House of Commons - Communities and Local Government Committee

Preventing Violent Extremism - Communities and Local Government Committee Contents

Memorandum from the Islamic Society of Britain (incorporating The Young Muslims UK) (PVE 61)

SUMMARY

The consultative strategy adopted by the Government in the aftermath of 7/7 was the right approach, but what became Prevent has created much more mixed feelings.

The Government's analysis of violent extremism has developed over time, and its latest thinking is not reaching people. Such analysis acknowledges a complexity but now needs a wider canvas of analysis. This must also be seen to happen.

Inconsistent and generalised language or loose terms weaken public confidence and hamper the debate around Prevent. In addition and more specifically, they also provide opportunities for Muslim Rejectionists at the grassroots.

Prevent funding marks institutions as partners in civic efforts for a safer, cohesive Britain, but the role of established organisations has been undervalued or poorly utilised. While Prevent funding has been a useful measure of directing resources and building capacity among some organisations, Prevent funding has also been seen to stigmatise the Muslim community on the one hand and, on the other hand, to alienate other communities, creating a potentially detrimental impact on cohesion.

There is inadequate differentiation between Prevent and other policy frameworks such as community cohesion, capacity building and integration. For example the twinning of the "shared values" agenda with Prevent risks a rejection of both by communities and confuses the shared values agenda with a security paradigm.

Confusion also affects local authorities, including local police, who in turn do not feel empowered to consider effective projects.

Communication across most levels has been ineffective and remains key. Central Government has been over reliant on local partners/authorities to carry Prevent "thinking" and aims, without it putting in place adequate support.

Genuine and sustained capacity building is key to a gradual shift for Prevent's broader aims to be realised in other important policy frameworks.

A. PREAMBLE: ABOUT THE ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF BRITAIN

1. The Islamic Society of Britain was established in 1990 after a process of dialogue and initiatives, all of which had a central aim: to inspire British citizens who belonged to the Islamic faith (and who were chiefly a post war migratory group of Asian descent) to live their lives in commitment to both country and faith without reservation or feelings of compromise. Individual members make up the Society. The Islamic Society of Britain was then, and remains today, an organisation that is focused on developing a British Muslim presence. It values dissent and free exchange of opinion amongst members, providing equal opportunities at all levels.

2. The purpose of the above brief description of the Islamic Society of Britain is to suggest it is suitably positioned to furnish this inquiry with perspectives that can help yield progressive policy frameworks four years on (from the 2005 PET Working Groups). This position may not seem so obvious today when a colourful array of Islamic organisations can be seen on many lists, but the Islamic Society of Britain has been a forerunner in several respects, for at least two decades. Indeed, the quest for and questions concerning integration, loyalty and cohesion were central drivers of our messages many years before such became common in our socio-political discourse.[66]

3. The Society's debates marked a turning point in Muslim discourse and gave countless individuals the impetus and confidence to participate in civil society. These included many members of the Society and many more individuals who had come into contact with it (or its youth section The Young Muslims UK). Many have gone on to make a positive contribution to the cause of democracy, policy, government and social cohesion. Others, both through the Society's works or independently of it, have added genuine value to the nation's social capital by being an important part of many concerns and projects—usually on a completely voluntary basis. Such giving of time, skills and energy has continued throughout "the PVE years". It is this rubbing of shoulders and sharing of notes with many gifted individuals that has given us what we think is valuable insight into the Prevent agenda.

B. PREVENT

4. From the outset of Prevent funding being available the Society has continually advocated a positive attitude to be adopted by Muslim institutions towards Prevent funding as it believes funding marks institutions as partners in civic efforts for a safer, cohesive Britain (so long as the Islamic teachings against greed, narrow interests and jealousy are adhered to).

5. We believe the consultative strategy taken in 2005, resulting in the PET Working Groups, was an admirable approach, and the right one for the time and for the circumstances. We believe that what became the Prevent programme, however, created a very mixed reaction among Muslim communities and the wider society. In some respects Prevent was a useful balance to Pursue, Protect and Prepare, in that Prevent was designed to be the "soft" and community orientated arm of the Contest strategy. However, calling the initiative Preventing Extremism has, in the minds of many, stigmatised Muslim organisations and the very partners that are needed to defeat extremism. The communication by the Government of such collaborative efforts between the Government and British Muslims, to Muslim Britain and to Britain at large was and remains a key challenge.

6. Terminology was a challenge in itself, and the outcome was to name the programme by its very aim. It seeked to prevent ideas (leading to violent action), and so it was named: Prevent. By its full title, "Preventing Extremism" and then a little later "Preventing Violent Extremism", it also sought to focus on the criminal act of violence and distance itself from the problem being a religious problem per se. Whilst we believe this direction was the right approach, it is questionable whether the term "Prevent" itself achieves that. The term Prevent lends itself to the idea that there lies a dormant terrorist within Muslims; that somewhere, entwined in their instincts and licensed by their religious beliefs, there is the possibility that some, albeit very rarely, will turn to terrorism against the state. And so we must do everything to "prevent" that from happening.[67]

7. Such can not only stigmatise Muslims, it can redirect attention to Islamic teachings being the identifying factor, and this has created vicious cycles of mistrust and demonising, in a language of otherness.[68]

8. The term "Violent Extremism" was however useful in drawing a clear line to separate general extremism from violent, criminal, terrorist acts—we believe this is a crucial distinction to be made across all levels of communication. However, the term did not always succeed in separating general extremist ideas from violent acts, and this is partly the impact of the action word "prevent". It resulted in a flawed logic that asked, "how do you prevent violent extremism?" and answered, "you go further back and stop extremism, because one (extremism) will lead to the other (violent extremism)". This is not only flawed logic, it is a dangerous logic in the hands of opportunists.

9. From early on, Central Government's communication streams were left wanting: the broader context of Prevent, the thought streams leading to the Prevent programme, the rationale for special funding and for attention to Muslims, the central aims and targeted people of the programme (Muslims), and how such Prevent "thinking" is to be differentiated from cohesion, equality and integration issues, all became difficult to separate out. The mesh of what Prevent is (or is not) became more entangled with time, as pressure for delivery built up on the desks of local government officers and local police officers, as well as on the ground. Even where staff had served the community for 20 years through their jobs, it was like an unknown in their job description had appeared overnight, and they were to be evaluated on their effectiveness. So much was unclear about Prevent and what it would mean to make it work.

10. Government offices leading the counter terrorism programmes did not build on the PET Working Groups through a creative series of direct communication methods and utilising technologies, that could have reached young Muslims in particular more speedily. Instead, Government placed an unrealistic emphasis on local service delivery and was over reliant on its (often Muslim) partners, without effective support. This played into the hands of Rejectionist thought, who would offer competing narratives of what Prevent was.[69]

11. This enquiry asks how robust the Government's analysis of the factors is? The question presupposes such analysis is knowledge that has been communicated. In our experience, what the Government thinks the factors are and what the Government's analysis of those factors is, remains unclear in the minds of local delivery partners, local police, mosques, and Muslims young and old. It may be found in official documents, but that has not been effectively communicated to most people. When such basic ingredients are foggy in the minds of most, perceptions and suspicious take root more easily, and the rejectionist discourse is offered an advantage.[70]

12. The Government has a fairly robust analysis of the factors, in that it acknowledges the complexity of factors, the limitations of any such analysis, and it steers away from simplifying the problem in its publications. But whilst the Government's analysis may be robust in terms of its realism, it is questionable as to whether the Government's analysis is based on a sufficiently wide view. The urgency of terrorism fears has naturally prioritised national security issues, the result of which means that the complex interplay of social, economic, historical, migratory, racial, educational and religious issues has been examined almost exclusively through the lens of national security. There remains however a narrowness in the scope of our analysis that needs our attention in order to enhance our understanding to date. In this respect, at least, there are no "terrorism experts", but a great many experts of many different disciplines who can and should help widen the canvas of analysis. Such widening must also be seen to happen.

13. The Government also acknowledges, in theory at least, that some factors, or paths into those factors, are not appropriately addressed through the direct application of the Prevent programme. It is this area which needs greater and closer analysis, workable channels of funding and support, and greater articulation as to the needs, aims and purpose of such support. In our experience, we encounter the reverse in practice: local delivery plans and subsequent programmes built on those plans seem to be eager to accentuate a Prevent dimension in order to "be prevent enough".[71] This stretching of project designs in order to make them worthy of Prevent consideration can lead to hit and miss results for the central aims of Prevent. Moreover other project proposals that can achieve the very forms of indirect inoculation from hate messages that Prevent is seeking to achieve, do not receive due attention because they may not "be prevent enough."

14. Such selective analysis of what can and cannot be considered based on a narrow assessment of its Prevent merits, and not on its impact on the identified factors (even where the project proposals are supported by academic research) points to the mistaken thinking in our view that, whilst a complex interplay of factors can lead people to become involved in violent extremism, the Prevent programme is the most appropriate means to address those factors—it isn't necessarily. There is then, inadequate differentiation between what should be achieved through Prevent and through other important policy frameworks. And yet the need for a dedicated Prevent fund is justified, and so is its spending on vulnerable Muslims—the underlying problems and associated risks to the state remain.

15. If the aims of Contest through the Prevent strand are to be more achievable, Government has to communicate a clearer distinction between what Prevent is aiming to do and what other policy frameworks are aiming to do, all in line with the overall aims of creating a more integrated, safe and secure nation. This requires, not necessarily, the negation or downgrading of Prevent—which brings a vital sense of balance and pragmatism to the hard-edged facets of Contest—but a more concerted and visible effort to address the many issues of integration and social cohesion, together with, but distinct from, Prevent. Government must also communicate, more directly, more clearly and more creatively,[72] its broader analysis of the factors and its approach to addressing the problem of violent extremism. In so doing, the Government must communicate more clearly (especially to local delivery arms and partners) that some factors will take more time and a sustained progression of initiatives to yield results—but are no less important.

16. The challenges of communicating are exacerbated with what seems to be a steady decline in the general public's trust in the Government, politicians and those in charge generally (a decline that accelerated with the War in Iraq and later the downturn in the economy). Such perceptions are arguably more acute in sections of British Muslim thought. Moreover, the thorny subject of the impact that "foreign policy" issues have or are allowed to have has, for many Muslims, received a poor amount of attention in the Government's communication. Notwithstanding "Contest 2" adding more meat to the bone to enhance our understanding of terrorism, views of Government insincerity in this area are widespread.[73]

17. There has been inconsistent communication as to whether the Government is concerned with and targeting extremism per se in its counter terrorism discourse. Similarly, the loose term "Islamist" has been used inconsistently, despite clear and widespread anxiety from British Muslims from the street level up.[74] Furthermore,

the Government's own analysis shows that the general public cannot adequately differentiate between terms such "Islamism" and "Islam" in public discourse. This leads many to see the Government as acting much less on a robust analysis of the factors and much more in response to periodic political pressure. The logic of preventing extremism per se is not only flawed, it is seriously damaging to trust and cooperation and to defeating the terrorist's narrative. Tackling extremism per se (which is impossible to define and a relative term) through the Prevent programme will malign orthodoxy and conservatism, both of which are common given the migratory patterns of British Muslims. The impact will have several negative effects including exacerbating a sense of victimhood, triggering a defensive attitude and fuelling the call of rejectionists.[75]

18. The Government should communicate more clearly its focus on terrorism by turning away from imprecise terms that attach themselves to the core of Muslim communities. We are seeing a gradual shift in the right direction, but this is insufficient and needs more effective communication.[76]

19. Trust is also eroded by suspicion that arises from what are viewed as conflicting or inconsistent signals from Central Government, that have stemmed from the Government seemingly picking and dropping its working partners in an "out with the old, in with the new" fashion. Accordingly, arousing suspicion in this way creates further negative undercurrents as a critical eye is cast upon chosen Prevent fund (or other counter terrorism fund) recipients. Established institutions, both small independents and larger organisations, have tended to be surprised by previously unheard of names receiving grants on the one hand, and established voluntary bodies not featuring even in consultation. The meteoric rise of some organisations, "out of nowhere" and lauded uncritically by some Government departments in the eyes of the Muslim public, would be one example. Such episodes add weight to feelings of a general bias in overall fund recipients. A perception has developed that while some organisations have to fill in forms and show due diligence (quite rightly) in attaining grants, other favoured organisations are simply "given money" to spend and in some considerable sums.

20. As Government has looked to get to the heart of local communities, and find new working partners—both of which we feel are positive aims—it has not been very successful in getting the feel good factor across concerning fund recipients generally, a factor that is an important component of public trust. The delivery partner mix between the "tried and tested" and the "fresher" organisations was not well balanced in our view. This resulting imbalance could be partly explained by an emergent narrative that undervalued the role of larger organisations and/or the influence of periodic attempts to pressure and sway government thought wholesale away from organisations with a certain heritage.[77] Because so much rests on a basic framework of trust and cooperation, this imbalance ought to be examined as we move ahead and the perceptions of bias need to be tackled through.

21. Overall, and onwards from the terrorist attacks of 2005, there is little doubt that, building on the PET Working Groups, Prevent has yielded a range of important initiatives that have also given voices to and energised different parts of Muslim Britain. The establishment of a national women's advisory group, a young Muslims advisory group and MINAB are positive collaborative outcomes for civil society and for Muslims in particular, notwithstanding their shortcomings. Much positive can also be said of the many beneficial and constructive projects at local community levels. In some cases, established networks or programmes could have been utilised, where a good track record for delivery and a reputation for transparency exists.[78]

22. Whilst numerous projects may have got off the starting blocks, and whilst the willingness within local communities remains high, the general capacity level across local communities is far from adequate. The Prevent programme hit the ground running but, on that ground, many were unskilled. This is one main reason, we believe, for the sustained success of the Islamic Society of Britain because it is where ordinary people can stay, work alongside and gradually develop skills and capacity, all on a completely voluntary basis. The projects Prevent funds made possible need to develop self-sufficiency skills, as they cannot, and should not in our view, be over reliant on Prevent funds. Prevent therefore ought to develop strategies to help projects and organisations it has identified as partners, and others it will identify, to build know-how and capacity.[79] Key areas to support would be marketing, internet solutions, cash flow and cost control, equalities policies, incorporation and constitutional development, etc. These support structures can yield real benefits as they "teach a man to fish". Such provisions will also, over time, distinguish the walkers from the talkers.

23. There is a tremendous amount of readiness latent within social networks that can be found within traditional mosques and among women (who can rarely be accessed through mosques), within voluntary sector organisations and in countless young people. Genuine and thorough capacity building is key to the combined activism that will sustain a gradual shift for the broader aims of Prevent to be realised within other important policy frameworks.

October 2009

See also "British Islam": UK Government Policy to create a new religion (12 July 2009) at http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/resources/issues-explained/-british-islam-uk-government-policy-tocreate-a-new-religion.html More strident versions were distributed at over one hundred British mosques on Friday afternoons, when mosques are typically full to the brim. The timing and repetition of these kinds of messages will coincide with alarmist news and announcements. The primary effect is to knock the confidence of the Muslim public in the Government and its delivery partners (especially its Muslim partners).

"Many Muslims I've talked to about these issues are deeply offended by the use of the word… "Islamist" to describe the terrorist threat we face today… There's too much denial of it in the Muslim community. But our efforts are not helped by lazy use of language. Indeed, by using the word "Islamist" to describe the threat, we actually help do the terrorist ideologues' work for them, confirming to many impressionable young Muslim men that to be a "good Muslim", you have to support their evil campaign."

66 In 1995, when tensions were very high (post Rushdie; massacres in Bosnia), and during a period when British radical and/or rejectionist thought took root and began mushrooming: Hizb-ut-Tahrir's strident rejection of parliamentary democracy and calls for a supremacist superstate, the establishment of a "Muslim Parliament" by pro-Iranian activists, the rejectionist dogma with a call to emigrate or isolate from a society of disbelievers by Saudi-Wahabbi led organisations, the call to arms to defend the honour of "our sisters in Bosnia" (who were being mass raped) by departing for war or supporting the fight financially-these examples set the scene during the early 1990s; it was the Islamic Society of Britain who, riding above hostile criticisms thrown at them of "compromising" religion and allowing men and women a "westernised" freedom, took the case for the full participation in the democratic processes to the debating floor, culminating in a well publicised London Conference. The case was won for mosques and mainstream institutions, as well as for citizens, who all remained suspicious of the various rejectionist ideas but found themselves in a state of mental paralysis. Back

67 Using the example of an analogy to help explain this, consider the merits, cooperation level and stigma attached to all men in a national "Preventing Rape" programme that sought to channel "pathfinders" through the general male public, in order to reach and disrupt the very few men who would rape a woman. Back

68 3 The core term Prevent is necessarily negative language and by way of an example, the City Council of Leicester adopted a more positive take in naming their PVE campaign "Mainstreaming Moderation". Back

69 Rejectionism is not the same as extremism and, like extremism, does not lead to violence as a rule. It seeks to undermine a discourse on integration and social cohesion, by repelling it with religion based arguments. Political rejectionist language will feed off a perceived sense of victimhood or notions of a hidden agenda. Rejectionism can therefore reach and affect both religious and non-religious Muslim minds to create mental barriers in attitudes towards the Government. Back

70 See Hizb-ut-Tahrir's "What does Kelly mean by a 'British Version of Islam'"? (13 April 2007) at http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/resources/issues-explained/what-does-kelly-mean-by-a-britishversion-of-islam.html Back

71 In one local council where a Society member was directly involved, the phrase "to be prevent enough" was routinely used by the police to reject otherwise workable ideas that would have a positive impact. Back

72 President Obama's Government for example has made concerted efforts to utilise modern methods to communicate directly at broad levels. Communicating the Government's analysis more clearly must not however be seen as telling people what to think. In this regard, the CD issued by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office aimed at Muslims was inappropriately titled "Think Again". As one recipient put it, "They're bombing the hell out of Iraq and asking us to think again!" Back

73 There remain, from the 2005 PET Working Groups onwards (Community Security Working Group: Recommendation 2, p.76), calls for a public inquiry into the terrorism of 7/7 and 21/7, with unsatisfactory explanations as to why such hasn't taken place. Back

74 David Cameron wrote on The Guardian's Comment is Free "What I learnt from my stay with a Muslim family" http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/may/13/comment.communities (13 May 2007): Back

75 Unlike peaceful conservative Muslims, rejectionists can appear visibly moderate (eg men clean shaven and in modern clothing) and so come across as not holding intolerant views, and would thrive under a focus on extremism per se. Back

76 "Contest 2" (2009) does not use the term "Islamist Terrorism" unlike the earlier Contest 1 (2006) which uses it throughout the main text, relying on a footnote to avoid a misunderstanding-a footnote is insufficient. Contest 2 also qualifies the use of the term "extremism", referring to violent extremism, religious extremism and domestic extremism. This is clearly better practice but neither document was or continues to be supported by effective communication. Additionally, despite many improvements in Contest 2, the Government's intentions raised suspicions when it said, "Government will… challenge views which… are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values" (p87). Back

77 Some of the individuals who encouraged the creation of the Society in 1990 were members of the Jamat-e-Islami religio-political party of South Asia. However, the Islamic Society of Britain is an independent British organisation that is also indigenous in terms of its ethos, thought and work. Back