of Muslims in an area. Moreover, it implies that the allocation of Prevent funding has not been driven by a local decision-making process in which local agencies identify their own needs and access central government funds accordingly. This blanket approach to funding creates an impression that the Muslim population as a whole needs to be the focus of work to prevent violent extremism, rather than specific groups or localities, and irrespective of the views of local stakeholders.[186]

Quilliam points to further drawbacks of the current approach:

In terms of gaining access to and influencing those people who are most at risk of radicalisation, Prevent has seen little success. For example, three groups which are particularly vulnerable to radicalisation (students, prisoners and Somali youths) have seen little benefit from Prevent spending, partly as a result of unfocused approaches to identifying priority areas for activity. For example, when deciding which universities should be prioritised for attention as part of the Prevent strategy, the decision is made purely according to the size of the establishment's local Muslim community. [...] Durham is an example of a university with few Muslim students and few local Muslims yet Hizb ut-Tahrir is very active on campus there.[187]

132. We acknowledge the challenges of allocating Prevent funds on a risk basis. However, we noted a recent answer to a parliamentary question regarding the criteria CLG had used to determine the allocation of Connecting Communities[188] funds to neighbourhoods. It suggests that a more intelligent and risk-based approach to identifying need is achievable in similar programmes:

Connecting Communities neighbourhoods have been identified by examining a range of hard and soft data around cohesion, deprivation and crime, perceived unfairness in the allocation of resources and feedback from people working locally. The funding allocated to each neighbourhood is based on the individual plans that they have drawn up which focus on giving people a bigger say in local issues, addressing specific local concerns and increasing access to local services and opportunities.[189]

133. The current system for allocating Prevent funds is not based on risk and work on addressing this should be a priority. We recommend that the Government apply the approach being adopted for the Connecting Communities programme, which demonstrates that risk-based approaches to identifying need in similar programmes is achievable.


134. In May 2008 BMG Research was commissioned by Communities and Local Government to conduct a mapping exercise of the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund (PVEPF). This mapping exercise involved collating descriptive data on all of the pathfinder projects funded in 2007-8. A database, initially developed by CLG and subsequently expanded by the research team, was distributed to all local authorities for completion. The database contains information about the range of projects funded, project partners, project beneficiaries and the contribution that the projects are making to the PVEPF priorities and the wider Prevent strategy to counter-terrorism.

135. Birmingham City Council's evidence highlights some good practice stemming from CLG in terms of monitoring and evaluating Prevent projects:

Guidance from CLG has been helpful in producing Birmingham's [Prevent] Delivery Plan and providing resources to use in order to evaluate projects and the whole delivery plan. […] Guidance issued around National Indicator 35[190] has proved invaluable as it has provided the ability to effectively measure performance against the criteria and recognise gaps in delivery, which will enable performance to improve.[191]

136. However, the majority of witnesses feel that current approaches to monitoring and evaluation are "under-developed",[192] with common criticisms being that they lack a focus on outcomes and fail to provide a clear picture at national level of how Prevent money is being spent and whether it is providing value for money. NI35 is seen to be an 'output' measure, rather than a way of measuring the effectiveness and value for money of interventions. NI35 has the added disadvantage of being subject to a certain stigma, as the Islamic Human Rights Commission describes:

Some local authorities have resented this reporting requirement, because it makes them an arm of the police or of the security [services].[193]

137. We believe that the lack of clarity in this area has occurred as a result of confusion over the aims and objectives of Prevent nationally and locally. With a programme like Prevent, there will always be a sense that it is impossible to measure what does not happen as a result of interventions. All preventative programmes share this problem. However, we were interested to note Leicester City Council's suggestions for an alternative way to measure the impact of local Prevent programmes:

one of the indicators that is much more helpful in measuring impact at a local level is […] NI2 which is the one around sense of belonging locally because I think that gives you an indicator set that can give some very tangible outcomes and outputs that you expect and that you can then monitor the way in which funding is used as a contributory factor to that outcome set.[194]

138. Monitoring and evaluation of Prevent interventions has not been a strength. Weak monitoring and evaluation is inevitable when aims and objectives are not clear in the first place. The development of a proportionate and risk-based approach to delivering Prevent, along with greater clarity as to what the programme aims to achieve, are needed before any useful performance measures can be agreed at national and local level.


139. We also heard evidence of confusion over the interplay of the Prevent and Pursue strands of CONTEST. Many witnesses believe that the blurring of the boundaries between the two has given the impression that all community work with Muslim populations is linked to the counter-terrorism agenda:

the link with what the Police are doing with their PVE work has been unhelpful. Whilst only a few challenge the role of the police in PVE work, no one is happy to see community projects linked to the work of the police. The creation of Prevent Officers working in the police service does nothing but confuse our work. Some (deliberately) see no distinction between the Police PVE work and community work. This leads to community projects being accused of being police spies. Some in Reading have promoted the idea that Prevent is actually Pursue.[195]

140. This was substantiated by the UK Youth Parliament, who told us that "In the UKYP survey we did online, 60 per cent of 1,000 people said they would not attend the conference if the police were there".[196] However, when we put this point of view to Sir Norman Bettison of ACPO, he told us:

I am very clear that if Prevent were left to the police it would fail […] because the police have got to undertake the full gamut of the four Ps—Protect, Prepare and Pursue as well as Prevent. There is always the potential for those different responsibilities to be confused and misunderstood. The police have a reach into a community at a particular level. Wherever you get good neighbourhood policing that reach is greater. Wherever you get safer schools partnerships the reach is greater still but the reach can only go so far. At a local authority level through schools, through youth outreach, through community health, there is the opportunity for a much greater reach into the wider realms of the community.[197]

141. As we discussed earlier in our report, under-developed information sharing practices between the police and local authorities have exacerbated perceptions of Prevent being police-controlled. The police continue to have a relatively high profile in Prevent partnerships as they have a much clearer view of the risks in a local area thanks to the information they hold. In many localities, it is currently difficult for local authorities to take a more leading role as they lack the information required to adopt a proportionate approach based on assessed risk.

142. However, a large number of our witnesses felt deeply uncomfortable with the notion of counter-terrorist police work getting too close to public services in any way. One group concluded that

efforts to combat terrorism should be kept within the strict purview of the security and intelligence agencies. Recent attempts to conflate the Prevent element within the CONTEST 2 Strategy, alongside the Protect, Pursue and Prepare strands is counter-productive. It has resulted in the securitisation of public services and community and voluntary organisations and undermined civil society, civil liberties and human rights.[198]

143. The Secretary of State was reluctant to accept that a straightforward separation of Prevent and Pursue could take place, telling us that

You could always talk about where the boundaries lie. [...] I think it would be a mistake to remove those key areas of the Prevent programme and say we will just call that "community cohesion" and not necessarily address those issues or we will just have Pursue and Channel. That strategy would be leaving a big gap in the work of Prevent at the moment.[199]

The Association of Police Authorities added:

From the perspective of policing the perception of a 'security versus community' approach to Prevent is erroneous. Prevent policing extends from work embedded in neighbourhood policing, including community engagement, gathering community intelligence and working with the most vulnerable groups in communities, through to Special Branch and Counter-Terrorism Units and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units, and necessarily covers all of the 'Prevent spectrum'.[200]

144. Sir Norman Bettison stressed that the police have experience in supporting vulnerable people in many walks of life:

For me the parallel, and it has all sorts of echoes with the early days which I sadly remember of dealing with other risks and harms such as drugs, what there was always when the police were first engaged on drugs enforcement was the tension between wanting to protect the vulnerable young people from the menace of addictive drugs and asking people within the community to, in a sense, report those who were experimenting or becoming seduced by drugs. The maturity of the relationship that we have with other partners now is such that actually the police are involved with treatment and education just as much as we are involved with enforcement, and it is because people have been able to see over the years that information or concern expressed to a third party can often be of benefit to young people in protecting them from a menace such as drug or other risks that particularly befall young people. This is a pretty new agenda but I am very optimistic that as long as we are sensitive, as long as it is not just a police initiative but one shared by other agencies within the community, I genuinely believe that it will become more and more trusted.[201]

145. Many approaches to crime prevention, such as those described by Sir Norman Bettison, have been subsumed into mainstream service delivery in the interests of supporting people with a range of vulnerabilities. Recently, Government has encouraged local authorities and their partners to mainstream Prevent and embed Prevent delivery with other core mainstream services. This approach has its supporters, as a recommendation of the Preventing Extremism Together Working Group on Supporting Regional and Local Initiatives and Community Actions suggests:

The Working Group concluded that an approach that works within the framework of existing government strategies was seen as a sensible starting point, as it enhances the potential for recommendations that respond to the particular needs of the Muslim faith communities being more readily incorporated. What was important was having a stronger delivery framework in operation ensuring better representation and accountability of diverse groups, and a positive framework allowing for differing views.[202]

However, it also has opponents, with the Muslim Women's Network UK, for example, saying that "the government has not shown that it has considered the impact this part of the strategy will have on how Muslims are viewed and treated by service providers. There is a fear that Prevent will exacerbate the problem of discrimination already faced by Muslims when accessing services".[203] NLGN provides a pragmatic response to these fears, saying

The perception around 'mainstreaming Prevent' is seen more as extending the security and surveillance aspects into wider council roles. This debate is not currently being held, and the argument needs to be made that this is not about front-line workers 'spying' but taking the same precautions and vigilance that all of us citizens undertake […] If a member of staff did not act on intelligence that subsequently could have saved lives, this would be severe negligence.[204]

146. We questioned whether targeted Prevent interventions such as the Channel project would benefit from being mainstreamed, so as to remove the stigma currently attached to them. Throughout our inquiry, it became clear that the Channel project epitomised many witnesses' concerns of 'spying' about the involvement of the police in the delivery of public services. Sir Norman Bettison suggested that the time had come to reposition Channel within the broader field of addressing vulnerability:

If we are moving off Channel, because I think this is the sort of Committee that ought to hear me say this, I think it is time now for Channel to be mainstreamed [into the vulnerability and safeguarding agendas] and not be a separate project. […] Channel pre-dated the ACPO Prevent strategy. It was a Government scheme not long after the 2005 bombings, the realisation that there was not a conduit for information or for identifying vulnerability. Actually the Prevent strategy and Prevent implementation plan and all the other joint governmental and partnership work now means that there is a vocabulary and that there are connections that we can use without having to badge something separately as Channel.[205]

147. This could constitute a logical shift, as the referral process for Channel involves many of the same players—and very similar mechanisms—as those in existence for child protection or safeguarding referrals. It is not, as Charles Farr reminded us, a process controlled by the Home Office.[206] Rather it is a local partnership of statutory partners and non-governmental organisations who decide together who may be suitable for referral to Channel and who then identify the nature of support that might be required to assist a vulnerable person to stop them being drawn into violent extremism.

148. The overlap between the Prevent and Pursue strands of CONTEST has given the impression in some quarters that all community work with Muslims is counter-terrorism work. However, the police have an important role not just in solving but in preventing crime in all its forms, terrorism included. This work involves important relationship-building across communities. We do not, therefore, argue for the police to be excluded from preventative work on this agenda. Many of the concerns about the Channel project may be based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the referral process, which is very much a partnership—not a police-controlled affair. It should be made clear that Channel does not focus exclusively on al-Qaeda-inspired extremism, but on all forms of extremism. We therefore recommend that Channel be removed from the CONTEST strategy and placed within the context of other crime prevention initiatives.

161   Ev 99 Back

162   Ev 155 Back

163   Anna Turley, Stronger Together: A new approach to preventing violent extremism, New Local Government Network, August 2009, p 7. Back

164   Ev 85, 87. Back

165   Q 377 Back

166   Ev 108 Back

167   Q 323 Back

168   Ev 100 Back

169   Ev 176 Back

170   Anna Turley, Stronger Together: A new approach to preventing violent extremism, New Local Government Network, August 2009, p 5.


171   Ev 202 Back

172   Ev 148 Back

173   Ev 175 Back

174   Ev 104 Back

175   Q 3 Back

176   HM Government, Delivering the Prevent Strategy: An updated guide for local partners, August 2009, p 5. Back

177   Q 181 Back

178   HMIC and Audit Commission, Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise, October 2008, p 4. Back

179   Q 184 Back

180   Q 7 Back

181   HMIC and Audit Commission, Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise, October 2008, p 5. Back

182   Q 387 Back

183   Q367 Back

184   ACPO's National Prevent Delivery Unit leads the development and introduction of new Counter Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs). The purpose of a CTLP is to identify where violent extremist activity is or has the greatest potential of occurring and provide suggested recommendations to address any risk. Back

185   Q 332 Back

186   Ev 101 Back

187   Ev 122 Back

188   In October 2009, Communities Secretary John Denham outlined the £12m Connecting Communities plan. This programme was designed to "reinvigorate and connect with those communities that are feeling the pressure from recession most acutely and ensure they are well placed to share fully in future prosperity and emerge stronger and more cohesive". Back

189   HC Deb, 2 Feb 2010, col 247W. Back

190   NI35: Building Resilience to Violent Extremism. Back

191   Ev 140 Back

192   HMIC and Audit Commission, Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise, October 2008, p 6. Back

193   Ev 93 Back

194   Q 200 Back

195   Ev 228 Back

196   Q 277 Back

197   Qq 228-29 Back

198   Ev 182 Back

199   Q 320 Back

200   Ev 143 Back

201   Q 243 Back

202   Ev 213 Back

203   Ev 128-29 Back

204   Anna Turley, Stronger Together: A new approach to preventing violent extremism, New Local Government Network, August 2009, p 15. Back

205   Qq 254, 255 Back

206   Q 361 Back

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