Memorandum from Leicester City Council
(PVE 29)
1. LEICESTERCONTEXT
1.1 Leicester is a very diverse, multi faith,
multi ethnic city and is amongst the most diverse ethnic minority
communities outside of London. The city prides itself on this
and the high levels of community cohesion that exists within and
amongst its communities.
1.2 This uniqueness has attracted much national
and international public and academic interest in the city and
how it manages community cohesion.
1.3 Local intelligence indicates that approximately
60% of the city's population is ethically white and 40% have an
ethnic minority background.
1.4 In terms of faith, Leicester has a unique
mix of Christians, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. The majority of
the ethnic minority community are Hindu (approximately 61%), a
quarter are Muslim (approximately 25%) and 4% are Sikh. (Leicester
City Council estimates September 2009).
1.5 Faith seems to play an active part in
the lives of many of Leicester's communities. There are approximately
150 places of Christian worship in the city, two Jewish synagogues,
36 mosquesmajority of which are Sunni mosques, 22 Hindu
temples, seven Sikh Gudwaras and one Jain temple.
2. LEICESTER'S
MUSLIM COMMUNITIES
2.1 Two thirds of Leicester's Muslim communities
are of Indian origin.
2.2 Over recent years, particularly since
the arrival of Somali communities from 2001, as well as asylum
seekers and refugees, the Muslim population in the city has significantly
increased. This growth is expected to continue as 26% of the school
population is Muslim and 15% Hindu. (PLASC, 2006).
2.3 As well as our Muslim population increasing
we have observed an increase in devoutness to the Islamic faith
with an increase in symbols, the wearing of the headscarf by Muslim
women and religious dress.
2.4 Another interesting observation is that
our Hindu and Muslim communities are very spatially concentrated
in Leicester: Hindus in the north of the city, and Muslims to
the east of the city centre. There are no similar concentrations
observed for other religions.
3. MAINSTREAMING
MODERATION IN
LEICESTER
3.1 During 2007-08, Leicester was identified
as a priority local authority and became one of the government's
70 Pathfinder areas.
3.2 Following the launch of the Prevent
Strategy, the city was provided with additional three year funding
through the Local Area Based Grant in support of work to prevent
violent extremism.
3.3 Leicester has questioned the government's
use of "Preventing Violent Extremism" (PVE) language
and has chosen to refer to it locally as a strategy of "Mainstreaming
Moderation" which is more suited to the to the city's approach
as it encompasses all forms of violent extremism.
3.4 We have built on the extensive work
on community cohesion in the city, coupled with a focus on developing
and delivering targeted work with our diverse Muslim communities.
3.5 Over the past two years our focus on
Muslim communities has concentrated on work to further understand
and engage our diverse Muslim communities, work with Muslim school-age
young people and women and supporting vulnerable individuals identified
at risk of getting involved in violent extremism.
3.6 In Leicester we continue to work to
challenge and prevent violent extremism in all its forms and promote
our city's shared values. This includes those inspired Al Qaida
and linked groups, and includes the far right and animal activists
etc.
3.7 Working hand in hand with our diverse
Muslim and non-Muslim communities and partners, we are actively
working to identify, challenge and expose violent extremist ideologies
that attack and undermine our city's shared values.
LEICESTER CITY
COUNCIL'S
RESPONSE TO
THE QUESTIONS
SET OUT
BY THE
COMMUNITIES AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COMMITTEE RELATING
TO THE
GOVERNMENT'S
PROGRAMME FOR
PREVENTING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM KNOWN
AS "PREVENT".
1. Is the Prevent programme the right way
of addressing the problem of violent extremism, or are there better
ways of doing it?
1.1 A Prevent strategy and programme alone
cannot and will not address the problem of violent extremism the
UK faces. This is a multi layered, multi issue, complex agenda
and the response needs to acknowledge and address this.
1.2 The current strategy has, intentionally
or not, led to the stigmatisation and isolation of some of our
Muslim communities. This has been unhelpful and at times even
detrimental to the strong levels of community cohesion the city
has worked so hard to achieve.
1.3 The current Prevent programme is heavily
focused on tackling "extremism" and does not give enough
importance to other social factors such as poverty, deprivation,
alienation and conflicts of culture and identity which all are
potential influencing factors.
1.4 By working with all our communities
in a fair and transparent way we can build a greater sense of
trust and confidence which will provide a stronger basis to bring
about challenges and solutions to common issues that affect us
allsuch as the threat of violent extremism.
1.5 We all (Government, local authorities,
the police, youth services etc) need to understand that a stand
alone strategy is not enough. This is a real challenge and we
need to be working across strategies and cross cutting agendas
to see "success"this means making sure all services
are open and accessible and fitting to the diverse communities
we serve, that all our young people have a fair chance to education
and achieving their aspirations, that those identified as "vulnerable"
or "at risk" and their families are suitably supported.
2. How robust is the Government's analysis
of the factors that lead people to become involved in violent
extremism? Is the Prevent programme appropriately targeted to
address the most important of those factors?
2.1 Our understanding of "terrorists"
in that they lie in the shadows and do not identify themselves
as "terrorists".
2.2 The profiles of previous convicted terrorists
paint a varied picture which cuts across ethnicity, culture, class,
education and geographical boundaries and makes it difficult to
effectively target work.
3. How appropriate, and how effective, is
the Government's strategy for engaging with communities? Has the
Government been speaking to the right people? Has its programme
reached those at whom it isor should beaimed?
3.1 Broadening and deepening community
engagement: The government needs to broaden its engagement
to include the UK's diverse Muslim and non-Muslim communities,
specifically smaller communities who do not affiliate themselves
to larger representative organisations.
3.2 This lack of formalised link to Muslim
representative opinion presents problems for government and us
locally too, as it can allow for individual opinions and differences
to sometimes dominate the debate.
3.3 Up until the recent refreshed version,
the Prevent Strategy has focused on engaging with Muslim communities
which has been at times unhelpful in engaging the "target"
communities as they have felt that the finger has been pointed
to them as the "problem". The refreshed version supports
Leicester's approach of engaging with all communities to address
varying forms and guises of violent extremism that undermine the
city's shared values, including those inspired by Al-Qaida and
associated groups and far right extremists.
3.4 The Prevent strategy needs to deepen
its engagement beyond the "usual suspects" and community
gatekeepers. We need to reach out to and work with those that
are not currently accessing service provision; those that are
not writing letters to us or sitting on our various groups and
committee. We need to be hearing and listening to the "unheard"
voices.
3.5 At present in Leicester partners and
key community contacts' are aware of the strategy but the wider
community is largely unaware, except for some negative perceptions
about its intentions fuelled by media reporting and internet sites.
3.6 For Leicester our programme of work
under this agenda will need to broaden and deepen, specifically
work with Muslim parents, NEET young people and those not accessing
youth provision, those of University age, and our Somali and Muslim
convert/revert communities. We are also stepping up our work with
our white outer estate communities, dispelling myths and perceptions
and addressing grievances' fuelled by the Far Right. We believe
this could be a potential area of tension, ie between Far Right
activist and those of Muslim faith in the city.
3.7 There needs to be less reliance on individuals
advising at a national level and closer working directly with
local authorities. Each area across the UK is very different in
its makeup, structures' and relationships and will therefore require
localised solutions. We would like the Government to be much more
open to varying approachesand this includes the allocation
of resources.
4. IS
THE NECESSARY
ADVICE AND
EXPERTISE AVAILABLE
TO LOCAL
AUTHORITIES ON
HOW TO
IMPLEMENT AND
EVALUATE THE
PROGRAMME?
4.1 Some are available and have proved to
be useful. To assist us further, we would welcome clear and consistent
guidelines, templates and case studies of what a "successful"
programme or intervention looks like.
4.2 Specific guidelines around conducting
a "risk assessment" of the Prevent programme would also
be welcome and assist in mitigating risks such as funding groups/projects
that advocate violence or that challenge our country's shared
values.
5. Are the objectives of the "Prevent"
agenda being communicated effectively to those at whom it is aimed?
5.1 "Prevent" should be aimed
at all of our communities and therefore the answer to this question
is currently "no".
5.2 It seems that those in the "prevent"
worldpractitioners', policy makers, academics and community
leaders are still focusing efforts on our Muslim communities.
5.3 In Leicester we have made conscious
efforts to balance focused work with our Muslim communities as
well as those from non-Muslim backgrounds. In the past we have
come across some tensions with Government about our approach however
with the recent refreshed version of the Prevent strategy now
in place this has confirmed our approach and we will continue
to build on thisfor example by working specifically with
our white communities from the outer estates and addressing far
right tensions.
5.4 More effort is required to promote positive
images and perceptions of what the strategy is striving to deliver
and achieve. Communities need to understand that this is "our"
(all communities) issue and not a "Muslim" issue.
5.5 Mainstreaming is key to achieving this.
We need to have the objectives of the Prevent strategy clear in
our minds and instilled in day to day work so that it become part
and parcel of everyday planning and practicerather than
being a "add on".
5.6 Increasing understanding and raising
awareness is crucial to the delivery of the strategyIn
Leicester we are encouraging frontline staff across public services,
including police officers, youth workers, social workers, mental
health staff and teachers to attend a two day awareness raising
training around "Prevent".
6. Is the Government seeking and obtaining,
appropriate advice on how to achieve the goals of the "Prevent"
programme?
6.1 The Government have commissioned a number
of research projects, reviews and inquiries into how we can best
achieve the goals of the Prevent programme, but there seems to
be a lack of conclusive information as a result. Further work
to seek the views of communities and individuals on "the
ground" needs to take place including Imams, Muslim young
people and women.
6.2 There also seems to be a lack of evidence/critical
evaluation of specific programmes such as "Channel".
Robust evaluation of Prevent programmes is required and this needs
to be disseminated in a timely fashion so localities are able
to plan and allocate resources based on "what works"
at the beginning of the programmerather than getting to
the end of year two and still being asked for information relating
to the previous year.
7. How effectively has the Government evaluated
the effectiveness of the programme and the value for money which
is being obtained from it? Have reactions to the programme been
adequately gauged?
7.1 As mentioned, Government must improve
the way it evaluates the effectiveness of the Prevent programme.
7.2 To date, this has been somewhat patchy
and unclear with mixed messages being communicated regarding the
effectiveness of programmes. In some cases this has led to a loss
of community confidence and trust in the work we do and negative
press coverage.
7.3 We need to have a much clearer understanding
of what "success" looks like and be equipped to demonstrate
that a project or programme has achieved Prevent related objectivesthrough
qualitative and quantitative evidence including case studies pictures,
one to one interviews, observations, interviews, questionnaires
etc.
7.4 Further work around "value for
money" also needs to take placewhat will end/continue
after the lifetime of the Prevent programme in 2011? To ensure
best value, we need to be considering if and how projects can
be mainstreamed, what additional and ongoing benefits may be reaped
and identify any links to community cohesion objectives before
funding is awarded.
7.5 Specialist units such as the Community
Contact Unit and RICU set up by the government to facilitate the
delivery of the strategy have made steps to engage partners. As
we move forward, we hope that this continues and develops further.
8. Is there adequate differentiation between
what should be achieved through the Prevent programme and the
priorities that concern related, but distinct, policy frameworks
such as cohesion and integration?
8.1 On the ground there is still a lack
of differentiation between "Prevent" and other related
policy frameworks, specifically "Community Cohesion".
8.2 It seems that practitioners working
in the field and those who have been involved or have a interest
in the "Prevent" world have begun to gain an understanding
of this complex agenda, reflected in the way funding has been
allocated to projects over the last year compared to the Pathfinder
year.
8.3 The term "community cohesion"
is relatively recentfurther work with strategic leads,
policy makers, front line staff and communities needs to take
place to communicate the similarities and distinctions with other
related policy areas including the prevention of violent extremism,
in a clear and accessible manner.
September 2009
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