Memorandum from Muslim Women's Network
UK (MWNUK) (PVE 20)
1. Having operated for four years under
the umbrella of the Women's National Commission, the Muslim Women's
Network UK (MWNUK) established itself as an independent national
organisation in 2007, registering as a Community Interest Company.
2. Since 2007, membership has expanded threefold
and the MWNUK now has 140 members. These include academics
and students; workers in voluntary sector support services; health
professionals; experts in women's rights, diversity policy, disability,
and refugees; businesswomen; local government and law enforcement
officers; and artists. Membership is diverse in terms of age,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, and location.
3. MWNUK has an elected Board which consists
of 13 members, some connected with the network since its
founding, and some drawn from newer members. MWNUK has two part-time
staff, an inter-active website (www.mwnuk.co.uk) and an office
located in central Birmingham.
ABOUT THE
VIEWS IN
THIS REPORT
4. Prior to writing this report, the members
of MWNUK were consulted for their views. This submission also
includes the views of the author of this report, Shaista Gohir,
Executive Director of MWNUK as she has considerable experience
in "prevent" work. She is an accredited specialist peer
for the Improvement and Development Agencya role that involves
developing and sharing best practice with local authorities on
preventing violent extremism (PVE). She has also worked as a PVE
consultant with local authorities which has involved engaging
with Muslim communities, facilitating workshops, developing commissioning
processes, assessing projects for funding, project evaluations,
assessments for the NI35, developing action plans, advising on
schools tool kits. Shaista also sits on various local authority
and police PVE boards.
Is the Prevent programme the right way of addressing
the problem of violent extremism, or are there better ways of
doing it?
5. The current approach of targeting the
entire Muslim community while trying to address the problem of
violent extremism is morally wrong. The far reaching implications
of the "Prevent" agenda for the Muslim community have
been totally ignored by government. There is little evidence of
recognition by the government on the massive harm done by their
emphasis on policies relating to preventing violent extremism.
The main concerns that have been expressed about this programme
are:
All Muslim are being stigmatized
5.1 The "prevent" agenda is too
broad as it stigmatizes the majority of Muslims who are law abiding
citizens. Even those Muslims who find the current prevent programme
as an acceptable approach to tackling extremism, feel uncomfortable
in the way that it is being promoted and labeled eg usage of words
such as "preventing violent extremism." Anger has also
been expressed in other usage of language in the "prevent
stategy" as it implies all Muslims have the potential to
become violent extremists. For example, prevent objective 4 is
about: "Increasing the capacity of communities to resist
violent extremism." Page 31 of "The Prevent
Strategy" explains this objective as follows: "strong,
organized and empowered communities are better equipped to effectively
reject the ideology of violent extremism
."
This description suggests that all Muslims will be tempted towards
violent extremism unless action is taken to build their resilience.
Hatred of Muslims is increasing
5.2 Many Muslims believe that stereotyping
all Muslims as potential terrorists in the "prevent"
strategy is resulting in the increase of racist attitudes and
Islamophobia within the media, amongst the general public and
service providers. Resentment also includes from other minority
communities who feel that Muslims are being given special treatment
by having funding targeted towards them. There is also great concern
that right wing groups such as the British National Party are
taking advantage of the anti-Muslim sentiments and fuelling further
hatred of Muslims. There is fear that Islamophobia has become
so acceptable that even school children are becoming involved
in verbal and physical abuse.
Right wing extremism is being ignored
5.3 There is resentment in Muslim communities
that to date the "prevent" funding by local authorities
has not been used to tackle the rising violent threat from racists
and fascists. This approach has led to the further alienation
of Muslim communities. Although the new Communities Secretary
John Denham has recently stated that the "prevent" programme
will now also focus on rightwing extremism, it remains to be seen
whether that translates to projects on the ground by local authorities.
Muslim are being put under surveillance by mainstreaming
"prevent"
5.4 There is a new drive to mainstream the
"prevent" strategy in core council services and other
statutory agencies so that it is embedded in the delivery of services.
The government has not shown that it has considered the impact
this part of the strategy will have on how Muslims are viewed
and treated by service providers. There is a fear that "prevent"
will exacerbate the problem of discrimination already faced by
Muslims when accessing services. This part of the strategy also
emphasizes information sharing amongst agencies which is being
perceived as "spying" on and monitoring of Muslims who
use public services. This is likely to alienate Muslims further.
5.5 Concerns about mainstreaming the "prevent"
agenda are also shared by service providers. For example, many
schools in the UK are resisting applying the guidance in the school
PVE toolkit launched by the Department of Children, Schools and
Families. The toolkit is aimed at helping schools to contribute
to the prevention of violent extremism. The government says that
many of the recommendations within the toolkit are in line with
what schools are already working (on eg to develop equalities
and anti-bullying practice, community cohesion and the PSHE and
Citizenship curriculum). The fact that separate guidance has been
produced especially to deal with PVE puts majority of the law
abiding Muslim pupils under the spotlight. According to research
carried out by various teachers unions, the problem of faith-based
bullying in schools and colleges has intensified in recent years,
particularly in the case of anti-Muslim prejudice and racism.
5.6 Services and school are also expected
to refer vulnerable young people to the police "Channel"
project. The project takes referrals from a number of sources
on individuals that may be vulnerable to becoming involved in
violent extremism. The referrals are likely to be subjective and
may result in inappropriate referrals of young Muslims bearing
in mind the anti-Muslim sentiments that have increased. It appears
that Muslims are under surveillance in every aspect of their lives
and such a strategy will be counterproductive.
Data Collection on Muslim communities
5.7 The national indicator 35 (NI 35)
is an assessment framework which evaluates the effectiveness of
Prevent related work programmes on a 1-5 scale against four
main criteria. One of the four criteria is: understanding of and
engagement with Muslim communities. Page 55 of "The
Prevent Strategy," states that local authorities should have:
"the sophisticated understanding of local Muslim communities
including strong knowledge and their make-up including different
ethnic groups, denominations, social and economic status, elected
representatives, community leaders, knowledge of location and
denomination of mosques, awareness of community groups."
5.8 This part of the strategy highlights
the amount of scrutiny that Muslim communities are under. The
government has not showed how this extent of the mapping of Muslim
communities is going to help it in its counter terrorism strategy.
This blanket approach towards whole Muslim communities highlights
that the "prevent" strategy is not targeted towards
individuals who are perhaps on the fringes of violent extremism.
No other community has been subjected to this level of information
gathering.
No Policies and Actions to tackle Social Injustices
faced by Muslim communities
5.9 There is concern that government actions
are not matching their rhetoric. For example the government promotes
"shared values" but policies and actions are not addressing
problems such as the rise in incitement of hatred against Muslims
which is resulting in increased verbal and physical attacks. Many
of the PVE projects funded by local authorities focus on capacity
building rather than deradicalising extremists and bringing them
back from the brink of radicalization. Such projects therefore
do not need to be linked with preventing violent extremism. Instead
these should be a part of a broader attempt to tackle inequalities.
A priority area for government should be policies and action to
tackle the discrimination against and inequalities faced by Muslim
communities. Due to the high levels of deprivation faced by Muslims
communities, the government could justify building the capacity
of communities without having to link such a policy with the "prevent"
programme. The relationship and trust between the government and
Muslim communities would be strengthened if it helped Muslims
in Britian achieve social justice.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Prevent should not be the only strategy
used to tackle violent extremism. The government should explore
alternative strategies and/or review and amend the current "prevent"
strategy and take into account the concerns raised by Muslim communities,
academics and other professionals who have knowledge or are working
in this field of work.
6.2 The language in the prevent strategy
should be reviewed and some research carried out on the impact
that the usage of the negative language has had. Research should
include an analysis on how the "prevent" programme has
impacted on the opinions of non-Muslims about Muslim communities.
6.3 The government should ensure that where
right wing extremism is a problem, there are projects which tackles
this issue.
6.4 The government should weigh the costs
of mainstreaming the "prevent" programme against any
tangible benefits eg will service providers realistically be able
to spot potential violent extremists?
How robust is the Government's analysis of the
factors which lead people to become involved in violent extremism?
Is the "Prevent" programme appropriately targeted to
address the most important of those factors?
7. The government lists many factors that
lead people to violent extremism which includes racism, discrimination,
inequalities, lack of social mobility, unemployment, and criminality.
Foreign policy remains the main grievance yet the government analysis
down plays this fact often describing this grievance as "perceived"
implying that it is not justified. In fact, "prevent objective
5" in the "prevent" strategy is about addressing
grievances. However, projects addressing this objective tend to
focus on providing space to express grievances rather than actually
dealing with them. Despite the government's analysis of factors
leading people to violent extremism, it has not shown how any
of these grievances are being addressed or taken into account
in policy decisions.
8. RECOMMENDATION
The government should not just to create space
for debating grievances but actually implement policies and take
action to tackle the grievances.
How appropriate, and how effective, is the Government's
strategy for engaging with communities? Has the Government been
speaking to the right people? Has its programme reached those
at whom it is-or should be-aimed?
9. Concerns regarding "who" the
government is engaging with and "how" they are engaging
with Muslim communities have been expressed as follows:
Muslim women are being used by government
9.1 Concern has been expressed about the
use of Muslim women in the "prevent" agenda. Muslim
women are one of the most deprived groups in Britain today who
should be empowered anyway. There is concern that the skills of
Muslim women are being built up to "spy" on their families
rather than participate fully in society and overcome barriers
they face. For example, Muslim women face multiple discrimination
based on their gender, ethnicity, faith and dress; highest unemployment
rates; the poorest health; low educational attainment etc, yet
there appears to be no concrete policies to tackle these issues.
In addition other faith and secular women's groups are hostile
towards Muslim women's groups as a result of the "prevent"
funding being targeted towards them.
9.2 As Muslim women are high on the government's
political agenda, the National Muslim Women's Advisory Group was
set up almost two years ago. At the time, this appeared to be
a good idea as Muslim women's voices are often not heard by policy
makers. In the last two two years the women have had little opportunity
to influence policy. Instead the women have been involved in developing
and overseeing the delivery of three projects. However, this task
could have been carried out by the myriad of the already existing
women's groups. The government has missed a real opportunity to
involve Muslim women in decision making processessomething
that even the Muslim communities are not doing.
Engagement not diverse enough
9.3 The government's engagement with Muslim
communities has improved since 2007 with more diverse groups
of Muslims being engaged with including women and youth. However,
more still needs to be done. The government and especially local
authorities need to continue with efforts to reach out to and
engage with more diverse Muslim groups and newer Muslim communities.
9.4 Some local authorities are only engaging
with a handful of groups and individuals who they are familiar
with. There is concern that this is resulting in some hard to
reach communities being ignored and funding being given to organizations
that have no access to people affected by extremists therefore
are achieving little tangible benefits. There are also concerns
that many grass root organisations are still unaware of the PVE
funding or have find it difficult to access it as they are unsure
of the agenda. This may perhaps explain the lack of resistance
from Muslim communities on "prevent" as they may not
be fully aware of the long term implications for them. However
there are groups that are refusing to work under the PVE banner
as they fear losing credibility as the title ignores that the
vast majority are law abiding citizens. Those that have accepted
the funding may not necessarily agree with the current strategy
but may be viewing the funding as an opportunity for empowerment
and capacity building.
10. RECOMMENDATIONS
10.1 The National Women's Advisory Group
should be given more opportunities to influence policy.
10.2 Policies to tackle the empowerment
of Muslim women should not be linked to "prevent."
10.3 Government and local authorities should
to continue seeking out more diverse voices in the Muslim communities.
10.4 Local authorities should to ensure
the PVE funding is accessible to a wider range of groups.
Is the necessary advice and expertise available
to local authorities on how to implement and evaluate the programme?
11. It is very difficult to judge whether
"prevent" has been effective. The local authorities
may feel that their initiatives have been successful. But overall
can we measure really the public is safer and the threat of violent
extremism has been reduced due to the "prevent" projects?
If Muslims feel alienated by "prevent," can we really
say that the strategy has been a success? Some concerns with regards
to the handling of "prevent" by local authorities include:
Lack of expertise
11.1 Concerns have been expressed that local
authorities do not have sufficient guidance, expertise and knowledge
of Muslim communities to implement the "prevent" programme.
In some local authorities there is insufficient staff to help
deliver the "prevent" work and is added to the existing
workload of staff. This often results in too much pressure being
placed on staff which must have a negative impact on the delivery
of the agenda. PVE budgets make up a tiny proportion of local
authorities total budgets, yet this area of work appears to be
taking up a disproportionately large amount of staff time in terms
of delivery, oversight and feeding back to government etc.
11.2 There does not appear to be sufficient
training and face to face opportunities for staff from different
local authorities to share best practice or learn from each other's
problems. Although a website exists through the Improvement and
Development Agency to share good practice and experiences, staff
are often too busy to make use of this resource. Also the National
PVE conferences that often take place involve listening to selected
speakers and do not give opportunities to staff actually delivering
the strategy to discuss good practice and problems amongst themselves.
Lack of transparency
11.3 The issue of lack of transparency has
also been raised with regards to how projects are funded ie whether
impartial and robust selection procedures are being applied; the
amounts of funding being awarded to organizations; and evaluation
reports. Where individuals have actually have tried to obtain
this information from their local authorities, they have been
met with resistance. Some local authorities are also accused of
being too busy ticking "boxes" and achieving targets
on paper that may not necessarily translate to practical tangible
results on the ground with real people.
12. RECOMMENDATIONS
12.1 Opportunities for staff delivering
PVE from different local authorities (such as away days) should
be created where they can share good practice and learn from each
other's problems and experiences.
12.2 There should be sufficient resource
in place to deliver the "prevent" strategy and support
provided to local authorities where needed.
12.3 Local authorities should implement
procedures to ensure there is transparency on funding awarded;
which groups receive funding; selection criteria followed on funding
decisions; and on evaluations.
12.4 Local authorities should have procedures
to ensure better communication with their communities.
Are the objectives of the "Prevent"
agenda being communicated effectively those at whom it is aimed?
13. Most groups that are being funded are
unable to reach those vulnerable youth that are likely to be drawn
into violent extremism or have extremist attitudes. Also such
individuals are unlikely to want to engage with such mainstream
Muslim organizations.
14. During the consultations the issue of
the issue of citizenship education was also raised. There was
criticism that the rather than patronizing youth by educating
them on what it means to be a good British citizen, more effort
should be directed towards making young Muslims feel that they
are fully accepted by society as a British citizen through action
such as tackling discrimination; raising educational attainment,;
tackling high unemployment rates; and tackling health inequalities
etc. More need to be done to engage with disaffected youth who
are marginalized and excluded from decision making processes but
not under the "prevent" policy.
15. RECOMMENDATION
An analysis needs to be carried out on how many
projects that have been funded to date actually engage with youth
who are on the fringes of extremism or have extremist attitudes
compared projects targeting Muslims generally.
Is the Government seeking, and obtaining, appropriate
advice on how to achieve the goals of the "Prevent"
programme?
Influence of Police
16. Concerns have been expressed about too
much influence from the police on local authorities on delivering
the agenda which means some action plans for delivery have a heavy
police bias and are insensitive to Muslim communities.
Influence of Muslim Advisors
17. Concerns have been expressed that the
Muslim advisors selected by government to advise on "prevent"
have had no or very limited contact with the Muslim communities
whom they are advising on and whom this strategy is having a considerable
impact. The recent recruitment of Muslim advisors through an application
process is welcomed and is a step in the right direction. However,
as the communities are diverse and spread across the UK, their
reach will still be limited.
Influence from Muslim communities
18. Concerns have been expressed that some
local authorities are not consulting the local Muslim communities
with regards to the best way to achieve the "prevent"
objectives especially as these communities are considered vital
in helping to deliver the "prevent" programme locally.
19. RECOMMENDATIONS
19.1 Recruitment of regional Muslim advisors
who can feed concerns of Muslim communities to the national advisors
should be considered.
19.2 When delivering the "prevent"
programme, local authorities should assess how the language and
actions relating to "prevent" is impacting on local
communities.
19.3 There should be check and balances
in place to ensure that police working with local authorities
take into account the impact their use of language; input; and
actions are having on local Muslim communities.
19.4 Local authorities should carry out
regular consultations with Muslim communities.
How effectively has the Government evaluated the
effectiveness of the programme and the value for money which is
being obtained from it? Have reactions to the programme been adequately
gauged?
Lack of expertise
20. Local authorities are often under resourced
in terms of staff to carry out "prevent work" and do
not have the expertise to carry out evaluations of projects. Local
authorities therefore at times have to rely on consultants for
evaluations and support. As this is a new agenda, there are insufficient
experts in this field of work. There is concern that some so called
"experts" have little knowledge of the agenda or knowledge
of communities but are being used by local authorities who perhaps
feel they have no choice as they need the support and are under
pressure to deliver the strategy locally.
Evaluations are not carried out or are not robust
enough
21. Although local authorities have been
visited by government auditors and some have even had independent
evaluations of their projects, such assessments are only as good
as the criteria set for them. During the consultation, there were
suggestions that some local authorities "know" what
to say to pass such reviews. Also there has been criticism of
some evaluations praising projects which the local communities
have felt have been wasted resources and have not fulfilled the
"prevent objectives." In most cases, where independent
evaluations and audits have been carried out, they have not been
communicated to the local communities and are not made accessible.
22. The government has selected certain
"prevent" projects from around the country as best practice
in their national "prevent strategy." However, there
was no independent evaluation of these projects to verify they
were indeed good projects that were worth replicating elsewhere.
The projects were simply chosen as they were recommended by local
authorities and regional government offices. Some of these so
called best practice projects have received criticism locally.
Reactions to the projects not being gauged locally
23. The "Prevent" programme will
only be effective if it has the support of the local organizations
and communities. It appears that to date, the opinions of people
on the ground have not been gauged after the delivery of projects
with regards to their effectiveness and appropriateness. Although
some local authorities may be running community workshops where
the reactions to their projects may be expressed, there is no
formal requirement to consult local communities to check the effectiveness
of the projects and local strategy. Such feedback is important
as it could help improve the local "prevent" strategy.
24. RECOMMENDATIONS
24.1 Projects that are highlighted by government
as best practice should be verified and evaluated first.
24.2 All evaluations should be more robust
with improved measurement criteria.
24.3 Lists of experts in the field of PVE
should be provided to local authorities by central government.
24.4 Local reactions towards projects should
be measured.
Is there adequate differentiation between what
should be achieved through the Prevent programme and the priorities
that concern related, but distinct, policy frameworks such as
cohesion and integration?
25. The engagement of Muslim communities
is mainly occurring through "prevent" rather than any
other policy framework including cohesion and integration. However,
as some of the aims of "prevent" overlap the aims of
integration and cohesion, some local authorities are packaging
and delivering "prevent" under the cohesion label to
make it more acceptable to Muslim communities. The Integration
and Cohesion programmes should be separate entities with their
own unique aims and goals as they are crucial issues in a multicultural
society. However, these policies also need to be reviewed as they
have been reduced to the failure of Muslim and other migrant communities
themselves. The government therefore focuses exclusively on changing
the behavior of these communities. However, cohesion and integration
involves a two way process involving both minority and indigineous
white communities. Unless the government acknowledges that there
is also an attitude problem among the white community, who maybe
even more unwilling to integrate, then any of the government's
policy frameworks will have a limited impact.
26. RECOMMENDATIONS
26.1 The "prevent" and cohesion/integration
policies should be kept separate by local authorities.
26.2 The cohesion and integration polices
should be reviewed and not just focus on attitudes of minority
communities but include the white indigenous communities as well.
September 2009
|