Memorandum from Wiltshire and Swindon Fire Authority (FIRE 21)

 

Executive Summary

 

· The programme has extensively overrun its original timescale.

 

· It is now some 5 years late.

 

· This overrun is directly affecting the existing control room staff morale and impacts on management of this FRS.

 

· There is a loss of confidence amongst elected members, management and firefighters and a belief that it will not be successful.

 

· The concept was part of a much bigger plan at a different political timescale and agenda.

 

· It was over ambitious in its concept.

 

· There has been a lack of understanding of the technical hurdles needed to be overcome to ensure success

 

· This FRA has tried to help at all levels of the programme.

 

· There is a reluctance by CLG to accept the impact of the Out of Scope work

 

· The successful Wiltshire and Gloucestershire Tri-Service Control room models should be revisited.

 

· There is a possible way forward in using the SW RCC for Devon and Somerset FRS with dated equipment and control rooms

 

· This SW RCC could also provide resilient fall back to other FRSs in the SW region.

 

· The improvements in the FireLink programme are welcomed.

 

· Data handling technology such as Mobile data terminals and risk information transmission already exists.

 

 

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Progress with the project so far

 

1. The project was initiated by Central Government and, whilst this Fire Authority recognises the legitimate right of the (then) Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Department for Communities and Local Government to reorganise control rooms, we judge it is not acceptable for individual fire authorities to share the burden of continuing extensive delays with considerable impact on staff morale, additional workloads and expense which all falls outside any "New Burdens" agreement.

 

2. The financial outlook for Fire Authorities in 2010/11 and 2011/12 cannot bear ongoing costs of this project which will, if carried through to completion, be handed over to FRAs at some future point in time to fund.

 

3. This FRA has not changed its position since the last Select Committee in that it has yet formally to agree to voluntarily move its mobilising operation into the now completed South West RCC building at Taunton.

 

4. The ongoing delays from an original completion date of 2007 have meant continuing uncertainty and a considerable loss of confidence, which has had a serious impact on:-

 

(a) staff confidence and morale, leading to staff leaving the FRS's employment;

 

(b) an impossibility to forward plan in terms of staff likely to apply to work at the new SW RCC; and,

 

(c) a continuing loss of confidence by fire authority Elected Members, management and firefighters in the programme - the complete opposite effect of what was publicly intended and stated at the programme's onset.

 

 

The reason for the cost and time overruns which the project has experienced

 

5. The FireControl programme was intended to provide benefits in public safety, firefighter safety, national resilience, efficiency, interoperability and mobilisation of national fire assets (New Dimensions' appliances and equipment). This Fire Authority accepted all these original promises as a means to further improve the safety of the community and its firefighters in Wiltshire and Swindon.

 

6. The project was conceived at a time when regional government, regional management boards, regional fire authorities and fire & rescue services were part of the current Government's programme. The 2004/05 National Framework document stated in paragraph 2.3 that the Government was "committed to a regional approach where that is the most appropriate level". Following the North East referendum decision in November 2004, the political direction has changed and the 2008-11 National Framework document stated at paragraph 4.3 "whilst closer joint working at a regional level has a role to play in improving efficiency; Government has no plans to introduce a regional fire service". CLG has continued to try to deliver this unique project through a different political, governance and financial model - itself creating many of the reasons for the cost and time overruns.

 

7. The original stated expectation was a significant financial saving in the order of 30% - a figure which is now recognised as unattainable.

 

8. It was also originally stated that the FireControl programme would deliver a mobilising solution that was as good as or better than the equivalent FRAs' control rooms - a point to which I shall return.

 

9. Finally, the FireControl programme was stated as delivering a high level of resilience - again a point which will be referred to later.

 

10. This project was embarked upon, for the best of reasons, placing complete reliance on new (albeit unproven) information technology. Regrettably, there is a long history of such projects both in Government, for example in Defence and the NHS, and in the private sector, for example in the aerospace sector with the current example being EADS' A400M military aircraft project. Knowing that the required technology does not exist, it is so tempting for the politician leading to believe, with the time available due to other routine work, often likely to take a year or two, and that a solution will have been achieved, to overcome systems design and execution that are known to exist at the start of the project. Mr Micawber's approach, "hoping that something would turn up", was laughable in a novel but is devastating in modern industry but, because of it, the RCC project has failed to meet its deadlines and is now nearly half a decade behind schedule. The system still has not been fully designed, delivered and tested from end to end.

11. Criticism has been levelled at the project management and numerous changes of personnel involved - all of which have led to a continuing loss of confidence that this project will deliver any of the stated benefits to FRAs.

 

12. This criticism is not made lightly - of all English FRAs, Wiltshire and Swindon has contributed at SW regional and national levels to try and assist the project through professional advice from officers on many aspects, including the treasury functions of the SW project and political leadership at LGA level.

 

13. It has also become clear that the RCCs will not undertake all of the functions already carried out by existing FRS mobilising controls - leading to the "Out of Scope" project to assess what work would still be undertaken by individual FRSs under the new RCC arrangements.

 

14. It is quite clear that some means of data collection and monitoring of functions beyond 999 call handling will fall to individual FRSs and this will mean that staff will continue to be employed in some sort of "non-emergency" control room function, with the additional expense borne by individual FRAs.

 

What, if any, changes need to be made to the Government's plans for proceeding with the project?

 

15. This Fire Authority would submit that the experience of Wiltshire FRA in operating the Tri-Service Control room since 24^th March 2004 following considerable financial investment by this Government under its Invest to Save budget of £7.5 millions, now warrants revisiting as a possible model for future adoption. It is noted that, since the inception of the Wiltshire model and a very similar Tri-Service Control room in Gloucestershire, one Welsh fire and rescue authority has decided to copy some of these functions with a dual police/fire facility.

 

16. The Wiltshire Tri-Service facility has been independently audited by the Audit Commission and judged to be successful by its three constituent "blue light" services with resilience embedded until at least 2015 without further investment being required. This has always been seen as a long-term investment (circa 30 years' contract) and illustrates the forward thinking and innovation of previous Chief Officers and Elected Members at NHS Health; Police and Fire & Rescue Authority levels.

 

17. In particular, the expected advantages of placing all three "blue light" services under one roof have been realised, namely:-

 

· The ability to share information technology.

· The close professional working relationship between all three services.

· The "bespoke" construction of the building making it totally "fit for purpose".

· The very high level of resilience against business disruption incorporated in its construction.

· Dedicated "Gold Command" and "Silver Command" multi-agency rooms within the same building, able to undertake the strategic management of emergencies, whilst being physically close enough to liaise with operational commanders through the mobilising control room on site.

 

18. It is noted that the "resilience aspect" of the FireControl project remains an argument for its continuation. It is fully accepted that any mobilising control must have sufficient resilience incorporated into its design.

 

19. The Wiltshire Tri-Service control room has proved, over its operation in almost six years, that satisfactory resilience has been incorporated, with fall-back arrangements in the event of "spate conditions" and overload of 999 calls to firstly Avon FRS and now Gloucestershire FRS control rooms, with reciprocal arrangements whereby Wiltshire FRS can take any overload of 999 calls from those FRSs. Similar arrangements exist for the other emergency services and, in respect of Wiltshire FRS, a fall-back facility to Service Headquarters exists should the Tri-Service Control room have to be evacuated - this is frequently exercised and rehearsed as part of our Business Continuity arrangements.

 

20. In the continuing uncertainty of global terrorism atrocities, the need for even greater levels of resilience may be required.

 

21. Given the completion of the nine Regional Control buildings and using the South West as an example, these could be utilised to provide an even greater degree of resilience and fall-back than currently exists.

 

22. It is already accepted that some FRS have dated equipment and control rooms requiring extensive upgrades at considerable expense. Again, using the Taunton RCC building as an example, this could be utilised to provide dedicated command and control mobilising for Devon and Somerset FRS, whose own two control rooms are overdue for replacement, whilst also accommodating a "super resilient" fall-back arrangements for modern Tri-Service control rooms such as Wiltshire FRS and it is suggested that this model be explored as a similar arrangement for Gloucestershire and other FRS.

 

23. This situation, whilst improving still further the resilience arrangements, continues with the considerable advantages of a locally based mobilising control room, totally under the control of the FRA with its legal responsibility for receiving 999 calls under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 to make arrangements for dealing with calls for help, for summoning personnel and to develop mutual aid schemes with other FRAs. This approach would also maximise the advantage of locally based control room operators utilising their local knowledge for call handling.

 

24. Significant benefit is claimed for the improved data handling to be provided to fire appliances and officers through the FireControl and FireLink programmes. It is important not to blur the distinction in that the improved radio scheme has been required urgently for many years and is most welcome. However, other FRSs already provide mobile data terminals (MDTs) as a stand-alone system and, therefore, it is apparent that existing information technology, delivered through the existing control rooms, would still deliver an improved system of information to the incident ground, without reliance on totally unproven technology.

 

25. In summary, technology already exists to provide much of the claimed data improvements such as automatic vehicle location systems, MDTs. etc. Indeed, if the project continues to be delayed, individual FRAs will have to consider purchasing such equipment to ensure it fulfils its legal obligations in terms of firefighter safety - a subject attaining even more importance nationally with recent increases in firefighter fatalities and other events leading to inspections of FRAs by the Health and Safety Executive.

 

26. In conclusion, what is urgently required now is a proper, open and transparent review of the complete programme. This needs to include a frank reappraisal of the political, financial and governance arrangements now in place in which this regional programme was intended to operate.

 

27. Notwithstanding the ongoing escalation of terrorist activity and the need to maintain resilience in operating an emergency response, it can be argued that in almost six years of operation, the Wiltshire Tri-Service Control has not failed at any time, its resilience arrangements have worked and this legacy needs to be properly considered as a viable alternative which provides local control to protect its citizens and firefighters.

 

January 2010