Memorandum from the Somali Family Support
Group (SFSG) (PVE 26)
The nuance that the programme itself was carrying
was very antagonistic and ill conceived. Positioning a programme
that denotes to fight violent extremism and help, support and
capacity build Muslim communities in one sentence spelt disaster
from day one. Most NGOs dealing with Muslim communities felt by
working under the said programme, they were in agreement with
the impracticality that Islam and its followers were sympathetic
terrorism.
On the Prevent programme our appraisal is as
follows:
— We do not think it to be the way forward
in addressing the problem of violent extremism. This is because
the government is tunnel visioned when it deals with its Muslim
community and fails dreadfully to get a peripheral view. In the
context of the Muslim community, it is significant that the government
should develop a policy that is transparent, that alleviates the
social injustice and structural inequalities Muslims have endured
in the last decades.
— The British foreign policy plays a crucial
role in the way British Muslims identity themselves with the Ummah,
and the government needs to accept that this unhappiness with
the foreign policy felt by those at "risk groups" could
be a potential for radicalisation. This especially rings true
in the Somali community regarding "Al Shabab" and piracy,
propagated by the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq & Palestine.
— Giving the charge of both funding and
supervising the funded project to the Local Authorities (LA) has
worked well in some boroughs but not in others. Some local authorities
use the money for other purposes, especially since it is not ring
fenced in the Local area agreement. We feel that the diversity
within the British Muslim communities is something that needs
to be acknowledged as there is no "British Muslim community"
who can speak for all British Muslims. We feel that the government
should set up an impartial body who oversee the delivery, consultation
and the dispensation to the whole of the Muslim community. The
programme must be widely promoted and application process simplified.
It is also very important to re-evaluate the objectives of the
programme in to what is potentially achieving and what is failing
at.
— We believe that the LA do not have the
necessary expertise to evaluate the governments' targets (especially
since the targets are quantitative rather than qualitative on
the Muslims) and perhaps a steering group ought to be set up,
made up of those within the diverse Muslim communities to evaluate
its effectiveness. Such implementation has to follow a carefully
thought through programme on the aims and outcomes, and be transparent
on all its dealings within the delivery and commissioning of services.
— Many of the Muslim grass root workers
who are respected and considered credible, prefer not to apply
for PVE money as they do not wish to come across as colluding
with the idea that Islam is an inherently violent religion. Many
Muslims are disillusioned and therefore do not trust the government's
intentions as they feel there is a institutionalised culture of
double standards, a point that the government must address.
— Another factor hindering the effectiveness
of the Prevent strategy is the perception of non Muslim communities.
There has been more funding going into Muslim communities ever
since 9/11, however there is a growing sentiment from other communities
that this is almost like a reward for "bad" behaviour,
creating tensions and thus hindering effective inter community
partnerships.
— The dissemination of PREVENT agenda remains
largely misunderstood, if not totally hidden from the target audience;
this is all stems down to a lack of diverse communication package
that is palatable to the audience its targeting
— By instituting the Local Authority as
the main purser for this programme, the government has failed
to address issues with relevant communities. The programme became
an exercise on ticking boxes and achieving targets on paper that
may not necessarily translate to practical tangible results on
the ground with real people.
— In this experience we consider ourselves
to be a isolated within a smaller minority and we therefore remain
marginalised, institutionalised and secluded from all decision
making policies that could have imminent effect on our way of
life.
— Government must learn to consult a much
wider group of Muslims as the British Muslim community is one
of a very complex web that encompasses multiple identities, different
cultures and indeed different historical backgrounds and this
leads to the present objectives in our opinion to be somewhat
misguided. Especially among the African Muslims who are not consulted
in most of the government policies that affect the local Muslim
communities, thus creating a plethora disenfranchisement from
mainstream society.
September 2009
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