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Memorandum
from
1 Executive Summary · A sufficient level of resilience for the FiReControl project is yet to be demonstrated to the Surrey Fire and Rescue Authority (the Authority). · The
Authority needs reassurance that the technology will have sufficient currency
and provide at least the same comprehensive level of functionality that is
currently in use within · There is a lack of clarity and detail associated with the project, which is impeding local delivery of the transitional arrangements. · It
does not appear that the FiReControl project will deliver the financial savings
originally identified and it could impede the development of other efficiency
savings for · It is essential that central government retains a significant stakeholder interest in the long term governance of the FiReControl project.
2 Introduction 2.1 The Authority has been making preparations to transfer its mobilising control arrangements to the Regional Control Centre (RCC) as required by the Fire and Rescue Service National Framework 2008-11. 2.2 This position is only tenable on the basis that the benefits of the FiReControl project are delivered and no additional financial burden is placed on the Authority. 2.3 It should be noted that Surrey Fire and Rescue Service (the Service) had sufficient concerns regarding the potential for delay in the project to warrant investment in a new mobilising system. The previous system was installed in 1994. This has been operational since 2nd December 2008 and combined with advanced mobile data technology this means the Service already has access to all of the projected benefits of the FiReControl project and is working with another FRS on the same system to develop a reciprocal fallback solution.
3 Areas of Concern 3.1 The Authority requires total confidence that the FiReControl solution has end to end resilience prior to transfer of undertakings. This is currently difficult to assess as there is insufficient detail associated with the project implementation plan. For example, there is no clarity on the fallback arrangements (the third way) or the proposals to adopt the 46 disparate networks currently in use by the participating Fire and Rescue Services (FRS).
4 Technological 4.1 The
delays to the project could result in the delivery of out of date technology
against the initial specification. As previously mentioned, the Service believes
that it already uses technology in advance of the specification being provided
by the FiReControl project and the Authority would be reticent to relinquish
these facilities. For example, demountable mobile data terminals are used for incident
command support, data capture, community safety education and language
translation within
5 Project Detail 5.1 It is noted that the FiReControl project has already been subject to delays but it is has not been apparent what has caused them. In order to be reassured, the Authority requests transparency as to the reasons for these delays and other variations to the project plan. 5.2 There is also a lack of detail relating to the requirements being placed on FRSs. These include requirements for data provision schemas, ways of working action plans, minimum attribute levels, etc. 5.3 The lack of and delays to published guidance on proposed Service - RCC technical interfaces is delaying local development on the project. 5.4 Without a greater level of project detail, it is difficult for the Service to undertake the work required to support the transition plan.
6 Transitional Arrangements 6.1 Although the Service has taken steps to ensure the resilience of existing mobilising control arrangements, delays in the project are increasing the risk associated with staff retention until cutover. Further slippage in delivery of the FiReControl project would exacerbate this risk and clarity regarding the central provision of funds to cover these costs is required. 6.2 The implementation of FireLink phase C ahead of the FiReControl project could lead to a loss of functionality to the Service of access to risk critical information and a dynamic mobilising capability, which is outlined in the Surrey Integrated Risk Management Plan. A contingency for this will need to be developed and is likely to create additional cost which, under the circumstances, the Service is naturally unwilling to bear.
7 Financial 7.1 The cost of the solution is also a key concern, initial indications from the Chief Executive of South East Fire Regional Control Centre Ltd (SEFRCC) are that the staffing numbers proposed centrally may not be adequate and a proposed enhanced staffing level has been circulated for consultation. It is difficult to accurately ascertain appropriate staffing arrangements until the end to end solution is seen to operate and the detailed ways of working and contingency arrangements are finalised. 7.2 This is coupled with a concern that the cost of residual activities that will stay within individual Services has been under estimated. 7.3 The updated FiReControl business case published on 6th May 2009 indicated a forecast saving of £70k for the Authority, taking into account the above factors it is a real concern that the actual costs will wipe out this saving and potentially create an increased financial burden. 7.4 The project is currently a barrier to exploring other options that could derive greater savings from collaboration with another Fire and Rescue Authority (FRA). 7.5 The long term funding for this national resilience capability should be adequate and transparent and should not increase the financial burden on the Authority.
8 8.1 The contractual arrangements regarding premises and infrastructure are currently between the Communities and Local Government department and the providers, with FRAs as end users having limited visibility and understanding of the potential risks. The potential change to the contract management to be via a non-departmental public body increases concern as to where these risks may be borne. 8.2 The continuation of central government funding and involvement in the long term governance arrangements for RCCs is considered essential to maintain national resilience arrangements.
9 The Way Forward 9.1 With the information currently available to the Authority it is not possible to judge whether the current project is the best way forward as the financial implications of adoption or abandonment cannot be judged. Reassurance regarding the resilience of the technical solution is impossible to gain as the end to end solution is yet to be provided. 9.2 The Authority is in the fortunate position of having identified the potential for delay and have refreshed the mobilising control technology. This leaves the Authority far less reliant on the delivery of this project than is the case elsewhere.
January 2010
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