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Memorandum from 1.1 Dorset Fire Authority has significant concerns about the FiReControl project. In summary, these are: § The commitment by central government to a major investment before the Business Case had been fully developed. § 'FiReControl resilience payments' which do not meet the Authority's own estimates of projected costs. § Financial assumptions which have changed from a projected saving of 30% to a cost to the Authority. § Significant delays in the delivery of the project with consequential impact on Fire Control staff. § Concern that any further delay to the project could mean that Dorset's cutover date will clash with the 2012 Olympics events in Dorset. § Loss of confidence in the ability of either CLG or EADS to deliver the project or provide the technological solutions to support the RCC or individual fire and rescue authorities. 2. FiReControl Business Case 2.1 The Fire Authority was disappointed that the Government chose to implement this project and commit the taxpayer to substantial investment before the Business Case had been fully developed. The Authority's own experience in seeking financial support for a major Government supported PFI project was that the sponsoring government department required a fully costed final business case before approving the provision of finance. This does not appear to have been followed in the case of the FiReControl project. Members of the Authority felt that because the Regional Control Centre had been completed and the main system contract awarded before the Business Case had been finalised, they would have little choice but to accept what is in effect a fait accompli. 2.2 The Authority wrote to the Minister at CLG responsible for the Fire and Rescue Service in October 2008 and reminded him that: § Final commitment to the project will not be made until the Full Business Case (FBC) is published and the legal obligations of best value have been satisfied. § The Authority reserves the right to withdraw from the local authority controlled company (LACC) at any time. § The Authority will not agree to long-term financial or contractual obligations entered into by the LACC, e.g. the lease of the RCC, until it is satisfied that the proposal to deliver a service through the LACC is justified. § The Authority will not agree to move its operations into the Regional Control Centre, either in principle or in practice, until it is satisfied that both operational and financial requirements have been met. 2.3 The Fire Authority's primary concern is that the Regional Control Centre will cost more than the current Authority's own Fire Control and this is detailed in section 3 below. 3. FiReControl Resilience Payments 3.1 The Fire Authority failed to understand why fire and rescue authorities should bear the cost of national resilience. If fire and rescue authorities were building or installing new Fire Controls they would not be installing the level of resilience that is specified for this project. That is a central government decision and it was the Authority's view that central government should bear the cost of that national resilience. The Authority considered that the best way to do this would be for CLG to calculate the extra cost of the resilient aspects of the project, e.g. increased costs for the building, the FM contract and the infrastructure services contract, and to make those payments centrally. 3.2 Previous versions of the Business Case proposed that any shortfall in costs between current Fire Control centres and the proposed Regional Control Centres would be met through a payment to regions rather than directly to individual fire authorities. Although this was changed in the last version of the Business Case so that the payment would be in the form of a 'FiReControl Resilience payment' direct to fire authorities, this fire authority is not convinced that the proposed payment is correct. It believes CLG has overestimated the level of cashable savings authorities will actually achieve by closing their control rooms and has underestimated the true costs to the fire authorities after cutover. Some of these costs relate to activities which will be required after cutover, including operational liaison, performance and contract monitoring and data management. The Business Case makes only limited assumptions about the resources required to support these functions. 3.3 The Fire Authority's other concern on costs is the duration of any resilience payment as it had been suggested this would only be for three years after cutover. The Government has stated "this should not be interpreted necessarily as a point of cessation as the principle remains that no FRA should be in a financially worse position that they were prior to their move to the RCC." Whilst the Authority should be reassured by this statement, it will continue to press for these payments to remain for as long as there is a potential deficit. The Authority will also want to ensure that the payment is not absorbed into revenue support grant (RSG). As Dorset is at the 'floor' for revenue grant settlements, any payment included within RSG will be lost in the revenue grant formula. 3.4 At the 2009 Fire Conference on 13 May 2009, the Fire Minister stated, "We can say with confidence that no FRA will be out of pocket because of the move to FiReControl." The Authority remains to be convinced that this will be the case. 4. Financial Savings 4.1 Members of this Fire Authority were extremely disappointed that the 30% savings anticipated at the start of the FiReControl project have evaporated. In February 2007, during a visit to the South West, a senior civil servant stated that based on the likely cost apportionment model, the region would realise savings of 20%. 4.2 When Part 1 of the Full Business Case was published in July 2008, it became clear that based on its estimates of the steady state costs of operating the RCC and the cashable savings from closing its existing control room, the Authority would face increased annual costs. Although this been recognised to some extent by the 'FiReControl Resilience payments' referred to above, the Authority is still disappointed that the anticipated savings have failed to materialise. 5. Delays to the Delivery of the Project 5.1 Staff in the Authority's Fire Control were informed in 2003 that Dorset's call handling and mobilising function would transfer to a regional control centre as early as 2005 and they would consequently face redundancy. Successive delays to the project have been particularly unsettling for staff who are expected to maintain their commitment to the Service whilst being unable to make plans for their future. This group of staff are extremely loyal and totally committed to the values of the Service yet they exist in an environment of uncertainty and doubt. 5.2 There is now significant delay in the delivery of key elements of the project. This has made forward planning by the Service difficult due to the uncertainty of the scope and functionality of the solution that will be supplied. The Authority now has serious doubts that the current cutover timescale will be achieved. Any further delay will only increase the anxiety being felt by both current staff in Fire Control and those seconded to the Service's own project team. 5.3 There is still considerable ambiguity about certain areas of the project. This includes how the Regional Control Centre will operate and interact with the Service, the timescales for delivery of key enablers and the requirements that the Service is expected to meet during the transition period and after transfer of its operations. This hinders the Service's ability to plan for the future and to know how the Service will ultimately be affected by the project. 6. 6.1 Dorset will host all the sailing events for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. It essential for the Service to have resilient call handling and mobilising facilities before and during the games in the event of a large multi-agency incident. 6.2 If the project
timescales were to change yet again, consideration would need to be given of the
potential clash in the transfer to the RCC and the Service's involvement in the
2012 games. In view of a potential
multi-agency exercise 12 months before the games themselves, the Authority has
determined that any cutover date between July 2011 and the end of the games in
September 2012 would be unacceptable and this could affect 7. Confidence in the Project 7.1 Dorset Fire Authority is becoming increasingly sceptical that the FiReControl project will actually be delivered, at least in the form which is currently proposed. It has asked officers to consider alternatives to the Regional Control Centre, including retaining the existing facilities, moving to a collaborative solution with a partner authority (including potentially another emergency service) or establishing a sub-regional solution. 7.2 The Authority's scepticism has been prompted by the late delivery of key products and the regular changes to the cutover schedule. The Authority is losing confidence in the ability of EADS to deliver the technological solutions which are an inherent part of the Regional Control Centre's concept of operations. The Authority has also lost confidence in CLG's ability to support the project and has doubts of the soundness of CLG's financial calculations. 8. Conclusion 8.1 The Fire Authority has no doubts that the FiReControl project has the potential to deliver benefits. The Mobile Data Terminals being provided as part of the Firelink project will enhance firefighter safety by providing key information about operational risks. The networking of the nine regional control centres will allow peaks in demand and large incidents to be managed more effectively. 8.2 The Authority is not convinced, however, that these benefits should be delivered through a prescribed national solution that provides an unnecessary level of resilience at considerable cost to the taxpayer. Most of the key benefits could have been met through local or sub-regional solutions combined with the provision of the national Firelink infrastructure.
January 2010 |