Memorandum from Institute of Community
Cohesion (iCoCo) (PVE 15)
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Institute of Community of Community
Cohesion (iCoCo) is an independent not for profit partnership
set up to promote community cohesion as a modern framework for
race and diversity focussed on practical action, based on research
and evidence.
1.2 iCoCo has unrivalled experience in the
area of engaging all sections of Muslim communities and we have
undertaken reviews of these communities in many parts of the Country,
often as part of more broadly based reviews of community cohesion.
1.3 See website for further details of iCoCo
(www.cohesioninstitute.org.uk)
2. SUMMARY OF
OUR VIEWS
2.1 In summary, our views about the Prevent
agenda are:
2.1.1 We fully support the need for an anti-terrorist
strategy, and believe the present approach should be developed
to tackle all threats from extremists that preach hatred and are
prepared to resort to violence.
2.1.2 We fully support the need for a preventative
agenda which seeks to undermine the allure of violent and anti-democratic
means of change and as a means of developing resistance to such
appeals.
2.1.3 However, the present single-minded focus
on Muslims has, to some extent, been counter-productive in that
the association with terrorism has been strongly resented by the
majority Muslim community and has damaged relations with Muslim
communities and created divisions within and between them.
2.1.4 The association of the Muslims with terrorism
and extremism has also become stronger in the eyes of the majority,
as well as other minority communities
2.1.5 Muslim identity, paradoxically, has also
been narrowed and reduced to a simple faith persona, rather than
building upon and providing wider experiences for people of Muslim
heritage.
2.1.6 Further, we question the efficacy and value
for money of many of the schemes developed under the Prevent agenda.
2.1.7 We therefore propose that the Prevent agenda
be de-coupled from the counter-terrorist strategy and that all
future preventative work be positioned within the community cohesion
strategy (with changes in departmental responsibilities) and re-branded
and widened to deal with all risks of violence by extremists on
a common basis, which is proportionate and informed.
2.1.8 In so far as subsequent preventative work
focuses on Muslims (or any other specific community) we propose
that they be engaged through multiple channels, as employees and
employers, parents, neighbours, sports players, students, mothers
etc. rather than solely through their Muslim faith identity.
2.1.9 Finally, we have to tackle the underlying
causes of hatred and intolerance and that means doing more to
tackle the poverty and deprivation within Muslim and other disadvantaged
communities to ensure that they have better educational outcomes
and employment opportunities and that they can more fully integrate
and engage in a wider range social and economic activities. We
also have to build social capital across faith, ethnic and other
divides ("bridging" social capital), ensure that there
are many more schemes to promote educative experiences, democratic
renewal and a shared sense of citizenship. This will depend upon
a new process of community cohesion "proofing" of all
related programmes, in the public, private and voluntary sectors.
3. PERCEPTIONS
AND REALITIES
OF PREVENT
3.1 During the course of our research and
working with Muslim communities throughout the Country, we are
aware that there has been a consistent and growing concern, about
the Prevent agenda. There is a widely held perception that the
Prevent agenda in the current form, demonises Muslims and attaches
guilt by association. This is not the stated aim of the policy
and the Government has been anxious to avoid such accusations,
but the iCoCo team frequently meets groups which simply refuse
to engage with the Prevent agenda. It is not just Muslim-led organisations
that are unhappy with the present arrangements—many different
groups, both other minority and majority groups, also express
strong reservations about what they see as the inherent unfairness
of focussing attention and resources on one community. Local authorities
have also been critical of the general thrust of this policy and
have been less than enthusiastic about using the funding and developing
programmes.
3.2 No one seriously doubts the need to
prevent terrorism, so we need to ask why the Prevent agenda in
its present form has been so controversial.
3.3 Anxiety has grown partly as a result
of the Government's latest version of the CONTEST Strategy (The
UK's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, March 2009).
This suggests that those who stop short of advocating violence,
but express "extreme" views, will now be targeted:
3.4 This appeared to create a further and
unequal level of special treatment for Muslims—ie they may
be targeted for expressing views that stay within the law. Many
Muslim and other commentators have suggested that, as a consequence,
most Muslims would be identified as extreme simply because they
do not share the Government's foreign policy objectives.
3.5 This approach further isolates Muslims,
already feeling under siege from the general association of everything
Muslim with terror, at least, in the usual discourse of much of
the press and media. Many Muslims have also been subject of verbal
abuse, and attack. For example some Muslim women have reported
having their hijab forcibly removed in public places, on buses
and in supermarkets.
3.6 However, concern was evident before
the new version of CONTEST as the overall approach also appeared
to ask Muslims to choose between those who express strong and
inflammatory language to demand justice for the Muslim community
to end victimisation; and those who support western values and
a democratic engagement in wider political life.
3.7 Whilst this may sound a reasonable choice
to some people, it misunderstands the complex range of perspectives
across Muslim communities. And within those communities there
is a widespread belief that an anti-Muslim set of policies operates
across the world, including the invasion of Iraq, resulting in
a distrust of western values. In addition, some Muslims (as with
other faith groups) are theologically opposed to democratic engagement
on the grounds that man made systems/rules should not rival faith
based doctrine. However, this does not mean that they do not associate
themselves with Britain and such a choice is therefore unhelpful
and far too simplistic. It could even encourage some Muslims to
be more inwardly focussed and be counter-productive, facilitating
more support for "extremist" views.
3.8 The views of Muslim communities are,
like any other community, subject to change, but change is more
likely with fuller engagement to discuss concerns openly, particularly
international policy. Tackling the day to day concerns of Muslims
(much of which are shared with other communities including deprivation
and poor educational attainment—see below),will also foster
a greater sense of respect, trust and inclusion and help to demonstrate
that democratic participation is not at odds with Muslim theological
values.
3.9 The Prevent agenda includes elements
designed to provide an alternative (and moderate) counter-narrative
at least in terms of the use of violence, but this has been focused
on Muslim theology—which to some extent reinforces the notion
of anti-Muslim agenda. However, all extremist arguments should
be openly challenged and defeated. We must demonstrate that such
challenges are applied fairly across all communities and to all
extremist views. Similar mistakes with the Far Right: in the past
it was argued that they should not be given "the oxygen of
publicity", but sympathisers can then argue that they are
silenced because society is "afraid of the truth" and
win support on the basis that "political correctness"
is at play. We believe the Far Right needs to be challenged more
openly. This is a tough option, but debating any extremist point
of view is essential to change attitudes and beliefs, rather than
simply contain behaviour, it is likely to be more successful in
the longer term.
3.10 So there is a real problem here—if
we brand "extremists" as potential law breakers, the
really dangerous people may retreat to the shadows, beyond challenge,
capitalising on their suppression and wider sense of grievance,
(even assuming that there is in fact an empirical basis to support
the claim that extremists tip people over the edge into violent
actions).
3.11 The CONTEST strategy is much wider,
and in overall terms, impressive and comprehensive. It has four
components:
— Pursue: stopping terrorist attacks.
— Prevent: stopping people becoming
terrorists or supporting violent extremism.
— Protect: strengthening our protection
against attack.
— Prepare: mitigating the impact
of attacks.
3.12 Generally no one would argue with any
of these strands and we must all be prepared to work together
to avoid any violence or further loss of life.
3.13 We believe that situating Prevent within
the CONTEST strategy has however been unfortunate, as it is the
one area that relies upon community involvement and support, yet
essentially links that community—and only one community—to
terrorism.
3.14 The Government introduced its revised
Prevent strategy in October 2007. The strategy is based
on trying to understand what causes radicalisation (defined as
the process by which people become terrorists or lend support
to violent extremism). It has five objectives:
— To challenge the ideology behind violent
extremism and support mainstream voices.
— Disrupt those who promote violent extremism
and support the places where they operate.
— Support individuals who are vulnerable
to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists.
— Increase the resilience of communities
to violent extremism.
— To address the grievances which ideologues
are exploiting.
(The are also two supporting objectives—communications
and intelligence.)
3.15 There is very little direct reference
to "Muslims" in this strategy, but nevertheless, this
is almost the entire focus. The Government has allocated substantial
funding for Prevent to a wide range of agencies and Departments
to develop these objectives.
3.16 Most of the money is directed through
local authorities and other statutory agencies, but programmes
are generally implemented by Muslim-led organisations, some of
which have only recently been established to gain funding, and
is generally wholly applied in Muslim communities.
3.17 Not surprisingly, "Prevent"
and "Preventing Violent Extremism" has simply become
synonymous with Muslims.
3.18 This therefore has all the problems
of "single group funding" which the Commission for Integration
and cohesion (CIC) warned about and which the Government supported
to a large degree. It has certainly reinforces the separateness
of the Muslim community.
3.19 There is also scepticism about the
way in which Prevent money has been allocated with suggestions
that money is "being thrown at a problem", or even inappropriately
"thrown" at particular organisations. Meanwhile, some
Muslim organisations will not, on principle, apply for such funding.
This scepticism seems to be shared by many Local Authorities concerned
about alienating their Muslim communities, by associating them
with terrorism especially as some schemes are perceived as "spying
on the Muslim community", thus developing a further sense
of alienation and distrust.
3.20 Those schemes which are established—and
to some degree supported by sections of Muslim communities willing
to utilise the funding—are difficult to target. Firstly,
the groups which do accept funding are generally, almost by definition,
moderate and do not influence those most attracted to extremist
arguments. In any event, those most at risk of radicalisation
do not have an outwardly identifying label as "potential
terrorist". The most alienated young people are also unlikely
to be drawn into community events where they may be identified.
3.21 Unsurprisingly, local authorities and
community organisations have used a fair degree of innovation
to develop schemes which address some of these concerns, and iCoCo
frequently works with local authorities that are genuinely trying
to build an approach which creates a common purpose, believing
that this is much more likely to achieve better results in the
longer term.
3.22 However, there needs to be a strong
dose of practical reality associated with this agenda; even the
best local authority, university, health trust or school, is simply
unable to understand the intricacies of Muslim (or any other)
community. Except for a very small number of staff, this role
will always be ancillary to their main function. Whilst they all
need to do more to reach out to all sections of the community,
this debate makes them even less confident and willing to tackle
increasingly difficult issues and feel that we should focus on
capacity building community cohesion teams.
4. THE NARROWING
OF MUSLIM
IDENTITY
4.1 iCoCo's fieldwork supports the view
that the Prevent's sole focus on Muslims through their faith identity
is limiting, rather than broadening, their perspectives. This
view is supported by academic and other commentators. For example,
Gary Younge writing in the Guardian (30 March 2009) pointing
out that :"the government continues to approach Muslims as
though their religion defines them". Younge draws upon Amartya
Sen to suggest that the present approach has been paradoxical
in its effect:
"The confusion between the plural identities
of Muslims and their Islamic identity is not only a descriptive
mistake, it has serious implications for policies for peace in
the precarious world in which we live", "The effect
of this religion-centred political approach, and of the institutional
policies it has generated … has been to bolster
and strengthen the voice of religious authorities while downgrading
the importance of non-religious institutions and movements."
Amartya Sen: Identity and Violence. 4.2 These
appear as sharp criticisms, but the former Community Cohesion
Minister, Sadiq Khan, has in fact made a very similar point in
his Fabian Pamphlet, Fairness not Favours and drew out
his own personal experience:"
I did not come into Parliament to be a Muslim
MP ..Just as ordinary citizens have multiple identities, so do
MPs… The people of Tooting elected me and those voters came
from all faiths and of none. But no matter how hard I try not
to allow my faith to define me as an MP—no matter how many
times I ask not to have my religion precede my occupation when
I am introduced or described—the fact is that others do
often define me by my faith." 4.3 We must recognise
that any programme aimed at a particular community tends to create
and/or reinforce a stereotyped and homogenised view of that community.
That is why iCoCo is particularly proud of its commissioned work
in many parts of the country to "understand and appreciate"
the diversity of Muslim communities. Like all communities no one
group can represent all ethno-national, theological or political
strands let alone the many differences associated with generational,
gender and other lines. The iCoCo approach has developed a series
of local and national studies based upon "understanding and
appreciating Muslim communities", which has helped to develop
new engagement strategies. (We have begun to apply this same approach
to other faith communities including disaffected White working
class groups).
4.4 Another problem is that Government also
addresses PVE as though local and community concerns will make
the difference to the sense of grievance felt by many Muslims,
whereas there is no doubt that many Muslims are less concerned
by local issues and continue to believe that Muslims around the
world are under attack.
4.5 Meanwhile, we must not forget that the
poverty and deprivation are very real in some sections of Muslim
communities and that many will find it difficult to develop a
meaningful sense of engagement and a real stake in society.
4.6 This therefore all points towards the
need for a broader approach, using multiple aspects of the identities
of Muslim communities and to integrate the work into that of other
communities where the potential for violence is also a concern.
5. PREVENT AND
THE COMMUNITY
COHESION AGENDA
5.1 We are concerned that the Prevent agenda
has been run as part of a counter-terrorism national programme.
This appears to be because of a lack of trust in the mainly local
authority community cohesion programmes which are seen by some
Government departments as "soft and fluffy". We reject
this view—as do most local authorities and other agencies—and
would point out that changing attitudes and values is generally
much harder than controlling behaviour. Further, local authorities
and their partners are able to see all threats to cohesion in
the round and have the same governance, policy and practice in
place to reach across the spectrum. Indeed, it is not practical
or cost effective to set up separate teams. An inclusive approach
enables them to maintain a working relationship with their Muslim
communities.
5.2 The real problem with the Prevent agenda
is simply that it is presently situated within a counter-terrorism
strategy and implemented by a team dedicated to counter-terrorism
and is therefore viewed through this lens with suspicion and apprehension;
there is a strong belief that the community will be spied upon,
wrongly accused and treated unfairly; or simply that the community
is made guilty by association with terrorism.
5.3 If Prevent were to be positioned with
the remit of community cohesion practitioners a more inclusive
and proportionate approach could be taken, working across communities,
dealing with all forms of extremism, in which ever community is
most at risk. We would point to the growth of the Far Right and
whilst some Far Right groups are legitimately contesting democratic
elections, it is also the case that these groups are often accompanied
by a dangerous fringe element who are prepared to resort to violence
and practice intimidation and promote hatred. Even Far Right democratic
parties often demonise communities, exacerbate tensions and intimidate
sections of our community.
5.4 The link between the Far Right and the
Muslim community is plain to see—many of their campaigns
promote negative images of Muslims, fringe elements sponsor hate
campaigns which just happen to coincide with elections and more
recently and more worrying the Far Right are embarking on a campaign
of provocation against Muslim communities—as evidenced by
the recent events of Harrow and Birmingham. All extremism is therefore
inter-connected and in this case, the intimidation of Muslim communities
is bound to heighten their fears and apprehension and, in turn,
push them towards their own extreme elements who persuade them
that this is simply indicative of the underlying western anti-Muslim
campaign. Community cohesion local teams and practitioners will
necessarily have to adopt common approaches and provide interventions
which are cross—community, to bridge divides, dissolve tensions
and widen experiences and identities.
5.5 We therefore propose that the Counter—terrorism
(CONTEST) strategy should focus on the largely reactive and responsive
elements most closely aligned with the emergency services and
that the "prevent" element be widened, re-named and
incorporated into generic and local cohesion programmes dealing
with all aspects of community relations, including the tackling
of issues of poverty and alienation and promoting common interests
and shared experiences.
5.6 None of this is to suggest that Government
should remove its very sharp focus on the combating of terrorism,
but rather it is more effective to engage people through all of
their life experiences and roles, rather than simply through their
faith identity. It exposes them not only to a wider variety of
voices and influences, but also to members of many other communities
too—and of course has the added benefit that non-Muslims
begin to see what they have in common with themselves. This would
also enable a closer alignment with other Government strategies
to promote active citizenship and community empowerment, which
are generally ignored under the current narrowly focussed work
of Prevent.
5.7 Community cohesion programmes are more
able to tackle the underlying issues that breed resentment, fear
and hatred and to provide the skills to enable communities to
learn to live and prosper with difference. This requires a wide
range of approaches including both formal and informal education
programmes (and the new schools duty has been a very welcome development),
active citizenship and volunteering schemes, sports, arts and
social care schemes, to build social capital and to encourage
people to look out for one another across ethnic, faith, age and
other boundaries. This needs supporting with a drive to ensure
that public services are cohesion "proofed" so that
all policies and programmes support "bridging". This
also needs to include procurement and the funding of schemes in
the voluntary and private sectors.
5.8 We believe this new approach will be
much more likely to broaden peoples' horizons rather than reducing
them, and be seen to be more open and fair, addressing extremism
and risks on a consistent and proportionate basis. This will gain
a wider acceptability and will be more sustainable in the longer
term.
September 2009
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