In response to our concerns about PVE and the
Prevent Strategy we produced a report in February 2009 entitled
"Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and Prevent—A
Muslim response." In this report, we comprehensively
highlighted why we believe Prevent fails in its aim to counter
violent extremism. The issues addressed are:
The details are in the report, which is attached,
and forms part of this submission. We will therefore not be addressing
these issues in detail in this paper but highlighting particular
areas of concern and making recommendations for the way forward.
Muslim Public Sector Worker
1. This submission has been prepared with
input from Muslims involved in Prevent.
2. We welcome this inquiry, as the Muslim
community has had no avenue to raise its legitimate concerns about
Prevent. However, we question the premise of this inquiry, which
assumes the problem lies in the strategy's implementation. We
fear that by seeking to tinker with the Prevent strategy's delivery
instead of looking at its inception, the inquiry has failed to
grasp that the problem lies in it's fundamental principles, which
treat a whole community as a potential terrorist risk.
3. We believe that this ill-conceived strategy
has further wounded and damaged the already vulnerable Muslim
community exposing it to increased vilification, physical attacks
and discrimination. It has given far right extremists ammunition
to justify their attacks on Muslims, such as the recent demonstrations
by groups linked to the BNP.
4. It has heightened tensions, created an
Islamophobic backlash and given legitimacy to far-right extremists
who have exploited the PVE agenda to further fuel the grievances
of alienated white communities. There is an erroneous impression
that Muslims are getting special treatment, funding and privileges,
which has also left other minority communities feeling resentful
thereby creating local tensions.
5. There is unprecedented and understandable
interest in the PVE funding programme by the media and others
as it claims it will build "resilience" to violent extremism
in Muslim communities. This has led to paranoia in local authorities
leading to disproportionate and heavy handed monitoring and security
checks of Muslim funded organisations, regular negative media
reporting and reports.
6. The vast majority of Muslims abhor and
condemn violent extremism and support initiatives to counter it.
They have sincerely taken part, for example, in the PVE Taskforce
convened after 7/7. Many accepted Prevent funding in goodwill
until they realised the full implications of the strategy that
they were not working "with" the government, as they
believed, but that they themselves were at the receiving end of
a government surveillance programme.
7. This strategy is unprecedented in that
the main stakeholders, the Muslim community, which it is targeting,
have been ignored—it is certainly not community-led. The
delivery of Prevent has been marked by secretiveness and lack
of transparency and accountability. There are infringes of civil
liberties and human rights. There has been a distinct lack of
normal democratic oversight processes. It makes a mockery of government
rhetoric and policies on equality, community involvement, stakeholder
engagement, open government, transparency and accountability.
8. The government has been accused of social
engineering the Muslim community by selecting whom it will interact
with based on their support for present government policy.
9. The first stage of Prevent was to bring
Muslim communities on board by offering them small pots of funding.
The next stage is to "mainstream" Prevent in core council
services and ultimately in all public sector services. Procedures,
which will be difficult to dismantle, are already being put in
place to monitor Muslims for signs of extremism when they use
any public service. For example, we understand that information-sharing
agreements with regards to identifying potential extremists have
been developed between departments and agencies.
10. The government has announced that it
will be reframing the Prevent Strategy to take into account
white far-right extremism. We can only imagine the outcry
if white working class communities were targeted as a whole community
that is vulnerable to violent extremism. We would not wish any
community to be subjected to the same treatment that has been
accorded to Muslim communities.
11. The government is sending out mixed
messages. Shortly after announcing the reframing of Prevent in
September 2009 to include far right extremism, it announced
a further £7.5 million is to go into improving the effectiveness
of the Prevent programme in tackling al-Qaeda-influenced extremism.
Part of this will mean more than 300 additional dedicated
police posts being set up across the two countries. In 2008-09 the
current posts were intended to support existing neighbourhood
policing teams. In 2009-10 the new posts are expected to
have a broader role, incorporating more aspects of the Prevent
strategy.
12. The government relies heavily on representative
bodies, advisory groups and advisors. A PVE industry has developed
where lucrative contracts are being given to consultants and "experts."
Most of these are well established having worked in the Race and
Equalities Industries They do not tend to have experience of the
faith sector and specifically the Muslim sector. Consequently,
a significant proportion of PVE funding is being wasted on ineffectual
mapping, research and consultation exercises.
13. The Quilliam Foundation have been given
considerable public funding and whose doubtful advice the government
listens to—being a reformed extremist does not make one
an "expert" on Muslim community issues. This has led,
for example, to the Contest 2 controversy where Quilliam's
advice led to the government's insistence on not "speaking"
to groups who did not reject "extremist" ideology as
defined by Quilliam.
14. The government's PVE and Prevent Strategies
have diverted attention from addressing the legitimate needs of
Muslims as citizens and as probably the most disadvantaged community
in the country as social indicators attest.
15. There has been a historical failure
of government policy towards the Muslim community. The most glaring
example is the Race Relations Act 1987. The fact that the Act
did not outlaw religious discrimination and make it a statutory
duty to address faith equality and anti-faith discrimination has
contributed to the social exclusion of Muslims. A faith-blind
approach to equality and anti-racism has not delivered social
justice for Muslims. The consequences have been extreme social
exclusion, marginalisation, alienation and lack of engagement
of Muslims in society.
16. Another policy failure is the Equality
Act 2006. The government failed to address the lack of faith discrimination
when they first came to power in 1997. It took until 2006 for
the Equality Act to include faith in the equalities agenda. However,
the legislation did not go far enough as there was no public sector
duty to consider religion faith/religion issues when designing
their policies, responsibilities and the delivery of services.
Therefore, there has been no incentive for the public sector to
address Muslim social exclusion institutionally and strategically.
17. The new Equality Bill, introduced into
Parliament in April 2009, will bring in a single "public
duty" requiring all publicly-funded bodies to proactively
promote equality across seven strands, including faith, and remove
barriers to fair service provision. However, at a consultation
by the Government Equalities Office in London this month, there
was a discussion on the urgency in getting the legislation through
before a general election in spring. It was said that if it were
not completed by April 2010 it would fall. In addition, the
House of Commons committee and the House of Lords may delete or
add duties. It may mean that the faith discrimination duty is
taken out.
18. The faith public duty in the Equality
Bill 2009 is essential to addressing Muslim social exclusion.
It will be disastrous for the Muslim community if the Bill was
to fall or if the faith duty is removed. If the Equality Bill
was to go through without a public duty on faith or if it was
diluted, the Muslim community will be in an even worse position
than before. The government needs to take responsibility for its
failure in getting faith equality on the statute books as soon
as it was elected and when it finally did so in 2006 it did
not make it a public duty. If the Bill falls and there is a change
of government, it is unlikely to be put forward again in the foreseeable
future.
MUSLIM VOICES—GRASSROOTS
EXPERIENCES OF
PREVENT
1. We have had a considerable amount of
feedback from the Muslim community, which has been overwhelmingly
against Prevent. They have recounted disturbing experiences of
working on Prevent projects, either as workers in the public sector
or as Muslim individuals and community groups involved in projects.
2. We have published a set of responses
that are representative of the feedback we have received. The
paper is attached is part of this submission—the extracts
below are taken from the paper.
3. We have been asked to keep them anonymous
because criticism of Prevent means marginalisation and exclusion
from funding and partnership working opportunities, whereas "compliant"
organisations are facilitated and favoured.
4. PVE is underlying both of the leadership/chaplaincy
initiatives, and I have been increasingly shocked and appalled
at what I see unfolding… University Lecturer
5. Although I was supposed to be part of
the PVE scrutiny board after the first meeting…I didn't bother
going back as it paints all Muslims under the same brush. One,
which I am not comfortable with.
London Muslim councillor
6. I'm working on PVE in (a London borough)
under Community Cohesion, and to be honest, I didn't understand
the strategy until I came into post. It immediately raised my
own concerns of the agenda, but I was reassured by the council
that they are using the PVE agenda for "capacity building"
and promoting civic pride for the Muslim communities in (London
borough). However, the framework and nature of the agenda and
partnership working with Police etc, contradicts this…
Muslim Worker—Employed in Prevent funded
post in a London council
7. The chair of the group who is the council
lead, and the (Prevent Board) as a whole, were reminded repeatedly
at the monthly meetings that the issue of local narrative needed
to be addressed before the group could proceed. It appeared that
this was largely being ignored and that the council wanted to
proceed on delivery without meaningful discussion.
Council Officer—North England
8. …in (our borough), the there has
been no public consultation with the Muslim community and its
voluntary sector. The Prevent Programme Board has no Muslim voluntary
sector representation. In our area, Muslims are so ill informed
and badly organised that we cannot make our local authority accountable
to the Muslim community for such a sensitive area of work. This
is replicated across the country.
Muslim Voluntary Group
9.Many of the programmes are aimed at Muslim
women…the promotional material is deliberately misleading.
Nowhere does it say "come to this workshop to prevent violent
extremism". The aims and objectives are false. Even if those
delivering the projects believe they are trying to improve the
prospects for Muslim women (which is in dire need), they never
disclose the real aims, which come from the Prevent strategy.
Muslim Voluntary Group
10. Many women invited to workshops are
vulnerable…they do not need to come to a PVE workshop to
help themselves. Their more fundamental issues of education, mental
health, marriage and extended family relationships need addressing
first through community development initiatives rather than Prevent.
Muslim Voluntary Group
11. Participants (at Prevent projects) whether
young or old are not told why they have been invited to the workshop
or programme. They are systematically deceived. Most don't have
the analytical approach necessary to question the organisers and
ask uncomfortable questions like: Who funded this? What are the
aims of this session? Where will our feedback go? Why were we
invited? If they had an inkling of the Prevent Strategy—in
simple terms, many would turn on their heels and head home.
Muslim Voluntary Group
RECOMMENDATIONS
We believe the government needs to undertake
the following with the same robustness that it has with the Prevent
Strategy.
1. An-Nisa Society believes that the government's
Preventing Violent Extremism agenda (PVE) agenda and the Prevent
Strand of its CONTEST strategy is fundamentally flawed and discriminatory
and calls for it to be dismantled with immediate effect.
2. The government needs to facilitate the
Muslim third sector, which will then be able to communicate with,
and advise the government and service providers on behalf of genuine
grassroots Muslim communities without recourse to expensive and
ill-informed "experts" and consultants.
3. The government should cease linking community
cohesion, capacity building, community development and addressing
inequalities with PVE. This approach risks de-legitimising much
needed community building of the Muslim community. Security measures
should be separate and distinct so that there is no doubt as to
their objectives. As the Taxpayers Alliance states, "Skilled
policing and robust intelligence are the most effective ways of
tackling violent extremism. Funding projects carried out by community
groups is doomed to failure."
4. Addressing inequalities, social and economic
deprivation, social exclusion and fractured families as a common
goal for all communities will be more productive to building "resilience"
to social ills, including extremism of any type.
5. We believe the way forward is to engage
purposefully with underprivileged communities to ensure cutting-edge
services within communities to prevent grievances based on perceived
inequalities based on ethnic, religious or socio economic factors.
6. A public debate needs to be held on the
crisis in our most vulnerable communities and how we need to address
this with sensible and just policies. There is general concern
nationally about young people in all communities, the breakdown
of families and fractured communities. Root causes must be investigated
and addressed.
7. Bring together Britain's diverse communities
to work to address the wider issues that are affecting all of
us including what is causing large numbers of young people, from
different communities, to feel hostile and alienated from society.
This will do more for community cohesion than anything else.
8. Rethink and reformulate the equality
and diversity agenda for the 21st Century. Review how communities
are identified and how needs are met to incorporate faith identity
and faith based needs.
9. Rethink its strategy towards the Muslim
community. It should cease dealing with the whole Muslim community
through the prism of anti-terrorism but rather as citizens who
need the support of their government and through mainstream strategies.
10. Ensure that the faith strand in the
Equality Bill is not diluted or removed. Furthermore, the faith
public duty should be elucidated in government guidelines in more
depth. The public sector lacks understanding of institutional
Islamophobia in the delivery of goods and services. There is a
need for comprehensive guidelines on faith equality for the public
sector.
11. Prioritise addressing Islamophobia and
Institutional anti-Muslim discrimination (Islamophobia) within
the public sector. A robust faith duty in the Equality Bill 2009 will
facilitate this.
12. Promote the mainstreaming of initiatives
targeting Muslims as a socially excluded community, as separate
and distinct from PVE, and make it core business. Prioritise community
development, community cohesion, social inclusion and capacity
building for the Muslim community through the mainstream. Set
targets in strategies and plans both nationally and locally so
that progress can be monitored.
13. Facilitate the building of local infrastructure
in the Muslim community, for example, through investment in the
development of a Muslim voluntary sector that will cater for a
wide variety of Muslims needs. The voluntary sector will then
have the capacity to formulate itself into community-led grassroots
local advocacy and consultative forums and eventually national
representative bodies. Such a programme will provide tangible
relief to distressed local Muslim communities and directly affect
their quality of life, increase engagement and give people a stake
in society as citizens and not as 'pariahs.' This will enable
the Muslim community to take the lead on its own issues and concerns
and engage on an equal basis.
September 2009
